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‘‘For human reason, without being moved by the mere vanity of 
knowing it all, inexorably pushes on, driven by its own need to such 
questions that cannot be answered by any experiential use of reason 
and of principles borrowed from such a use; and thus a certain sort of 
metaphysics has actually been present in all human beings as soon as 
reason has extended itself to speculation in them, and it will also 
always remain there.’’ (Critique of Pure Reason, B21) 
 
“…it is not at all [traditional] metaphysics that the Critique is doing 
but a whole new science, never before attempted, namely the 
critique of an a priori judging reason…”(Kant, Gesammelte 
Schriften, Vol. 10, 340) 
 
“The complete transformation which philosophical thought in 
Germany has undergone in the last twenty-five years and the higher 
standpoint reached by spirit in its awareness of itself, have had but 
little influence as yet on the structure of logic…logic shows no traces 
so far of the new spirit which has arisen in the sciences no less than 
in the world of actuality. However, once the substantial form of the 
spirit has inwardly reconstituted itself, all attempts to preserve the 
forms of an earlier culture are utterly in vain; like withered leaves 
they are pushed off by the new buds already growing at their 
roots…Now whatever may have been accomplished for the form and 
the content of philosophy [Wissenschaft] in other directions, the 
science of logic which constitutes metaphysics proper or purely 
speculative philosophy, has hitherto still been much 
neglected…Philosophy, if it would be science, cannot…borrow its 
method from a subordinate science like mathematics, any more than 
it can remain satisfied with categorical assurances of inner intuition, 
or employ arguments based on grounds adduced by external 
reflection. On the contrary, it can be only the nature of the content 
itself, which spontaneously develops itself in a scientific method of 
knowing, since it is at the same time the reflection of the content 
itself which first posits and generates its determinate character […] 
logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of 
pure thought. This realm is truth as it is without veil and in its own 
absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this content is the 
exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of 
nature and a finite mind [Geist].”(Science of Logic, Preface to the 
First Edition, 25-27, Introduction, 50) 
 
  
“Metaphysics has as the proper end of its investigation only three 
ideas: God, freedom, and immortality; so that the second concept, 
combined with the first, should lead to the third as a necessary 
conclusion. Everything else with which this science is concerned 
serves merely as a means of attaining these ideas and their reality. It 
does not need them for the sake of natural science, but instead to get 
beyond nature. The insight into these ideas would make theology, 
morals, and, through their combination, religion, thus the highest 
ends of our existence, dependent solely upon the faculty of 
speculative reason and on nothing else. In a systematic 
representation of those ideas, the suggested order, which is a 
synthetic one, would be the most appropriate; but in working 
through them, which must necessarily be done first, the analytic 
order, which inverts this one, is more suitable to the end of 
completing our great project, proceeding from what experience 
makes immediately available to us from the doctrine of the soul, to 
the doctrine of the world and from there all the way to the cognition 
of God.” (Critique of Pure Reason, B395; my emphases) 
 
“…philosophy has absolutely nothing at all to do with merely correct 
definitions and even less with merely plausible ones, i.e., definitions 
whose correctness is immediately evident to the representing 
consciousness; it is concerned, instead, with definitions that have 
been validated, i.e., definitions whose content is not accepted merely 
as something that we come across, but is recognised as grounded in 
free thinking, and hence at the same time as grounded within 
itself.”(Encyclopedia Logic, §99, Addition, 158) 
 
“Logic being the science of the absolute form, this formal science, in 
order to be true, must possess in its own self a content adequate to 
its form; and all the more, since the formal element of logic is the 
pure form, and therefore the truth of logic must be the pure truth 
itself. Consequently this formal science must be regarded as 
possessing richer determinations and a richer content and as being 
infinitely more potent in its influence on the concrete than is usually 
supposed.” (Science of Logic, Introduction to The Subjective Logic, 
594) 
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Preface 
 
This thesis is a study of the idea of “God” in the philosophy of Kant 
and Hegel. It focuses on this idea in order to clarify certain high level 
structural features of their views about the aim, scope, and character 
of metaphysics. In order to achieve this aim the thesis at different 
points occupies distinct perspectives on the question of what the 
structure and function of the idea of "God" in idealist logic is, and in 
so doing, it relies on the claim that this idea is itself one side of a 
dialectical pair, the other side of which is the finite, rational judging 
subject. Significantly, this dialectical metaphysical relation is 
correlated with another relation at the epistemological level; namely, 
that between knowledge of individual things and the systematic 
unity of knowledge of which they are a part.  
As a whole, this thesis constitutes an extended argument for the 
claim that in Kant and, in a different way, in Hegel, conceptual 
determination is that activity which involves mediation between 
judgments by rational subjects about individual things and the idea 
of a limit case that cannot be fully conceptually determined this way 
(“God”). Further, that this provides a ground for knowledge of 
individual things by situating them within a systematic unity. 
Another way of viewing conceptual determination is as an activity 
that, at least in Kant, extends in two directions without reaching a 
limit at either: maximal generality and maximal specificity. Neither 
the maximally general or inclusive (“the All”, or “the One”), nor the 
maximally specific and completely determined, may be represented 
and known conceptually. Both however serve as essential grounds 
and are instantiated as the ens realissimum (I here also use the term 
summum genus) and an empirical intuition (which is a representation 
of an infima species). 
Here, then, is one way to view Kant’s position: concepts do not 
reach either the upper or lower bounds of thought, but rather 
constitute the rational activity which reaches in two opposite 
directions simultaneously without coming to the limit of either. 
For his part, Hegel sees the difficulty with this view and insists 
that whilst Kant may be correct insofar as the dialectical 
development of conceptual determinations cannot ever be seen as 
complete (thus reaching stasis), it is nevertheless misleading to think 
one can separate a “given” intuitional material from conceptual 
activity, as if the intuitional material was there to be exploited in a 
way that makes it seem as if it were amenable to conceptual activity 
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whilst being separated from it by a gulf that could not in principle be 
crossed. 
A key part of the extended argument referred to above is the 
claim that any such rational activity, in both practical and theoretical 
dimensions, involves moments of both schematic and symbolic 
activity, where schemata are structures involved with saying and 
“directly” representing, and symbols “show” cases where the “ought” 
is satisfied in an “is”. This structure is that which allows, at least in 
Kant, for the mediation between singular thoughts and the 
purported ground of them all; in Hegel, I take it the schematic-
symbolic relation, although not articulated in the same way as Kant, 
is nevertheless pervasive and important for his critique of 
transcendental idealism. The consequence is that one can establish 
that the perceived relation between the finite and the infinite in both 
Kant and Hegel entails in each case a certain conception of rational 
activity. In particular, the logical triad of universal, particular, and 
singular, will be seen as an essential structural component of both 
idealisms in their respective theories of judgment and inference. 
A point of clarification is in order. Kant famously characterised 
the limited, finite, conditioned position of thought which, as a 
discursive understanding, has empirical knowledge of phenomena, as 
“the human standpoint” (A11/B24). This kind of discursive 
understanding reasons from the part to the whole, but never knows 
the whole. That is to say, for Kant, we cannot know the 
unconditioned: we cannot know things in an unconditioned manner, 
nor can we have unconditioned knowledge. This coordinates with the 
claim that “knowledge of God” is to be construed as knowledge of 
God as well as knowledge like that of a God. 
Kant contrasted this characterisation of “the human standpoint” 
with the idea of an “intuitive understanding” (CJ, 76-77), which, if 
such a hypothetical subject existed, would know noumena; that is, 
such would know things in an unconditioned manner and would thus 
have unconditioned knowledge. This kind of knowledge possessed by 
such an understanding (or, an “intellectual intuition”) would know 
the parts in virtue of knowing the whole. I take it this latter idea of 
an intuitive understanding, or intellectual intuition (I shall not focus 
on the difference here), is the philosophical core of the “Godly 
knowledge” or “knowledge of God”, and the ens realissimum, or 
“most real being”, is the “philosophical kernel of the idea of God” 
(Allison, 2004, 386). Thus an intuitive understanding is that 
hypothetical epistemic agent which would know the omnitudo 
realitatis (“all of reality”) in its perfection, thus as containing the 
11 
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perfections of all possible predicates, as the “most real being”, the 
singular ens realissimum. 
Under this way of thinking God's knowledge would be of God 
itself; in Neoplatonic terminology “the One” would know only “the 
One”, which would of course be an unsatisfactory proposition due to 
the fact that such knowing would require a division within "the One", 
whereby it could, paradoxically, only know itself in its act of knowing 
and could not thereby know itself fully. 
In any case, the way this idea plays out in idealist logic as a 
transformation of Aristotle's noesos noeseos noesos demonstrates 
how the idea of the finite and infinite perspectives relate to one 
other; the Absolute Idea, as the methodological remarks in that 
chapter in the Science of Logic reveal, may be regarded as a 
transformation of this Aristotelian idea of such “divine narcissism”, 
such that God ought not be regarded simply as "the One" which 
divides itself and produces itself by thinking only of itself, but rather 
"God" is only intelligible insofar as a community of rational subject is; 
thus, that these two ideas are internally related. Of course, given 
Kant's transcendentally ideal view of rational entities and his 
nominalism at the phenomenal level, the idea of a "One" being real, 
let alone able to “know itself”, he could not accept such a proposition, 
yet the idea is revealing for the alternative Hegel proposes. 
I take it the above interpretation of the hypothetical infinite 
epistemic agent, the intuitive understanding, is a reasonably 
uncontroversial interpretation of Kant's meaning which, moreover, 
justifies my interpretive choice to focus on the idea of "God". But 
what of Hegel? Here the case is slightly more complicated, and the 
structural difference in the relation between the human and the 
divine in Hegel is unique and foreshadows some of the conclusions 
drawn later in this work. 
Firstly, Hegel at many points rails against Kant's “metaphysics of 
subjectivity” on the grounds that he misconstrues the nature of 
reason by appearing to extrude it from the realm of actual human 
practices of reasoning. In Hegel's words from Faith and Knowledge, 
Kant's philosophy was an “idealism of the finite”, because Kant, 
Hegel suggested, had separated the finite rational subject which 
partakes of reason from reason itself, the result being that there was 
something that reason was separated from and therefore limited by 
(actual reasoning practices of reasoners!), thus making reason limited 
rather than unlimited, finite not infinite, conditioned and not 
unconditioned, and perhaps worst of all, more phenomenal than 
“mere” appearances. 
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At this point it is worth briefly digressing to note a complaint 
against this critique. I here set aside the objection that Hegel's 
quarrel was merely verbal, that his objection consisted simply in a 
stipulation about the meaning of “infinite” and related terms. 
Whatever the theoretical merits of Hegel's objection, the practical 
merits of his reformed vision of rationality are obvious: if one can 
expect to never have “true” thoughts by virtue of definitively failing 
to know “things in themselves” as well as failing to become 
satisfactorily moral, by failing to satisfy the demands of the moral 
law, then one must live with the guilt of human failure, with the 
gravity of perpetual disappointment. This line of criticism against 
Kant is well expressed by Stanley Cavell’s remark that much modern 
Western philosophy appears to labour under an illusory and 
existentially problematic “Rejection of the Human” (The Claim of 
Reason, p. 207). I take it one of Hegel's goals was to make coherent 
the idea of a supreme ground of reason, truth, and spirit that 
transcended individual rational subjects, but not all of them at once; 
that God was the “divine” ground of a self-mediating community that 
recognized itself in its other, whose subjects recognised themselves 
in their own norms, and which constituted truly rational autonomy. 
In Hegel's view, we need to reevaluate our rational activity as 
involving us as having a double aspect: we are both finite and infinite; 
we are finite in the sense of merely being an instance of the in-itself; 
that is, we are in a sense a mere thing. And yet we are also a case of 
that which is for-itself: we are able to self-reflexively form a 
perspective on who and what we are, which in turn provides us with 
the distance from ourselves required for us to form ideals which 
guide our life and action, some cases of which are ideals of ourselves, 
indeed, ideals that make us who we are. 
It is this latter perspective that leads Hegel to defend a stronger 
conception of freedom than Kant, for instance. But I am not focusing 
on freedom here, so I will restrict my claim to this: in Hegel, Kant's 
idea of “the human standpoint” is transformed from the idea of 
something finite and conditioned to something which is both this and 
its contrary; that is, for Hegel, we have a finite and an infinite aspect. 
This seems to simply run together Kant's dualism dogmatically, into 
a “monism” (yet we must take care with this word). How could this 
Hegelian critique be satisfactory? The trick is to be found in what 
Hegel does with Kant's idea of “God”, and the epistemic model of the 
intuitive understanding, or intellectual intuition. 
The idea of "God" is thematised in many places in Hegel's 
writings, yet the most important context for us at present is the 
13 
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following: the end of the “Spirit” chapter of the Phenomenology 
where Hegel discusses the dialectical relation between the judge and 
the confessor in the context of “the moral view of the world”. It is in 
this moral context that Hegel's complaint against Kant’s conception 
of a God from whom we are radically separated is clearest; Hegel 
claims that God exists in the shape of spirit of a community which 
comes into being where two (or more) subjects enjoy the kinship 
actualised in confession and forgiveness. It is this possibility of living 
one's norms which is necessary for the idea of “God” to make sense; 
Kant's error was to postulate a form of constraint that was 
unintelligible. Ask oneself, for instance: “What is moral perfection? 
What is unconditioned knowledge?”, namely: “What do we hear God's 
voice commanding us to do when we feel the moral law bearing down 
upon us in our conscience? And what kind of knowledge do we think 
we are in principle, and in metaphysical terms, incapable of?” 
Now, so conceived, “God” in Hegel, is an essential ground of the 
dialectic between what he calls the in-itself and the for-itself, because 
“God” expresses that ground of true mutuality and true community. 
Thus for Hegel “God” is still a dialectical pole opposed to the finite, 
rational judging subject, yet because he conceives such subjects as 
partaking of the infinite, he allows a moment of the divine within the 
human, and vice versa, as can be gleaned from his account of “the 
Son”, Jesus, as the second moment of the Trinity. 
The parallel with Kant is thus imperfect, because for Kant the 
idea of “God” is rendered as external to “the human standpoint”, 
rather than internal, as in Hegel's philosophy. But this imperfection 
is beside the point, for if there were complete agreement between 
Kant and Hegel there would be nothing to say. This thesis is 
therefore an extended defence of the above-described Hegelian 
reform of Kant. 
The overall picture that emerges is that both Kant and Hegel had 
quite novel views about the idea of “God” that, when examined 
closely, reveal some interesting features of their views of both 
theoretical and practical philosophy; and specifically, about the 
determination of the world through judgment and the determination 
of the will in action. Along the way, we encounter long neglected 
themes in their work that resonate with current concerns. These 
themes turn out to be interesting for their own sake, as well as key 
moments in idealist logic which reveal it to have some affinity with 
currents in epistemology, the philosophy of language and semiotics, 
as well as philosophical logic, meta-ontology, and epistemic modality. 
It is the view of the present author that much more can be done to 
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integrate such insights as emerge from classical German philosophy, 
in a way that would complement current interest in the prospects for 
an analytical Hegelianism.     
The work is in three parts. Chapter One briefly outlines the 
dialectic between the idea of “God” and “the human standpoint” in 
both Kant and Hegel, and explains why certain of the divergences 
between their views are connected in a deep way with fundamental 
differences at this level. The rest of the chapter offers a synoptic 
account of some contemporary disputes over the nature of the 
metaphysics conceived by Kant and Hegel. 
Chapter Two begins by detailing the different structures Kant 
claims exist at the level of the understanding and reason, 
respectively. It proceeds to offer criticisms of Kant that follow from 
his own position; it also offers elaborations of certain ideas present in 
Kant that, if developed adequately, stand to resolve these difficulties. 
The remainder of the chapter offers a reading of Hegel’s view of 
representational structure, firstly, in general, then secondly, at the 
specific level of cognition of “God”. This latter discussion goes some 
way to showing how Hegel could defend philosophical theology as a 
project without regressing to a pre-Critical view of metaphysics. It 
also acknowledges that Kant’s and Hegel’s views about “God” should 
be understood in close connection with their views about the nature 
of conscience. 
Chapter Three focuses narrowly on a principle employed by 
reason in its speculative use, as discussed by Kant in the 
Transcendental Dialectic, which was taken by him to generate the 
idea of the omnitudo realitatis (“All of reality”) and the ens 
realissimum (“the most real being”), where the latter is to be 
understood as the core of the idea of “God”. The structure of this 
principle is analysed and some crucial elements of Kant’s theory of 
judgment are explained in connection with it. A Hegelian dialectical 
exposition of the principle is offered by way of an evaluation of the 
idealist logical components that purportedly ground it. The result is 
an explanation of what “God” could not mean for Hegel. The final 
section of the work involves offering the skeleton of a positive 
account of what “God” seems to have meant for Hegel, where this 
entails an explanation of the connection between self-consciousness 
and its activity of determination. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One: Philosophical Theology, Philosophical 
Anthropology, and Metaphysics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
I Preamble 
 
Beatrice Longuenesse1 has proposed an interpretation of Hegel’s 
critique of Kant that concludes with an endorsement of the latter’s 
critique of traditional metaphysics by way of appraisal of his 
supposed comparative success at articulating the contours of “the 
human standpoint”. Importantly, the notion of a “human standpoint” 
has traditionally been conceived as what Hegel would call an 
“abstract negation” of the idea of “knowledge of God”, where the 
former is associated with a particular understanding of the concept of 
“finite” (“the conditioned”), the latter with a particular 
understanding of the concept of “infinite” (“the unconditioned”).2 
Hegel discusses this point at length in the Introduction to Faith and 
Knowledge: 
 
The fixed standpoint which the all-powerful culture of our time has 
established for philosophy is that of a Reason affected by sensibility. 
In this situation philosophy cannot aim at the cognition of God, but 
only at what is called the cognition of man…philosophy is not 
supposed to present the Idea of man, but the abstract concept of an 
empirical mankind all tangled up in limitations, and to stay 
immovably impaled on the stake of absolute antithesis…3 
 
I take it that an “abstract” view of negation refers to the idea that 
two concepts or things are contradictions or contraries of one 
another, and yet in addition, entirely independent of one another. 
Hegel conceives of this outlook as a product of the understanding 
which is overcome by reason.  
                                                 
1 See Longuenesse (1992/2007, esp. 216-217), 1995/2007, esp. 167 & 191), 
2001/2005, esp. 207-208). Although the first two papers were originally 
written in the early nineties the recency of their republication, in 
conjunction with the systematic reading that emerges from her entire 
oeuvre, gives the impression that the stance taken in the papers 
themselves would not differ radically from Longuenesse’s current view. 
2 See Kreines (2007, 323-324), where he acknowledges that Kant’s 
conception of finitude relies on a contrast with a certain conception of  
divine intellect, the conception of the both of which, in Hegel’s eyes, can be 
questioned. He claims that “Hegel’s initial example of knowledge of natural 
laws and kinds suggests that Kant’s basic distinction is rather a false 
dichotomy.”  
3 Hegel (1977a, 65). 
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It is a commonly held view that one of Hegel’s core innovations 
was to overcome the traditional understanding of negation by 
offering a dialectical account of it. His resultant view may be 
referred to as “symmetricalism” about negation.1 This view is 
manifest everywhere in Hegel’s dialectical philosophical approach; it 
is expressed by his famous phrase “determinate negation” and 
complemented by his concept of “sublation” (Aufhebung). By 
“symmetricalism” I mean a position that insists positive claims have 
no logical primacy over negative ones; that they are two sides of one 
discursive coin. Hegel’s particular version of this view is part of his 
rejection of positivism: the view that to each significant claim there 
matches sense-data of some kind (cf. Kant’s claim that matter is “that 
in the appearance that corresponds to sensation”).2 
The contrast between the theological and the anthropological is 
the core of the interpretive framework here employed, due to the 
fact that it brings into focus how Hegel attempted to overcome what 
he saw as the problematically dualistic image of human finitude to 
which he claims Kant was captive.3 I develop a reading4 that is 
sympathetic to many of Longuenesse’s broad interpretive claims, 
although I emphasise that Hegel’s account of “knowledge of God” 
(knowledge of God “itself”, as well as knowledge like that of God’s) 
differs in important ways from Kant’s.5 In contradistinction to her 
reading I claim that a proper assessment on this count stands to 
vindicate rather than damn Hegel. If this criticism is sound, 
significant consequences for assessments of Kant, and Hegel’s 
attempted critique of him, follow. 
Primarily, I claim that once one acknowledges Hegel was self-
consciously post-Kantian, an uncritically negative assessment of his 
endorsement of the human affinity for “knowledge of God” cannot be 
                                                 
1 On this view see Horn (1989). For a historical angle of the influence of 
such a perspective on negation, see Adams (2007). 
2 A20/B34. 
3 Of note here is Wallace (2005), in which his aim is to defend Hegel’s 
formulation of an individualism that avoids the standard pitfalls of modern 
secularised pictures of the human; ones that, in a merely compatibilist 
manner, offer a weak sense of freedom and self-determination in place of 
the theologically-funded picture of humans as strongly metaphysically free 
actors. 
4 Cf. Pinkard (1994, Chapter 6), Redding (2007b, 2008), Buterin (2011). 
5 For Kant, knowledge of the unconditioned is coextensive with 
unconditioned knowledge. Hegel would seem to agree, although he 
redefines such key terms.  
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sufficiently motivated.1 In particular, given that Hegel avowed to 
have completed Kant’s Copernican Turn by adding further 
dimensions to the latter’s critique of traditional metaphysics, I claim 
that his apparently flamboyant metaphysical claims about “God” and 
“Absolute Knowing” are to be understood more sympathetically as 
part of this overall transformation of Kant’s Critical Philosophy. (One 
should not underestimate the extent of hyperbole and metaphor in 
Hegel’s writings; contrariwise, one should not underestimate the 
confusion engendered by affixing the word “mere” to the front end of 
“metaphor”, even when speaking of Hegel’s penchant for vivid turns 
of phrase.)2 In short, one must be cognisant of the fact that an 
adequate account of Hegel’s idea of “God” is necessary for 
understanding the conception of metaphysics he endorses, and 
therefore his philosophical project as a whole. 
One must here be reminded that, for Hegel, the idea of “God” is 
the “form” and “content” of the three forms of Absolute Spirit (art, 
religion, and philosophy); he explicitly identifies “God” with Absolute 
Spirit in the Logic,3 which when combined with his identification of 
that work with “the exposition of God”4, would mean the work is an 
exposition of “God” at the level of philosophy. Although Hegel is 
always warning his readers to avoid being satisfied with brief and 
programmatic statements, which, as such, are abstract and not 
“true”, at some point one needs a perspective from which to interpret 
his intentions and there is simply no better perspective to take than 
the ones he explicitly provides his readers as a guide. 
                                                 
1 Cf. Pippin (1989, 7): “Just attributing moderate philosophic intelligence 
to Hegel should at least make one hesitate before construing him as a post-
Kantian philosopher with a pre-Critical metaphysics.” Unfortunately, 
Pippin characterises Hegel’s view as a form of anti-realism (99, 262 n.15, 
and 267 n.23) and this simply confuses the issue since it saddles Hegel with 
a highly general label that may not illuminate his way of thinking at all, but 
rather obscure it further. What, after all, is anti-realism? One then needs to 
explain this, and it is not easily done. 
2 See Pinkard (2002, 264-265). Pippin (1989, 82-83) also acknowledges 
this point in the context of a discussion of Hegel’s “identity theory”. I take 
it that the same point pertains for Hegel’s talk of “the Absolute”. See 
Kant’s remarks about “absolute” (as in, absolute possibility) at A322-
323/B379-380 in “On the Concepts of Pure Reason”). 
3 See the explanation of this in the introduction to the “Objectivity” 
section of the Subjective Logic, where Hegel compares his conception of 
“God” with the traditional rationalist idea of the “sum-total of all realities”. 
4 Hegel (1969, 50). 
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The Hegelian descendent of Kant’s critique of metaphysics should 
thus be understood not as a simple rejection of metaphysics, but, in 
truly Hegelian fashion, an attempt to offer a more “adequate” 
conception of it. This is well recognised. We ought then to speak of 
Hegel’s “dialectical exposition” of the concepts of metaphysics, 
rather than his “critique” of them.1 Consequently, Hegel’s conception 
of “God” is not be understood as a metaphysically inflationary, 
transcendent version of Kant’s God that is “infinite” in a sense 
abstractly opposed to Kant’s conception of human finitude.2 Hegel 
provides the materials for a much more complex and philosophically 
interesting idea of “God” than this. 
Overall, three basic assumptions which ground suspicion about 
Hegel’s attempts to reform Kant’s dualistic position can be 
questioned: (i) The assumption that Hegel accepts Kant’s pietistic 
Christian idea of “God” and conception of “knowledge of God”/“Godly 
knowledge” and, therefore, endorses humanity’s affinity for Kant’s 
conception of the latter; (ii) the assumption that this—Kant’s—
conception of “God” and “knowledge of God” is at best philosophically 
superior or, at worst, philosophically neutral. Upon reflection, it is 
revealed simply to be theologically dogmatic, relative to a quite 
specific Christian religious view and, further, critically undeduced; 
thus it is a serious blindspot for Kant, given his general aim of 
critiquing metaphysics. 
Attention to these two assumptions leads to the revelation and 
then rejection of (iii): the assumption that the conception of “the 
human standpoint” and “knowledge of God”, with which Kant’s 
                                                 
1 Longuenesse (2007, 4 & ff.) acknowledges that this point is more than 
terminological when she cautions against the idea that Hegel’s “critique” of 
metaphysics—the title of the book to which her reading under scrutiny 
here belongs—would be of the same variety as Kant’s. One should bear in 
mind here Hegel’s objection to critical, transcendental philosophy, as 
expressed in the Introduction to the Science of Logic. His view is that such 
philosophical accounts of epistemological principles or foundations resemble 
attempting to learn to swim before getting into the water (Hegel 1991b, 
§41, Addition 1., 82), and are furthermore akin to the event of being “shot 
from a pistol” (Hegel (1969, 67)). These statements express Hegel’s 
rejection of epistemic, semantic, and ontological forms of foundationalism. 
2 Such an idea of “God” is akin to Spinoza’s, rather than Hegel’s; it is 
isomorphic to reality considered as “the One”, qua singular object. Of 
course, one of Hegel’s initial moves here would be to say that such an idea 
is incoherent at least because such a “One” could not know itself, for if it 
could it would have to implicitly distinguish itself from its thinking of itself, 
which would make it non-simple and therefore not “the One”. 
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contrast between “conditioned” and “unconditioned” is correlated, is 
philosophically uncontroversial; therefore, that Kant’s conception of 
“the human standpoint” is philosophically neutral or unproblematic.1 
Crucially, it is the last assumption—(iii)—that grounds 
Longuenesse’s (among others’) overarching endorsement of Kant’s 
philosophy.2 Revelation of its difficulties rewards one with a fresh 
view of both Kant and Hegel and paves the way for an extension of 
Longuenesse’s claims in her doctoral dissertation Hegel et la 
Critique de la Métaphysique. It also makes headroom for further 
engagement between ambitiously reconstructive readings of both 
philosophers, such as Robert Brandom’s reading of Hegel, and more 
textually faithful interpretations. After all, as Longuenesse notes, 
such an extension would lead to a position that bore a family 
resemblance to Brandom’s interpretation.3 This is a further 
motivation for extending to Hegel Longuenesse’s focus on the 
“capacity to judge” (Vermögen zu urteilen) in Kant. 
Despite the fact that many view Kant as at least partly successful 
in his articulation of the contours of the so-called “human 
standpoint”, it is argued that if there is anything deserving this name 
it ought to be viewed as historically grounded and mediated by a 
complex process of the kind detailed in both the Phenomenology of 
Spirit and the Science of Logic; therefore, that it—“the human 
standpoint”—is more accurately accounted for by the conception of 
(self-) consciousness implicated in Hegel’s dialectical logic, rather 
than the egological conception of subjectivity recommended by 
Kant’s transcendental logic. The basis of this claim is essentially the 
same as that which grounds enthusiastic interpretations of the post-
Kantian Hegel: whilst Kant’s Critical Philosophy shifted 
                                                 
1 It is not necessary to here exhaustively catalogue extant and 
otherwise possible Christian interpretations of God. It is sufficient to say 
that Hegel does not endorse knowledge of the “God” of which Kant grants 
rational faith since it is this God which more or less fits with the traditional 
metaphysical, or Transcendental Realist, conception. Part of the point is to 
see that even though Hegel allows for “knowledge of “God” he is not 
thereby committed to knowledge of something that would be similar to 
knowledge of medium-sized dry goods, such as gumboots, possums, and 
roof tiles. Appreciating this point is fundamental to understanding Hegel’s 
“cognitive contextualism”: according to him not all consciousness, 
intentionality, or knowledge has the same dialectical-logical form. (The 
term “cognitive contextualism” is from Redding (2007a).) 
2 See Ameriks (1985, 1991, 1992, 2006), Guyer (1993, 2000) for some 
prominent defences of Kant against Hegel’s criticisms. 
3 Longuenesse (2007, xix). 
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metaphysical questions from the level of “being qua being” to that of 
“being qua thought”, he nevertheless stopped short of adequately 
deducing and expositing the logical functions of judgment and the 
categories, as well as the nature of reason, and it is first and foremost 
these shortcomings that Hegel sought to remedy in his own 
theoretical philosophy. 
In particular, Hegel saw Kant’s neglect of such exposition as 
particularly urgent in the case of the ideas of reason, “God”, and the 
infinite; an attitude expressed strongly in Faith and Knowledge and 
later in the Science of Logic, most memorably in his equation of the 
content of the latter work with the “realm of truth” (understood as 
the realm of logic), as “an exposition of God as he is in his eternal 
essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind.”1 In fact, this 
work should be read as a meditation on the implications of that 
difficult remark, itself supported by one of Hegel’s comments made 
elsewhere: “[P]hilosophy has no other object but God and so is 
essentially rational theology.”2  
Two brief sections follow the present one. In §II I respond to 
quietism about matters theological by considering the significance of 
this kind of talk for idealist logic. This is crucial, since if one is to 
defend either Kant or Hegel one must understand how their 
philosophies amount to varieties of philosophical theology, however 
radical that project might be for them. 
This discussion feeds naturally into a brief cataloguing of the 
range of prominent and relatively recent interpretations of Hegel’s 
metaphysics, in §III. In this section I make explicit some of the key 
conceptual distinctions upon which interpreters rely when taking a 
stand as to whether Hegel’s critique of Kant’s Critical Philosophy is 
either sound, or viable as a philosophical view on its own terms.
                                                 
1 Hegel (1969, 51). 
2 Hegel (1975/1988, 101). 
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I take it that those interpreters who feel sympathy with the outlook 
of Kant or Hegel (or both) also recognise that the distinctive feature 
of modern philosophy is a concern with subjectivity. If one thinks 
both that Kant and Hegel were concerned to promulgate a 
metaphysics of subjectivity, and also that something like such a 
project is viable, then one is inclined to locate them within the 
landscape of possible positions such that they are assessable. 
It is easy to see that Kant was committed to a certain theory of 
finite, conditioned cognition; unfortunately, less attention is 
expended on the fact that he was by implication committed to a view 
of what the idea of “God” was, given his view of what 
“unconditioned” thought would be. This is simply a way of saying 
that for Kant—and Hegel also—the metaphysics of subjectivity is 
committed to a certain position within philosophical theology.1 It 
follows that anyone who takes seriously Kant’s or Hegel’s 
metaphysics of subjectivity must also take seriously their 
philosophical theology. However, to those interpreters of Kant and 
Hegel who are also mindful of certain philosophical developments 
that have occurred since then—i.e., Left-Hegelianism, 
Nietzscheanism, Logical Positivism, and Late Wittgensteinianism—
the idea that one should tie issues connected with theoretical and 
practical subjectivity to theology is bound to seem egregious.2 
If one notices the connection between the metaphysics of 
subjectivity and philosophical anthropology the connection is clearer. 
                                                 
1 It would be misleading to say that philosophical theology is connected 
with objectivity in the same way as philosophical anthropology is connected 
with subjectivity. There is nevertheless something to this. We come to the 
issue in Chapter 2, §II.iii when discussing symbolic representation in Kant, 
as well as Hegel’s view of the role of rational norms (ought-to-dos and 
ought-to-bes) in imparting objectivity. 
For a contemporary attempt to defend the centrality of “ought-to-dos” 
and “ought-to-bes” in a theory of normativity, see Sellars (1963, 1969). 
2 For early dissent, see Schopenhauer (1958/1966, xxvi): “my philosophy 
is certainly not so ordered that anyone could live by it. It lacks the first 
indispensable requisite for a well-paid professorial philosophy, namely a 
speculative theology, which should and must be the principal theme of all 
philosophy—in spite of the troublesome Kant with his Critique of 
Reason;although such a philosophy thus has the task of for ever talking 
about that of which it can know absolutely nothing.” 
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Once anthropology itself becomes a philosophical inquiry, rather than 
an empirical investigation into human culture, one cannot avoid the 
question of how the finite thinker and agent, which an 
anthropomorph presumably is, is to be related to what it is said to 
not be able to know (the unconditioned; how things look from spatio-
temporally uninhabitable points of view) or do (the morally perfect; 
be everywhere in the universe simultaneously). Suppose that the 
account of subjectivity given in philosophical anthropology does not 
pertain so much to the species homo sapiens, which is, after all, a 
biological concept, but rather to persons: beings capable of knowing 
as well as acting purposefully. It is clear that one’s views in this 
arena will entail certain dialectical opposites: what the agent cannot 
know and what the agent cannot do (presuming persons are agents). 
I think both Kant and Hegel saw that this minimal commitment is at 
the core of the project of modern philosophy, if such philosophy is 
concerned with the metaphysics of subjectivity. 
This is a way of saying that being concerned with the metaphysics 
of subjectivity commits one to a contrast between the subject’s point 
of view and the idea of that which is not conditioned in this way. One 
way of dealing with this issue is to claim there is no single contrast 
between a conditioned subjective point of view and the 
unconditioned; one can say there is a simply a plurality of possible 
perspectives whose conditions are environmental, or linguistic, or 
whatever. However, it is clear that both Kant and Hegel are 
committed to the binary distinction, albeit indifferent versions, and 
they express it in terms of the contrast drawn above between “the 
human standpoint” and “knowledge of God”, or “the finite” and “the 
infinite”. 
In order to be convincing, rather than merely dogmatic, one needs 
to consider why philosophy should regard religion and theological 
claims as more than the manifestation of psychological delusion; one 
needs to take seriously the idea that they might say something about 
what it means to be a self-conscious agent.1 It is worth noticing, 
however, that if the anthropological stance is taken toward religion 
this does not invalidate the worth of studying its philosophical 
significance: not all explanations are debunking explanations. Such a 
stance might nevertheless recommend to investigators a more 
                                                 
1 I acknowledge the possibility of doing this, although it is not to the 
point here. See, for example, Freud (1989), or the New Atheism of Harris 
(2005), Dawkins (2006), Dennett (2006), Hitchens (2007a). The latter work, 
especially Hitchens’s, builds on the classic Russell (1957/2004). Cf. the 
range of views in Hitchens (2007b). 
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empirical methodology than hitherto practiced. Importantly, such an 
approach might be closer to the individual-focussed methods of 
psychoanalysis than quantitative methods encountered in social 
psychology, for instance. Even were this the case it is not clear that a 
defender of a philosophically anthropological account of “God” would 
be immediately committed to saying the idea of “God” is under such a 
view a mere “projection of human essence” in the manner of 
Feuerbach.1 After all, therapists who prefer conversational 
treatment over sheer medical prescription are thereby committed to 
thinking such treatment works and that it is somehow superior, and 
perhaps not simply because sufficiently fine-tuned chemical 
treatments haven’t yet been synthesised. It is hard to see on what 
grounds such individuals could think this without thinking expressed 
ideas have causal power much as chemical substances do; indeed, 
that in some cases the former, suitably employed, are a more 
appropriate medicament than the latter. 
Another consideration here arises. One must also ask how the 
idea of “the human being” is to be established: by a priori or a 
posteriori methods (i.e., philosophically, or, for example, 
biologically)? If it is the former, can this stipulation escape triviality 
on pain of deciding what counts as an actual or valid human 
experience? And in any case, shouldn’t such a stipulation rest on 
thorough empirical investigation into what conditions human beings 
flourish? Or, into what conditions that lead human beings to become 
mindful of certain existential concerns, such as ethics and religion 
themselves? 
Even if this approach were taken, it seems it would amount to no 
more than a description of the circumstances under which such forms 
of human life emerge. One possible attitude toward such a topic is 
quietism. Such an attitude is motivated by the questions: “Why talk 
about “God’ anyhow? Being, say, an atheist, can I not simply say that 
I have no response to so-called ‘religious’ matters?” Further: “What 
kind of concept is ‘religion’ anyhow—upon what basis is one 
grounding philosophical investigation into certain language-games or 
social tendencies? Why should I be forced into taking a position on 
something in which I take little interest and whose dogmatic 
presuppositions I reject?” And additionally: “Why should I be told 
dogmatically that the idea of my being self-conscious, and the idea of 
me responding to norms, and having a picture of myself as a free 
rational agent who is also finite, requires an appeal to theology? 
                                                 
1 See Feuerbach (1957). 
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Why, in short, insist that theological and anthropological discourses 
come in dialectical pairs?”1Notice that the sentiment expressed here 
might also motivate rejection of a systematic philosophical account of 
finitude (human and otherwise), to which the Hegelian claims the 
idea of “God” is wedded. 
What gives bite to such an objection to the supposed necessity of 
an idea of “God” or “religion” is that opponents of the objection 
cannot escape forcing onto it a thought it regards as foreign; that is, 
the quietist can seem convincing because it may appear very 
reasonable to say: “I don’t have opinions about all possible language-
games one might play, or all possible cultural practices one might 
engage in; consider the fact that one does not typically define one’s 
worldview by whether or not one believes in the Green Cheese 
Moon, or whether or not one chooses to say the concept of the 
Cthulhu is significant, or whether a certain ineffable emotion felt at 
                                                 
1 One can think this if one wants, but a thorough explanation is called 
for. Just because Kant set up an epistemic, semantic, and ontological 
dichotomy on its basis does not mean it must be accepted. Further, one can 
be recognisably Kantian or Hegelian without buying into the specific 
conception of the language-game proposed in these terms. The issue boils 
down to this: if one has insufficient reason to believe the entities spoken 
about in a certain vocabulary are doing any serious work that could be 
better done in another fashion, one can say the discourse should be viewed 
in other terms. Note that whilst one might characterise this appeal to 
“work” as an appeal to “evidence”, the latter term can be epistemologically 
neutral: it can very well refer to the general process of finding out if what 
one is talking about makes any sense. One does not need to be saddled with 
an empiricist epistemology in order to find the objection compelling. 
Here the explanation would be a debunking one which could not be 
resisted by exclaiming that it doesn’t matter, if one has no compelling 
reason to speak about the entities the discourse refers to, because the 
“proper methods” for ascertaining if they exist have shown they do not.  If 
one does this (as some expressivists and pragmatists have), one can say 
that the discourse should be understood “from inside” in terms of the forms 
of life in which it occurs, and perhaps therefore be appraised for the 
consequences it has. But then one is giving a pragmatic defence of it. Now, 
Kant indeed offered a pragmatic defence of the pure concepts of reason in 
the Appendix to the Dialectic, yet he there spoke only of the idealist logical 
employment, for theoretical inquiry, of the concepts of the soul, world-
whole, and God. There is at this level no talk of religion. I shall restrict this 
thesis to speaking about these entities, rather than religion per se, since 
the former is philosophically more fundamental and, indeed, grounds the 
latter. 
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sunset on the third day of every month is worth taking seriously as a 
guide to life.” 
Here are two broad responses which the Hegelian or Kantian 
opponent of the quietist position can choose: 
 
(1) Note that varieties of what are called “religions” are 
widespread phenomena that occur in most human communities 
in some form. Concede that they might share family 
resemblances without being expressions of some identical 
underlying phenomenon. Insist that studying theological and 
religious claims nevertheless has some philosophical and 
“anthropological” value: it reveals to us certain natural needs.  
(“Natural” here can be regarded as equivalent to whatever 
one can, in principle, study empirically. Notice that studying 
something empirically is not at the outset claimed to involve 
any particular research methods, other than the obvious 
requirement for hypothesis testing, which includes 
falsification as an “in principle” possibility; the matter is much 
more complex.) 
Notice that this response need not advocate a theory of 
“human nature”. It simply needs to point out that the 
investigation is grounded in our shared natural, biological 
heritage: this is all the reason we need for investigating a set 
of phenomena in a uniform manner and expecting to discover 
rules or laws. But saying the investigation is grounded on this 
is far from saying the topic of investigation is necessarily 
reducible to its ground. This is blatant confusion. 
The basic claim the Hegelian is making here is as follows: “Not 
all studies of things that we ought to call ‘natural’, in the broad 
sense just mentioned, are to be conducted in the manner of 
what is called ‘natural science’. The possibility, in principle, of 
falsification via hypothesis testing is present in historical and 
interpretive work, although in a different way: interpretation 
of the significance of human actions in the past or present is 
subject to rational evidence—what claims one can make and 
be seen to be on solid argumentative ground. 
This latter variety of inquiry is the relevant one for 
philosophy; therefore, for explaining the idea of ‘God’ in 
philosophical theology and religion.” 
 
Or, somewhat more strongly: 
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(2) Insist dogmatically that the idea of a conditioned/finite view of 
the world for us humans is intrinsically connected to its 
antithesis: an unconditioned/infinite view. Then say that our 
finite view of things is necessarily to be contrasted with the 
antithesis, represented by “knowledge of God”.  
Now, if this is insisted upon dogmatically, the quietist can ask 
what is meant by “the human standpoint” and “knowledge of 
God” and then judge whether either of these would ever 
apply. Yet if they decide that some version of “the human 
standpoint” is to be accepted, they can go on to suggest that 
this idea needs to be employed in the right kind of 
investigation, i.e., in some empirical study of “human nature”, 
in order to be roughly intelligible.  
The quietist’s view here is that we cannot simply say there is 
some coherent conception like it in “ordinary” usage. This 
appears to repeat the mistake of the theists/atheists that hold 
to a transcendental realism, since the post-Kantian agnostic 
looks like they are stipulating that everyone has some idea of 
“the human standpoint” and “God” and that, therefore, these 
ideas are innocent and therefore up for theoretical grabs. Yet 
the post-Kantian has only so far pointed to the empirical fact 
that a statistically significant portion of individuals believe 
that there is some viable version of either of these two ideas. 
But, as always, believing, even in the case of ideas, does not 
make it so: a single individual could claim to guide their life 
with an idea yet fail to be convincing as to why such an idea 
was indispensable; the question is whether the issue is merely 
statistical. Moreover, we can be misled and judge poorly in our 
case as to what causes us to be as we are and think as we do. 
In any case, the error is demonstrable in this case by showing 
the lack of a coherent meaning for the idea of “God” or “the 
human standpoint.” Do these ideas have “meaning” in 
anything but a trivial sense? I.e., one that is tied to confused 
metaphysical assumptions? 
Again, the Hegelian will insist that the issue is a priori, not a 
posteriori; the claim will be that understanding our own 
epistemic situation requires some ideal (which Kant insisted 
was merely regulative) which is to be regarded as an essential 
part of what it means to have a point of view at all. The 
Hegelian would most likely go on to say that failure to accept 
this is a consequence of failing to understand the dialectical 
character of consciousness. For Hegel, the quietist would 
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simply be in denial, or, insufficiently aware of the 
presuppositions grounding the dialectic inherent in their own 
thinking. 
The basic response to the quietist would go this way: “Whilst 
you recognise that there might be some statistically significant 
proportion of individuals who have some religious or 
theological beliefs in “God”, you fail to recognise that the 
appropriate method of studying such a phenomenon is not 
necessarily the method of natural science (assuming this is 
sheer dogmatism). Rather, the appropriate method is a priori 
reflection of the logical structure of the ideas involved and the 
data for this reflection can be garnered from particular 
empirical instances where alternate conceptions of “God” are 
manifest. Once you acknowledge that there is an interesting 
phenomenon to be studied you have only to decide what the 
appropriate way of studying it is. I claim that philosophical 
reflection is an essential feature of well-formed inquiry into 
the idea of “God” because a priori reflection consists in 
clarifying ideas that are actually employed.” 
 
The common view expressed by both responses is that some basic 
distinction is at play when making claims about the metaphysics of 
subjectivity and one way to frame this is in terms of a contrast 
between “the finite” and “the infinite”. We now need to consider the 
attitude to metaphysics one can plausibly impute to Hegel, such that 
the present question of what it might mean to speak of “God” can be 
rendered a little clearer. 
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Much recent Hegel scholarship has concerned itself with the nature 
of his metaphysics. Some nod at current conventions in saying1 this is 
justifiable due to the revival of analytical metaphysics in the past 
forty years or so; others acknowledge the issue is important given 
both the Hegel revival and his recent warm reception in some 
analytical circles.2Given the opaque and contested character of both 
metaphysics and Hegel’s writings it is important one draw attention 
to certain general obstacles to an unambiguous account of either.3 
This is here done in a summary fashion and not intended as an 
exhaustive guide to either enormous topic; we here focus on elements 
relevant to the core of the present work. 
One can cover the basics quickly; there are disputes as to 
whether: 
 
(1) Hegel is/is not a metaphysician 
(2) Hegel is/is not post-Kantian 
(3) Hegel is/is not a historical relativist 
(4) Hegel is/is not a hermeneuticist 
(5) Current analytical philosophy is/is not a chapter within 
Hegel’s dialectic 
 
Clearly, these disputes presuppose answers to the questions: 
 
(1*) What is metaphysics? Namely, how should we characterise 
it? (One’s answer to such a question reveals a lot about one’s 
attitude to the nature of inquiry. “Does it have an essence? And 
what would that be?”) 
(1**) What does Hegel think metaphysics is? Are there not 
merely different metaphysical theories (e.g., Platonism, 
                                                 
1Stern (2009b, 2). See Stern (1990, 114-119) for an account of Hegel’s 
appropriation of Aristotle’s noesisnoeseosnoesis(which is tied to the 
former’s account of “God”) distinct from the approach here. 
2For a critical perspective on the revival of metaphysics see Chalmers 
(2009). The Hegel revival in analytical philosophy is usually attributed to 
scholarly work such as Pippin (1989) and Pinkard (1994), as well as 
reconstructive work that pays lip service and actual debt in different 
measures: Brandom (1994),  McDowell (1996). 
3 I here express agreement with Kreines (2006) as to the importance of 
removing verbal disputes from Hegel interpretation. 
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nominalism), but different ways of being a metaphysician; some 
better (post-Kantian) and some worse (pre-Kantian)? 
(2*) What is it to be post-Kantian? (What is the nature of Kant’s 
philosophy?)  
(3*) What is it to be a relativist about ontological matters? 
(4*) What is hermeneutics; what theory of subjectivity and 
objectivity does an interpretative stance toward human thought 
and action itself presuppose? What success of this is a 
consequence of the success of Kant or Hegel in some area of 
another? 
(5*) What is the project of analysis itself about (i.e., what are its 
semantical and epistemological presuppositions)? 
 
This range of highly general questions provoke controversy, and it is 
by no means clear exactly how they all bear, or ought to bear, on 
one’s reading of Hegel. This is the case especially given the 
concessions made in our Preface as to the question of interpretation 
itself (especially of a philosopher not of one’s time). I do not presume 
to respond to the questions themselves, but here rather sharpen the 
significance of one’s responses to them by pointing to jargon 
frequently employed in current Hegel scholarship. 
Some of these pieces of jargon are contained in the claims above 
(metaphysics, post-Kantian, relativism) and some are not (mind-
in/dependent, real, limit, finite, infinite, condition, un/conditioned, 
etc.). I take it that jargon in the first group is best clarified by saying 
a little about the kinds of terms in the second. I think the most 
problematic of these in the current context are “mind 
(in)dependent”,1 “real”, and “condition”; therefore I shall focus on 
these three terms and say what I think needs to be said in order that 
a general picture of the main issues can emerge. 
                                                 
1 See for example Stern (2009a, 75). Stern recognises the possibility of a 
verbal dispute where it is presumed by some that realism (in the current 
sense; whatever that means) and idealism (in the classical German sense; 
indeed, whatever that comes to, exactly) are opposed. Unfortunately, Stern 
capitulates the confusion by insisting the appropriate way to frame the 
issue is as one concerned with Platonism and nominalism, but this issue is 
for Kant and Hegel (and for any philosopher with a keen nose) inextricably 
tangled up with the question of “mind-dependent”/“mind-independent” 
entities, precisely because the metaphysical and epistemological issues 
cannot in their eyes be separated. 
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In recent work, Kreines, Redding, and Stern have engaged in 
explicit attempts at clarifying some of the issues I have so far raised.1 
The basic issue seems to be this: once one takes seriously Hegel’s 
claim to be completing Kant and yet still doing metaphysics one feels 
bamboozled and is inclined to insist: “Kant dispensed with such 
inquiry by showing how it was confused!” Yet this answer is clearly 
superficial since both Kant and Hegel professed to be doing 
metaphysics; thus disputes over the attribution of a metaphysical 
project to either philosopher turn out to be verbal. This immediately 
leads one to ask whether the metaphysical project endorsed by 
either Kant or Hegel is satisfactory on its own terms; this in turn 
leads one to clarify the basic terms upon which their philosophical 
vision depends. The full measure of this task is as big as explaining 
both of their entire philosophies, although one can immediately rule 
out what one should not say these terms mean to either of them. It is 
upon these generalities that the framework for the rest of the work 
builds. 
A natural way to illustrate the meaning of “mind-independent” is 
to apply it to things one thinks would exist whether or not anybody 
thought of them. Obvious candidates are objects like rocks, trees, and 
possums. Contrariwise, a natural way to characterise “mind-
dependent” is to include under its heading things such as values, 
secondary qualities, numbers, and norms. But it is immediately clear 
that both sides of the distinction presuppose a correlated explanation 
from the other side: trees, rocks, and possums are things about which 
one can have thoughts and are accessed by things with minds in their 
being thought about; therefore one’s grasp of what these things are 
is dependent upon the nature of one’s mind (and the minds of others 
with whom one discourses about such things).  
On the other side, it is obvious that one can give an account of 
what the mind is doing in a way that does not depend simply on one’s 
own mind: one can study from a behavioural, neurophysiological, and 
socio-psychological standpoint the correlations which values, 
secondary qualities, numbers, and norms bear to other things. 
Clearly neither of these one-sided attempts needs to capture the 
whole story; it is sufficient if they tell at least some of the story 
which cannot be told in the same way from any other standpoint. 
A common way to frame this issue is to draw a contrast between 
“natural facts” and “institutional facts”,2 but this sharpens the 
                                                 
1Kreines (2006, 2007, 2008a), Stern (2009a), Redding (2010). 
2 Cf. Anscombe (1958), Searle (1995, 121) and Williams (2000, esp. 6). 
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instrument to deal with the problem, rather than constituting a 
solution; the sharpening, if combined with a certain metaphysical 
dogmatism, can result in equating the former with things about 
which one is a “realist”, the latter with things about which one is not 
a “realist” (say, an “anti-realist”). But this is unhelpful, since it 
presupposes an unambiguous explanation of what these two so-called 
philosophical positions amount to. 
If one reflects upon the reason for this distinction the general 
issue emerges: inquiry begins by assuming there is something whose 
universal type or individual token merits explanation. One then 
attempts to formulate an explanation on the basis of an ad hoc 
assumption that the thing exists. Consider the assumption within 
biology that animals are to be spoken of as if they were beings some 
of which are conscious and emotional, unique categories meriting the 
employment of certain explanatory structures, and not to be thought 
of merely as masses of electro-chemical activity no different from 
things that are not conscious and emotional. The distinction between 
“human science” and “natural science” may be rough and ready 
rather than sophisticated, but it marks a more basic and important 
difference: the distinction between the first- and third-personal 
perspective that is ineliminable for a self-conscious being. 
Once one gets this far one sees how Kant and Hegel could be 
committed to some kind of ontological difference at this level, 
regardless of what one thought the metaphysical flavours of their 
projects are. Indeed, Kant’s metaphysics is that of an “a priori 
judging reason” (roughly correlated with “institutional facts” insofar 
as such things are the product of thinking and reasoning). One must 
then ask if the “metaphysics of being” makes sense as a project, for it 
does not in any way coordinate with “natural facts”, in either Kant’s 
or Hegel’s view. Indeed, the “metaphysics of being”, in Kant’s view, 
is a confused project that is committed to transcendental realism.  
In Hegel’s view, such a project can initially be shown to be 
radically confused by thinking through the dialectic of “Being” and 
“Nothing”, as he does in the Logic. Moreover, and most 
advantageously, in Hegel’s view the logic of “Being”, along with the 
logic of “Essence”, finds its truth in the fully-fledged dialectical logic 
of subjectivity: The Subjective Logic. In other words, in Hegel’s 
view, talking about “Being” turns out to presuppose self-
consciousness, as well as a whole system of thinking, the form and 
content of both of which, taken together, is to be identified with 
“God”. 
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Hegel’s view can therefore turn out to sound like a radical anti-
realism about all facts; as if all facts were institutional facts. But one 
need not buy this simplistic distinction; it may work for some cases, 
but there is no reason to accept it as a one-size-fits-all distinction. 
For his part, Kant can certainly sound like an anti-realist that insists 
thought itself has an essential structure; Kant can seem like a 
metaphysical realist about the structures of subjectivity and a 
metaphysical anti-realist about the world. This is unhelpful, however, 
since Kant often sounds like a metaphysical sceptic: he insists that 
one can talk about certain universal and necessary structures of 
which thoughts possessed, but is careful to deny that one can draw 
inferences about empirical matters from them (except insofar as such 
matters can only be thought of in terms of said universal and 
necessary structures).Clearly the most pressing case here is that of 
the judging subject, insofar as it may also be thought of as a natural 
object. 
As a consequence of this, “mind-(in)dependent” does not seem to 
be a useful label to apply when speaking about Kant and Hegel 
because both philosophers reject the metaphysical dogmatism upon 
which it is based: that one can make a distinction between what is 
“Really Real” and what is “real, but not Really Real”. This follows 
from a rejection of transcendental realism: the idea that there is 
some single vocabulary within which all metaphysical truths can be 
stated. 
Given the foregoing discussion, the concept of “real” merits no 
further brow sweat, because it least initially requires a more detailed 
explanation in terms of the concept of “condition” (or “limit”). We 
turn now to this latter concept. 
It is accurate, to an extent, to portray Kant as a philosopher of 
conditions; his transcendental philosophy, after all, is based upon the 
idea that one can enumerate “conditions of the possibility of 
experience” as well as “conditions of the possibility of a systematic, 
unified reason”. Yet in speaking of conditions one invites talk of that 
which is unconditioned, hence Kant’s commitment to talking about 
rational entities such as the pure concepts of reason, and the 
necessity of speaking of something which appears if one can speak of 
“appearances”.1 
                                                 
1Bxxvi-xxvii: “even if we cannot cognise these same objects as things in 
themselves, we must at least be able to think them as things in themselves. 
For otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that there is an 
appearance without anything that appears.” Boldface in translation. Below 
this Kant draws his distinction between “thinking” about “cognising”, 
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Hegel sees how this dualism is self-defeating. As early as 1802, in 
Faith and Knowledge, he claims that since by Kant’s own lights the 
rational entities necessary for guiding the understanding in its 
systematic joining of judgments into unities, as well as rational 
concepts of “moral perfection” purportedly required for moral action, 
are limited by the possibility of their empirical actualisation, the 
realm of the unconditioned is as phenomenal as the realm of the 
conditioned.1 
Another one of Hegel’s ways of stating this is to say that Kant’s 
“infinite” is actually rendered “finite”; that his philosophy is “an 
idealism of the finite”.2 One could say that empirical realism is never 
adequate to the non-empirical and this may be partly correct, but 
also deeply misleading. It is misleading because it creates the illusion 
of two separate realms that do not come into contact and yet 
somehow are in harmony. In thinking this through one seems the 
common theme in Western metaphysics in everything from the 
mind/body problem to Platonism/nominalism, to free 
will/determinism: some phenomenon (consciousness; the relation of 
the universal to the particular; the relation of action as cause to 
action as caused) is separated in two and then viewed as problematic, 
but problematic in a way that is guaranteed, given the terminology, 
to defy solution. 
One way to view Hegel’s solution is to see him as saying that 
Geist is a phenomenon that needs to be understood as containing 
certain complex structures that can reflected upon by a self-
conscious being, and that this can be done in a way not dependent 
upon the empirical results of natural science. Or rather, there is no 
need to assume that empirical science is the appropriate area of 
inquiry within which to deal with such issues.3 
                                                                                                                            
where the former can venture anywhere within the realm of non-
contradictoriness, yet the latter must “prove” something’s possibility, 
either “by the testimony of experience from its actuality or a priori through 
reason”. 
1Hegel (1977a, esp. the Introduction). 
2Hegel (1977a, 64). 
3 Sometimes I do not translate Hegel’s term “Geist”. In other cases, I 
translate it as either “mind” or “spirit”, depending on context. Although 
consistency is usually ideal, the plastic nature of the term warrants special 
treatment.  
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I Preamble 
 
This chapter has two complementary expository aims: (1) key 
features of both Kant’s and Hegel’s theories of “representation” are 
explained such that, (2), the significance of their views regarding the 
representation of the idea of “God” can reveal some deep structure in 
their respective idealisms. This deep structure is that to which we 
referred in Chapter 1 when signalling Kant’s and Hegel’s different 
views of the way in which reason is “unconditioned”, the sense in 
which it does or does not have “limits”, and, therefore, the sense in 
which we can speak of an “inner” and “outer” of the realm of the 
“thinkable” or “knowable”.1 
It will be explained what is meant by “representation” as our 
discussion progresses. Because it bears a distinct sense depending 
when it is used by Kant, Hegel, or contemporary philosophers, one 
cannot presuppose a given definition at the outset. 
We explore some of the key structures that, according to Kant 
and Hegel, are involved in “thinking” and “knowing”; specifically, we 
explain what their accounts of the related structures reveal about 
their general views regarding conditions and limits. As we shall see, 
examination of the divergence in their interpretations of certain 
logical forms of judgment and inference is the key moment in this 
enterprise. 
Speaking more broadly, an investigation into forms of 
representation and inference demonstrates how Kant and Hegel held 
different views of what I shall call, borrowing Brandom’s phrase, the 
“metaphysics of intentionality”.2 The representation of “God” 
                                                 
1 See B146 for an explanation of the difference. 
2 This phrase seems so apt it would be unscrupulous to not employ it. It 
forms part of the title of Brandom (2002). It should be clear that, suitably 
conceived, this phrase refers to a tripartite structure (as in Brentano and 
Husserl, for instance) of intentional acts, contents, and objects; so there is 
no especial favouritism here toward any particular reading of Kant or 
Hegel since regardless of whatever else they were interested in, and 
regardless of the precise spin they would put on the phrase itself, they 
certainly were interested in something like this topic. The key, especially in 
Hegel’s case, is to remember that intentionality does not simply refer to the 
existence, at the level of psychological reality (subjective spirit), of a 
certain structure involved with knowing. Speaking of intentionality 
necessarily also involves speaking of intentional contents and objects, not 
simply intentional acts of knowing. 
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provides a key case study for their would-be interpretations of that 
phrase, since “God” is that idea or concept which, traditionally 
conceived, was believed to be “unconditioned”, “unlimited”, and 
“most real”;1 therefore, scrutiny of the way in which Kant and Hegel 
thought that idea was supposedly represented by human thought and 
cognition reveals the structure of their fundamental disagreement.2 
The paragraphs below provide a synopsis of the topics treated in 
each subsequent section of this chapter. 
§II is devoted to an examination of the significance of Kant’s 
contrast between three forms of what I shall call 
“metarepresentations”. With “metarepresentation” I refer to 
structures that are of a higher level than judgments. And whilst it 
may be proper perhaps to say of a judgment that it is a 
“metarepresentation” because it is a “representation of a 
representation”,3 I take it this is misleading since judgments fall 
under Kant’s account of representation itself.4 Thus I focus on certain 
high-level structures in Kant’s philosophy that cannot be accounted 
for in this way:5 the Schematism of the Categories,1 the schema of the 
                                                 
1 The idea of the ens realissimum (“most real being”, Kant (1998, 556 
n.a). Kant also explains some related terms that pick out the 
Transcendental Ideal, when he says that “the object of reason’s ideal, which 
is to be found only in reason, is also called the original being (ens 
originarium); because it has nothing above itself it is called the highest 
being (ens summum), and because everything else, as conditioned, stands 
under it, it is called the being of all beings (ens entium).” Of course, “all of 
this does not signify the objective relation of an actual object to other 
things, but only that of an idea to concepts, and as to the existence of a 
being of such preeminent excellence it leaves us in complete ignorance.” 
(A578-579/B606-607) 
2 Recall, from Chapter 1, that Kant and Hegel were both committed to 
the conjunction of two claims: an unconditioned knower has absolutely 
unconditioned knowledge and knowledge of the unconditioned is possible 
only for an unconditioned knower. This is why “knowledge of God” is co-
extensive with “Godly knowledge”. See Longuenesse (1995/2007, 175) for 
her explanation. 
3 A68/93: “Judgment is the mediate representation of an object, hence 
the representation of a representation of it.” See also A69/93: “All 
judgments are functions of unity among our representations.” 
4 His taxonomy is at A319-320/B376-377. 
5 A problem therefore arises for our arrangement of §§II.i-iii: since 
symbols have an imagistic structure they are apparently akin to intuitive 
representations, so they are not “metarepresentations” in the way 
schemata are. This claim could be modified by insisting that insofar as 
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ideas of pure theoretical reason,2 and the symbolic representation of 
ideas in both moral judgments guided by practical reason and in 
aesthetic judgment.3  
There it is argued that the conjunction of two claims of Kant’s 
philosophy forbids him sufficient resources for making such contrasts 
in an unproblematic way: (1), his insistence upon a unity of 
theoretical and practical reason4 and, (2), his claim to provide a 
“critique of pure reason”. For although (2) is more often and more 
easily interpreted as an admonition against claims to speculative 
knowledge through pure reason alone, it should readily be seen that 
(1) negates an interpretation limited to this aspect. After all, Kant 
commits himself to a form of projectionism in with both theoretical 
and practical uses of reason, and it is clear such projectionism leads 
directly to a questioning of the source of its products. With 
“projectionism” I refer to the idea that reason contains within it 
certain epistemic demands and moral commands which it “projects” 
onto the world when either viewed from either an epistemic or moral 
standpoint. 
Notoriously, Kant’s account of rational autonomy is tied a 
problematic formalism whereas Hegel insists upon a broadly social 
and historical basis for reason—even if he acknowledges an element 
of necessity in that social and historical substratum—and hence 
develops a theory of the intersubjective conditions of rational 
freedom and autonomy. At this high level of generality Hegel’s basic 
                                                                                                                            
symbols are “indirect” representations of ideas, they are 
metarepresentational in the sense that they contain a semantic condition on 
how they are to be integrated into our thinking beyond just their being 
instanced in our cognition: they are to “guide” our thinking, albeit in a 
different way to that in which principles, for Kant, are meant to “guide” our 
thinking. This would be so even if we admitted that other forms of 
representation contain semantic conditions, since only ideas “guide” our 
thinking in this unique way that warrants the qualification. The case is 
more complicated with schemata, since they not only involve particular 
judgments but recommend the idea of a unity among families of judgments, 
which is a condition of the categories playing the role they are meant to 
play as conditions of the possibility of empirical knowledge. 
1 A137-147/B176-187. 
2 A669-704/B697-732, esp., A674/B702, A681-683/B709-710, A697/B725. 
3 The systematic explanation of this form of representation in the latter 
case is found in §59 Kant (2000); in the former case the most direct 
explanation of such a function occurs in the section entitled “Of the typic of 
pure practical judgment”, in Kant (1996f, 5:67-71, 194-198). 
4 See Kant (1996f, 5:107-148, 226-258). The quote is from 5:121; 237-238. 
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criticism of Kant is already in view: if, as Kant says, the real use of 
reason is the source of the transcendental idea of “God”, and if one 
can argue that this source is socially and historically mediated, 
namely that the terms in which ideas are to be understood are 
dictated by the practices within which they are embedded, then the 
idea of “God” can be said to have social and historical conditions (thus 
it does not as a concept have necessary and sufficient conditions; a 
concept is a form of continuity in normatively mediated practices, 
they “rest on” “functions”1 for Kant. Moreover, he claims concepts 
are essentially for judging, and therefore, gain their cognitive 
significance through being instanced in a judgment that could 
function as premise of conclusion of an inference). 
Our second charge mentioned above, regarding Kant’s failure to 
provide a “critique of pure reason” that meets its own standard of 
criticism, arises as a consequence of an extension of the former 
criticism, (1), which thereby encompasses a claim for the apparently 
self-defeating justification of the “as-if” function of ideas in both 
theoretical and practical uses of reason: the analogical role of ideas is 
to be regarded as grounded in a pattern of reasoning referred to by 
Kant in the Jäsche Logic as an “inference of analogy”,2 and 
resembling what in the Science of Logic Hegel calls the “syllogism of 
analogy”.3    
This is the theme to be explored in our discussion of the forms of 
metarepresentation. Kant’s denial that cognitive employment of 
objects of reason constitutes knowledge appears to many, including 
Hegel, to be a failure of nerve, for the judgmental determination of 
analogical cases depends upon a rational knowledge of the goodness 
of an inference from one case to another. And such inferences are 
true “inferences of reason”, not mere “inferences of the 
understanding”:4 the rightful encompassment of symbols into 
reasoning constitutes knowledge of those symbols and therefore 
knowledge of what they symbolise; it constitutes rational reflective 
capability of the kind necessary for proper knowledge of things 
reasoned about. To say this is to deny that there is a difference 
between knowledge involved with employment of a symbol and 
                                                 
1 A68/B93. 
2 Kant (1974 §84).  
3 Hegel (1969, 692-695). I exploit Redding’s (2003) article on the 
connection of both these thinkers with Peirce’s later work in logic, 
especially in Peirce (1992). 
4 A303/B360. Kant there also calls such things “immediate inferences” as 
opposed to “mediate inferences” which are enacted in a syllogism. 
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knowledge of that symbol itself. At a very general linguistic level, it 
is to deny that there is a difference between knowing a linguistic 
item and knowing something through that linguistic item; it is to 
deny that there is any difference between “knowing a word” and 
“knowing how to use a word”.1     
The basic conclusion that follows from these criticisms is that 
Kant’s philosophy makes a mystery of the “rational will” by 
characterising reason as “unconditioned”, and therefore 
characterising it in a way that makes it seem as it if were extruded 
from actual human practices. 
An examination of how the forms of Kantian metarepresentations 
we discuss differ allows for a more subtle and sympathetic phrasing 
of the standard objection levelled against Kant’s supposedly “formal” 
account of practical reason.2 Moreover, it allows for a detailed 
explanation of exactly how Hegel improved upon Kant’s attempt to 
ground normative force in a non-supernatural,3 rational dimension. 
These refinements of the standard objection to Kant’s purportedly 
“formal” conception of reason notwithstanding, it is acknowledged 
that Hegel, like most post-Kantians, was nevertheless not 
sufficiently sympathetic or attentive to Kant’s explanations of the so-
called “finite” elements required for ethics.4 That is, Hegel did not 
                                                 
1 Clearly this does not entail a conflation of, on the one hand, 
etymological knowledge of a word’s entire history as well as its phonetic 
and phonological properties, and on the other, the ability to use that word 
in the appropriate, normatively constrained sense (all relevant caveats 
considered). I take it that to “know” a word or symbol is primarily to know 
what that word or symbol means (one could also say “signifies”, yet we 
need to acknowledge both direct reference and inferential implication). 
2 See, for example, Sedgwick (1988a, 1988b). 
3 To say “natural” would of course be misleading; to say “supersensible” 
would actually contradict some of Kant’s pronouncements, since he does 
after all argue for a regulative role for the supersensible in dissolving the 
dialectics of both aesthetic and teleological judgment. Clearly, one must 
take care with terminology here; I employ “supernatural” to evoke the pre-
Critical and traditionally religious sense of a God that grounds the concept 
of truth, in moral and epistemic cases. 
4 Louden’s excellent (2000) book provides a guide for this aspect of 
Kant. At various places (esp., 168, 173, 175) Louden claims that the 
standard formalist objection, of which Hegel was an early proponent, must 
be reconsidered in light of the empirical dimensions of Kant’s ethics. In 
addition, such tempering of the criticism leads to a reduction of the 
difference between Kant and the post-Kantian idealists. Nevertheless, 
Louden does recognise the tension between “this-worldly and otherworldly 
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acknowledge sufficiently the extent to which Kant himself saw that 
placing reason “outside” human thought and action would render it 
“finite” instead of “infinite”. Kant’s concern is on this count 
expressed by his regard for the empirical elements required for 
ethics (knowledge of the human subject in moral anthropology) and 
for the role of symbolic examples required to make unconditional 
imperatives sensibly apprehensible and so represented as 
conditioned. 
It is important to recognise the value of these concessions made 
by Kant, since they have the same motivation as that which impels 
him to make claims regarding the symbolic representation of ideas of 
practical reason. For Kant, it is a condition of the possibility of 
symbolic representation having any import for our knowledge or 
thought that both nature1 and human artefacts bear intelligible (even 
if “analogical”) connections with the conceptual structure of both. We 
might say however that, from Hegel’s perspective, Kant simply did 
not pay sufficient attention to this point and did not develop it 
adequately. 
Examination of these elements of idealist logic allows a key 
divergence between Kant and Hegel to emerge: Hegel argues much 
more doggedly than Kant that all judgments are ultimately 
evaluative, that they therefore include an irreducibly normative 
dimension, and thus contain a suppressed premise about how 
something ought-to-be. Part and parcel of Hegel’s position here is 
that the typical examples of “judgments” in philosophical literature 
such “The rose is red” (a “judgment of existence” which Hegel says 
does not demonstrate an “impressive” power of judgment)2 are 
precisely untypical: they suggest the possibility of pure description 
                                                                                                                            
strands in the second part of Kant’s practical philosophy”, and he sees 
“their co-presence constitutes an unresolved tension in his [Kant’s] 
thought.” (182) Hegel manages to develop Kant’s thought in a congenial 
way in many senses. One significant point, however, is that Hegel never 
reflected on the fact that Kant put to work a notion of symbolism in his 
philosophy, yet the function it fulfilled was restricted by Kant’s conception 
of reason generally. 
1 The Analytic of the Sublime of the 3rd Critique (esp. §29) contains 
poignant references to the sublime and the similarity between the 
simultaneously humiliating and elevating feeling in such cases evoked, and 
that which arises in us upon reflection on the moral law “within us”, (recall 
Kant’s epitaph, quoted from the 2nd Critique (see the Conclusion in Kant 
(1996b, 5:162, 269)). The case of “beauty” is distinct, as we shall below. 
2 Hegel (1991b, §171, Addition, 249)  
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having import for our cognitive economy where no such purity exists. 
This attitude parallels Hegel’s attitude (which Kant actually shares) 
that judgments, unlike sheer propositions, are essentially “difference 
makers”: they contribute pragmatic import to our way of thinking 
rather than add atoms of information to our stock.1  
All of this has the consequence that Kant, if he were to be more 
consistent, really ought to have acknowledged a deeper role for 
symbolic representation in our thinking, because such an 
acknowledgment would not only have resolved internal tensions in 
his position, yet would also have arguably been the proper step 
towards a more plausible theory of mindedness. Yet his conception of 
reason restricted its scope to analogy, where one term of the analogy 
was an intuited empirical item and the other an uncognisable idea 
(according to Kant, we can “think” ideas but can’t “know” them; one 
of the consequences of his rationalist sense of possibility at the level 
of pure concepts of reason). Hegel’s own theory of symbolism 
demonstrates the integration between the traditionally so-called 
“empirical” and “rational” elements that are inextricably linked in 
any plausible theory of the mind, and the social basis of reason and 
language.     
In articulating the broader context of Hegel’s response to this 
Kantian problem, we are led in §§V and V.i to an evaluation of 
Hegel’s theorising about the commonalities between certain of what 
he calls “shapes of consciousness” (feeling, representation, and 
thought) and certain “shapes of spirit” (religion, philosophy). Of 
particular interest there is the aforementioned symmetry between 
the structural transformations that Hegel believed occur in the 
emergence of linguistic consciousness—specifically, that from 
symbolising to sign-making consciousness—and those Hegel thought 
are involved with the formation of religious imagery itself.  
§VI compares Kant’s and Hegel’s views about the role of the idea 
of “God” in our cognition, the way it manifests in our conscience, and 
some of the function it fulfils in the structure of self-consciousness. It 
therefore examines some of their writings on religion, although only 
for the purposes of elucidating the representational character of 
theological phenomena. In this section some of the reasons for 
Hegel’s intense interest in the model of the triune God of 
Christianity (which Hegel refers to as the “absolute religion”) are 
examined and their relevance is connected with the other structures 
discussed. 
                                                 
1 See Hegel (1991b, §167, 246). 
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It was mentioned above that the deep problem for Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy, of interest here, was his differentiation 
between three forms: the Schematism of the Categories, the 
schemata of the ideas of reason in its speculative use, and the 
symbolic representation of ideas of reason in moral and aesthetic 
judgment. Since the division between the former one and the latter 
two is entailed by Kant’s distinction between the understanding and 
reason, respectively, this section shall begin with an outline of the 
judgmental and inferential structure which, in Kant’s view, 
distinguishes these two faculties.  
First, recall Kant’s proclamation that the understanding is the 
faculty of rules (or the faculty of judgment),1 whilst reason is the 
faculty of principles (or the faculty of inferring).2 Further, note that 
the rules of the understanding are essentially those for judging, just 
as concepts are formed for the same reason. Given that concepts rest 
on “functions”,3 as well as the fact that a function prescribes a rule 
that makes possible “ordering different representations under a 
common one”,4 concepts themselves dictate the rules of the 
understanding by virtue of being elements of judgments. The 
understanding is the capacity to judge—whilst the principles of 
reason are those that unify and systematise the understanding and 
ensure its “thoroughgoing connection” with both itself and the goals 
of rational thought.5 
The former case of connection pertains to reason’s “formal” use in 
inferences made on the basis of the coupling of relevant judgments 
                                                 
1A69/B94. 
2A299/B356. The second characterisation occurs at A330/B386. 
3 Cf.: “All intuitions, as sensible, rest on affections” (A68/B93). 
4A68/B93. I say “prescribes a rule” because Kant identifies functions 
with the “unity of the action” of the ordering of different representations 
under a common one. Thus, the function is the unity of the action of 
applying the rule (across all cases), where the rule is the concept in 
question. One notices how Carnap derived from Kant his empirical criterion 
of meaning when one reflects that a concept (qua intension) can be 
conceived as the rule that defines the set of entities that fall under it (qua 
extension). 
5A305/B362. Note here “thoroughgoing” is a translation of 
“durchgängig” which I have been rendering as “complete”, as in the 
“principle of complete determination”. 
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whose juxtaposition constitutes a syllogism: reason ensures the 
understanding does not make illogical (inconsistent) judgments. The 
“real” use involves the positing of transcendental ideas, which 
function as regulative ideals and serve as the unconditioned guide for 
inferences to conditioned cases, and thus one may characterise this as 
reason ensuring the understanding’s agreement with “the goals of 
rational thought” because if this phrase means anything it surely 
means that the understanding thereby judges in a way that allows 
for a systematic unity to emerge.1 
Some immediate qualifications are in order. Not only are there 
such things as “inferences of the understanding”,2 but also instances 
of judgment which depend upon the real use of reason. This real use 
is instanced in two main cases: the regulative employment of 
transcendental ideas of reason in its speculative use is one; the 
constitutive use of symbolic representations of ideas of reason in its 
practical and aesthetic uses another.3 Both these cases involve the 
real use of reason, insofar as in such usage “reason itself contains the 
origin of certain concepts and principles, which it derives neither 
from the senses nor from the understanding.”4 Importantly, 
“cognition from principles” is for Kant “that cognition in which I 
cognise the particular in the universal through concepts.”5 Thus, he 
says, “every syllogism is a form of derivation of a cognition from a 
principle.”6 Here Kant is referring to the synthetic, ampliative 
function of reason, whereby it can generate a conclusion on the basis 
of subsuming the predicate of the minor premise of a syllogism under 
                                                 
1 The contrast between “real” and “formal” uses is drawn at A299/B355. 
At A310/B366 Kant says: “concepts of pure reason…are not merely 
reflected concepts but inferred concepts.” Concepts of the understanding, 
meanwhile, “contain nothing beyond the unity of reflection on appearances, 
insofar as these appearances are supposed to belong necessarily to a 
possible empirical consciousness.” (A310/B367) The former are never a part 
of empirical synthesis (A311/B367-368). 
2A303/B360. 
3 See Longuenesse (2005c) for an exploration of the idea that a moral 
judgment is a “judgment of reason”. 
Note that I broach neither the topic of the “aesthetic idea”, as 
contrasted with ideas of reason in §57 of the 3rd Critique, nor what Kant 
calls “ideals of sensibility” in the 1st (A570-571/B589-599), although such a 
discussion would add to the general argument here advanced regarding the 
role of ideas in rational contexts.  
4A299/B355. 
5 For an insightful perspective on this theme, see Ginsborg (2006c). 
6A300/B357. 
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the conditions of the logical subject of the major premise, as 
expressed by its predicate. Observe Kant’s example from the First 
Book of the Dialectic, “On the concepts of pure reason”,1 put into 
sequence: 
 
Major premise: Every human is mortal. 
Minor premise: Caius is a man. 
Conclusion: Therefore, Caius is mortal. 
 
Here, “in the conclusion of a syllogism”, “we restrict a predicate to a 
certain object [Caius], after we have thought it in the major premise 
in its whole domain [every human] under a certain condition 
[mortality].” Crucially, Kant then writes:  
 
This complete magnitude of the domain, in relation to such a 
condition, is called universality (universalitas). In the synthesis of 
intuitions this corresponds to allness (universitas), or the totality of 
conditions. So the transcendental concept of reason is none other than 
that of the totality of conditions to a given conditioned thing. Now 
since the unconditioned alone makes possible the totality of 
conditions, and conversely the totality of conditions is always itself 
unconditioned, a pure concept of reason in general can be explained 
through the concept of the unconditioned, insofar as it contains a 
ground of synthesis for what is conditioned.2 
 
Note how a predicate is a kind of condition. With respect to our 
citation, if something is human, then it is mortal: if the logical subject 
of a judgment (represented by an intuition of that thing) can be 
subsumed under the concept “human”, then it can be subsumed 
under the concept “mortal”. Kant’s remark here regarding the 
“transcendental concept of reason” will be unpacked in the next 
chapter when the principle of complete determination is discussed, 
yet for now we must heed his insistence that the ideal of reason is the 
“absolutely unconditioned”, whatever that might turn out to be. Kant 
believes reason having such a character makes possible the claim 
                                                 
1A321/B378 & ff. 
2A322-323/B379. The italicisation of the third sentence is mine. In 
Chapter 3 I argue that Kant’s principle of complete determination should 
be considered as the basic principle of the “transcendental concept of 
reason” mentioned here. At A308/B364-365 Kant says the “logical maxim” 
of there being articulable conditions for things can onlybe a “principle of 
pure reason” if the idea of the unconditioned is “not contained in” the idea 
of the conditioned, even if related a priori to it. 
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that individual things being thus-and-so have in each case explicable 
conditions. 
What is the significance of this for our discussion? Notice that 
insisting that the aim of reason is to provide the totality of conditions 
for conditioned things is not to claim that one can actually know such 
a totality, for this would amount to knowing a particular thing in an 
unconditioned manner and thus amount to having both 
“unconditioned knowledge” and “knowledge of the unconditioned”, 
which according to the basic thesis of transcendental idealism is 
impossible. Instead, syllogistic inferences of reason are steps toward 
greater determination of things, made possible first through the 
subsumption of objects under logical subjects in judgments, and 
therefore under the predicates of such judgments, and second, by the 
subordination or superordination of concepts instanced in judgments 
in their role as minor premise under concepts instanced in judgments 
in the guise as major premise.  
Importantly, whilst episyllogistic, deductive series of inferences 
“on the side of the conditioned” are the only syllogisms involving 
properly determinative, specificatory judgments in Kant’s view, 
syllogisms can proceed in the opposite direction also. Syllogisms 
involving inferences “on the side of the conditions” are prosyllogistic 
and involve reflective, classificatory judgments whose import is 
ultimately subjective and functional for the unification and 
systematisation of cognition.1 
The latter direction of syllogising is the one that in rationalist 
metaphysics leads ultimately to the pure concepts of reason (the soul, 
the world whole, and God), where the major premise of the syllogism 
is a “judgment of relation”: categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive 
(where these correspond to the transcendental ideas just listed). In 
Kant’s words, the operation of reason at this level is to be regarded 
in the following way: Firstly, with reference to the three judgments 
of relation, 
 
There are…just as many species of syllogism, and in each of them 
prosyllogisms proceed to the unconditioned: one [categorical], to a 
                                                 
1 See A331/B387-388. At A323/B379 Kant says “prosyllogisms proceed 
to the unconditioned”. Although one cannot correlate episyllogistic chains 
of inference with the making of analytic judgments, such a similarity exists 
since, for Kant, analytic judgments explicate a concept. A similar point 
holds for prosyllogistic chains of inferences: synthetic judgments involve 
attributing a predicate to a subject that is “not contained in it”, and 
therefore amplify a concept. 
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subject that is no longer a predicate, another [hypothetical] to a 
presupposition that presupposes nothing further, and the third 
[disjunctive] to an aggregate of members of a division of a concept.1 
 
He continues: 
 
Hence the pure rational concepts of the totality in a synthesis of 
conditions are necessary at least as problems of extending the unity 
of the understanding, if possible, to the unconditioned, and they are 
grounded in the nature of human reason, even if these 
transcendental concepts lack a suitable use in concreto and have no 
other utility than to point the understanding in the right direction so 
that it may be thoroughly consistent with itself when it extends itself 
to its uttermost extremes.2 
 
Such syllogistic inferences of reason move regressively from the 
conditioned up a chain of conditions to ultimately posit the 
unconditioned. This process can be likened to what Kant conceives of 
in the Critique of the Power of Judgment as a process of 
classification in virtue of the postulation of rational entities (Kant 
calls ideas “inferred concepts”). This makes the contrast with 
determinative judgments involved with specification appear 
somewhat peculiar, for Kant insists that reflective judgment does not 
determine its objects, yet insists that the final concept arrived at in 
such a process—the ens realissimum—both serves as the ground of 
the complete determination of things, whilst being simultaneously 
indeterminate and unable to do more than regulate such a process. 
The basic point of Kant’s relevant here is that not only would a 
claim to know the unconditioned constitute a metaphysical fallacy by 
his own lights, yet it would also make nonsense of the idea of the 
search for the totality of conditions for given things, since the search 
for such a totality is that which takes place in empirical investigation. 
The growth of empirical knowledge in such an enterprise entails that 
inferential connections between new judgments made in experience 
(in Kant’s terms: through mediate, syllogistic inferences of reason, or 
in immediate inferences of the understanding) lead to the 
subsumption of concepts under further concepts. Therefore, the 
totality of conditions for given things is not only never discovered, 
approximations to it are enacted in empirical investigation as aided 
                                                 
1A323/B379-380. 
2A323/B380. 
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by the rational framework of inferences between judgments, rather 
than determined at the outset by the real use of reason.  
In sum, the termini1 of syllogisms are for Kant either instances of 
synthetic, ampliative cognition, or analytic, explicative cognition. 
And the former acts of judgment, in place at the conclusions of 
syllogisms, are the paradigm of goods secured in the advance of 
knowledge, whereas the latter are merely acts of clarification, 
unification, and systematisation. The question is whether the latter 
by contrast should be denied the status of “knowledgeable” 
advances, and if not, why and in what sense not. 
It is important to at this point be reminded that the 
understanding, on its own, is not capable of providing knowledge. 
Kant insists that sensibility and the understanding are together 
necessary for contentful, non-blind cognition,2 and he attributes the 
possibility of synthetic cognition to sensibility; temporal succession 
and spatial juxtaposition are necessary for such synthetic advances 
in knowledge.3 
Notoriously, Kant conceives of mathematics as formulated in 
synthetic a priori judgments and mounts his argument upon the 
supposed dependence of geometry on spatial cognition (outer sense).4 
The understanding’s actions are restricted to analysis of concepts, 
which is the proper form for philosophy, in Kant’s eyes.5 It is for this 
                                                 
1 One must take care with terminology here. We cannot say 
“conclusion”, since that implies the result of a deductive inference, where 
the termini of prosyllogisms are not strictly conclusions in the formal sense 
because they do not follows deductively from their premises, but rather are 
postulated as hypothetical conditions (where hypothetical judgments are 
the major premise of hypothetical syllogisms of relation). 
2A51/B75. 
3 See the transcendental and metaphysical “expositions” of space and 
time in the Aesthetic, especially Kant’s remarks about time at B48-49. 
4B40-41. 
5A713/B741. Cf. Kant (1997/2004, §10) and: “The analytic method, 
insofar as it is opposed to the synthetic, is something completely different 
from a collection of analytic propositions; it signifies only that one proceeds 
from that which is sought as if it were given, and ascends to the conditions 
under which alone it is possible. In this method one often uses nothing but 
synthetic propositions, as mathematical analysis exemplifies, and it might 
better be called the regressive method to distinguish it from the synthetic 
or progressive method. Again the name analytic is also found as a principal 
division of logic, and there it is the logic of truth and is opposed to dialectic, 
without actually looking to see whether the cognitions belonging to that 
logic are analytic or synthetic.” (§5, 4:277, 28, n.*) 
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reason that inferences of the understanding can only take the form of 
a logical unpacking of a concept; they are inferences permitted 
merely on the basis of analytical relations among concepts.1 Such 
examples include the inferences below:2 
 
1. All humans are mortal. ∴ 2. Some humans are mortal. 
3. Some mortal beings are 
human beings. 
4. Nothing immortal is a 
human being. 
 
Of course, these immediate inferences are from one logical concept to 
another, and the understanding is also able to infer from one non-
logical concept to another, yet again on the basis of its “content”.3 
Kant’s example of the concept of a “body “in the Introduction is 
intended to draw attention to the ability of the understanding to 
arrive on its own at conclusions about experiential objects: 
 
If I say: “All bodies are extended,” then this is an analytic judgment. 
For I do not need to go outside the concept that I combine with the 
word “body in order to find that extension is connected with it, but 
rather I only need to analyse that concept, i.e., become conscious of 
the manifold that I always think in it, in order to encounter this 
predicate therein…4 
 
Thus, if one is told 
 
“X is a body”, 
                                                 
1 Insofar as arriving at new information typically seems like coming to 
know something one didn’t know, rather than being reminded of something 
one already knew, we are tempted to say that the understanding allows a 
kind of growth of knowledge. Yet we quickly see that once the lesson has 
been learnt as a logical principle, we realise we have simply become aware 
of the structure of our thought once and for all, rather than being able to 
say that with every new application we come to some new knowledge. 
2A303-304/B360. See Kant (2005, R 5553, 1778-79, 18:221-9, 224) for an 
anticipation of his distinction between reason and the understanding. 
3 The idea that logical concepts have “content” is difficult to explain, 
although one way of justifying such a claim would involve the appeal to the 
notion that they “express” the structure of the discourse in which they 
occur (Sellars and some of his heirs, i.e., Brandom, take this line and 
attribute some version of it to Kant). 
4A6-7/B10-11. 
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one can infer from it that 
 
“X is extended”, 
 
without needing to consult experience. This is therefore another case 
of an immediate inference; one only needs to grasp the “content” of 
the concept “body”. One can also infer immediately to a synthetic a 
priori judgment, although these involve sensible conditions and are 
the product of principles of reason.1 
Attention to the example motivates one to question the difference 
between relations among sheer concepts, and the relations among 
conceptualised intuitions and concepts predicated of them. The 
relation between the former can be captured by the relation of 
“subordination” of one concept under another, whereas the latter 
involve the act of “subsumption” of an object under a concept. It is 
interesting to note that Kant here provides the bare skeleton of a 
theory of reference here, on which we will not elaborate. It is useful 
to be reminded that the difference between these relations clarifies 
Kant’s containment metaphor: concepts subordinated to higher 
concepts can be said to be contain them (the universal in the 
particular), whereas objects subsumed under concepts can be said to 
be contained in the extension of those concepts. Some writers have 
argued that this inverted structure of concepts and intuitions forbids 
the reading of Kant as a “conceptualist” (or, “propositionalist”, say in 
Frege’s sense), although the issue awaits, among other things, a 
clarification of the operant sense of “intension” and “extension”.2 
The point of the “body” example is that such an immediate 
inference of the understanding from one concept to another is 
possible on the basis of the content of those concepts alone: it does 
not require the mediation provided by the minor premise of a 
syllogism to demonstrate that one concept can be subsumed under 
the condition of another by way of an inference; neither does it 
require recourse to the nature of experience itself; it simply requires 
competent participation in “linguistic practice”, insofar as that 
practice makes possible the knowledge of meanings of words. 
                                                 
1A11/B24. 
2See Wilson (1975, esp. 254) on the mereological structure of intuitions 
and concepts, and Thompson (1972) for an exemplary attempt at connecting 
Kant’s account of conceptual content with Frege’s. Another prominent line 
of defence of Kant as a “non-conceptualist” can be found in Hanna (2005, 
2008b, 2011a, b), Hanna and Chadha (2011). 
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Kant begins the Schematism chapter by contrasting the way in 
which empirical concepts differ from pure concepts, insofar as the 
former can be “encountered” in intuition.1He then poses the question 
of how intuitions can be subsumed under the categories and assigns 
the task of explaining how this is possible to the “transcendental 
doctrine of the power of judgment”. Note how this doctrine is 
elaborated later in the 3rd Critique. 
Note that objects are subsumed under concepts by way of their 
being encountered in intuition. Recalling the remarks about Kant’s 
containment metaphor above, we can say that subsumption is to be 
understood such that predication involves the attribution of 
properties to singular representations of empirical intuitions through 
the employment of conceptual functions. And whilst such attribution 
requires logical subjects to be expressed conceptually as particular 
instances of a universal, as in “this dog”, it is essential to Kant’s view 
of the epistemology of predication that the objects of predication are 
singular intuitions. An extremely important divergence between the 
German idealists and modern analytical philosophy occurs over 
precisely this point: singularity and particularity are not to be 
equivocated over. 
Roughly, singularity is the mode of representation when one 
judges “This (or, that) A is B”,2 where the intuitive matter (X) 
subsumed under A is also, by virtue of this, subsumed under the 
concept B (which in turn is superordinate to A). Particularity is the 
                                                 
1A137/B176. 
2 Note the connection between intuitional representation and 
demonstrative reference. Of course, one can refer to singulars that are not 
within one’s perceptual purview (one can refer with proper names), 
although Kant would appear to be committed to the idea that intuitional 
representations are always themselves perceptual representations. There 
is then a divergence between the merely conceptual operation of proper 
names in one’s cognitive economy, and the intuitional representation of 
items referred to by either proper names or names of particulars. The 
consequence is that although the transcendental-logical form of intuitions is 
singular, the items represented in intuition can be regarded as universal, 
particular, or singular, depending on their use. Kant (1974) makes this 
point:“It is mere tautology to speak of general or common concepts, a 
mistake based on the wrong division of concepts into general, particular, 
and singular. Not the concepts themselves, only their use can be divided 
this way.” (§1, 96) 
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mode of representation when one refers to “This (or that) A”, and 
insodoing marks out an object by characterising it as an instance of a 
kind: as a particular instance of a universal. 
The above point is relevant only to empirical concepts, however. 
Pure concepts are not “contained in the appearance”,1 but rather only 
contain “the unity of reflection on appearances, insofar as these 
appearances are supposed to belong necessarily to a possible 
empirical consciousness;”2 they cannot be “intuited through the 
senses”,3 are “entirely unhomogeneous, and can never be 
encountered in any intuition.”4 And as a consequence of this, one 
must show how the categories can be applied to appearances at all let 
alone a priori; thus, one must expound what Kant calls the 
“transcendental doctrine of the power of judgment in general”.5 
The 3rd Critique extends and specifies this idea with regard to 
certain types of judgment (aesthetic and teleological). The questions 
that are raised with regard to these specific forms are: “How can a 
standard of taste be grounded in an object, qua intuition, rather than 
only in the subjectivity of the thinker who finds his own taste in the 
world simply because he has put it there?” and “How can purposes 
be represented in an object, qua intuition, rather than only in the 
subjectivity of the thinker who envisages a final cause?” The case of 
the categories is different since the 3rd Critique discusses the role of 
guiding ideas in judgment rather than pure concepts; the parallel is 
nevertheless clear: it must be shown how certain non-empirical rules 
necessarily apply to the empirical. Note this general problem is the 
main topic of the Transcendental Deduction, where Kant 
characterises it as that of establishing “how subjective conditions of 
thinking should have objective validity”.6 
                                                 
1A138/B177; my emphasis. 
2A310/B367; my emphasis. 
3A137-138/B176-177. 
4A137/B176. 
5A138/B177. 
6A89-90/B122. Note that Kant says “objective validity” and not 
“objective reality” (the difference between these is first drawn at A27-
28/B44). Kant’s latter phrase is the basis for him being called a 
“verificationist”: concepts which have objective reality can be given 
ostensive definitions, and be shown to have actual intuitional content.  
According to Hanna (2008a, 11-12) the former phrase signals the “logico-
syntactic well-formedness (grammatical correctness) and logico-semantic 
well-formedness (sortal correctness)”.  So a judgment is “objectively valid 
if and only if it is logically well-formed and all of its constituent intuitions 
and concepts are objectively valid (A155-156/B194-195).” 
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For our purposes, the fact that transcendental schemata mediate 
between the categories and appearances in virtue of the homogeneity 
of both with the “transcendental time-determination”1 can be 
bypassed. Nevertheless, note that since the categories themselves 
are not homogeneous with appearances the identity is intransitive; 
namely, Barbara 
 
All As are Bs. (All categories are represented as schematic time-
determinations.) 
All Bs are Cs. (All schematic time-determinations are 
represented as sets of empirical intuitions.) 
∴ All As are Cs. (All categories are represented as sets of 
empirical intuitions.) 
 
is inapplicable here; the inclusion of the phrase “represented as” 
forbids such straightforward transitivity.2 
Instead, the categories “must…contain a priori formal conditions 
of sensibility (namely of the inner sense) that contain the general 
conditions under which alone the category can be applied to any 
object.”3 Whether Kant means that the “general conditions of 
sensibility under which alone the category can be applied to any 
object” are either a subset of the “formal conditions of sensibility (of 
inner sense)”, or synonymous with them, is irrelevant. The lesson is 
that this feature of them is precisely what forbids them from being 
homogeneous with any intuition; equivalent lessons are that one 
should not mistake a rule for a case in which it applies, or mistake an 
intension for an extension, because one then is trapped in a realm of 
representation without a distinguishable conception of what 
constitutes its order. 
The transcendental schemata exist by virtue of the pure 
understanding in its guise as the “a priori imagination”, and can be 
distinguished from any particular “image” that is, so to speak, part of 
its conceptual order. The particular images which cohere with such 
schemata are products of the “empirical faculty of the productive 
imagination”.4 This is because the synthesis of the imagination “has 
                                                 
1A138-139/B177-178. 
2 This is a different version of the same problem with doxastic contexts; 
if Hannah believes that A is B and Alex believes that B is C one cannot 
infer from these two facts alone that either of them believe or ought to 
believe A is C. 
3A139-140/B178-179. 
4A141/B181. 
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as its aim no individual intuition but rather only the unity in the 
determination of sensibility”. Schemata for concepts can be 
understood as the “representation of a general procedure of the 
imagination for providing a concept with its image”;1 moreover, it is 
these schemata that “ground our pure sensible concepts.”2 
With this last remark Kant offers a counter-proposal to the 
erroneous empiricist recommendation that all rules for thinking can 
be derived by abstraction from cases. Clearly that which governs 
most of our individual, empirical concepts can in each case be 
expressed in the form of a rule which has come about through 
reflection, comparison, and abstraction from individual cases, yet for 
Kant certain concepts are presupposed by us in our attempts to 
attribute to experience the power of constraining our thought. These 
concepts are the pure concepts of the understanding. Kant’s 
geometrical example of a triangle coheres with his defence of a non-
formal conception of mathematics as a synthetic a priori enterprise 
that is a “science of space”, and is intended to demonstrate that no 
given intuition of a triangle can be understood to ground its rule, 
since this constitutes a conflation of a singular representation with a 
universal one: “No image of a triangle would ever be adequate to the 
concept of it.”3 
The key point is that there is more to singularity than the 
distinction between a kind and its instances. For although one might 
say that “Socrates” is an “instance of the kind ‘man’”, the fact that 
there is an analogue of this in the case of the universal-particular 
distinction, itself expressible in terms of genus and species, does not 
yet allow a complete parallel. At the level of determination of 
content, the concept of singularity in Kant is attended by the concept 
of a certain inexhaustibility of content that has consequences for his 
theory of judgment in the 3rd Critique; in aesthetic judgment not only 
can we always say more about aesthetic qualities in virtue of the 
complexity of the effects aesthetically praised objects have on us (in 
virtue of sensible affection, whose possibility a priori is based on 
structures shared by all rational human subjects),4 but the standard 
of taste can be debated on this same basis: the possibility of 
multifarious effects on other subjects with whom one can debate in a 
common, quasi-objective language of standards, without having 
recourse to sheer subjective affectivity. 
                                                 
1A140/B179-180; my emphasis. 
2A140-141/B180. 
3A141/B180. 
4 Cf. the “sensuscommunis” discussed in Kant (2000, §40).  
58 
Chapter Two: Metarepresentational Structure in Kant and Hegel 
More can be said. This feature of judgment is found in the logical 
character of the conjunction of two theses: the simultaneous (1) 
indivisibility and (2) infinite divisibility of the structure of 
singularity.1The former refers to the fact that intuition itself is 
presented under two conditions whose form is indivisible: there is 
only one space and one time; the latter refers to the fact that an 
infinite number of marks can be predicated of an intuition, a fact 
taken account of in Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment. It is this 
latter character of “infinite divisibility” that undergirds the 
possibility of infinite aesthetic appraisal, as well as the logical 
irreducibility of singularity to a bundle of particulars.  
When returning to the divergence mentioned above, between the 
images represented in intuition and the transcendental schemata 
that are the transcendental time-determinations of the categories, 
we notice that Kant says: 
 
The schema of a pure concept of the understanding…is something 
that can never be brought to an image at all.2 
 
What is he committing himself to? We can at least see that pure 
concepts are distinct from empirical concepts to the extent that the 
former are “reflected”, whereas empirical concepts are arrived at 
through “comparison” and “abstraction”, in addition to “reflection”. 
It is clear that the reflection involved with pure concepts is unlike 
the reflection enacted to produce empirical concepts: reflection upon 
any possible appearance yields the categories, whereas empirical 
concepts are adduced given the individual character of the 
phenomenon in question as well as its similarity to other relevant 
phenomena. In the former sense, reflection reveals the categories to 
be intellectual conditions of experience, and in the latter, reflection 
on the synthesised manifold made possible by the imagination brings 
forth empirical concepts. 
Kant tells us that pure a priori concepts (the categories) by 
definition cannot be “abstracted” from experience, since they first 
make it possible; they also cannot have their instances “compared” 
precisely because they, so to speak, do not have instances. Further, 
that the schema of a pure concept 
                                                 
1 Cf. (3) & (4) at A24-25/B39-40, (5) at A25/B41, the First and Second 
Antinomy (A426-443/B454-471), and the section at the end of the 
Antinomies entitled “Resolution of the cosmological idea of the totality of 
division of a given whole in intuition” (A523-527/B551-555).  
2A142/B181. 
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is rather only the pure synthesis, in accord with a rule of unity 
according to concepts in general, which the category expresses, and is 
a transcendental product of the imagination, which concerns the 
determination of the inner sense in general, in accordance with 
conditions of is form (time) in regard to all representations, insofar as 
these are to be connected together a priori in one concept in accord 
with the unity of apperception.1 
 
And here he is simply restating the point that the “schema” is 
something over and above the family of images which are correlated 
with it by virtue of the cooperation between pure faculty of a priori 
imagination and the empirical faculty of the reproductive 
imagination; only schemata of empirical concepts can be construed as 
instanced in intuition, whilst transcendental schemata are to be 
regarded as functions (although in a different sense than concepts) 
consequent upon the marriage of the conditions contained in the 
categories with the conditions contained in inner sense.  
In short, Kant is required to introduce schemata because he 
insists that the categories do not take into account the pure form of 
intuition; that they could somehow require mediation by a form that 
was amenable to both sides of the divide he finds simply because he 
put it there. In the Schematism Kant is required to show that the 
categories necessarily cohere with the temporal (not spatial) form of 
pure intuition: the transcendental time-determination is that which is 
shared between a category and instances where it is empirically 
discernible by virtue of the transcendental schema.  
After running through a brief account of the schemata of the 
twelve categories (which are not germane to our concerns just now), 
Kant says: 
 
From this it is clear that the schematism of the understanding 
through the transcendental synthesis of imagination comes down to 
nothing other than the unity of all the manifold of intuition in inner 
sense, and thus directly to the unity of apperception, as the function 
that corresponds to inner sense (to receptivity). 
 
This is a way of repeating the point that the categories express in a 
singular fashion—in the form of a synthetic unity—that which is 
necessarily instanced in cases of empirical cognition, the discovery of 
whose shared structure, or transcendental conditions, are made 
                                                 
1A142/B181. 
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possible by reflection upon the mediating representation of the 
relevant transcendental schema.1 
The question to be pursued in the next section is whether Kant 
can sustain the distinction between the schemata corresponding to 
the categories and the schemata corresponding to the transcendental 
ideas.2We must ask whether the idea of a mediating representation 
(a transcendental schema) between empirical instances and a pure 
concept that represents a unity of reflection upon experience is 
sufficiently distinct from a “schema” that mediates between the 
actual unity of the understanding and a rational ideal of that unity. 
We can redress this as an inquiry into whether there is a 
defensible difference between “unity of reflection” and “guiding 
principle”. The obvious suggestion is that the former is intended to 
express a unity that is discovered, whereas the latter suggests a 
unity that is sought. But surely the latter unity is nevertheless 
“found” insofar as it is “found in our reason” as a result of reason 
being brought to bear on the pure understanding’s articulation of 
experience, whereas the former unity is “found” in experience as a 
consequence of the understanding’s reflection upon experience. 
Apart from the triple-tiered structure here (sensibility, the 
understanding, reason), the contrast appears to be a distinction 
between what is “found” in the pure understanding and what is 
“found” in the real use of reason. But the distinction between the 
Schematism of the Categories and the schema of the ideas cannot 
rest on this prior distinction, because then the only thing stopping 
the assimilation of the two faculties is that reason is said to be the 
faculty of inferring and that is precisely its formal function. But this 
                                                 
1Cf. Kant’s examples of the schemata at A142-147/B182-187, which he 
presents “according to the order of the categories and in connection with 
these” (A142/B181). 
2 Kant does not put his phrasing in exactly this manner, although I 
exploit the intelligibility of such a rendering in order to demonstrate the 
difficulty involved. He refers to the “schematism of the pure 
understanding” (A140/B179) and to a “schema” of the ideas(A670/B698), yet 
the former pertains the “procedure” of the understanding that is involved 
with the employment of schemata, whereas the “schema” of the ideas is 
confusedly phrased in the singular, whereas the fact that there are 
principally three “ideas” of traditional metaphysicaspecialis implies the 
plural “schemata” ought to be used.  
That this is not a terminological perversion of Kant can be argued on 
the grounds that Kant himself does not make the issue plain enough to 
forestall the objection by simply stipulating an inconsistent employment of 
the grouping principle of nouns. 
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is a stipulation. We can press further by claiming that since the 
understanding is already the faculty of judgment and already capable 
of immediate inferences based on both logical and non-logical 
conceptual content (as noted above), why not extend that capacity by 
admitting that valid inference is no more than that which occurs 
between judgments ordered in an appropriate form? And since the 
understanding is the capacity to judge, is it not also the capacity to 
judge well in particular cases, which is often (but not always) the 
outcome of what was formerly called “inference”?1We can lay these 
additional concerns to the side, however, since it is not our purpose 
to question Kant’s entire framework. 
At bottom it is the real use of reason—its being the source of 
principles—that is in question here; the formal use of reason as a 
faculty of inferring is left intact by the main objections above. 
However, if one is consistent one must admit that the two uses are 
co-dependent: when performed in all its variations, and ad infinitum, 
the subsumption of the minor premise of a syllogism under the 
conditions of concepts in the major premise leads to a search for the 
conditions of conditions; i.e., leads to a search for a totality of 
conditions, which Kant refers to as “the unconditioned”. So whilst we 
might question Kant’s explanation of “unconditioned” we seem bound 
to admit the real use of reason, if we are to justify its formal use.
                                                 
1Cf. Ginsborg (2006a). See also her (2006b, c, 2011). 
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The second section of the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, 
entitled “On the final aim of the natural dialectic of human reason”, is 
one of the most important in Kant’s corpus for understanding his 
theory of reason in its speculative use, and therefore serves as a key 
textual basis for understanding some of his most fundamental 
divergences from Hegel. Here Kant extends the discussion from the 
preceding section of the Appendix (“On the regulative use of ideas of 
pure reason”) by attempting to defend what he refers to as the 
“schema” of pure concepts of reason. This justification is called by 
Kant the “transcendental deduction” of the transcendental ideas,1 
and is honoured with being characterised as “the completion of the 
critical business of pure reason” (presumably not as a consequence of 
Kant’s argument occurring at the end of the Transcendental Doctrine 
of Elements).  
The parallel with the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories 
consists in the fact that in both cases Kant is attempting to vindicate 
the a priori employment of the thought-entities2 in question.3 He does 
this, in the Deduction of the Categories, by demonstrating that the 
synthesis, in objective judgments of experience,4 of the empirical 
manifold of intuition necessarily depends on their employment.5 In 
the deduction of the ideas, themselves ultimately inferred to on the 
                                                 
1A669-670/B697-698. 
2 I employ this phrase in a way that is intended to be neutral between 
Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophies. Hegel’s equivalent formulation would be 
“thought-determinations”. Kant employs the phrase “thought-entities” in 
The Amphiboly when discussing different versions of the concept of 
“nothing” (A292/B348). 
3 “One cannot avail oneself of a concept a priori with any security unless 
one has brought about a transcendental deduction of it.” (A669/B697) 
4 I will not discuss the import of the distinction between judgments of 
perception and judgments of experience, although an account of it would 
contribute to the arguments offered here. See Kant (1997/2004, §18). 
5Longuenesse understands the categories to be the expression, in terms 
of a pure concept, of the act whose form is the corresponding logical form of 
judgment, where it is the synthesis made by possible by the logical 
functions of judgment that make the unity of consciousness expressed by 
the categories possible in the first instance (Longuenesse (1998)). For 
criticism, see Allison (2000) and Sedgwick (2000); for a response see 
Longuenesse (2000). 
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basis of the three judgments of relation, which in truth are the major 
premises of their respective syllogistic forms, he does this by arguing 
for the impossibility of our having systematised, unified cognition1 
without them (the soul, the world-whole, God) to guide our thinking 
in a regulative fashion.  
It is important to recognise that whilst in both cases Kant would 
appear to be insisting upon our a priori warrant for employing pure 
concepts,2 only when these pure concepts have their origin in the 
understanding does Kant refer to them as “transcendental conditions 
of the possibility of experience”. So Kant is caught in ambiguity, 
since he denies pure concepts of reason this status in stating that 
with them one never gets beyond possible experience3 where an 
intuitional representation of them is impossible, yet insists upon 
their pragmatic necessity, insofar as ideas—purely rational 
entities—allow for systematised, unified cognition of empirical 
matters. This insistence upon pragmatic necessity does appear to 
constitute an appeal to another kind of “condition” of our having the 
experience we do have, or if ideas can be said to be unnecessary for 
our thinking, at least in the epistemological case of the scientific 
enterprise of searching for conditions of conditions, this can have 
appeal only on the same grounds that would place the theoretical 
security of the categories in doubt: scepticism about whether all 
rational subjects would need to think precisely this way in order to 
have a “rational”, “systematic”, “unified” “experience”.  
Of course, one does not get beyond possible experience when one 
employs the categories either, yet the categories can be said to be 
“satisfied” insofar as they represent the reflective unities of 
judgments.4Ideas, meanwhile, are never “satisfied”; they are 
inexhaustible. They must have this character if they are to function 
as principles and thereby “guide” cognition in the way Kant insists. 
As we just noted in §II.i, this much is so far insufficient to distinguish 
                                                 
1 Or even approximating to it, which might be all he means given his 
claim for the impossibility of knowing the unconditioned. 
2 Given Kant’s terms this sounds tautologous, although a careful 
empiricist might insist that there are certain “pragmatic” kinds of apriority 
on offer and that the concepts so employed are still nevertheless empirical 
(cf. Lewis (1923), Sellars (1953/1991)). 
3A702/B730. 
4 See A310/B366-7: “Concepts of the understanding are…thought a 
priori before experience and on behalf of it; but they contain nothing 
beyond the unity of reflection on appearances, insofar as these appearances 
are supposed to belong necessarily to a possible empirical consciousness.” 
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the pure understanding from the real use of reason; the real use of 
reason thereby being placed into question as a distinct function. 
The objection, put in a manner sympathetic to Hegel’s idealism, is 
that by denying us “knowledge” of ideas, Kant would seem to lose 
the courage of his convictions. He already insists on the necessity of, 
and pragmatic justification for, their employment, so why not allow 
our employment of them to constitute knowledge of (at least) our 
own rational capabilities, and therefore reason itself? (One might 
think this is trivial if we can only be said to know our capabilities 
through actualising them, and if actualising them is thought of as no 
more than doing as we do.) In any case, to equate “knowledge of 
ideas” with “knowledge of the rational capabilities possessed by 
oneself and the group of knowers to which one belongs” appears to 
be a great stretch of Kant’s position. Yet perhaps if pressed on the 
point Kant would not have denied this; perhaps such a position is 
implied by this remark:  
 
metaphysics, according to the concepts we will give of it here, is the 
only one of all the sciences that may promise that little and unified 
effort, and that indeed in a short time, will complete it in such a way 
that nothing remains to posterity…For it is nothing but the 
inventory of all we possess through pure reason, ordered 
systematically. Nothing here can escape us, because what reason 
brings forth entirely out of itself cannot be hidden, but is brought to 
light by reason itself as soon as reason’s common principle has been 
discovered. The perfect unity of this kind of cognition, and the fact 
that it arises solely out of pure concepts without any influence that 
would extend or increase it from experience or even particular 
intuition, which would lead to a determinate experience, make this 
unconditioned completeness not only feasible but also necessary. 
Tecum habita, et noris quam sit tibi curta supellex. – Persius.1 
 
Presumably “reason’s common principle” should be taken to be 
equivalent to the “transcendental concept of reason”: the “totality of 
conditions to a given conditioned thing.”2 In the passage above, Kant 
appears to characterise metaphysics as being concerned with the 
                                                 
1Axx. The translation of the Latin, provided at the bottom of the page—
Kant (1998, 104)—is: “Dwell in your own house, and you will know how 
simple your possessions are” (Persius, Satires 4:52). The italics in the 
second sentence are mine. 
2A322/B379. 
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topic of being-thought, or being-qua-thought,1 yet if we can impute 
this to him we can impute further conclusions which he may not have 
accepted readily and which would have caused him more grave 
difficulty. The most important of these is that we may well be said to 
have knowledge of ideas if we can claim to do metaphysics in Kant’s 
intended “scientific” sense, and indeed for basic Hegelian reasons; 
therefore, that we can have “knowledge of (the idea of) God”, in 
Hegel’s sense, where the idea and actuality cannot be separated.  
Kant distinguishes between objects given to reason “absolutely” 
and those given “in the idea” and says in the former case, unlike the 
latter, “my concepts go as far as determining the object”.2 In the 
latter case, there is “only a schema for which no object is given, not 
even hypothetically”, which is to insist that our postulation of ideas is 
precisely not a hypothetical claim that something we can 
nevertheless not know might still exist: recall that ideas are the 
paradigm of things-in-themselves. (This tells us Kant is no mere 
indispensability theorist about ontology; thus he is not a pragmatist 
even if he appears to have certain pragmatist leanings when he 
insists upon the primacy of the practical dimension of reason.) The 
restriction therefore follows from Kant’s refusal to allow claims 
about things-in-themselves, of which the purported referents of the 
pure concepts of reason, envisaged when in the grip of 
transcendental illusion, are taken to be archetypes. This should be 
taken to mean that no judgment can ever furnish one with an 
occasion to infer to the existence of an “object given in the idea” in 
the terminus of a syllogism; rather the “schema” of the idea (and 
then, the idea as its singular representation as a unity) shall be 
inferred to on the basis of a unity which it represents among 
judgments and under whose assumption the shared structure of such 
judgments can be revealed.  
Note this way of putting the point suggests the “schema” of an 
idea is precisely a representation of a distributive unity among 
judgments (where the inference to the existence of a collective unity 
                                                 
1 Cf. the assessment of Hegel’s reading of Kant in Longuenesse (2007, 
xvii). A make the, admittedly small, amendment to Longuenesse’s phrase in 
order to stress the fact that it is not only “something being thought” but 
also, equally, “being in its shape as thought”; and thus I mean also to imply 
that the question of matter and form ought to be in the forefront of our 
minds. 
2A670/B698. 
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is that which must be resisted)1 that is occasioned by the use of the 
judgments of relation in their role of the major premise of syllogisms. 
When it was said earlier that schemata of transcendental ideas were 
“metarepresentations” this is what was meant.2 
In cases where objects are given to reason “absolutely” one has 
occasion to infer, according to Kant, in a syllogistic fashion that leads 
to the further determination of both the things and the concepts 
contained in the major and minor premises. Recalling the comments 
above regarding the opposite directions in which one might syllogise 
(episyllogistically on the side of the conditioned or prosyllogistically 
on the side of the conditions), we can note that such determination 
terminates on the prosyllogistic side once the conditions employed in 
the syllogism can no longer be encountered in possible experience; 
one cannot encounter the summum genus in experience. On the 
episyllogistic side determination never terminates, due to the infinite 
divisibility of singular representations as evidenced in the fact that 
more “marks” can always be applied to objects of intuition. 
Nevertheless, given that intuitions are singular representations of 
fully determinable things (objects with properties/substances with 
accidents) an intuition is the paradigm of a representation of an 
infima species. 
As we shall see in §II.iii, this point about determination is 
relevant to the structure and function of symbolic representation of 
ideas of pure practical reason.3 
                                                 
1 See the contrast between “the distributive unity of the use of the 
understanding in experience” and “collective unity of a whole of 
experience” at the end of the Transcendental Ideal (A582-583/B610-611). 
2 Clearly “representation” can only be employed in an extended sense 
here; cf. the taxonomy at A319-320/B376-377. 
3 Recall that not all prosyllogisms are reflective: some are simply 
determinative judgments of objects of possible experience and therefore 
moreover require no deduction, since their being instanced is explained by 
the power of judgment, itself not further analysable (although such a 
capacity can be acquired, one either has a sound faculty of judgment, or 
does not). In his analysis of the Schematism in (2004, Chapter 8), Henry 
Allison points out that Kant’s apparent insistence that there “can be no 
rules for applying rules” (2004, 206) in some respects resembles 
Wittgenstein’s account of following a rule. See Bell (1987), to which Allison 
refers, for an account of this aspect of the Kant-Wittgenstein relation. 
The text to which Allison appeals is the following: “[A]lthough the 
understanding is certainly capable of being instructed and equipped 
through rules, the power of judgment is a special talent that cannot be 
taught but only practiced” (A133/B172). 
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For Kant, pure concepts of speculative reason enable the 
systematic unification of other objects by way of their “schema”; 
speculative use of transcendental ideas is only heuristic and not 
ostensive;1 they show “not how an object is constituted but how, 
under the guidance of that concept, we ought to seek after the 
constitution and connection of objects of experience in general.” I 
presume the words from “how” onwards express the meaning of 
Kant’s term “regulative”. 
Kant here seems to be saying that the pure concepts of reason can 
only be represented in the form of a schema, itself having the form of 
a principle, or set of principles, for the direction of cognition. Michelle 
Grier captures Kant’s point succinctly by condensing the expression 
of the transcendental illusion to the improper move from a sound 
epistemic injunction to an erroneous metaphysical hypothesis; that 
is, from 
 
P1: Find for the conditioned knowledge given through the 
understanding the unconditioned whereby unity is brought to 
completion.2 
 
To: 
 
P2: If the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions, 
subordinated to one another—a series which is therefore itself 
unconditioned—is likewise given, that is, contained in the object and 
its connection.3 
And of course, in this most general case, the transcendental 
illusion leads ultimately to the postulation of an erroneous form of 
the Transcendental Ideal: the ens realissimum in its guise as the 
anthropomorphic “God” of monotheism. In the cases of the pure 
concepts of reason, we have three interrelated forms of this same 
error, instanced as the soul, the world-whole, and God. 
We must now address the transcendental ideas proper; what, 
then, are the equivalent principles? Kant outlines these on A672-
673/B700-701, and the passage is worth quoting in full. He begins by 
outlining the task of transcendental psychology. 
 
                                                 
1A671/B699. 
2Grier (2001, 119). The numbered propositions (P1, P2) are Grier’s 
invention. Both statements are from A308/B364. 
3Grier (2001, 122). 
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Following the ideas named above [those of rational psychology, 
cosmology, and theology] as principles, we will first (in psychology) 
connect all appearances, actions, and receptivity of our mind to the 
growing thread of inner experience as if the mind were a simple 
substance that (at least in this life) persists in experience with 
personal identity, while its states—to which the states of the body 
belong only as external conditions—are continuously changing.  
 
The immediately following comment expresses the central task of 
transcendental cosmology: 
 
we have to pursue the conditions of the inner as well as the outer 
appearances of nature through an investigation that will nowhere be 
completed, as if nature were infinite in itself and without a first or 
supreme member—although, without denying, outside of all 
appearances, the merely intelligible primary grounds for them, we 
may never bring these grounds into connection with explanations of 
nature, because we are not acquainted with them at all.  
 
And, in a transcendental theology: 
 
we have to consider everything that might ever belong to the context 
of possible experience as if this experience constituted an absolute 
unity, but one dependent through and through, and always still 
conditioned within the world of sense, yet at the same time as if the 
sum total of appearances (the world of sense itself) had a single 
supreme and all-sufficient ground outside its range, namely an 
independent, original, and creative reason, as it were, in relation to 
which we direct every empirical use of our reason in its greatest 
extension as if the objects themselves had arisen from that original 
image of all reason.1 
 
Kant then reminds us of what this entails: 
 
That means: it is not from a simple thinking substance that we derive 
the inner appearances of our soul, but from one another in accordance 
with the idea of a simple being; it is not from a highest intelligence 
that we derive the order of the world and its systematic unity, but 
                                                 
1 The italics in the final clauses are mine. 
In view of the liberal dosage of the “as-if” epithet, note Erich Adickes 
objection to Kant on the grounds that he propounded an “as-if philosophy”. 
See Bielefeldt (2003, 35 n.73), and his reference to Eric Adickes’s (1927) 
Kant und die Als-Ob-Philosophie. This objection recalls Vaihinger’s 
objection to this same “as-if” character, which he claimed “indicates the 
merely fictitious nature of the ideas of reason”. 
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rather it is from the idea of a most wise cause that we take the rule 
that reason is best off using for its own satisfaction when it connects 
up causes and effects in the world. 
 
Kant admits that the psychological and theological case are distinct 
from the cosmological case, where the latter does run into 
contradiction in the Antinomies if it assumes a transcendental realist 
response to them. The former two do not run into a contradiction 
when applied in the transcendental realist’s sense, so must be 
resisted on the grounds that a mere lack of hindrance to their 
postulation does not provide them a permit; to think such a 
presumption was thereby warranted would not only amount to losing 
the world in the Meinongian Jungle, but would also rob the appeal to 
them of any significance.  
Kant’s next step provides grist for Hegel’s mill, for he admits that 
since the ideas of reason are unconstrained by the understanding, 
where the latter is necessary “for us to be able to have a determinate 
concept of any thing”,1 in thinking of them we are therefore thinking 
of a “Something about which we have no concept at all of how it is in 
itself, but about which we think a relation to the sum total of 
appearance, which is analogous to the relation that appearances have 
to one another.” Before moving to acknowledge Kant’s 
pronouncement that the greater “connectedness” among objects 
provided by the postulation of the ideas is their ultimate import, we 
must ask whether the “somethings” providing this could really be 
indeterminate in the way Kant is saying.  
The relevant lesson from Hegel to be borne in mind here is that 
“being” and “nothing”, “reality” and “negation”, and other similar 
categorial pairs cannot be separated from one another. In his 
discussion of “Something” in the “Determinate Being’ chapter, he 
says: 
 
Reality itself contains negation, is determinate being, not 
indeterminate, abstract being. Similarly, negation is determinate 
being, not the supposedly abstract nothing but posited here as it is in 
itself, as affirmatively present [als siend], belonging to the sphere of 
determinate being.2 
 
For Hegel, “Something is the first negation of negation”. Further, 
that the “negative of the negative is, as something, only the 
                                                 
1A674/B702. 
2Hegel (1969, 115). 
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beginning of the subject [Subjekt]—being-within-self, only as yet 
quite indeterminate.” That is, “something” must be determined to a 
greater degree in order to play the role it is called upon to play in 
Kant’s account. Hegel explains the point this way: 
 
something…determines itself further on, first, as a being-for-self and 
so on, until in the Concept it first attains the concrete intensity of the 
subject. At the base of all these determinations lies the negative 
unity with itself. But in all this, care must be taken to distinguish 
between the first negation as negation in general, and the second 
negation, the negation of the negation: the latter is concrete, absolute 
negativity, just as the former on the contrary is only abstract 
negativity.1 
 
And although Hegel is, in the examples he gives in this context, 
referring to finitude, the point holds for “something” in general, and 
the point is crucial for understanding Hegel’s distinct view of the 
idea of “God”. Even positing the idea of “God” as an abstract “most 
real being” (ens realissimum) as Kant does, regardless of the function 
he attributes to it, is to be led into great error, for in such a 
conception “God” becomes finite, like an abstract singular that 
simply cannot be known. Thus, the idea of “Something” cannot be 
determined without a sense of its negation as phrased in Hegel’s 
implicit inversion of Spinoza’s dictum omni determinatio est negatio.2 
And, since functioning “regulatively” as an ideal is akin to 
functioning as a limit (recall that “Limitation” is the category 
corresponding to infinite judgment), to employ a regulative ideal is to 
place a limit as a negation of a determinate concept and therefore 
involves determining the limit itself.3 Hegel therefore would say that 
if the transcendental ideas play any role in thinking at all, they are 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 115-116). 
2See Hegel’s (1969) discussion in the chapter on “Determinate Being” 
esp. the section on “Quality” (111-114). Hegel cites Spinoza’s phrase at 113. 
Note here also the remarks in the introduction to “Objectivity”, Section 
Two of The Subjective Logic, where Hegel recalls his discussions of the 
“totumrealitatis” from Doctrine of Being and Doctrine of Essence. He 
claims such an idea is mistaken if thought to exclude negation. 
3 Cf. Hegel (1969, 132): “In order that the limit which is in something as 
such should be a limitation, something must at the same time in its own self 
transcend the limit, it must in its own self be related to the limit as to 
something which is not.” Cf. the distinction between boundaries (which 
necessarily imply two sides) and limits (which, according to Kant, do not) in 
Kant (1997/2004, §57). 
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not mere “Somethings”, but rather, in virtue of their negative 
function, “Everythings”. That is, they are the negative unity of all 
determinations (both logical subjects and predicates) of the class in 
question. Further, the Transcendental Ideal, the ens realissimum, is 
the negative unity of all possible classes.1 They are therefore the 
ground of all determination and, in a peculiar sense, the most 
“determinate” thought entities, but now qua unities, not qua things.  
On this basis we might form the slogan that, for Hegel, “God” is 
the most determinate principle, or unity, of rational thought. 
Although given the points we’ve just made, it may be better to say 
“God” is that which is most “concrete”, because the term signifies the 
negative unity of all phenomena. Put in words more familiar to Kant, 
“God” is that concept that expresses the form and content of a 
rational system.2In fact, such an interpretation would cohere with 
Hegel’s notorious claim that the content of his entire Logic is an 
exposition of “God”, since the Absolute Idea is the form and content 
of the entire system as articulated in the dialectical logic of 
philosophy.3 
But what kind of “principle” would this be? If we buy Kant’s 
distinction between the understanding and reason, as reformulated 
by Hegel in a way that insists families of contrary determinations 
arise only in certain shapes of thought, which is as much as saying 
that they are relative to a given categorial framework. If sound, we 
would then say that “God” is the most determinate 
“metajudgmental” (or, perhaps, “metanormative”) principle that 
expresses the ground of the connections between all possible 
categorial frameworks which arise from “thought thinking itself”. 
This is not a clear explanation, but it is perhaps getting closer to 
what Hegel meant. 
These points can be brought to bear on Kant’s own explanation of 
the nature of ideas. He writes: 
 
We remove from the object of an idea those conditions that limit our 
concept of the understanding, but that also make it possible for us to 
be able to have a determinate concept of anything.4 
                                                 
1On the distinct senses of “being” as ontological (Aristotle) and 
henological (Plato), see Henrich (2003, Ch. 6, esp. 85-86 & Chs. 20-21). 
2Cf. Longuenesse’s reading of Kant’s concept of God and the ens 
realissimumin Longuenesse (1992/2007, 1995/2007, 1995/2005). See also 
Buchdahl (1992b), and, for a slightly different angle (1992a). 
3Hegel (1969, 51). 
4A674/B702. 
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And by connecting the concept of “limit” with “determination”, 
betrays an implicit sympathy with the idea of a limit functioning to 
determine.1 For if the “conditions that limit our concept” “make it 
possible to have a determinate concept” such limiting conditions do 
function to determine; therefore, that which a thing is not serves to 
determine that thing. 
Now, Kant is unwilling to grant the status of objective reality to 
the thought entities that serve to determine our cognition in this way 
unless they are formulated as schemata, as explained above. And yet 
he allows that a schema is a principle, or set of principles, whose 
status as such is justified by the greater systematic unity for 
thinking achieved through its postulation. No specific details beyond 
these regarding how a schema must be constructed in order to allow 
for the idea for which it is a schema to count as subjectively valid are 
provided, and the justification seems to rely on the idea of success in 
practice to an unacceptable extent, for a justification in pragmatic 
terms of the ideas of metaphysica specialis is based on a petitio 
principii: Kant finds them useful because they allow for a systematic 
unity whose structure he has already argued for on their basis. Of 
course, this objection is not necessarily devastating—Kant’s circle 
may perhaps be seen as virtuous—yet it prompts one to entertain 
alternate possible accounts of rationality.  
A question that recommends itself here is whether Hegel has a 
way of overcoming this difficulty, perhaps through his employment 
of a conception of reason that itself is not open to the charge of 
“abstractly (rational) grounding of postulated highest concepts”. As 
recent scholarship has argued,2 Hegel does in fact seem to provide a 
solution to Kant’s formalism with his key concept “recognition” 
(Anerkennung).3Such literature usually claims that Hegel’s social and 
historical account of reason is to be grounded on this basic concept. 
Part of the problem to which Hegel’s account of this concept is an 
answer4 is that of demonstrating the conditions of thinkers coming to 
                                                 
1 Cf. the distinction in the Appendix to Maimon (2010), entitled 
“Symbolic Cognition and Philosophical Language”, between a “limit” and a 
“boundary”, where it is only in the latter, in its geometrical instantiation, 
that properly functions to determine. 
2See, for example, Williams (1992) and Redding (1996).  
3 One of the cognates of the term is a performative: “anerkennen”. This 
would be a key mode in which to explicate Hegel’s theory, since it focuses 
attention on the performances of acknowledgment themselves. 
4 Cf. the title of Pippin (2000). 
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be reasonable in the first place; the very possibility of such a thing as 
reason or rationality and, therefore, rational ideas and ideals of the 
kind to which Kant appeals. We will come to that issue later, and for 
now will restrict ourselves to details in the following paragraphs and 
come to a summary of Kant’s overall position regarding the schemata 
of the transcendental ideas. 
Kant had said that ideas are not “mere figments of the brain”,1 
but rather useful parts of our cognitive economy. This commits him 
to a distinction between illusory rational phenomena that 
presumably do not have a proper role in cognition, and other rational 
phenomena whose employment is secured by pragmatic 
considerations. This is equivalent to a distinction between helpful 
and unhelpful illusions and reminds one of current fictionalist 
positions, for if we cannot claim to “know” the objects of ideas and 
ideals they too must be dubbed speculative and must not be thought 
of as objects of “knowledge”; they simply aid knowledge. But on what 
basis can we claim they do this? Kant is in deep water here since the 
distinction between “helpful” and “unhelpful” illusions presupposes 
we know antecedently how to distinguish the two. But if we have no 
access to the “objects” of ideas and ideals (the “object given in the 
idea”) then we have no way of knowing if supposedly “helpful” 
illusions really are helpful. In other words, we must grant that we do 
know something about these entities, via their effects, and it must be 
admitted we only ever know anything in virtue of its effects, 
whatever these may be (a triviality).2 
Again, Kant’s basic self-defence is that the reward is not an 
extension beyond possible experience, but an extension of “the 
empirical unity of those objects” of possible experience, primarily 
afforded by the syllogistic connections between judgments about 
empirical phenomena, whose interconnections are guided by reason’s 
ideal of systematic unity. Recall that this basic ideal expresses the 
commonality between the real and formal uses of reason and their 
interaction in theoretical contexts. Now, Kant’s position can be 
revealed as unsatisfying, and Hegel’s motivation for characterising 
transcendental idealism as a “subjective idealism” understood, for 
Kant says further that 
 
                                                 
1A569/B597. 
2 In fact, Kant’s transformation of the principle of sufficient reason has 
been read as an argument for the exhaustive application of the causal 
principle to appearances. See Longuenesse (2005a).  
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this [the above paraphrased view] proves it is reason’s speculative 
interest and not its insight which justifies it in starting from a point 
lying so far beyond its sphere in order to consider its objects in one 
complete whole.1 
 
This is a weak attempt at justification. In this context, Kant proposes 
“relative” and “absolute” presupposition, which simply pushes the 
argument a further stage back, and one is prompted to raise anew 
the question of how reason could have a “speculative interest” that 
was radically divorced from “insight”, not only into the basic 
structure of its own activity (which is, after all, worldly), but also into 
the world about which one reasons. After all, reason’s activity occurs 
in the empirically real world, even if it is only comprehensible as such 
given the perspective of transcendental idealism. 
Some additional criticisms recommend themselves. It must be 
noticed that Kant does not vindicate the regulative employment of 
just any metaphysical ideas, but specifically those traditional objects 
of metaphysica specialis, where the sheer systematic unity granted 
by them for our thinking is that to which Kant appeals in his 
justification for their employment. This seems insufficient, for might 
there not be an infinite plethora of “ideas” which could play this 
function? One could ask whether there might not be alternate 
rational functions which might supersede them; one could be 
sceptical about the very idea of “systematic unity” on 
Wittgensteinian or anti-essentialist grounds, although it is not clear 
what the alternative to (some kind of) systematicity is apart from 
nihilism. 
Although Kant argues for the transcendental employment of the 
ideas of rational psychology, cosmology, and theology on the basis of 
his theory of judgment of relation, the point just made above still 
stands: the distinction between helpful and unhelpful illusions 
presupposes a way of distinguishing the two. And claiming that it is 
in reason’s “interest” rather than its “insight” to employ such ideas 
presupposes that it is a sound principle of rationality to do so; and 
this is an instance of the same error. How can it be in “reason’s 
interest” to employ certain principles, unless those principles are 
truly sound, and bear some intrinsic connection with that to which 
they apply, or that to which they are brought to bear upon (in 
                                                 
1A676/B704; my emphasis. 
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psychology, cosmology, theology)?Longuenesse signals her interest 
in answering this question:1 
 
It would be desirable to specify in the case of each idea (the soul, the 
world, God, or the ens realissimum) what its specific regulative role 
is, and how it relates to the form of systematicity expounded in the 
first section of the appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic (A642–
68/ B670–96). Within the limits of this chapter, my goal was only to 
clarify the role of the idea of a totum realitatis and the related ideal 
(hypostatized singular object, ens realissimum).2 
 
Kant does say, after all, in the expression of an ambiguous attitude to 
his, on other occasions, clearly expressed position regarding rational 
possibility (non-contradictoriness = conceivability = possibility) at 
A673-4/B701-2: 
 
we cannot be allowed to introduce mere thought-entities that 
transcend all our concepts, though they contradict none of them, as 
real and determinate objects merely on credit, just so that 
speculative reason can complete its business as it likes.   
 
                                                 
1We should ask what the logical structures of the schemata of each of 
the pure concepts of reason are. We have already noted that the ideas arise 
from the thoroughgoing [durchgängig] employment of the judgments of 
relation, yet it seems more can be said. The “schema of God”, for instance, 
is arguably the “principle of complete determination”, as extended to the 
omnitudorealitatis and onto the ens realissimum, prior to the tripartite 
transformation (mentioned by Kant at A583/B611, n.*) that ends in the 
postulation of an anthropomorphic God. But what about the “schema of the 
soul” and the “schema of the world-whole”? Since these three schemata are 
together necessary for the systematised, unified character of possible 
experience the articulation of each is only coherent in the context of the 
others (cf. the quote from A672-673/B700-701 above).  
For a clue regarding the basic structure of the suggested “schema of a 
world-whole”, from the Antinomies, see the table of the “four cosmological 
ideas, according to the four headings of the categories,” that arise “if one 
selects those that necessarily carry with them a series in the synthesis of 
the manifold.” (A415/B442 & ff.) 
On this basis we might speculate thus: the schema of the “world-whole” 
is the abstract unity in virtue of which spatio-temporally conditioned, 
indexical, judgments, can be thought of as being “held together” in one 
possible experience. 
2Longuenesse (1995/2005, 234 n.25). 
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And this seems perfectly sound if one construes speculative reason 
as entirely unconstrained by empirical considerations. Namely, 
rationalist metaphysics should be denied its claims to know anything 
about merely speculated entities. But now one must ask, given 
Kant’s self-assigned task to offer a critique of metaphysics, why is he 
defending the pure concepts of reason at all? Why does he offer 
revised, “critically-reduced” versions of them? We can forestall this 
objection by first noting that simply because Kant employs the same 
words for these ideas as the tradition he may nevertheless envisage 
them differently from the tradition, yet the distinct functionality 
does not on its own necessitate a different word.  
The different version Kant might have offered would have been 
close enough to be almost a terminological variant, and Kant is not in 
the business of making a name for himself with unnecessarily novel 
terminology, as he tells us, in speaking of the term “idea”, and having 
made reference to Plato: 
 
In the great wealth of our languages, the thinking mind nevertheless 
often finds itself at a loss for an expression that exactly suits its 
concept, and lacking this it is able to make itself rightly intelligible 
neither to others nor even to itself. Coining new words is a 
presumption to legislate in language that rarely succeeds, and before 
we have recourse to the dubious means it is advisable to look around 
in a dead and learned language to see if an expression occurs in it that 
is suitable to this concept; and even the ancient use of this expression 
[“idea”] has become somewhat unsteady owing to the inattentiveness 
of its authors, it is better to fix on the meaning that is proper to it 
(even if it is doubtful whether it always had exactly this sense) than 
to ruin our enterprise by making ourselves unintelligible.1 
 
We note now that Kant’s accordance of objective reality to the 
schema of the transcendental idea (from which follows its objective 
validity) rests upon the possibility of showing that “all rules of the 
empirical use of reason under the presupposition of such an object in 
the idea lead to systematic unity”.2 Kant says strongly that if this is 
possible, “then it is a necessary maxim of reason to proceed in 
accordance with such ideas”. Specifically, it is the greater cultivation 
and correction of the “systematic unity of the manifold of empirical 
                                                 
1A311-312/B368-369. One is pushed to speculate as to whether Kant 
would have approved of Hegel’s linguistic innovations and, if so, what in 
them he would have approved of. (Part of what he would have disapproved 
of is clear from this remark alone.) On this compare Kant (1996b, 5:10, 145). 
2A671/B699. 
77 
II.ii ~ The Schemata of the Transcendental Ideas 
cognition” afforded by the transcendental ideas that vindicates them; 
that is, such advantages they have over the “mere use of principles of 
understanding.”  
If the line of argument thus far is cogent, we can say that the 
success of the employment of such principles is due to the fact that 
they tell us something about the multiplicity of elements of the 
empirically actual world of sense, and the appropriate manner of 
investigating them; namely, that they do actually have the “form of a 
system” of the kind that reason does, as argued for by Kant in the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment,1 and that this is the reason for 
the success of the application of the principles. The implication is 
therefore that Kant is wrong to deny the possibility of hypothetical 
existence claims about them; for even if Hegel’s claims regarding 
“knowledge of God” are to be denied, this does mean one can say 
nothing at all. 
Rather, since Kant does after all grant that the schemata of the 
pure concepts of reason represent forms of unity among judgments 
of relation (categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive), perhaps he ought 
to have allowed that the pure concepts of reason themselves (the 
soul, the world-whole, God) are the proper names of the sets of 
judgments represented as a unity by the relevant schemata. 
Recall that Kant is here signalling the potential for thought-
entities that are not, and cannot be, imagistically represented to 
extend and improve cognition and attributes such actions to reason. 
From what does this conviction stem? The basic thought depends 
first on the fact that singular instances, as of empirically given 
individuals, cannot possibly “extend” cognition because their 
cognitive value is insufficiently general; cognition can only be 
extended through entities that are abstract and general and, 
therefore, express laws or rules for the application of concepts. Yet 
Kant’s distinction between “ideas” and “ideals” (the Transcendental 
Ideal)2 and a priori concepts cannot rest on this, because, as we’ve 
                                                 
1Kant (2000, First Introduction, see esp. IV, 20:208-209, 13 and V, 
20:216, 19). See also A680/B708: “The unity of reason is the unity of a 
system, and this systematic unity does not serve reason objectively as a 
principle, extending it over objects, but subjectively as a maxim, in order to 
extend it over all possible empirical cognition of objects.” 
2 It is peculiar that Kant speak of “ideals” in the plural at the beginning 
The Ideal of Pure Reason, yet in the section “The Transcendental Ideal” 
insists that there is “only one genuine transcendental ideal of which human 
reason is capable” (A583/B611). 
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noted, Kant insists that the schemata of the categories, let alone the 
categories themselves, can never be instanced in experience. 
Indeed, the contrast here seems to rest on a further distinction 
between what is “contained” in the pure understanding and what is 
“contained” in reason. Unlike the fortune of the understanding, 
occasion never arises where one can say that reason’s pure concepts 
are “found” in experience, even as a “reflective unity of the 
manifold”; ideas are inferred concepts and therefore by definition 
collectively constitute a “beyond” of experience, albeit one that has 
some bearing on experience itself.  
Therefore, the answer stems partly from the prior distinction 
between the understanding and reason;1 a distinction which in this 
case involves claiming there are concepts whose application can be 
vindicated a priori simply because experience cannot be 
knowledgeable (cannot be “experience” in the philosophical sense 
intended) without them. Reason, meanwhile, is conceived of by Kant 
as necessary for “comprehension”2 in the sense which implies the 
formation of a systematised, unified body of thought whose empirical 
investigations are, to restate Kant’s apparently contradictory view, 
“guided” by that which is not instantiated in them. 
Kant says that the objective reality of pure concepts is “founded 
solely on the fact that because they constitute the intellectual form of 
all experience, it must always be possible to show their application in 
experience.”3 And recall that the demonstration of the application of 
the categories in experience occurred through demonstration of the 
“import” of their “transcendental time-determinations”, as schemata. 
The schemata of the ideas of pure reason admit of no such validation, 
however. Again, this sounds suspiciously similar to Kant’s claim that 
the schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding are never 
instanced in experience.4 We are thus impelled to question if and how 
Kant can make a consistent and clear distinction between the 
schemata of the categories and the schemata of the transcendental 
ideas; that is, between the pure concepts of the understanding and 
the pure concepts of reason.  
Putting the proper names of the entities in the latter form draws 
attention to the commonality at a superficial level, yet we are pushed 
to ask whether the similarity may be more than superficial. Or at 
                                                 
1 Which Hegel, at (1971, §467 Z, 226), says, Kant was the first to 
recognise and for which he was to be applauded. 
2A311/B368. Cf. Hegel (1969, 755). 
3A310/B367. 
4A142/B181. 
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least we cannot rule such a possibility out in considering how else one 
might formulate the distinction between the two faculties. Our 
question then is whether Kant’s distinction between reason and the 
understanding is appropriate; not that it might be discarded, but that 
it might be reconceived in order to capture the idea that there can be 
categorial structures employed in the garnering of empirical 
knowledge (experience) that are transformed and guided by 
rationality. Put thus, it is clear that this is at least part of what Hegel 
attempts to exposit in his dialectical logic: the transitions from one 
categorial framework to another, which can be termed “rational” 
insofar as such transitions to successor frameworks are motivated by 
explanatory failures necessitated by the structures of predecessor 
frameworks. 
To take a related but slightly different angle, notice that our most 
basic guiding question so far can be put this way: “How is Hegel’s 
conception of reason different from Kant’s?” So we must now ask: 
“What would the equivalent be in Hegel’s philosophy (if there is one), 
of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of reason?” 
More narrowly: “Is there an equivalent in Hegel’s philosophy of 
Kant’s transcendental deduction of ‘God’, qua pure concept of 
reason?”1 
As mentioned above, if one takes Hegel’s remarks in the 
Introduction to the Logic2 seriously, and is sympathetic to an 
interpretation of Hegel as a transcendental philosopher (conceived 
very broadly),3 then one might be tempted to suppose that the Logic, 
as a whole, is itself this transcendental (rather, for Hegel, dialectical 
and speculative) deduction of the idea of “God”. Yet what that means 
                                                 
1 “Now if one can show that although the three kinds of transcendental 
ideas…cannot be referred directly to any object corresponding to them and 
to its determination, and nevertheless that all rules of the empirical use of 
the understanding under the presupposition of such an object in the idea 
lead to systematic unity, always extending the cognition of experience but 
never going contrary to experience, then it is a necessary maxim of reason 
to proceed in accordance with such ideas. And this is the transcendental 
deduction of all the idea of speculative reason, not as constitutive principles 
for the extension of cognition to more objects than experience can give, but 
as regulative principles for the systematic unity of the manifold of empirical 
cognition in general” (A671/B699).  
2Hegel (1969, 50). 
3 To get some idea of the suggestion, and its difficulties, see Williams 
(1985). 
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is not clear when so stated and much more detail would have to be 
added to make the comparison even slightly illuminating. 
The role of negation here must be stated more clearly, in order 
that the present point can be clarified. Kant’s remarks about the 
systematic unity afforded by the transcendental idea of “God” at 
A672-3/B700-1 provide some starting points for comparison. In short, 
Kant says it is necessary to (1) consider everything belonging to 
possible experience as if it was part of an “absolute unity” qua “world 
of sense”;1 (2) consider the “sum total of appearances” qua “world of 
sense”, as if it had “a single supreme and all sufficient ground outside 
its range” to be understood as “an independent, original, and creative 
reason…in relation to which we direct every empirical use of our 
reason in its greatest extension”; (3) consider “objects themselves” 
as if they had “arisen from that original image of all reason”. 
We might indeed ask whether the fact that all cognition is 
“regulated” by reason means that comprehension of objects does in 
fact arise from the “original image of all reason”. In other words, we 
must ask whether one can distinguish the phrase  
 
“comprehension of objects, qua objects about which one can 
reason”, 
 
from the phrase  
 
“comprehension of objects, qua objects given to reason”,2 
 
                                                 
1 At A677/B705, when referring to the idea of a world-whole, Kant says 
“I can nevertheless assume such an incomprehensible being, the object of a 
mere idea, relative to the world of sense, though not in itself.” Clearly the 
point follows for the concept of “God”, and therefore the ens realissimum. 
This is just one piece of text that recommends Longuenesse’s “critically-
reduced” interpretation of the ens realissimum to the purely rationalist, 
metaphysical interpretation. 
2This phrasing calls to mind Kant’s distinction between objects given to 
reason as “an object absolutely” and those given only as an “object in the 
idea” (A670/B698). The present point is that that distinction is not as 
straightforward as Kant assumes. Although Kant uses “given” in both 
cases here, it seems clear that objects “given” “in the idea” are not strictly 
“given” from anywhere, but postulated as a rational ground for systematic, 
unified cognition. The way this has been phrased in the two examples 
draws attention to the fact that reason itself has no way of distinguishing 
the origins of objects given to it; this is only possible with the 
understanding and through the refinement of the capacity to judge well. 
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where the former makes no distinction between an “inner” and an 
“outer” of the “materials” available to rationality, and the latter 
characterises “reason” as that to which “material” is “given” to work 
on. Notice that the apparent difficulty disappears once one clarifies 
what it means for something to be “available” or “given” to “reason”. 
Presumably all that is required is that that thing is in a form 
amenable to processes of rationalisation, and clearly material 
presented in judgmental form is precisely that, regardless of its 
sources (experience, or pure reason). 
Importantly, Kant’s conception of human reason is formulated as 
a “weak copy” of the “self-sufficient reason” of the being possessing 
“highest perfection (“God”).”1 Hegel, meanwhile, conceives of this 
relation differently, due to his conception of the transformative 
power of the dialectically negative moment of reason. Free self-
consciousness is truly infinite, due to it not consisting in any 
particular, abstract, finite moment, but rather in the capacity for self-
creation.2 This is not to reduce the “True Infinite” to self-
actualisation, a-la Sartre, because each of the slew of appearances is 
to be thought of as “moments” of the “Idea”, or “Concept”.3 Namely, 
self-consciousness is capable of self-transformation through the 
emergence of linguistic, sign-making consciousness (the intelligence 
in action) and thereby also the transformation of the phenomena 
implicated in such “shapes of consciousness”. 
According to Hegel, Kant would therefore be in error in saying: “I 
can never assume the existence of this thing-in-itself, because none of 
the concepts through which I can think any object determinately will 
attain to it, and the conditions for the objective validity of my 
concepts are excluded by the idea itself.”4 Hegel can simply ask why 
the “existence” of a transcendental idea, i.e., the ens realissimum, 
would depend on it being determined positively through concepts; 
why could it not be determined negatively through the kind of 
structure that is schematised by infinite judgment?5 It is important 
to clarify what is meant by “existence” here.  
Note first that two broad senses of “existence” are in play in the 
philosophical tradition which Kant and Hegel inherit. The first of 
these is an Aristotelian notion of “being” which, despite its range of 
                                                 
1A678/B706. 
2 Cf. Wallace (2005) on the “True Infinite”. 
3Cf. Aquila (1985). 
4A676-677/B704-705; my emphasis. 
5 See Chapter 3, §III.i. 
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uses,1 essentially amounts to the sense of “existence” to which Kant 
refers here: something determinable. The second sense is that of 
Platonic “unity”. One could capture Kant’s argument regarding the 
transcendental ideas by saying that one should not confuse rational 
unities with existing objects. After all, since one cannot find occasion 
in possible experience to point to their “existence” one cannot make 
existence claims about them. But Kant, being an acute and deep 
thinker, realises that the road to nominalism is a rough one; one that 
turns out to be other than it seems at the first step. So he does 
commit himself to a theoretical claim for Platonic unities, conceived 
in an “ideal” sense. And as we’ve seen, Hegel’s alternate inheritance 
of Plato through the neo-Platonic tradition of Proclus allows him a 
careful criticism of this Kantian resistance to knowledge of “ideas”, 
qua unities.2 
Put in more contemporary terms, Kant’s sense of “existence”, as 
pertaining to the Aristotelian sense of “being”, belongs to an 
empiricist, verificationist sentiment; recall Hegel’s repeated 
criticisms of Kant’s “empiricist” tendencies.3 Kant does, after all, say 
that we do not find the object of the idea in possible experience 
represented by the “sensation”, qua “matter of appearance”, 
therefore we cannot make determinate claims about its “existence”; 
it being therefore urgent to recall that the ens realissimum itself, on 
Kant’s account, is the ground of determining anything completely. 
Yet Kant is therefore faced with what appears to be a contradiction: 
 
                                                 
1Cf. Brentano (1862/1975) on the four basic senses of “Being” in 
Aristotle.  
2 Observe Kant’s remarks in his Geography Lectures: “we have to know 
the objects of our experience as a whole so that our knowledge does not 
form an aggregate but rather a system; in a system it is the whole that 
comes before the parts, whereas in an aggregate the parts are first…The 
idea [Die Idee] is architectonic; it creates the sciences. For example, he who 
wants to build a house first creates for himself the idea of a whole, from 
which all the parts will be derived. So our present preparation is an idea of 
the knowledge of the world. Here we make for ourselves in a similar way 
an architectonic concept, which is a concept wherein the manifold is derived 
from the whole. (9:158; cf. A832/B860; cited in Louden (2000, 23); the 
emphases are mine). 
3Hegel’s mature view of this aspect of Kant is expressed most clearly 
See “The Second Position of Thought with Respect to Objectivity” in Hegel 
(1991b, esp. §§40-60 on "The Critical Philosophy"). 
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(i) It is a condition is completely determining any thing (X) 
that one compares it with “the whole of possibility”,1 which 
is the same thing as “the sum total of all predicates of 
things in general”. This is conceived of here as a 
singularity, the Transcendental Ideal in individuo, “an 
individual thing which is determinable, or even 
determined, through the idea2 alone”:3 the ens realissimum. 
This conception is a dialectical transformation of the idea of 
a “storehouse of predicates” (conceived of as an “All of 
reality”: omnitudo realitatis)4 that are applicable to all 
objects of possible experience.  
Such a dialectical transformation seems to be comparable 
to what Kant later characterises as that from the 
“distributive use of understanding in experience, into the 
collective unity of a whole of experience.”5 Those which do 
not apply to the thing in question therefore serve as 
limiting predications, for they are those predicates which 
are not satisfied by that thing.6 
(ii) But, some predicates are therefore negative 
determinations or “limits” of X, and this ought to imply 
that the negative determinations (failures to satisfy) of the 
thing in question necessarily admit of comparison with, by 
contrast, the positive determinations (satisfactions) of the 
predicates as applied to the ens realissimum.7 
                                                 
1A572/B600. 
2The idea which Kant refers to here seems to be the omnitudorealitatis, 
as mentioned in the Transcendental Ideal.  
3A568/B596. 
4 Recall that “singularity” is the form of judgment corresponding to the 
category of “totality”. Recall also that no judgment can have the form of 
singularity, except under the qualification that one conceive of the form of a 
so-called “singular judgment” on the model of a universal judgment; the 
predicate applied to the subject in question “applies to all of it” in the way 
that the predicate applied to a universal applies to it in its status as 
universal; that is, “to all of it”. 
5A582/B610. 
6 “…in order to cognise a thing completely one has to cognise 
everything possible and determine the thing through it, whether 
affirmatively or negatively.” (A573/B601) 
7 Cf. Hegel’s remarks in his discussion of “Determinate Being”: “In 
connection with the term ‘reality’, mention must be made of the former 
metaphysical concept of God which, in particular, formed the basis of the 
so-called ontological proof of the existence of God. God was defined as the 
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(iii) But, no predicates can be positive “determinations” of the 
ens realissimum, against which the thing is being compared 
transcendentally, because the latter cannot be determined 
at all, given that of it we cannot have an objective 
cognition.  
(iv) Therefore, Kant’s argument fails, at a basic level, by failing 
to explain adequately how the contrast between something 
satisfying a predicate, or failing to satisfy it, is possible at 
the level of the principle of complete determination; 
therefore, Kant fails to provide the bare minimum that 
ascertainment of truth requires. 
This is, however, unless Kant has some other way of 
explaining the contrast between satisfying, or failing to 
satisfy, a predicate at this level of abstraction.1 
                                                                                                                            
sum-total of all realities, and of this sum-total it was said that no 
contradiction was contained in it, that none of the realities cancelled any 
other; for a reality is to be taken only as a perfection, as an affirmative 
being which contains no negation. Hence the realities are not opposed to 
one another and do not contradict one another. Reality thus conceived is 
assumed to survive when all negation has been thought away; but to do this 
is to do away with all determinateness.” (112) And further on: “When 
reality, taken as a determinate quality as it is in the said definition of God, 
is extended beyond its determinateness it ceases to be reality and becomes 
abstract being; God as the pure reality in all realities, or as the sum total of 
all realities, is just as devoid of determinateness and content as the empty 
absolute in which all is one. If, on the other hand, reality is taken in its 
determinateness, then, since it essentially contains the moment of the 
negative, the sum-total of all realities becomes just as much a sum-total of 
all negations, the sum-total of all contradictions; it becomes then 
straightaway the absolute power in which everything determinate is 
absorbed; but reality itself is, only in so far as it is still confronted by a 
being which it has not sublated; consequently, when it is thought as 
expanded into realised, limitless power, it becomes the abstract nothing. 
The said reality in all realities, the being in all determinate being, which is 
supposed to express the concept of God, is nothing else than abstract being, 
which is the same as nothing.” (113) In this last sentence Hegel seems to be 
implicitly denouncing Kant’s concept of God. 
1 Kant says the “aim of reason with its ideal is…a complete 
determination in accordance with a priori rules; hence it thinks for itself an 
object that is to be thoroughly determinable in accordance with principles, 
even though the sufficient conditions for this are absent from experience, 
and thus the concept itself is transcendent.” (A571/B599) There is here an 
ambiguity: by saying the concept is “transcendent” (which suggests a 
conditioner outside or inaccessible to cognition)Kant seems to commit 
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The argument just presented is in effect Hegel’s argument against 
the rationalist conception of a “sum-total of all realities”, which he 
denounces in each of the books of the Logic: in his discussion of 
“Determinate Being” in the Doctrine of Being, in his remark on “The 
Law of Contradiction” in the Doctrine of Essence, and his preamble 
to the “Objectivity” section of the Doctrine of the Concept. This 
critique of a rationalist conception of a “sum-total of all realities” 
goes hand in hand with Hegel’s reformulation of the idea of “God”.  
Note, however, that Kant draws a distinction between “logical 
negation” and “transcendental negation”, where the former is 
“indicated solely by the little word ‘not,’” and “is never properly 
attached to a concept, but rather only to its relation to another 
concept in a judgment, and therefore is far from sufficient to 
designate a concept in regard to its content.”1 Recall that by 
“content” here Kant is referring to intuitional content: the presence 
to consciousness of something empirical to which a concept is applied; 
this suggests that for Kant “logical negation” is purely truth-
functional, since it is determined solely by the validity and truth of 
judgments. 
Transcendental negation, on the other hand, “signifies non-being 
in itself, and is opposed to transcendental affirmation, which is a 
Something, the concept of which in itself already expresses a being, 
and hence it is called reality (thinghood), because through it alone, 
and only insofar as it reaches, are objects Something (things);2 the 
opposed negation, on the contrary, signifies a mere lack, and where 
this alone is thought, the removal of every thing is represented.”3 
It is clear how Hegel’s response to this claim would go: The 
distinction between “non-being” and “something” is, for idealist 
                                                                                                                            
himself to the rationalist conception of possibility, where saying 
“transcendental” (which would have suggested “condition”) would have 
been in harmony with transcendental idealist conception of cognitive 
possibility, as in “possible experience”. The vagueness here seems to be a 
confusion about the words “the aim of reason” and “it thinks for itself”, 
where it is suggested later in the section that reason is led into error in its 
employment of the Transcendental Ideal, and so really should be said to 
here to fail to think for itself. After all, how can thought be said to occur if it 
is a failure?  
1A574/B602. 
2 The Aristotelian flavour of this paragraph must be noted. Recall the 
remarks above regarding the contrast between “being” and “unity”. 
3A574-575/B602-603. 
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logical purposes, parallel to that between “being” and “nothing”, and 
both of these duos of categories are entirely inadequate attempts to 
think something much more complex that cannot be thought in such 
abstract terms; moreover, not only are these categories not thinkable 
in such terms, but they are identical when so thought: “non-being” is 
equivalent to “something” as much as “being” is equivalent to 
“nothing”.1 Kant should have realised this, since he does say that “no 
one can think a negation determinately without grounding it on the 
opposed affirmation”;2 where there is in this statement nothing to 
preclude that affirmations and negations are simply relative 
contraries.   
Of course, Kant means that “realities contain the data, the 
material, so to speak, or the transcendental content, for the 
possibility and the thoroughgoing [durchgängig] determination of all 
things.”3 But this can’t be quite right, since “thinking about 
something” is usually not conceived of as static state,4 but instead 
usually implies an alteration in consciousness and therefore an 
alteration of the relationship between the relata of the relation; there 
is no “given” material qua cognitive, only “given” material qua 
physically conceived processes in nature. That Kant knows this is 
evident in his admittance in the Critique of Practical Reason that 
freedom depends upon the (sound) possibility of thinking of oneself 
                                                 
1 An argument of this form is presented in Volume One, Book One, 
Section One, Chapter One, of Hegel (1969). See also Hegel’s discussion of 
“Something” at the level of “Determinate Being” at 114-116 & ff.  
2A575/B603. 
3A575/B603. 
4 We might say, insofar as one is not making progress or changing one’s 
state of mind one is not thinking at all. If accurate, this would give credence 
to the idea that people with “fixed ideas” do not think. From Hegel’s 
perspective, the confusion is to equate an episode of sheer feeling with 
thinking; thought and rationality are hereby paired. However, one might 
advance a criticism here along the lines that much thinking is unconscious 
and there is no uncontentious way to divide “conscious” from “unconscious” 
thought processes, simply because the exact relationship between “having 
a thought” (at the cognitive, unarticulated level) and “expressing a 
thought” (at the communicative level) is theoretically problematic. One way 
out is to stipulate that the ineffable is, as such, to be excluded from the 
realm of “thought”; this is simply to stipulate that thinking is inherently 
communicable, and this seems fairly agreeable. As stipulations go, this one 
seems as good as any, especially in a domain where one seems necessary. 
87 
II.ii ~ The Schemata of the Transcendental Ideas 
other than as a natural object;1 it is also the basis, in the Critique of 
the Power of Judgment for his Dialectic of Teleology where he 
admits that it is necessary to conceive of oneself as both an object in 
mechanistic nature as well as a purposive subject whose action is to 
be conceived in teleological terms. 
So, when Kant equates “reality” with the presence of sensation, 
he seems merely to be flagging a necessary condition of thinking of 
oneself as affected by the objects one knows in their guise as 
phenomena; in so doing, however, he is misconstruing the meaning of 
“reality”, since for the same reasons that “being” and “nothing” are 
not only dialectically contrary but, upon reflection, equivalent, the 
presence of the world to thought in the guise of sensation is 
equivalent to the absence of the world to thought; thought only 
emerges through the negation of sheer sensation and the 
development of more complex categorial distinctions.2Kant knows 
this as well as Hegel does, although the latter believed himself to 
taken better account of this. 
Kant recognises the extension of reason in its “opening up new 
paths into the infinite”,3 and this seems to be part of what Hegel’s 
claim about the self-transforming character of spirit, qua “True 
Infinite” involves. According to Kant, one cannot determine objects 
of reason through the understanding, so one cannot make judgments 
about them, even if reason is intimately bound up with the actions of 
the understanding’s capacity to judge, because synthetic a priori 
judgments are a product of the principles of reason.4 
Given this, and the fact that Kant was trying to secure a place for 
ideas and ideals in our thinking, one must characterise them in a 
distinct way, unrelated to judgment proper. It is tempting to then 
characterise their respective roles as both “meta-judgmental”. But 
what does this mean? An equally alluring expansion of this idea is 
formulable in terms of the recently re-ignited term 
“metavocabulary”, which originated in Rudolf Carnap and was 
developed by Sellars and, more recently, Brandom. Perhaps there is 
                                                 
1 See his compatibilist explanation of freedom in Kant (1996b, 5:6, 141, 
n.*). Cf. the remarks regarding the need for a theoretical account of 
freedom is forestalled by the metaphysical orientation of his practical 
account of it in Kant (1996c, 4:448, 95-96, n.*). 
2 The dialectic in Chapters 1-3 of Hegel (1977b) seems to take this form. 
Notice that this same argument is employed by Hegel in his account of the 
emergence of free self-consciousness (cf. Hegel (1969, 37)). 
3A680/B708. 
4A11/B24. 
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something to this line of thought, yet at present little can be said in 
way of elaboration; nevertheless, a comment can be added to make 
the point clearer. Ideas and ideals evince certain designs we have on 
our own way of thinking; when explicated and, in the practical cases, 
symbolised, they reveal to us certain convictions adopted or accepted 
by thinkers which “guide” their more critical cognitive endeavours. 
We therefore now discuss the role symbolic representation plays for 
Kantian order to develop this critique in greater detail. 
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II.iii The symbolic representation of ideas 
 
Defenders of Kant’s conception of practical reason are saddled with a 
problem: how does an individual consciousness come into contact 
with, and comprehend, the moral law? Notoriously, Kant conceived 
of ethical imperatives as unconditional commands of reason which 
we, as finite and conditioned, can only apprehend as being fulfilled in 
experience indirectly via symbolic representation; our only way of 
approximating to the unconditioned is through the formation of 
symbols or images that we employ as guides when we act as if1 pure 
concepts of reason such as “the highest good” could be instanced in 
the empirically real and thus be rendered accessible to us.2 
Notice that I’ve just contrasted comprehension of the moral law 
with apprehension of symbolic representations. Typically the former 
mental act of standing in an epistemic relation to something 
emphasises the conceptual or rational character of that relation, 
whereas the latter act tends to highlight sensory (and perhaps 
causal) features of the relation in question. 
Thus, Kant employs a set of semantically related concepts in his 
scattered reflections on symbolic representation: “archetype”,3 
“exemplar”,4 “example”,5 and “analogy”. One definition of this last 
concept is offered in the 3rd Critique: 
 
                                                 
1 The “as-if” character that pure concepts of reason are meant to have 
for us is elaborated most clearly in the section entitled “On the final aim of 
the natural dialectic of human reason” (A669-704/B697-732). Note the 
apparently problematically metaphorical character of this locution insofar 
as it presupposes the usefulness of a distinction between literal (essential) 
meaning and figurative, metaphorical or analogical (accidental) meaning. 
2Kant (2000, §29, 5:274, 156) refers to the “sublime passage” from the 
“Jewish Book of the Law” which states: “Thou shalt not make unto thyself 
any graven image, nor any likeness either of that which is in heaven, or on 
the earth, or yet under the earth, etc.” He adds that the “very same thing 
holds of the representation of the moral law and the predisposition to 
morality in us.” 
3 See A315/B372, where examples are contrasted with the idea or 
“archetype” of virtue and moral perfection. 
4 For a nice discussion of exemplars and their philosophical import in 
this connection, see Ferrara (2008). 
5 See O'Neill (1986) for a discussion of the role of examples in moral 
philosophy in general and Kant in particular. 
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Analogy is the identity of the relation between the grounds and 
consequences (causes and effects) insofar as it is present despite what 
difference in kind there is between the things...or between those 
properties themselves that contain the ground of similar 
consequences.1 
 
We unpack this below. For now, note that the diffuse character of 
Kant’s theory of symbolic representation and the concepts it employs 
are both more than idle curiosities: together these facts reveal the 
theory’s incompleteness. Indeed, the incompleteness of Kant’s theory 
of symbolic representation is merely one of many criticisms that can 
be made about Kant’s failure to engage with empirical considerations 
in his moral philosophy. One result of this shortcoming is that Kant’s 
moral anthropology as a whole is lacking.2 
Moral anthropology—empirical considerations relevant to ethical 
theory—must be understood here as germane to the form and 
content of symbols. This general idea is upstream from the more 
specific claim that the form and content of symbols should 
demonstrate a basic connection between linguistics and 
anthropology. Kant says the following about moral anthropology: 
 
The counterpart of a metaphysics of morals, the other member of the 
division of practical philosophy as a whole, would be moral 
anthropology, which, however, would deal only with the subjective 
conditions in human nature that hinder people or help them in 
fulfilling the laws of a metaphysics of morals.3 
 
The two portions of text where Kant comes closest to offering a 
theory are §59 of the 3rd Critique and in the section of the 2nd Critique 
entitled “Of the typic of pure practical judgment”. In the former case, 
                                                 
1Kant (2000, §90, 5:464, 328, n.*). Cf. Kant (1997/2004, §§57-58), where he 
mentions the role of symbolic representation of the idea of “God” in 
theoretical uses of reason. In that context he claims the analogical 
employment of the idea does not suggest “an imperfect similarity between 
two things, but rather a perfect similarity between two relations in wholly 
dissimilar things.” From this it is supposed to follow that symbolisation of 
ideas of the supersensibledoes not involve “falling into that 
anthropomorphism which transfers predicates from the sensible world onto 
a being wholly distinct from the world”. We raise problems with this claim 
here. Cf. the discussion of medieval sense of “analogy of imitation” and 
“analogy of participation” in Ashworth (2009, 2-3). 
2 Cf. (2000, 74) on the “incompleteness” of Kant’s moral anthropology. 
3Kant (1996f, 6:217, 372). 
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Kant offers a brief but systematic explanation of the difference 
between schematic and symbolic forms of representation; in the 
latter, he explains why the nature of practical reason entails that we 
require concrete examples to guide us in moral judgment. The 
former is discussed directly in §IV. The latter provides a text for the 
most common and basic case in Kant’s writings: that of subsuming 
human actions, in their guise as phenomenal, under practical laws, 
which can never be apprehended in the phenomenal world, and its 
lesson therefore pervades our text. 
Our aim is to exploit both the fact that Kant’s theory is 
incomplete and the fact that he employs the insufficiently explored 
concepts mentioned above. As such, I will here attempt to develop 
some implications of Kant’s use of these concepts, especially 
“analogy”. 
Regarding the concept mentioned above, note that “exemplar” 
denotes archetypical instances of symbols which as such reveal a 
significant portion of their core meaning already signals a problem. 
Notice that ideas, when represented symbolically, are conditioned 
representations of the unconditioned (or, the unconditional);1 it 
therefore being easily seen that some of these symbolic 
representations could exemplify more of the core meaning of an 
unconditioned idea2than others, but if so, only by being in accord with 
more of the demands of the idea of practical reason than other 
instances.3 And presumably it is these archetypes which we should 
                                                 
1 Necessity in aesthetic judgments from the 3rd Critique is “exemplary” 
rather than “practical” necessity. In these contexts, as Louden says, 
“agents are not supplied with a rule or principle by means of which they 
can make the judgment” (see the reference in Louden (2000, 112)). We will 
come back to this issue of interpretation; it has however already been 
foreshadowed in our discussion of the inexhaustibility of the singular 
character of empirical intuition and the aesthetic, evaluative dimension of 
perceptual judgment. 
2 I am using “idea” in the singular here because it is the idea of pure 
practical reason in general which, for Kant, is that to which our actions 
must ultimately answer. Once plurality is introduced we have descended to 
the level of duties enacted in accord with this idea. Notice that even the 
Categorical Imperative is too specific, since it is expressed in a range of 
forms Kant (1996c, 4:421, 73 & ff.); for whilst the Categorical Imperative is 
the key expression of the idea of pure practical reason, pure practical itself 
can only be wholly expressed as “rational, transcendental freedom”.  
3 Yet see the * footnote in Kant (1996f, 6:480, 593): “‘Instance’ [Beispiel], 
a German word, is commonly used as synonymous with ‘example’ 
[Exempel], but the two words really do not have the same meaning. To 
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emulate (ought to will), rather than actions, when conceived as 
symbolic, that satisfy less of the demands of the idea of pure practical 
reason. The fact that exemplary instances of moral action can be 
emulated, whereas the idea or archetype of moral perfection can only 
be approximated to, reveals the need for the former to function as 
symbolic representations of the latter. 
Given the above remarks, it seems as if the idea of pure practical 
reason is a unified principle of moral action1 which, when coupled 
with detailed specifications of particular imperfect duties,2 is 
employed to signal a unity existing among certain kinds of moral 
behaviour; a unity which, given the force of “ought” in moral 
contexts, one must attempt to bring about.3 If this is right, exemplars 
would therefore be empirically real examples that approximate most 
closely to moral perfection as is possible, under the finite conditions 
of experience (recall actions are empirically real and thus 
appearances, and therefore subject to aesthetic and transcendental-
                                                                                                                            
take something as an example and to bring forward an instance to clarify an 
expression are altogether different concepts. An example is a particular 
case of a practical rule, insofar as this rule represents an action as 
practicable or impracticable, whereas an instance is only a particular 
(concretum), represented in accordance with concepts as contained under a 
universal (abstractum), and is a presentation of a concept merely for 
theory.” 
1 I’ve just equated “idea” with “a principle of action”. This strikes a 
discord. If we recall the distinction between “being” and “unity” from §II.ii 
it is clearer what is meant: an idea is a unity existing among actions; it is 
that upon which the actions are grouped together and that upon which the 
actions are conducted in the first place (if we are being moral and acting 
from duty in Kant’s sense).Another way of conceiving of this contrast is as 
structurally similar to that between extension and intension: the extension 
is the things to which the principle applies, the intension is that which 
applies to those things (a principle, concept, description, etc.). We return to 
this below. 
2I say “imperfect” because perfect duties are connected more tightly 
with the Categorical Imperative and are, moreover, unconditional. 
Imperfect duties involve a greater degree of empirical information than do 
perfect duties, according to Kant. There is then, however, a sense in which 
the representation of unconditionality in perfect duties is more difficult 
because less mediation is involved and we are therefore closer to the 
supposed schism between rational demands and empirical circumstance. 
3 “‘Ought’ expresses a kind of practical necessity and connection with 
grounds which is found nowhere else in whole of nature…When one has the 
course of nature alone before one’s eyes, ‘ought’ has no meaning 
whatsoever [ganz und gar keineBedeutung]” (A547/B576). 
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logical conditions). Exemplars thus serve as unifying empirical 
functions for a set of moral behaviours that are both intuitional and 
conceptual; other examples of moral actions would count as being less 
satisfactory instances and would constitute the remainder of the set 
of actions that fell under the duty being considered. 
Note that this gives us a way of comparing the characterisation of 
perfect duties with imperfect ones: fulfilment of an imperfect duty 
can be regarded as an action, or set of actions, that has been more 
completely described than a perfect duty such that it is regarded as 
less pure, even if still moral. One wishes Kant had considered this 
point more seriously when discussing the moral status of lying; one 
wants to ask: “Are all lies the same?” Notice that the more detail 
contained in the description of a duty, or the greater explanation of 
one’s moral action, the more specific and thus the more conditioned it 
is; the specification of one’s action is shaped by the salient features of 
one’s context, for example, from: 
 
 “Do A.”  
 
To 
 
“When in C do A.” (Note that the specification of a circumstance 
need not initially rob an action of its moral perfection: by putting “C” 
here one might be understood as simply acknowledging that certain 
actions only become possible, or called for, in certain circumstances. 
One cannot, for example, respect a person by saving their life if their 
life is not in danger. Yet the point of a perfect duty is that one need 
not specify that one must be in a relevant circumstance for it to 
become a point of consideration. The famous example here is Kant’s 
claim that truth telling is a perfect duty: “Tell the truth”, never “If in 
circumstances C, tell the truth; and therefore, if not in C, tell, or 
don’t tell, the truth.” Yet note that, in harmony with our initial 
observation, we can say that truth telling is not relevant if one is not 
in a position to speak—one’s current beliefs do not simply issue in 
truthful avowals in absence of either relevant speech contexts or, 
more pressingly, relevant speech partners; one also is not typically 
pressed to issue truthful reports on things one sees for no reason at 
all other than that one sees them. Such is folly and in no way morally 
imperative.) 
 
“When in C, and when C contains obstacle O1 to satisfying duty D, 
do A2.” 
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To  
 
“When in C, and when C contains obstaclesO1, O2, O2…On to 
satisfying duty D, do An+1.” 
 
And so on. Notice how a richer description of the circumstances 
issues in a “maxim of an action” that must describe the moral 
difficulties of the situation. It is not so much that Kant was ignorant 
of this as he thought of it as dealing with empirical matters, and so of 
less philosophical interest and importance. 
We are now concerned with the sense in which (1) symbolic 
representation is meant to be indirect; (2) it encompasses material 
apparently external to reason; and (3), whether Kant’s theory of it 
can be deemed successful. We must, however, first address (1), the 
issue of indirectness, and therefore we must cite Kant’s taxonomy of 
representations from the first book of the Dialectic: 
 
We are not so lacking in terms properly suited to each species of 
representation that we have need for one to encroach on the property 
of another. Here is their progression: The genus is representation in 
general (repraesentatio). Under it stands the representation with 
consciousness (perceptio). A perception that refers to the subject as a 
modification of its state is a sensation (sensatio); an objective 
perception is a cognition (cognitio). The latter is either an intuition or 
a concept (intuitus vel conceptus). The former is immediately related 
to the object and is singular; the latter is mediate, by means of a 
mark, which can be common to several things. A concept is either an 
empirical or a pure concept, and the pure concept, insofar as it has its 
origin solely in the understanding (not in a pure image of sensibility), 
is called notio. A concept made up of notions, which goes beyond the 
possibility of experience, is an idea or a concept of reason. Anyone 
who has become accustomed to this distinction must find it 
unbearable to hear a representation of the colour red called an idea. 
It is not even to be called a notion (a concept of the understanding).1 
 
Kant’s theory of symbolic representation depends, at its core, on the 
possibility of an analogical inference2 made from a conceptualised 
                                                 
1A319-20/B376-7. In the last two sentences Kant is referring to the 
British Empiricists; particularly Locke. 
2 Of course one typically will not perform this inference, although the 
informal validity of such an inference is implied by the possibility of 
employing symbols as if they were analogous to the idea/s they supposedly 
95 
II.iii ~ The Symbolic Representation of Ideas 
empirical intuition that is, as such, an objective, immediate, direct 
perception, and a singular representation, to an idea, that is, as such, 
subjective, mediate, indirectly applicable to experience, and a 
universal representation. Explaining how such an analogical 
inference is possible will require us speaking to the second concern 
above, so we ask: “How does symbolic representation allow for the 
encompassment of material apparently external to reason (intuitively 
represented/-able individuals) to be taken as analogous to material 
internal to reason (ideas in their guise as universal, subjectively valid 
maxims of pure reason)?” 
We do well to commence our argument by acknowledging Kant’s 
insistence in the Groundwork that examples cannot, on their own, 
ground morality: 
 
one [could not] give worse advice to morality than by wanting to 
derive it from examples. For, every example of it represented to me 
must itself first be appraised in accordance with principles of 
morality, as to whether it is also worthy to serve as an original 
example, that is, as a model; it can by no means authoritatively 
provide the concept of morality.1 
 
                                                                                                                            
represent. One must be careful to say “informal”, since analogical 
inferences, like abductive ones, are not formally valid methods of reasoning; 
the ground of their informal validity is part of what is being investigated 
here. 
1Kant (1996c, 4:408, 63); my emphasis. He says a few pages later that 
“the question of how the imperative of morality is possible is undoubtedly 
the only one needing a solution, since it is in no way hypothetical and the 
objectively represented necessity can therefore not be based on any 
presupposition, as in the case of hypothetical imperatives. Only we must 
never leave out of account, here, that it cannot be made out by means of 
any example, and so empirically, whether there is any such imperative at 
all, but it is rather to be feared that all imperatives which seem to be 
categorical may yet in some hidden way be hypothetical.” (4:419, 71) Note 
the use of the word “model”(Vorbild). 
With this same goal in mind, Kant provides an explanation of the “typic 
of pure practical judgment” to guard against “empiricism of practical 
reason” in Kant (1996b, 5:70, 197). In that context Kant is effectively 
anticipating an objection to utilitarianism on the grounds that the empirical 
phenomenon of happiness cannot be one’s sole guide in moral judgment: 
“empiricism…destroys at its roots the morality of dispositions…and 
substitutes for it something quite different, namely in place of duty an 
empirical interest, with which the inclinations generally are secretly 
leagued” (5:71, 197). 
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Bear in mind that Kant’s theory of symbolic representation is 
concerned with the subjective conditions of morality, one branch of 
which is the impure, empirical part of ethics known as moral 
psychology.1 It is also helpful to recall that Kant’s moral psychology 
is an element in his general theory of intentionality: it addresses the 
question of what the conditions of the possibility of the rational mind 
standing in a relation to the moral law are. The specific issue in this 
domain that is addressed by Kant’s theory of symbolic 
representation is as to what conditions there might be for 
(intuitively) apprehending acts, and comprehending them (with 
understanding), that are in accord with the moral law in actual cases. 
Clearly, understanding the moral law and being able to apply it are 
theoretically but not practically distinct abilities. In his moral 
psychology Kant’s concern is with the latter, insofar as such a theory 
must expound a “method of founding and cultivating genuine moral 
dispositions.”2 
We are now in a position to formulate the basic question to be 
directed at Kant’s theory of symbolism: “If one cannot derive 
morality from examples, what role can examples play in determining 
moral conduct?” There is no doubt that at the level of ordinary 
moralising such an activity takes place; what then are the conditions 
of its possibility?  Note that this is precisely the way to formulate a 
Kantian transcendental question. Seeing this brings to one’s 
attention that Kant’s philosophical modesty is peculiar yet profound, 
insofar as he is concerned to defend the idea of a “common human 
reason”.3 
                                                 
1Louden (2000, 11) notes that even much of the Groundwork failed to 
restrict itself to the rigorously “pure” elements of ethics, for Kant 
recognised very well that since morality and ethics are intrinsically 
connected with the actual actions of rational creatures they could never be 
conceived by us without examples. Kant says in the Collins Lectures, the 
study of “practical philosophy without anthropology, or without knowledge 
of the subject…is merely speculative, or an idea [eine Idea]; the human 
being must therefore at least be studied later on.” (27:244; cited inLouden 
(2000, 18)). 
2Kant (1996b, 5:153, 262). 
3 “Here it would be easy to show how common human reason, with this 
compass in hand, knows very well how to distinguish in every case that 
comes up what is good and what is evil, what is in conformity with duty or 
contrary to duty, if, without in the least teaching it anything new, we only, 
as did Socrates, make it attentive to its own principle; and that there is, 
accordingly, no need of science and philosophy to know what one has to do 
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In addressing this question of internality/externality to reason we 
are required to evaluate the third of the connected concepts 
mentioned at the start of this section: “analogy”. First, we must 
explain the nature of Kant’s appeal to analogy. As a preface, note 
Kant’s reference to the “inference of analogy” in the Jäsche Logic:  
 
In proceeding from the particular to the general in order to draw 
general judgments from experience—hence not a priori ([but] 
empirically) general judgments—the power of judgment concludes 
either from many to all things of a kind or from many determinations 
and properties in which things of the same kind agree, to the others 
so far as they belong to the same principle. The first manner of 
concluding is called conclusion through induction, the second, 
conclusion by analogy.1 
 
And in the relevant portions of his notes to this Kant writes: 
 
In the conclusion by analogy…only identity of the ground (par ratio) 
is required. By analogy our conclusion only goes to rational 
inhabitants of the moon, not to men. Also one cannot conclude by 
analogy beyond the tertium comparationis…Every syllogism must 
yield necessity. Induction and analogy are therefore no syllogisms but 
only logical presumptions or empirical conclusions2…The said 
conclusions of judgment are useful and indispensable to the expansion 
                                                                                                                            
in order to be honest and good, and even wise and virtuous.” Kant (1996c, 
4:404, 58; cf. 4:405, 60). 
Cf. his comments regarding the presumptuousness of providing 
concrete duties in a moral theory: “A reviewer who wanted to say 
something censuring this work [the 2nd Critique] hit the mark better than 
he himself may have intended when he said that no new principle of 
morality is set forth in it but only a new formula. But who would even want 
to introduce a new principle of all morality and, as it were, first invent it? 
Just as if, before him, the world has been ignorant of what duty is or in 
thoroughgoing error about it. But whoever knows what a formula means to 
a mathematician, which determines quite precisely what is to be done to 
solve a problem and does not let him miss it, will not take the formula that 
does this with respect to all duty in general as something that is 
insignificant and to be dispensed with.” (Kant (1996b, 5:9, 143)) 
1 Kant (1974, §84). 
2 Notice Kant denies that analogical inferences can be instanced in 
syllogisms, simply because syllogisms are by definition valid, and analogical 
inferences are not valid. Cf. Hegel’s account of the syllogism of analogy in 
(1969, 692-695). 
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of our experiential cognition. Since, however, they give only empirical 
certainty, we must avail ourselves of them with care and caution. 
 
The relevance of this passage rests on the fact that Kant is here 
claiming the import of analogical inferences is restricted to the 
“expansion of our experiential cognition”: such inferences “give only 
empirical certainty”, by which it can be taken to mean that their 
validity depends on the goodness of an inference from two (or more) 
objects having (some of) the same “determinations and properties” to 
these two (or more) objects being of a same kind.1 
Kant denies us transcendent knowledge of natural kinds (we have 
only “empirical certainty”), but insists we may be possessed of 
transcendental knowledge of the most general features of the “world 
of sense”.2 Our employment of analogical inferences therefore affords 
us reflective generalisations in an analogous way to that in which the 
pure concepts of reason do by directing us to unify and systematise 
judgments enacted by the understanding in its cooperation with 
sensibility. And of course, the judgments to which one infers by 
analogy are reflective judgments, as opposed to determinative 
judgments: they involve adducing a general concept which subsumes 
the object, rather than predicating a general concept of a particular 
object, where this implies the general concept picks out a perceived 
mark (Kant’s sensationalist account of concepts—his peculiar brand 
of phenomenalism—commits him to a strong distinction between 
perceived and unperceived properties of objects). The relevance of 
the fact that this is the case with aesthetic judgments will also 
emerge below.  
In any case, it is more proper to say that the unification and 
systematisation of our knowledge of the empirical world of sense 
necessarily involves analogical inferences: where we cannot claim 
knowledge of natural kinds we are forced to systematise and unify 
our judgments about those empirical phenomena which we take to be 
natural kinds. And we do this for the reason Kant mentions in the 
text above: “[T]he said conclusions of judgment are useful and 
indispensable to the expansion of our experiential cognition. “We 
might of course press Kant on how such judgments can have this 
                                                 
1 We must employ the indefinite article, since we are not claiming that 
two objects can be said to be the same in all relevant respects. 
2 Cf. the attempt to explicate the concept of matter in Kant (2004). See 
Kreines’s excellent work on issues pertaining to teleology and the 
philosophy of science in Kant and Hegel in his (2004, 2005, 2007, 2008b, 
2009). 
99 
II.iii ~ The Symbolic Representation of Ideas 
character if we must deny they provide us with knowledge of the 
things they refer to; one is tempted to argue that there is no relevant 
contrast here with a kind of knowledge, say, of the very idea of 
“matter”, that is of a higher standard than that. 
There is a nice question to be asked here, as to whether Hegel is 
right to insist that we do have knowledge of natural kinds in a more 
demanding sense,1 although we will bypass that in order to focus on 
the question of how distinct Kant’s sense of analogy in practical 
contexts is, in contrast with theoretical contexts; more importantly, 
we will ask how distinct it can be. As a preface to that, we examine a 
text from the Doctrine of Method. We therefore turn to Kant’s 
reference—in the context of his discussion entitled “On having an 
opinion, knowing, and believing”—to the possibility of claiming 
certain beliefs about attaining moral ends to be necessary: 
 
Taking something to be true is an occurrence in our understanding 
that may rest on objective grounds, but that also requires subjective 
causes in the mind of him who judges. If it is valid for everyone 
merely as long as he has reason, then its ground is objectively 
sufficient, and in that case taking something to be true is called 
conviction. If it has its ground only in the particular constitution of 
the subject, then it is called persuasion2…Taking something to be 
true, or the subjective validity of judgment, has the following three 
stages in relation to conviction (which at the same time is valid 
objectively): having an opinion, believing, and knowing.3 
 
With reference to believing, he says 
 
Only in a practical relation, however, can taking something that is 
theoretically insufficient to be true be called believing. This practical 
aim is either that of skill or of morality, the former for arbitrary and 
contingent ends, the latter, however, for absolutely necessary ends. 
Once an end is proposed, then the conditions for attaining it are 
hypothetically necessary. This necessity is subjectively but still only 
comparatively sufficient if I do not know of any other conditions at all 
under which the end could be attained; but it is sufficient absolutely 
and for everyone if I know with certainty that no one else can know of 
any other conditions that lead to the proposed end. In the first case 
my presupposition and taking certain conditions to be true is a 
                                                 
1 This issue is treated in Kreines’s work, as cited above. See Stern 
(2009a) for a stronger reading of Hegel. 
2A820/B848. 
3A822/B850. 
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merely contingent belief, in the second case, however, it is a 
necessary belief.1 
 
When reading the first sentence of this passage, one should bear in 
mind the guiding role of examples in moral matters. Taken in this 
connection, and recalling Kant’s words about the danger of 
“deriving” morality from examples (a guise which symbolic 
representation takes), several things can be suggested: 
 
(1) Moral ends are “absolutely necessary”, yet the “conditions for 
attaining them” can initially only be claimed to be 
“hypothetically necessary”—that is, until one knows that 
these means are themselves the necessary means (read: 
practically best) to the necessary moral end in question. 
(Recall that for Kant moral imperatives are never 
hypothetical, but rather always categorical; what is 
hypothetical, at least in the initial stage of moral reasoning, is 
the appeal to the symbolic value of an exemplary action for the 
guidance of moral behaviour. According to the interpretation 
currently being recommended, in employing a symbol of a 
moral action we first hypothesise that the moral action 
satisfies the moral law, then determine that no other way of 
following the moral law is possible via confirmation that no-
one could know of any other way of satisfying it (internal 
limits on practical reason).) 
(2) The proper characterisation of the necessity of such conditions 
can be altered from “subjectively, and comparatively 
sufficient” to “absolutely sufficient” when it is determined to a 
certainty that “no one else can know of any other conditions 
that lead to the proposed end.” 
(3) Kant is therefore claiming that it is essential, in moral conduct 
where “absolutely necessary ends” are being considered, that 
one can determine to a certainty that no other alternative 
means to a necessary end could be known. That no other 
means to a necessary end could be known is a necessary 
condition of the possibility that “my presupposition and taking 
certain conditions to be true” is a “necessary belief”. 
(4) Establishment of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
attaining moral ends, qua necessary, requires that one 
determine that no alternative to the one being considered be 
knowable. 
                                                 
1A824/B852. 
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(5) That establishing “my presupposition” and “my taking certain 
conditions to be true” as “necessary beliefs” requires that “no 
one else can know of any other conditions that lead to the 
proposed end”, demonstrates that practical rationality is 
conditioned by certain epistemic limits; that is, limited by 
theoretical as well as practical knowledge.  
Practical rationality is therefore conditioned in a manner 
unlike theoretical rationality, where the normativity operative 
in the latter involves not only what people can know, but what, 
transcendent of rationally guided epistemic goals, there is to 
be known.1 For rationally guided epistemic goals do not, as 
Kant saw very clearly, need to specify the details of what will 
be known (in one respect this would result in an absurdity, and 
is moreover the ruse of an iguana ratio (lazy reason)2 which 
fails to envision the nature of empirical inquiry correctly), but 
rather only why one should go on to seek such details: Kant’s 
famous claim is that reason demands one unify and 
systematise one’s knowledge to a maximum.  
Now, the crux of the matter, put crudely, is that the 
empirically real world is there to be known independently of 
reason’s interests, whereas reason’s interests do determine 
what practical demands there are to be fulfilled.3 The point is 
that one can say that in the practical context, unlike the 
theoretical, the very idea of there being demands that are 
unknowable in principle is incoherent.4 (This must be taken to 
                                                 
1 Recall Kant’s remark about “ought”: “‘Ought’ expresses a kind of 
practical necessity and connection with grounds which is found nowhere 
else in whole of nature…When one has the course of nature alone before 
one’s eyes, ‘ought’ has no meaning whatsoever [ganz und gar 
keineBedeutung]” (A547/B576). 
2A689/B717 & ff. 
3 Although Kant is a transcendental idealist he does not make the 
outrageous claim that humans “construct” the knowable empirical world; 
rather, perceiving the empirically real has certain conditions of its 
possibility. This of course does not rule out there being unperceived but 
nevertheless existent states of the world which would be just as they are in 
absence of being perceived. 
4 Cf.: “it is understanding, not conscience, which judges whether an 
action is in general right or wrong. And it is not absolutely necessary to 
know, of all possible actions, whether they are right or wrong. With respect 
to the action that I want to undertake, however, I must not only judge, and 
be of the opinion, that it is right; I must also be certain that it is. And this is 
a requirement of conscience to which is opposed probabilism, i.e., the 
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mean that we are never in a position to know ahead of time 
what we have to find out about the world in order to have a 
perfect theory of it, except in the form of platitudinous 
generalities. This doesn’t mean we can’t know what additional 
information we would need to show a certain theory to be 
correct, but rather that we cannot know in advance what we 
would need to know in order to have the right theory: this 
would negate the very process of discovery through collection 
of evidence, since we would already be claiming to know that 
to which our hypothesis was to be applied and tested against; 
an absurdity.)1 
(6) There is another problem here, however, since one must 
contrast the demand of reason in both a theoretical and a 
practical context with the empirical actualisation of the 
demand. In theoretical contexts, the demand is to maximally 
systematise and unify one’s knowledge by employing the ideas 
of pure reason as guides for the formal use of reason in 
syllogisms of relation (categorical: subject and predicate; 
hypothetical: antecedens and consequens; disjunctive: 
community, reciprocity), and the actualisation of the demand is 
the actual judgings2 themselves; in practical contexts, the 
                                                                                                                            
principle that the mere opinion that an action may well be right is itself 
sufficient for undertaking it. – Conscience could also be defined as the 
moral faculty of judgment, passing judgment upon itself, except that this 
definition would be much in need of prior clarification of the concepts 
contained in it. Conscience does not pass judgment upon actions as cases 
that stand under the law, for this is what reason does so far as it is 
subjectively practical (whence the casusconscientiæ and casuistry, as a kind 
of dialectic of conscience). Rather, here reason judges itself, whether it has 
actually undertaken, with all diligence, that examination of actions 
(whether they are right or wrong), and calls upon the human being himself 
to witness for or against himself whether this has taken place or not.” Kant 
(1996g, 6:186, 203). For a related discussion see “Casuistical questions” 
appended to “Article 1. On Killing Oneself”, in Kant (1996d, 6:423-424, 548). 
1 Kant warns not only of a “lazy reason” but also a “perverted reason” 
(A692/B720), where the latter indulges in metaphysical speculation about 
the fundamental structure of transcendental reality. Such a reason is 
improperly scientific, since it claims to know before it can know and 
therefore negates the activity of properly scientific inquiry. 
2 Here one must recall the possibility, signalled repeatedly by Sellars, of 
rendering “representation” as “represented” and “representing”, because a 
parallel distinction obtains between the content of a judgment (what is 
judged) and the act of judging itself. This is relevant when considering the 
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demand is to follow the moral law by bringing to bear 
unconditional imperatives on one’s conditioned circumstances, 
where such a demand is actualised through the modelling of 
one’s behaviour on certain symbolically represented/-able 
actions which would count as doing the morally best thing in 
the circumstances.1 
 
It is important to remind oneself at this point that Kant leaves it 
open how one is to determine or specify the content of an action. This 
is an important feature of his position that moreover harmonises 
with his defence of the idea of a “common human reason” which must, 
in accord with the philosophical modesty that Kant to his merit 
frequently demonstrates, be presumed to know its way about in its 
own domain; in fact, this is a presupposition of his transcendental 
philosophical method. And clearly, as Kant implies, determining the 
maxim of an action is not always a straightforward matter.  
If the idea of a “common human reason” is sound and is to be 
employed, it must be admitted that “doing the right thing, given the 
circumstances” is something one comes to understand by having it 
brought to one’s attention that, in circumstances C, action A is the 
most rational (if moral: the best) of one’s options. Of course, one can 
only come to know this kind of thing by being in a situation with 
one’s fellows and having it pointed out that what so-and-so did was, 
or was not, the right thing to do. Here, as in the case of formation of 
empirical concepts by comparison, reflection, and abstraction, one 
abstracts the relevant universal character from the instance in 
question; unlike the case of empirical concepts, however, it is already 
rationally determined, to some extent, what the right thing to do is. 
Notice that abstracting from singular cases to derive universal 
concepts is an activity; there not being any pre-determined standard 
of correctness for this activity, namely one internal to reason. The 
latter claim is disputed by Hegel. 
                                                                                                                            
fact that one can distinguish, as here, between the “demand” and the 
“empirical actualisation of the demand”. 
1 He asks: “Is it murdering oneself to hurl oneself to certain death (like 
Curtius) in order to save one’s country?—or is deliberate martyrdom, 
sacrificing oneself for the good of all humanity, also to be considered an act 
of heroism?” Kant (1996d, 6:423, 548). The section from which this is cited, 
and which is entitled “Casuistical questions”, is appended to “Article 1. On 
Killing Oneself”. It includes some other interesting examples also. 
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Such practical necessity,1 as just discussed, is to be contrasted 
with the theoretical status of “pragmatic beliefs”, where such items 
in one’s cognitive economy play the role they do in virtue of the 
connections they bear to already established knowledge (rather than 
mere belief).2 In speaking to this point, Kant provides the example of 
diagnosis of an unknown medical condition: 
 
The doctor must do something for a sick person who is in danger, but 
he does not know the illness. He looks to the symptoms, and judges, 
because he does not know of anything better, that it is consumption. 
His belief is merely contingent even in his own judgment; someone 
else might perhaps do better. I call such contingent beliefs, which 
however ground the actual use of the means to certain actions, 
pragmatic beliefs.3 
 
In the context from which this remark is cited, Kant is telling us that 
there is a parallel to be drawn between the move involved with 
sound judgments about moral examples (and exemplars), and that 
involved with reasonable judgments about empirical facts. His point 
is that in practical cases it is enough that one can establish that “no 
one could know a better way of achieving a moral end, qua 
necessary”, whereas in the theoretical case, the possibility is left 
open that “someone else might perhaps do better”. And given the 
nature of empirical inquiry, inevitably somebody will. This seems to 
reflect the fact that the relevant empirical and practical knowledge in 
combination with sufficient rationality allows one to know what is 
morally (practically) necessary, whereas no amount of empirical 
knowledge combined with rational speculation allows one to know 
what is theoretically necessary in the empirical world, regarding the 
nature of empirical phenomena (excluding here the highly general 
analysis of matter that Kant offers in the Metaphysical Foundations 
of Natural Science). Rather, according to Kant, we can only claim 
transcendental knowledge of necessity (of course, we may wish to 
                                                 
1 One should here compare the statement of the “fundamental law of 
pure practical reason” as well as that of the “fact of reason” in Kant (1996b, 
5:30-32, 164-165). 
2 Note that we are here talking about the contrast between “empirical 
knowledge” and “empirical belief”. This is clearly distinct from the 
transcendental knowledge which according to Kant we have, and of which 
knowledge of natural kinds and processes are not instances. 
3A824/B852. The italicisation is mine. As Menand (2001, 227) notes, 
Peirce employed this example of Kant’s in the same talk to the 
Metaphysical Club in which he “coined the term ‘pragmatism’”.  
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deny that there is a difference between knowledge of empirical 
necessity and knowledge of transcendental necessity, insofar as we 
reject the coherence of the latter). 
On this point, note Kant’s remarks about our knowledge of 
theoretical and practical necessity in the “Concluding Remark” from 
the Groundwork: 
 
The speculative use of reason with respect to nature leads to the 
absolute necessity of some supreme cause of the world: the practical 
use of reason with regard to freedom leads also to an absolute 
necessity, but only of laws of actions of a rational being as such. Now, 
it is an essential principle of every use of our reason to push its 
cognition to consciousness of its necessity (for without this it would 
not be cognition on the part of reason). It is, however, an equally 
essential limitation of this same reason that it can see neither the 
necessity of what is and what happens nor the necessity of what 
ought to happen unless a condition under which it is and happens or 
ought to happen is put at the basis of this. In this way, however, by 
constant inquiry after the condition, the satisfaction of reason is only 
further and further postponed. Hence it restlessly seeks the 
unconditionally necessary and sees itself constrained to assume it 
without any means of making it comprehensible. 
 
And below this, the last sentence of the Groundwork reads: 
 
thus we do not indeed comprehend the practical unconditional 
necessity of the moral imperative, but we nevertheless comprehend 
its incomprehensibility; and this is all that can fairly be required of a 
philosophy that strives in its principles to the very boundary of 
human reason.1 
 
One can make the point even sharper: Notice that the practical use of 
reason, conceived of as an idea, can be understood as unpackable into 
the various forms of the Categorical Imperative. This itself goes 
some way to showing the logical relationship of unity and being that 
is at issue: the idea of pure practical reason unpacks into general 
injunctions for perfect duties that follow from the Categorical 
Imperative and these are particularised once additional relevant 
information is added, and the precise maxim of an action rendered 
specific enough to allow for it to conflict with other duties (issuing in 
imperfect duties). In short, the idea of pure practical reason is the 
unifying function of all the perfect and imperfect duties (which are 
                                                 
1Kant (1996c, 4:463, 108). 
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expressed/represented) as judgments (and hence, as exercise of the 
Vermögen zu urteilen), much as the ideas of the metaphysica 
specialis Kant refers to in the Dialectic are systematic-unifying 
functions of the understanding’s use in experience (crucially, also as a 
Vermögen zu urteilen).  
If this is sound, it is readily seen that the idea of pure reason in its 
practical use is the idea of there being certain rational laws for 
conduct; reason in its practical use is intrinsically connected with the 
specification of laws (and rules1) for the behaviour of rational beings 
which may or may not be satisfied, depending on their ability to 
internalise the demands made upon them by those laws. Crucially, 
Kant sees the moral law as being analogous to a natural law, and 
upon this basis he makes a striking claim about what it means to 
envisage a moral world as being determined by the moral law, as 
through the wills of individuals who form the moral community Kant 
refers to as the “Kingdom of Ends”.  
Kant here notes that moral maxims, the imperatives that contain 
a description of one’s action and thus also capture the situation of 
action if the description is appropriately detailed—as above “Do A!”, 
or, “If in C, do  A!”—have a form as well as a matter. He uses this 
contrast to explain why his three formulations of the Categorial 
Imperative are three versions of the same claim.2 Thus he says that 
(1) the “form” of a maxim is its universality, thus corresponding with 
what is often called the “Universal Law Formulation”; (2) that the 
“matter” of a maxim is “an end”, which is the rational being, which is 
for Kant “an end by its nature and hence an end in itself”, and which 
must moreover “in every maxim serve as the limiting condition of all 
merely relative and arbitrary ends”; finally, he offers a crucial 
explanation of how the Kingdom of Ends is to be envisaged; namely, 
as 
 
a complete determination of all maxims…namely, that all maxims 
from one’s own lawgiving are to harmonise with a possible kingdom 
of ends as with a kingdom of nature. A progression takes place here, 
                                                 
1 According to Kant, moral imperatives are categorical and therefore 
always have the status of law; non-moral employment of reason in its 
practical use is typically hypothetical and therefore involves rules for 
conduct: to judge well is to judge “thusly”.  
2 The initial expression of the Categorical Imperative is in Kant (1996c, 
4:421, 73). The Universal Law Formulation occurs at (4:421, 73), the 
“Humanity Formulation” at (4:429, 80), and the “Kingdom of Ends 
Formulation” at (4:433, 83).  
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as through the categories of unity of the form of the will (its 
universality), the plurality of the matter (of objects, i.e., of ends), and 
the allness or totality of the system of these. 
 
And, to drive the point home, a footnote marked * reads: 
 
Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends, morals considers a 
possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature. In the former the 
kingdom of ends is a theoretical idea for explaining what exists. In 
the latter, it is a practical idea for the sake of bringing about in 
conformity with this very idea, that which does not exist but which 
can become real by means of our conduct.1 
 
The key point is that it is our moral vocation to bring about such a 
state of the world,2 although given our finite, conditioned nature, and 
the empirically real self of appearance, we cannot within experience 
expect to encounter such a state of affairs; hence Kant’s requirement 
for his practical metaphysics that we envisage ourselves as an 
immortal soul that has infinite time to perfect itself and bring its 
actions into harmony with the divine will of “God”. We discuss the 
details involved in §VI. 
Given the centrality of the point, we must ask: “What is involved 
with conceiving of the moral law as analogous to a natural law?” A 
clear way to envisage this is in terms of the moral law describing the 
actual actions of beings in a Kingdom of Ends, just as natural laws 
describe the actual (from which we can infer possible) behaviour of 
natural objects.3 One can therefore think of the vision of a Kingdom 
                                                 
1Kant (1996c, 4:436-437, 85-86). 
2 Note how Kant expresses this point in a slightly different context: “No 
rational principle prescribes specifically how far one should go in 
cultivating one’s capacities (in enlarging or correcting one’s capacity for 
understanding, i.e., in acquiring knowledge or skill). Then too, the different 
situations in which human beings, may find themselves make a human 
being’s choice of the occupation for which he should cultivate his talents 
very much a matter for him to decide as he chooses. – With regard to 
natural perfection, accordingly, there is no law of reason for actions but 
only a law for maxims of actions, which runs as follows: ‘Cultivate your 
powers of mind and body so that they are fit to realise any ends you might 
encounter,’ however uncertain you are which of them could sometime 
become yours.” (Kant (1996d, 6:392, 523)) 
3 Cf.: “moral laws… require a power of judgment sharpened by 
experience” (Kant (1996c, 4:389, 45)) and “the concept of freedom should 
make the end that is imposed by its laws real in the sensible world.” (Kant 
(2000, 5:176, 63)). These remarks signal Kant’s view of some of the 
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of Ends as that of a set of phenomena—the moral actions of rational 
beings—behaving in accordance with rational laws. This model, 
conceived of as an image of a particular action, or a series of images 
of particular actions, then serves to guide judgment as to what kinds 
of actions one should perform in order to bring it about that the 
group of phenomena (the moral actions of the rational beings in 
question in a particular circumstance) bears a close resemblance to 
what is demanded by the moral law. That is: what one ought to do to 
bring this about. 
We can illuminate this by considering a common contrast. In 
contemporary philosophy a distinction is often drawn between 
descriptive and normative discourse, where the former is typically 
regarded as being articulated in terms of what “is”, the latter, 
involving reference to what ought to be. I will confine my comments 
here to the general orientation of Sellars’s Kantian views about 
natural laws. One of Sellars’s master thoughts is that the standard 
conception of this division between descriptive and non-descriptive 
discourse is ill-conceived.1He emphasises the fact that statements of 
empirical laws do indeed have a normative flavour; and not only, qua 
linguistic, are they just trivially governed by norms; they also 
contain a claim about how the world ought to be if they are true. 
Crucially, failing transcendental realism, even natural laws will 
never get beyond the ought to be character attributed to moral 
imperatives. 
Thus we can take Kant to be inviting us to envisage how the 
world would be were the action under consideration a member of a 
class of actions all governed by the same universal law; Kant is 
inviting us to envisage certain parts of the world as governed by 
rational laws by analogy with the way empirical phenomena are 
                                                                                                                            
requirements of the empirical part of moral philosophy; he says in the 
Groundwork that this concern is “for the will of the human being insofar as 
it is affected by nature” (4:387, 43). Louden takes this to commit Kant to a 
“weak naturalism” (2000, 8).  
It is also noteworthy that Kant says that “it would not be a duty to aim 
at a certain effect of our will if this effect were not also possible in 
experience (whether it be thought as completed or as always approaching 
completion); and it is a theory of this kind only that is at issue in the 
present treatise.” (Kant (1996e)8:276-7, 280). This suggests the standard 
objection that Kant demands the impossible of rational beings is somewhat 
misguided; such a claim does not entail Kant’s theory of normativity is 
wholly sound, however. 
1 See, for example, Sellars (1958, see esp. §108).  
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governed by natural laws. And not only this; he is also insisting that 
it is implied by the force of the moral law itself that we ought to do 
whatever it takes to bring this about. 
The divergence from natural laws consists primarily in the fact 
that, thanks to his transcendental idealism, Kant is able to insist that 
the phenomenal world is articulated in a way entirely harmonious 
with the transcendental-logical structure of the understanding; 
namely, the terms in which it is describable derive from the logical 
functions of judgment, the categories, and the synthetic a priori 
judgments which express the principles governing the physical 
world, qua phenomenal. Yet whilst the phenomenal is, for Kant, in 
some sense “rationally articulated”, insofar as acts of empirical 
judgment are guided by rational principles, it is not morally 
articulated; our representational capacities condition the possibility 
of our representations and acts of representings, yet since such 
representational capacities are non-moral (even if reason in 
theoretical contexts shares the moral of systematic unity as much as 
it does in practical contexts, reason does not itself constitute a 
representational capacity: only sensibility and the understanding are 
faculties of representation in the sense intended here), we can never 
claim to discover instances of the actual moral law in the empirical 
world. 
We have noted that it is a condition of the possibility of this 
demand that (1) the unconditional demands of the moral law are 
represented in intuitional form in experience as conditioned symbols 
of moral behaviour, which rational subjects can attempt to emulate in 
order to approximate to the unconditional moral law. (It being crucial 
here that symbolic representations—qua imagistic—can always be 
determined further.) 
Compare reason in its theoretical use. Kant provides no strict 
equivalent, although as a parallel we can conceive of the need to 
cultivate sound judgment in those to whom it did not come readily or 
naturally. Note that whilst such a point speaks to the act of judging, 
the same point stands for reason since presumably it takes either a 
sound mind or sound training, or both, to see that one should “unify 
and systematise” one’s thinking. And this need be no more nor no 
less demanding than simply, and initially, making one’s judgments in 
their form as both beliefs and as knowledge consistent. 
There is a further demand, however, which follows from Kant’s 
claim that the Kingdom of Ends is formed as an intelligible idea by 
analogy with a Kingdom of Nature: (2) the moral character of the 
human being being refined by the aesthetic experience of the 
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beautiful1 as well as by commonplace moral instruction (the second of 
which does not require further analysis here), and then this moral 
character being prepared further through the experience of the 
sublime,2 where the latter issues in a feeling of simultaneous 
humiliation and elevation: the structurally similar feeling 
experienced when confronted with the moral law. Thus we are led to 
briefly consider Kant’s view of the moral character of the “finite” 
human, insofar as it shapes his theory of symbolic representation.3 
Kant’s discussion in the “Analytic of the Sublime” involves an 
appeal to the feeling of “awe”, experienced in face of the sublime, 
that is structurally similar to that experienced when one stands in a 
relation to the moral law. That structure is the two-tiered feeling of 
simultaneous “humiliation” and “elevation”.4Confrontation with the 
                                                 
1Kant (2000, §60): “the true propaedeutic for the grounding of taste is 
the development of moral ideas and the cultivation of the moral feeling; for 
only when sensibility is brought into accord with this can genuine taste 
assume a determinate, unalterable form.” Cf. §42 “On the intellectual 
interest in the beautiful”.  
2Kant (2000, §29): “The disposition of the mind to the feeling of the 
sublime requires its receptivity to ideas…it is a dominion that reason 
exercises over sensibility only in order to enlarge it in a way suitable for its 
own proper domain (the practical) and to allow it to look out upon the 
infinite which for sensibility is an abyss…The beautiful prepares us to love 
something, even nature, without interest; the sublime, to esteem it, even 
contrary to our (sensible) interest…the intellectual, intrinsically purposive 
(moral) good, judged aesthetically, must not be represented so much as 
beautiful as sublime, so that it arouses more the feeling of respect (which 
scorns charm) than that of love and intimate affection, since human nature 
does not agree with that good of its own accord, but only through the 
dominion that reason exercises over sensibility.” 
3Cf. Guyer (1990a, 35). Louden (2000, 114 & ff.) discusses the 
“epistemological” dimension of the connection between the moral and the 
aesthetic.  
4Kant (2000) says that beauty and sublimity “are aesthetic modes of 
representation that we would never come across in ourselves if we were 
merely pure intelligences (or even if we were to transfer ourselves in 
thought into this quality)” (5:271, 153; cf. 5:233, 117). Louden (2000, 109) 
supports a reading of the 3rd Critique that employs it to illuminate Kant’s 
“impure ethics”. 
Kant (1996d, 6:443, 564) words support this reading, where he speaks of 
a “feeling in [the human being]…which, though not of itself moral, is still a 
disposition of sensibility that greatly promotes morality or at least 
prepares the way for it: the disposition, namely, to love something (e.g., 
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moral law issues in a subject being simultaneously humiliated by the 
impossible demand for perfection, and at the same time elevated by 
the possibility of moral improvement; an Augustinian rising out of 
the bonds of sensibility and servility to inclination. Note that Kant’s 
insistence that moral behaviour is always done from duty rather than 
inclination entails that “what one does”, or “what one might do” must 
always be at least assessed in light of the moral law, and more 
typically overcome and superseded by the commands that law issues.  
In his discussion of the other aesthetic idea “beauty”, Kant claims 
such an experience can precipitate the cultivation of a moral 
character: 
 
Beautiful arts and sciences, which by means of a universally 
communicable pleasure and an elegance and refinement make human 
beings, if not morally better [sittlich besser], at least better 
mannered for society, very much reduce the tyranny of sensible 
tendencies, and prepare humans for a sovereignty in which reason 
alone shall have power.1 
 
Note the distinct but related parallel Kant insists upon here between 
the possibility of a common emotive response and the responsiveness 
to rational demands. His famous defence of the quasi-objective 
character of aesthetic judgments depends on precisely this point: the 
appeal to a shared form of sensibility common to judging subjects 
with whom one engages in debate about aesthetic matters (sensus 
communis as discussed in §40 of the 3rd Critique). The basic claim is 
that just as reason embodies a certain standard, so too does feeling. 
In Louden’s words,  
 
Aesthetic objects and experiences also make abstract moral ideas 
more tangible for human beings, and, precisely because we are at 
once both rational and animal beings (cf. 5:210), our mixed nature 
requires that we search for more palpable, concrete ways of 
representing moral ideas to ourselves.2 
 
Thus, our capacity for recognition of ourselves as rational animals, 
that is, as bound by both the moral law (in the intelligible sense) as 
                                                                                                                            
beautiful crystal formations, the indescribable beauty of plants) even apart 
from any intention to use it.” 
1Kant (2000, §83, 5:433, 301).  Louden (2000). 
2Louden (2000, 114). For a recent, systematic examination of Hegel’s 
critique of Kant’s formalism, see. For a development of this theme see 
Sedgwick (2012, Introduction, esp. 3-4 & ff) 
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well as natural laws (in the empirical sense), is a ground of our ability 
to manifest rational demands empirically. This is also a ground for 
our capacity for treating other rational beings in a way that respects 
their intelligible aspect, as the “Humanity Formulation” of the 
Categorical Imperative demands we do. (To treat other rational 
beings as mere appearances is to treat them as ordinary empirical 
objects that behave in accord with deterministic laws). Having 
acknowledged the importance of this point, we begin to see that 
reasoning itself requires us recognising other rational entities as the 
kinds of beings to whom we offer reasons, and from whom we also 
accept reasons. Thus we are forced to consider how rational demands 
can be understood as issuing not merely from an abstract moral law, 
but from the community of the Kingdom of Ends itself, in virtue of 
that community consisting of individuals who are able to will the 
maxims of their practical and theoretical judgments (how things 
ought to be and how they are) as universalisable; that is, as 
applicable to all other rational beings. We will come to a proper 
treatment of this in a moment (below in §III). First we must consider 
some additional points. 
The parallel drawn by Kant between the moral law and natural 
laws reminds us of the fact that he envisages both as being governed 
by the same ideal (indeed, because reason is itself a unity). We saw in 
§II.ii that Kant insists upon a schema for the ideas of pure reason in 
its theoretical use, where these ideas guide empirical knowledge to a 
maximally unified and systematised state through the joining of 
judgments in syllogistic inferences. Moreover, that it is their 
contribution to this end that justifies their employment. One must 
then raise the question: where does the idea of systematic unity come 
from? Indeed, what is the “idea” of “systematic unity”?1 It is true 
that Kant takes this idea for granted; it is fundamental to his 
philosophy. Yet since we are here committed to considering a 
Hegelian response we must be open to rethinking what it could 
mean. This response is not immediately forthcoming, however. 
Consideration of Kant’s conception of the Kingdom of Ends 
reveals to us what “systematic unity” might mean in the moral sense: 
the actions of rational beings being in harmony with the moral law, 
qua basic rational law conduct. We can ask how coherent this idea is; 
we can also ask how useful it is as a demand. 
Kant appeals to the real use of reason, which is the source of the 
transcendental ideas, and the formal use of reason, which is 
                                                 
1For an excellent account of this theme see Henrich (1994). 
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actualised as the joining of judgments in syllogisms in order to 
systematise and unify our judgments about the world of sense. In 
accordance with his transcendental approach to philosophy, Kant 
does not allow for the principles of the framework of either moral 
action or possible experience to be counted as abstractions and 
generalisations from what one does, or what one knows, respectively. 
Such an allowance is part and parcel of the form of Lockean 
Empiricism, against which he is arguing. But one must nevertheless 
ask how the understanding might be understood to relate, to reason’s 
ability to form an idea of the soul, the world-whole, or God.  
In the practical case, symbols allow unconditional demands for 
action to be represented as conditioned: as having empirical, 
intuitional content (objective reality). In the theoretical case one is 
only able to form the principle expressed by the following injunction: 
“seek to maximally unify and systematise one’s knowledge”. Now 
this general form, of the idea of reason in its theoretical use, certainly 
seems logically prior to, that is, to ground, the three transcendental 
ideas. Note we are not talking about temporal formation of the ideas. 
The point is that in the case of the practical use of reason one can 
form principles for action without yet knowing anything about their 
conditions of satisfaction, for this is the function of moral 
anthropology: to tell us how and under what conditions certain 
unconditional demands can be approximated to. 
This is not the case with theoretical uses of reason. When Kant 
began the Transcendental Logic by saying that “although all 
cognition commences with experience, yet it does not on that account 
all arise from experience”,1 he was insisting that sensibility and the 
understanding have theoretically distinct roles in cognition, but also 
acknowledging that no cognition was possible prior to sensible 
affection. Reason does not strictly feature as an element of cognition, 
but rather of thinking; reason guides the actions of the 
understanding. Beyond this triviality of definition, Kant is committed 
to saying that regardless of what reason is it must be counted as 
coming on the scene, in the logical sense, after cognition has gotten 
going. Although Kant is committed to saying that the real use of 
reason directs the understanding’s making of judgments via the 
formal use of reason in its syllogising, one must ask how the 
transcendental ideas are able to connect up with the three important 
areas of the pure understanding’s function in delimiting the 
conditions of possible experience.  
                                                 
1 B1.  
114 
Chapter Two: Metarepresentational Structure in Kant and Hegel 
The question is how one can get from the idea of reason in its 
theoretical use to the three specific transcendental ideas without the 
pure understanding’s categorial framework of a possible experience 
(which again we must recall is inherently sensible). The problem is 
that the transition, or rather the grounding relation, is internal to 
reason itself: the real use of reason is meant to be the sole source of 
the transcendental ideas. But since the idea of reason in its 
theoretical use seems to express no more than the general idea 
behind the formal use of reason—“unify and systematise one’s 
judgments”—it is unclear whether the transcendental ideas follow 
from it without consideration of possible experience. And if the pure 
understanding and reason are connected at this level, then one must 
explain how and in what sense. 
It is at this point that the deep importance of Kant’s theory of 
symbolic representation emerges. Given the foregoing discussions, it 
is clear that insofar as the faculties of the understanding and of 
reason interact an activity of symbolising must occur in empirical 
judgments insofar as such judgments presuppose, in the form of a 
principle, an idea of a world-whole to which they all belong (as a 
unity). This is, moreover, thought of as analogous to “God”, qua 
singular being (the distributive unity as the sensibilised omnitudo 
realitatis).Thus it is claimed that Kant was implicitly committed to 
allowing symbolic representation in theoretical uses of reason.1And 
this can be taken as a consequence of, in addition, his recognition of 
the usefulness, albeit informal validity, of analogical reasoning about 
empirical matters. The key is that, given his empirical realism, Kant 
requires such analogical reasoning to play a central part in the 
improvement of the epistemic situation of human beings. 
We are tempted to suppose this feature of human reason is also 
necessary, and not merely possible, because its limited character 
requires the kind of speculative assistance that symbolism and 
analogy supply. We will not comment further on this complication, 
although such a claim seems congenial to Kant’s thinking insofar as a 
scientific metaphysics makes claims about the necessary structure of 
reason itself.  
This takes us quickly to the claim that Kant’s three 
transcendental ideas are related to the structure of regions of 
possible experience itself. That is to say, if reason in its theoretical 
use is to relate to possible experience at all, it must connect with the 
                                                 
1 No extant works in English explore this possibility. There is one 
example in the German literature: Eichberger (1999). 
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transcendental logical structure that Kant argues for in the 
Transcendental Analytic, and in a way that ensures more than a non-
contradictoriness in one’s set of judgments. More specifically, in 
actual cases, it must establish this connection by relating its guiding 
ideals to what is already known: it must model the empirical import 
of the ideas of theoretical reason on the phenomena they are meant 
to systematise and unify.  
Here we say “empirical import of the ideas” because we cannot, 
after all, say that any such “modelling” involves the equation of the 
ideas with the models; rather, we must admit that we need to employ 
examples of what else we should look for in the world of sense to 
extend and improve empirical theories, and we can only do this on 
the basis of (1), what we know and, (2), the theoretical apparati we 
employ (where (1) is available only within the purview of (2)). It is 
important that in attempting a clarification of Kant we do not 
radically violate his restriction against illusory transcendent 
metaphysics, for even if we disagree with him the present aim is to 
restate some of his claims such that they can be made more 
consistent. 
Consider Kant’s remarks in the Prolegomena on this point: 
 
we hold ourselves to this boundary if we limit our judgment merely to 
the relation that the world may have to a being whose concept itself 
lies outside all cognition that we can attain within the world. For we 
then do not attribute to the supreme being any of the properties in 
themselves by which we think the objects of experience, and we 
thereby avoid dogmatic anthropomorphism; but we attribute those 
properties, nonetheless, to the relation of this being to the world, and 
allow ourselves a symbolic anthropomorphism, which in fact concerns 
only language and not the object itself.1 
 
Kant here seems to be caught in an awkward position: he wants to 
insist that we can employ transcendental ideas symbolically such that 
we “attribute…properties”, presumably exemplified in a symbol, “to 
the relation of this [symbolised] being to the world”. This implies 
that the meaning of symbols, encountered in their guise as objects of 
possible experience, is determined by the relation to that which they 
symbolise; so symbolic representation of the supersensible 
represents the relation of the sensible to the supersensible. This is 
presumably what Kant means when he says symbolic representation 
                                                 
1Kant (1997/2004, §57, 4:357, 106). 
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is “indirect”: symbols represent their relation to that which they 
symbolise.  
This strikes one as odd, because ordinary concepts, unlike 
symbols, are usually understood to express the significance of that 
which they refer to, not their relation to that which they refer to. 
And, after all, the idea of something representing the relation of 
what it represents to the manner in which it is represented is not so 
perverse: symbolic representation exemplifies a mix of calculated 
rational and instinctive tendencies in a community and reveals part 
of the Not-Self that determines the Self.1 
That this has an air of mystery is no surprise: since we cannot 
know the supersensible we cannot know the relation it has to the 
sensible. Perhaps since we only have knowledge of our phenomenal 
selves, and not our noumenal selves, symbols should be taken to 
reveal some of our own ineffable character, and not merely the 
ineffable character of the idea of “God”. This is, of course, 
speculation, and is forbidden by Kant’s transcendental idealism. In 
any case, if symbolisation is to be contrasted with schematisation, 
and if the latter is to be identified with that which makes possible 
explicit claims about things whose concepts are schematised, it might 
be proper to construe the former as demonstrating paradigmatic 
(exemplary) instances of the concepts they express. In fact, this 
might be a way of recommending that schemata are the structures 
that allow one to say something, whereas symbols show: symbols 
reveal “reason’s interests” where what ought to be also is. 
It is worth saying a little more about the idea of ineffability before 
moving on. Bielefeldt claims that Kant’s theory of symbolic 
representation and its role in practical philosophy provides a 
workable alternative to the libertarian uneasiness about normativity. 
                                                 
1This suggestion is developed a little by Magnus’s (2001) Hegel. See 
§V.i. One of her basic contentions is that spirit’s determination by the 
symbolic is not a determination “from outside”, but rather, a self-
determination by its “other”. I take it this is an appeal to a structurally 
similar idea: self-determination requires reference to what Kant refers to 
as the “noumenal self”, and even though Hegel rejects such a metaphysical 
view, he indeed retains the logical point that a dialectical self-othering 
process is involved with any determination whatsoever. In fact, this same 
process occurs in acts of knowing individual objects; a distinction is made 
between the object known and the subject knowing it, and then these are 
seen to be two poles of one the phenomenon of an instance of knowledge. 
Magnus takes her reading of Hegel on this count to save him from the 
criticisms of Derrida (1982). 
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This uneasiness can be captured best by thinking of it as a self-
undermining attitude that assents to some set of normative 
propositions, whilst simultaneously denying that they need to be 
assented to by everybody, thus that they are not properly universal; 
further, that those who disagree with them need not be brought into 
agreement with oneself, this being more problematic in moral cases 
than in, say, aesthetic cases.  
Bielefeldt suggests that, properly interpreted, Kant’s conception 
of symbolism is useful for understanding how one might, in a modern, 
individualist, secular society, retain a concrete connection with that 
to which one responds with normative considerations in mind. If this 
possibility is foregone, one might ask “What ought I to do?”, and lack 
examples which might be appealed to. I take it that part of the 
problem here is meant to be that the idea of “framework relative” 
truth (say, that is “phenomenal”, or of the “world of sense”), so easily 
concluded from Kant’s Copernican Revolution, leads quickly to 
anxieties about a whole gamut of relativisms, and that symbols 
unlike schematic “metarepresentations” can put a stop to this by 
providing concrete instances of what one’s “common reason” tells one 
what ought to be. That is, symbols are cases to which one points. 
Moreover, according to Bielefeldt, evincing one’s normative 
commitments by pointing to examples of what one thinks “ought to 
be” and “ought to be done” can allow for a “friendly irony”1 that 
simultaneously affirms one’s normative commitments as well as 
acknowledges the element of opacity in them: the moral law and the 
demands it makes on us are in a sense incapable of further 
analysis.2This, I take it, impels many to nihilism. 
It is interesting how from this opacity of the moral law some may 
infer its contingency, as if not being able to understand why reason 
has the power to command somehow undermined the fact that it 
ought to.3Notoriously, Kant’s position is that moral demands have 
the force of necessity. However, the idea that the normative 
demands to which one responds, and for which one is partly 
responsible, involve either “opacity”4 or “contingency” allows one to 
                                                 
1Bielefeldt (2003, 3). 
2 Note the different way in which this theme is developed by the 
Romantics. 
3 On our comprehending the “incomprehensibility” of the moral law, see 
Kant (1996c, 4:463, 108). 
4Bielefeldt (2003, 5, cf. 32-33) comments on this theme: “human 
finiteness manifests itself in the fact that human beings cannot ultimately 
comprehend the unconditioned moral vocation under whose spell they find 
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acknowledge, in different ways, that one comes to have some certain 
set of attitudes about moral matters as a result of being born in a 
certain time and place, and that this heritage can seem puzzlingly 
contingent whilst simultaneously having a powerful shaping effect on 
one’s personal experience of the human condition.1 It seems fair to 
say that Kant’s analysis of morality, whatever else it may be, is a 
transcendental explanation of the conditions of the possibility of the 
experience of “necessary” moral demands by a rational being (here, 
specifically human). 
We return now to the general question of the role of symbolism 
and analogy. In short, we must acknowledge that reason is employed 
in theoretical cases to unify and systematise thought and knowledge 
about such empirical phenomena, by connecting intuited images 
(models) of the known with the principle of systematic unity and 
thereby transforming their rational significance, in order to specify 
further connections one can and should make with other regions of 
known phenomena. This is, of course, a defeasible process involving 
hypothesis testing, but a Kantian philosophy of science insists that 
the structure of pure reason is such that connections are necessarily 
made in this way. In this context, it is useful to recall Kant’s 
characterisation of his metaphysics as that of an “a priori judging 
reason”. 
                                                                                                                            
themselves. Morality in general remains beyond the scope of both empirical 
demonstration and theoretical speculation. The unconditional “ought” 
inherent in moral consciousness reveals itself as a “fact of reason,” as Kant 
puts it. This “fact of reason” is the existential reality of the moral vocation, 
a reality of which we are certain in moral practice, even though we 
ultimately fail to comprehend (let alone prove) it in theory. We thus again 
confront the inextricable interconnectedness of the unconditioned and the 
conditioned. Practice and theory remain different, and practical and 
theoretical uses of reason can never be one and the same thing. It is only 
indirectly that they form a unity.” Most importantly, it is the unconditional 
demand of practical reason and, therefore, the transcendental condition of 
human freedom, which makes possible a critical metaphysics (9). 
1Bielefeldt’s purpose in his book is “to show that Kant’s practical 
philosophy can help us to develop an appropriate language of liberal ethics 
in the broadest sense. What Kant offers is a highly sophisticated language 
that includes, among other things, the deliberate use of symbols, analogies 
and, at times, a friendly irony. Symbols, analogies, and irony can serve as a 
means of expressing indirectly those basic normative convictions that, at 
the same time, must be protected against the ever-lurking tendencies of 
authoritarian objectification.” (3) 
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Notoriously, Kant is claiming that although we cannot have 
metaphysical knowledge that outstrips possible experience, we can 
have metaphysical knowledge of the nature of reason, which in a 
sense is “beyond experience” proper. By this Kant means that we 
can know something about rational structure and rational limits, 
although we cannot know purely rational entities. Hegel has some 
sympathy with Kant’s revised conception of metaphysics, although 
he offers a radically different explanation and defence of what it 
might mean. One of his main objections to Kant’s Critical Philosophy 
is that such philosophy presupposes that reason has a certain 
structure, yet does not provide an adequate dialectical explanation of 
why it must in terms of how it must. We now discuss some of the 
Hegelian corrections of Kant in the context of evaluative reasoning.
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The claim to be argued further here is that, by Kant’s own lights, the 
unity of the understanding cannot be separated from the unity of 
reason; thus, conditions on the latter are conditions on the former, 
and reason itself is an implicit element in the conditions of the 
possibility of experience. We therefore arrive at a Hegelian 
confrontation with Kant, since Hegel laid a similar charge at Kant’s 
feet. The issue over which there is confrontation is the second 
concern we raised in the form of a question, near the commencement 
of §II.iii: “How does symbolic representation allow for the 
encompassment of material apparently external to reason (intuitively 
represented/-able individuals) to be taken as analogical to material 
internal to reason (ideas in their guise as universal, subjectively valid 
maxims of pure reason)?”1 
As we noted in the earlier context, this question focuses the 
arguments of this chapter as a whole; it is moreover the theme which 
we will be extending and deepening in our direct discussion of Hegel. 
First let us consider how the rightful distinction between two 
aspects of cognition, the capacity for receptivity through sensibility 
and the capacity for spontaneous conceptual activity through the 
understanding, led Kant to characterise cognitive representations 
themselves as having two aspects: the intuitive and the conceptual. 
Note that cognition depending upon two basic capacities does not 
entail it has two essential forms. Hegel is careful to note this point by 
offering in place of “receptivity” and “spontaneity” a distinction 
which allows for the penetration of the understanding’s content—and 
not merely its form—by reason. Hegel’s successor concepts would 
seem to be “immediacy” and “mediation”, respectively, yet these do 
not align with Kant’s distinction, since rational entities can appear in 
the role of “immediate” just as sensuous content can appear in the 
                                                 
1 Hegel actually intimates a criticism similar to the one I’ve 
recommended here: “if the syllogism consists in the unity of the extremes 
being posited in it, and if, all the same, this unity is simply taken on the one 
hand as aparticular on its own, and on the other hand as a merely external 
relation,and non-unity is made the essential relationship of the syllogism, 
then the reason which constitutes the syllogism contributes nothing to 
rationality.” (1969, 665)He makes similar remarks in the introduction to the 
final section of The Subjective Logic, “The Idea”, of roughly this kind 
(Hegel (1969, 755-760)). 
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guise of “mediated”. In fact, the point that thought-entities do not in 
any straightforward sense have an intrinsically “immediate” or 
“mediated” quality is perhaps one of the keys to understanding what 
Hegel is up to at any given point in his dialectic. 
In any case, the basic lesson is that the transformation of the 
content of the understanding’s judgments by reason turns out to 
depend upon the negative power of reason. On this Hegel says: 
 
The understanding determines, and holds the determinations fixed; 
reason is negative and dialectical, because it resolves the 
determinations of the understanding into nothing; it is positive 
because it generates the universal and comprehends the particular 
therein. Just as the understanding is usually taken to be something 
separate from reason as such, so too dialectical reason is usually 
taken to be something distinct from positive reason. But reason in 
truth is spirit which is higher than either merely positive reason, or 
merely intuitive understanding. It is the negative, that which 
constitutes the quality alike of dialectical reason and of the 
understanding; it negates what is simple, thus positing the specific 
difference of the understanding; it equally resolves it and is thus 
dialectical.1 
 
The notorious difficulty for Kant is that of synthesising intuitions and 
concepts such that one can say by what right subjective conditions of 
thinking can have objective validity.2Hegel thought he was able to 
overcome the difficulty of explaining how rationally articulated 
thought, namely, that taking the form of a syllogism, could include a 
moment of singularity without resorting to the dualism between pure 
immediacy or givenness (on the side of “being”),and absolute 
conceptual mediation (on the side of “thought”).3 
Hegel’s transformation of Kant’s intuition-concept distinction 
depends, however, on Fichte’s, which for its part involves a contrast 
between “feeling” and “concept”. This distinction between “feeling” 
and “concept” opened the way for Hegel to claim that the singular, 
particular, or universal character of a concept depended on its 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 28). 
2 This phrasing is used in the Transcendental Deduction at A89-90/B122. 
3 That Kant is blocked from importing structures of syllogistic 
reasoning into his account of judgment by his intuition-concept distinction 
is mentioned by Redding (2003, 301). In that context it is also mentioned 
that Hegel’s rejection of the intuition-concept distinction allows him to 
adopt this strategy. 
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context of application. Note that this effectively restates Kant’s 
claim in the Jäsche Logic: 
 
It is mere tautology to speak of general of common concepts, a 
mistake based on the wrong division of concepts into general, 
particular, and singular. Not the concepts themselves, only their use 
can be divided this way.1 
 
The additional novelty of Fichte’s account stems from his reference 
to “feeling” rather than “sensation”, where the former is meant to be 
entirely non-representational (as contrasted with Kantian intuitions, 
which are singular representations of phenomena). Fichte’s removal 
of Kant’s element of non-conceptuality from the realm of 
representation appears to have served as a signal to Hegel as to how 
to advance his own case. 
The problem that remains is that of explaining the role singular 
representations have in judgments and syllogistic inferences; indeed, 
the question to be asked is how there can be such a thing as a 
normative constraint on the way sensible affections function in our 
cognition without it appearing as if cognitive conceptuality is 
imposed on merely “given” non-cognitive material. Hegel’s rejection 
of a separable intuitional form for cognition is of a piece with 
rejection of non-conceptual representations;2 Hegel does not deny 
the existence and importance of feeling, although it is for him not the 
kind of “shape of consciousness” that can function to represent. Of 
course, it is not clear that Kant thinks intuitions can function to 
represent by themselves, when “represent” is taken in Kant’s usual 
sense, since we require concepts to knowingly stand in relation to 
some object. 
An advantage of Hegel’s approach is that the realm of reason is 
not construed as distinct from things reasoned about, as the case 
apparently is in Kant. And this is because logical subjects of 
judgments are rendered fully in conceptual terms and able to become 
integrated into pieces of reasoning. Moreover, for Hegel syllogisms 
are the “truth” of the judgment; therefore the partially rational 
character of judgments and their terms are resolved in a more 
adequate way with no remainder: for Hegel there is no residual 
intuitional form which forbids reason from being “the certainty of 
consciousness that it is all reality”.3 
                                                 
1Kant (1974, §1).  
2 Yet cf. the discussion below in §§V-V.iof “shapes of consciousness”. 
3Hegel (1977b, §233, cf. §235). 
123 
III ~ Examples and Evaluative Reasoning 
On this point, Redding refers to the way in which Hegel 
characterises a judgment about a house being “good”.1 Indeed, Hegel 
regarded evaluative judgments as “the most developed of judgment 
forms”, which, due to their evaluative character, are “contestable” 
and therefore lead to the “truth” of “the judgment” being claimed by 
Hegel to be “the syllogism”, since this latter form of rationality 
contains an explicit argumentative structure.2 In his discussion of 
this judgment Hegel says  
 
this—the immediate singularity (Einzelheit)—house—the genus—
being constituted thus and so—particularity—is good or bad.3 
 
In his discussion of the evaluative dimension of perceptual judgment 
Redding draws a comparison between Aristotle’s second figure and 
Hegel’s third: 
 
Aristotle’s second figure (i.e., Hegel’s third), designated “PUS”, is 
meant to be read: 
UxP 
UxS 
PxS.4 
 
And adds, 
 
If we compare Hegel’s third figure to the pattern of the first, 
(UxP&PxS, “UxS”) from whence it has been generated, we will see 
that this is inference to the minor premise or the “case”.5 
 
Here Redding is establishing grounds for claiming there is a germ of 
inferentialist semantics in Kant by connecting Hegel’s and Peirce’s 
references to abduction and hypothetical reasoning to Kant’s 
inferences of analogy, which themselves involve an informally valid 
“inference to the minor premise”.6 His explanation of the logical 
                                                 
1Redding (2003, 302). Cf. Redding (2007a, Chapter 6) on the “dynamics 
of evaluative reason”. 
2Redding (2007a, 181 & ff.). 
3Hegel (1991b, §179). See the discussion of this in Redding (2007a, 188-
189). 
4Redding (2003, 302). 
5Redding (2003, 303). 
6 The relevant Kantian example is that of the analogy drawn between 
the moon and the earth (where the moon is conceived in the example as “an 
earth”, as if the singular earth were a particular instantiation of a universal 
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character of abduction establishes it as resting on a form of analogical 
inference that is capable of generating hypotheses regarding 
properties a given phenomenon might have, on the basis of it 
possessing other properties. This structure is readily seen to be 
present also, at least implicitly, in the employment of symbolically 
represented ideas in moral judgment.  
Hegel’s seems to view the forms of judgment in which evaluative 
terms “guide” inferences that may be made from them, as aesthetic 
ones.1As Redding notes, Peirce took a similar view of the way 
abductive inference relates to “aestheticised” perceptual judgment. 
Here, “Hegel considers the explicitly evaluative ‘assertoric 
judgment’ in which universals such as ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘true’, ‘beautiful’, 
and so on, are predicated of some individual thing—his example is 
‘this house is good’. The universals predicated of the subjects in such 
judgments are essentially what Kant treats as ‘ideas’, characterising 
not simply how the thing is but also how it ought to be, and while 
more general than judgments of beauty, such judgments for Hegel 
clearly refer back to Kant’s aesthetic judgments.”2 
Redding makes some further important comments on the 
connection between syllogistic reasoning and the employment of 
exemplars in aesthetic judgment. He notes that for Kant “there were 
no given rules for the application of the evaluative concept 
‘beautiful’” and that “this seems to agree with the experience of 
aesthetic judging itself”. However, “abduction needs a rule”, even if 
the rule for the inference in question does not allow for that inference 
to be formally valid, and does not involve the move from the claim 
that an object has some determinate property, or is of a certain kind, 
to the claim that it has some other determinate property, or is of 
another kind. Thus it can be said that although aesthetic judgments 
are not governed by rules which dictate necessary and sufficient 
conditions, or make universal statements of the form “All Xs are 
beautiful”, they certainly are governed by a standard; aesthetic 
judgments are not subjective in the sense of being arbitrary. 
Importantly, rather than their being governed by perspicuous rules, 
as if this was ever the case with language anyhow, they are guided 
by reference to exemplary instances which have lived up to the 
standard being predicated in the judgment (i.e., “beautiful”).  
                                                                                                                            
whose properties could be regarded as a relevant model for other instances 
of such a kind. 
1 See “Judgments of the Concept” in Hegel (1969, 657-663). 
2Redding (2003, 305). The emphases are mine. 
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The task required of a reasoner is that of convincing an 
interlocutor how a case being judged about somehow lives up to the 
same standard as an exemplary case, as in the case of an artwork 
said to be beautiful on the basis of it resembling some piece of 
classical art, for instance. 
As Redding points out, such an analysis “seems to fit in with 
Hegel’s description of the universal ‘middle term’ of the ‘syllogism of 
analogy’ as an ‘essential universality’ within which ‘singularity and 
universality are immediately united’ rather than abstractly 
opposed”.1The point is that the normativity operative in aesthetic 
judgments, like moral judgments, depends on the fact that certain 
perceptually discriminable features shared by certain objects can be 
grounds for claiming they ought to be categorised in the same way, in 
some relevant respect.2This is obvious, yet the present point extends 
further.  
Unlike in empirical judgments where one can in principle 
conclusively determine whether, to use Kant’s example, a certain set 
of symptoms is a sign of a certain disease, aesthetic judgments do not 
allow us to infer from the fact of an object having a certain empirical 
property to the determinate empirical fact of a certain object being 
beautiful. For Kant, we can at most reflectively characterise 
something as beautiful in a way that is determined by the non-
cognitive feeling that arises in us as a result of being confronted with 
the object (we might also say “state of affairs”). And such reflective 
aesthetic classification rests on the possibility of reference to other 
cases where empirical objects occasion a certain structurally similar 
feeling that leads us to say things like: “That is beautiful”. Namely, 
                                                 
1Redding (2003, 306). The emphases are mine. There is a reference in 
this context to Hegel (1969, 693-694). 
2 Redding refers to Kant’s view of the reflective characterisations 
involved with aesthetic judgment in the following way: “Kant is insistent 
that such inferences ‘are not functions of the determinative power of 
judgment…but rather of the reflective; hence they also do not determine 
the object, but only the mode of reflection concerning it, in order to attain 
its cognition’” (Kant 1992a, 625-626). In theDohna-Wundlacken Logiche 
notes that: “According to the inference by analogy, if 2 things agree under 
as many [determinations] as I have become acquainted with, then I infer 
that they agree also [in] the other [determinations]. I infer, then, from some 
determinations, which I cognize, that the others belong to the thing too. 
This is an inference of a provisional judgment. One reserves the right to 
change it’.” Kant (1992a, 503) See Redding (2003, 308, n.2). 
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judging reflectively must in principle be an expression of a general 
capacity that can be actualised on other relevant occasions. 
Employment of examples of moral behaviour involves a similar 
grouping principle, yet moral judgment is meant to be cognitive, 
since it involves the application of determinate concepts to appraised 
actions and events.1 But if moral examples that are employed as 
symbolic representations of the idea of the good cannot be said to be 
fully determinate representations of “the good” (recall that symbols 
are “indirect” representations), then how can one claim that moral 
judgments are entirely cognitive? Is there not some non-cognitive 
dimension involved? Do our moral judgments not depend upon our 
ability to respond with feeling? Kant denies that inclination (feeling) 
is ever the ground of moral action, yet the presence of an approving 
attitude toward the moral law is surely a condition of acting morally 
(which is not to say that the moral law having the force it ought to 
depends on our liking it).2 This sounds out of step with Kant’s official 
doctrine, since one cannot “opt out” of morality and one need not be 
inclined to act morally in order to be moral. This is beside the point, 
however. The idea is that whilst acting morally does not require one 
to experience morally commendable sensations, it does require one to 
endorse the moral law, in the sense of recognising its commands as 
ones to be followed. 
This, it seems, is why determining a certain course of action to be 
moral requires comparing its structure (expressed by its maxim) 
with the structure (found in the maxim) of moral exemplars. If one’s 
                                                 
1 There is a nice question as to whether it makes sense for events to be 
characterised as moral. In one sense we can say that to do so is to commit 
the error of anthropomorphisation; in another sense, we can say that it is 
better or worse that certain events happened, but this is only a moral 
appraisal if we can tie the event/s to actions performed. In other words, an 
attribution of responsibility is required to make the moral appraisal 
coherent. 
2 Of course, “approval” might be a totally inappropriate term here, since 
presumably, for Kant, the moral law does not depend on our approval in 
order to be the true ground of moral action; one might rather be humiliated 
and elevated by the moral law. The difficulty here stems partly from the 
fact that it is difficult to appreciate how one could assent to something 
without approving of it; this is the problem faced by the Humean when 
defending the notion of second-order desires. Kant’s point is simply that 
rational determination of the will occurs by one’s action being occasioned by 
a principle, rather than it being empirically determined by a desire. On this 
see Kant (1996b, "On the Principles of Pure Practical Reason", 5:19-41, 153-
173, esp. 1. Definition & 2. Theorem I). 
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present course of action exemplifies a structurally relevant similarity 
with what the Categorical Imperative demands, say by respecting 
another rational being as an end in themselves in a complicated way 
that is not immediately obvious,1 then it can, for example, be 
regarded as moral; sometimes one needs to give quite a lot of 
information to determine exactly what moral worth an action has. 
Kant voices this concern in an admission from the Metaphysics of 
Morals, where the maxim of an action is noted as being not always 
perspicuous. That is, we can ask questions like: 
 
Is it murdering oneself to hurl oneself to certain death (like Curtius) 
in order to save one’s country?—or is deliberate martyrdom, 
sacrificing oneself for the good of all humanity, also to be considered 
an act of heroism?2 
 
This is now an important point that allows one to say that knowing 
what is the right thing to do requires knowing how to apply the 
demands of the moral law to one’s situation. And doing so is often not 
a straightforward matter.3 This is the reason finite human beings 
often need to guide their behaviour with moral examples: one can use 
cases of highly regarded moral behaviour as models. Such models 
have the normative function of signalling what actions count as good 
(in the case of exemplars, the “most good”, or the “morally best”), 
precisely because they are the paradigm of a (crucially, non-
accidental) coincidence of the is and the ought: exemplars are cases 
where we say what is so is also what ought to be. Determining one’s 
future conduct morally therefore requires understanding what it is 
about exemplary cases of “doing the best thing in the circumstances” 
that makes them exemplary. And, importantly, this is determined by 
“common human reason”.4 
                                                 
1 Kant insists that “when moral worth is at issue, what counts is not 
actions, which one sees, but those inner principles of actions that one does 
not see.” (1996c, 4:407, 61-62) Cf. his remarks about reason being pure self-
activity (4:452, 99). 
2Kant (1996d, 6:423, 548). 
3 Of relevant consideration here is contemporary theory in the 
philosophy of action, two leading cases of which are Anscombe (1957/2000) 
and Davidson (1963). 
4 One is struck by the difficulties that arise if it is admitted that 
patterns of reasoning about what is morally best are determined by social 
and historical context. Even if one elaborates upon this claim no further, 
and takes Hegel to endorse something like it, then a salient point of tension 
between him and Kant emerges: how can one assume there to be a 
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What we have said above regarding the determination of moral 
conduct implies that the maxim of an action can be somewhat 
indeterminate. It might seem erroneous to impute to Kant the 
thought that moral judgments are not fully determinate, because 
they are, unlike aesthetic judgments, cognitive. However, they are, 
like aesthetic judgments, evaluative; that is, normatively guided in a 
strong sense. Consider, however, the fact to which Kant assents, and 
which was adduced above: the maxim of an action is not always fully 
determinate. This means that not only is the “content” of the piece of 
moral behaviour being conceived symbolically not always fully 
determinate, but the action one is now performing does not have a 
fully determinate character either, unless one can say once one 
knows the proper maxim of the action the action is rendered 
determinate by its being known, but this introduces the complication 
that an action initially was not, rather than that it was not known as 
such. So not only are both terms of the relation of the analogy, when 
one makes an analogy between one’s current action and a moral 
exemplar, indeterminate, but the idea to which one approximates 
with a symbol, is indeterminate also. This seems to make a mystery 
of Kant’s account of moral judgment. What should one say in 
response to this difficulty? 
It seems one fall back for Kant is the claim that the capacity for 
“sound judgment”, either innate or acquired, is that which allows for 
the proper linkage between one’s moral actions, symbolic examples, 
and the moral law, and that this is the ground of our ability to say 
certain actions are necessary and that one ought to perform them. 
But this appears to reduce the whole analysis to the concession that 
sociality alone determines the conditions of what can be deemed 
good. After all, how else could we come to learn the ways of proper 
judging?1 
With such a general conclusion Hegel would most likely have been 
satisfied; Kant, however, is in no position to grant such a concession. 
                                                                                                                            
universal “common human reason”, whose structure is identical in all the 
relevant respects, and that is not determined by the communities of 
reasoners beholden to it? Whilst Hegel does not say anything to confirm 
that he is some kind of radical relativist, he does emphasise that the 
structure of what he calls “thought” is determined by mutually recognitive 
relations between rational subjects who participate in Sittlichkeit. 
1 The alternative to “socially acquired” is “biologically innate”. Clearly 
an appeal to the latter issues in what McDowell (1996) refers to as an 
“exculpation” rather than a justification, of the rational status of one’s 
conduct. 
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For if socially determined standards of correctness were the grounds 
of determining what counted as “good”, the necessary form of the 
moral law would be reduced to the contingent content of the 
preferences of the community within which it was appealed to. 
Hegel’s position seems to be that although this may be 
approximately correct, this does not mean one can regard the 
normative standards of a community as merely contingent. Yet it is 
notoriously unclear how to explain that normative constraint is 
relative to historical and social contexts without abolishing the idea 
of something resembling a non-illusory standard altogether.  
In a later work, Redding provides a hint; in speaking of the 
indeterminate nature of beauty, he claims that seeing beauty as a 
value rather than a property “brings it into the orbit of Fichte’s and 
Hegel’s treatment of recognition.” Thus, aesthetic judgments are 
more similar to acts of “Anerkennen” (recognition) than “Erkennen” 
(cognition).The basic idea is that in making an aesthetic judgment on 
is “recognising or acknowledging that it lives up to or exemplifies 
some norm much in the way in which my affective respectful 
response to another person’s action acknowledges that action as an 
expression of the moral law.”1 
Redding acknowledges that there are divergences between 
aesthetic and moral cases, although the key point here is that both 
kinds of judgment are meant to be disinterested. This point is 
captured best by Kant’s three injunctions in the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment: “(1) to think for oneself; (2) to think from the 
standpoint of everyone else; and (3) to think always consistently”.2 
The force of these rests on the fact that Kant seems to appeal to a 
parallel between the sensus communis3 and “common human reason 
(or understanding)”,4 where in both cases the task set for a rational 
being is to bring themselves into line with certain acceptable 
standards of aesthetic and moral appraisal.  
The question one ought to raise is whether the separation of 
reason and feeling (qua sensation—which is, moreover, the “matter 
of appearance”) is absolute. On this point, one ought to compare 
Kant’s discussion of the aesthetic idea with the ideas of reason from 
§57 of the 3rd Critique. Kant posited an equivalent, at the level of 
sensibility, of that which he posited at the level of reason and his 
reason for keeping these separated from one another follows from his 
                                                 
1Redding (2007a, 180). 
2Kant (2000, §40, 5:294, 174). 
3 This phrase is in the title of §40 of the 3rd Critique. 
4Kant (1996c, 4:404, 58). 
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transcendental idealist thesis that appearances and things in 
themselves are radically distinct. 
A more helpful way to make Kant’s point, from “Remark 1” to §57 
of the 3rd Critique, that aesthetic ideas are “inexponible” and ideas of 
pure reason “indemonstrable”, would be to say that infima species, 
the representation of which Kantian intuitions are a paradigm, and 
the summum genus, which correlates with the ens realissimum, are 
not conceptually determinable.1 Rather, that conceptual activity is 
that which extends in two opposite directions, maximum specificity 
and maximum generality, without ever reaching a limit at either. If 
one puts the point this way one avoids the pitfalls of Kant’s 
transcendental idealism, whilst retaining one of its core insights.2 
One problem is that Kant characterises the former (the aesthetic 
idea) as a “subjective” and the latter as “objective”. The arguments 
of this chapter are aimed at undermining the way Kant draws this 
distinction. 
The conclusion of all this is that symbolically representable moral 
exemplars of “the good”, in cases of human moral action, can be 
instanced as place-fillers in judgments that fit into patterns of 
syllogistic reasoning, where an analogy is made between the action 
performed and what the moral law demands. Performances are 
appraised morally by (1) determining the action’s proper maxim, 
which is then, (2), compared with an example of what doing the right 
thing in the circumstances would involve, where in order for one’s 
action to be deemed moral it must share some relevant structural 
similarity with the example.  
Note that this structural similarity will be present both at the 
level of the maxim (the description of the action), and, more 
interestingly, the action to be performed by the moral agent (the set 
of events in the empirically real that is described). This means that 
agents can be viewed empirically as being a physical part of an event 
and therefore be described in purely empirical, causal terms, yet at 
the same time be viewed in intelligible terms, as a self-determining 
moral agent acting in accordance with a practical law (the 
Categorical Imperative). Part of the difficulty, of which, as we noted 
above, Kant is aware, is that there is some ambiguity involved here, 
and this depends on the fact of the occasional obscurity of the 
connection between a physical action and its envisaged significance 
on both the part of the agent as well as those who judge their action. 
                                                 
1 Cf. Kant’s reference to “ideals of sensibility” at A570-571/B598-599. 
2Longuenesse (1995/2007, 180) discusses this general point, although her 
view is different. 
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Kant does insist that to properly understand the significance of an 
action one cannot make superficial judgments about empirical 
appearances, but rather seek to discover the agent’s reasons, which, 
qua reasons, issue from them qua rational agent.1 
Hegel’s point, according to Redding, seems to be that when one 
appraises something as having a certain character, i.e., “goodness”, 
one is claiming that it has this character on the basis of some 
empirical property. Moral and aesthetic cases essentially involve the 
reflective, evaluative classification of empirical matters. Yet Hegel 
makes a stronger point than this; he thinks that all judgments are 
like this, at a deep level only revealed through dialectical explication. 
Hegel regards evaluative judgment, the proper form of which he 
refers to in the Science of Logic as the “judgment of the concept”, as 
the most developed: it is the dialectical form that reveals the “truth” 
of judgment, prior to its explicitation in syllogistic form. This might 
be better put by saying that all judgment is evaluative, although 
oftentimes only covertly rather than explicitly so. 
To connect this with Kant’s discussion of aesthetic judgment in 
§29 of the 3rd Critique, envisage Hegel as asking: “Why do we need to 
presume a distinction between “subjective” (agreeable), “subjective-
objective” (beautiful), and “objective” (good) properties, as there is in 
Kant?” Indeed, Hegel does not separate “beauty” from “goodness”,2 
and in any case argues for a dialectical progression from “feeling”, to 
“representation”, and then to “thought”. 
If one could understand Hegel’s response to this, one could also 
understand part of what Hegel is reacting to in Kant’s purportedly 
“subjective” idealism. This issue is that of how one ought to 
understand normative constraint. The general question: “Is 
determination of normative constraint a radically subjective matter 
based on projection of one’s preferences, or are normative appraisals 
anchored in their objects in some stronger sense?” Note how this 
question reflects the general concern of this chapter, as already 
noted: the question of how material apparently “external” to reason 
(symbolically represented individuals) can be judged as analogous to 
the transcendental ideas, which are “internal” to reason. We must 
now consider what Hegel means when he claims that the syllogism is 
the “truth” of the judgment, and how this explains the attitude just 
referred to.3 
                                                 
1 See 138, n.1 above. 
2Redding (2007a, 182, n.18). 
3 Cf. Hegel (1991b): “It is only when things are studied from the point of 
view of their kind, and as with necessity determined by the kind, that the 
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As Redding notes, Hegel views the subject term of an evaluative 
judgment of reflection not as a “mere singular” that has some 
“abstract universal” predicated of it. Rather, this is the case with the 
first shape of judgment in the dialectical progression: the judgment 
of existence.1 Instead, in judgments of reflection,2 the subject of the 
judgment “is now understood as instantiating some kind and 
determined by some defining power or disposition.”3 This means that 
it is understood “‘as standing in relation to something else’—such as 
the illness to be cured in the case of the ‘curative’ plant, for 
example—because such powers are expressed in the changes induced 
in other things with which they interact.”  
There is a further step here: once something is judged in terms of 
its capacity to induce some effect, “that in virtue of which” it has 
such an effect must be ascertained. Redding notes that satisfying this 
requirement would “be the task of specifying its ‘concept’.” This step 
completes the investigation, whose conclusion would be expressed in 
a structurally analogous way to this: “this plant, in virtue of its 
containing such and such a compound, is curative”. Such a statement 
lays out the implicitly syllogistic structure of such reflective 
judgments explicitly.4 
It is not necessary for present purposes to explain the details of 
the remainder of the dialectical progression in judgment, except to 
note that it is in the final shape, judgments of the concept, that the 
intersubjective dimension implicated in the establishment of 
objectivity, in its guise as normative constraint, emerges. It is a 
central theme in this intersubjective dimension that judgments of the 
concept allow for the subject term to include a demonstrative 
element, as expressed as, for example, “this house” or “this action”. 
This demonstrative element in the subject term is crucial for it 
enables the evaluative judgment to “be thought of as establishing a 
genuine cognitive relation to an independent object.” Yet because 
each subject who judges evaluatively will at least initially have an 
equal claim to correctness, such judgments are “subjective” and 
                                                                                                                            
judgment first begins to be a true judgment (wahrhaft)” (EL, 329; EnL, 
242); cited in Pippin (1989, 239). Cf.: “Truth is the agreement of the object 
with itself, i.e., with its Notion [Begriff]”. (EL, 323; EnL, 237; Pippin (1989, 
239)) 
1Hegel (1969, 630-643). 
2Hegel (1969, 643-650). 
3Redding (2007a, 182). 
4Redding (2007a, 182). 
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“problematic”.1 It must therefore be shown how a further distinction 
can be drawn, within the process of reasoning itself, between that 
which is “external” to the conceptual realm (the object referred to 
demonstratively) and that which is “internal” (the concept predicated 
of the object).2 
The key Hegelian move here, according to Redding, is that once 
one determines something as “external” to the concept (or, 
equivalently, to “reason”), one has determined it conceptually, or 
reasoned about it in some way. To reinvoke the role of 
demonstratives, Redding recalls Hegel’s dialectical breakdown of the 
structure of “Sense-Certainty” in Chapter 1 of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit: “An actual sense-certainty is not merely this pure immediacy, 
but an instance (or example [Beispiel]) of it”.3This is to say that one 
cannot be confronted with a mere “this” in general, but always at 
least a “this such”, where the singular structure of the “this” can only 
be intelligible in terms of it having such-and-such a character. In a 
parallel way, “[I]n judgment, the concept is brought into relation to 
something singular and external, but singularity here must come to 
be understood as only an aspect (‘moment’) of a more coherent, 
organised, and hence, conceptualised world.” The question is then 
whether a “stronger conception of ‘externality’” is needed;4 Hegel 
appears to think not, at least not in the context of his discussion of 
Geist.5 In the Logic, at any rate, Hegel says: 
 
The concept is the universal essence of a thing or a fact [Sache] 
withdrawn into itself, its negative unity with itself; this constitutes 
its subjectivity. But a thing is also essentially contingent and has an 
external constitution; this may equally be called the mere subjectivity 
of the thing in contrast to the other side, its objectivity…The thing 
itself is just this, that its concept, as the negative of itself, negates its 
universality and projects itself into the externality of individuality. 
The subject of the judgment is here posited as this duality; those 
opposite significations of subjectivity are, in accordance with their 
truth, brought into a unity.6 
 
                                                 
1Redding (2007a, 184). Recall that problematic judgments correlate with 
Kant’s two categories of “possible” and “impossible”. 
2Redding (2007a, 186). 
3Hegel (1977b, §92); cited in  Redding (2007a, 186). 
4Redding (2007a, 187). 
5There is, of course, a difference in the element of “absolute externality” 
in Hegel’s philosophy of nature. 
6Hegel (1969, 661). 
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This passage is another way of stating the point already made above: 
demonstrative reference to objects is a way of securing a connection 
between purported “externality to reason” and “internality to 
reason” (or, the concept), in such a way as to allow for the distinction 
between what is said (or thought) of something and that of which it is 
said (or thought) to be regarded as occurring within processes of 
reasoning themselves.1 The basic point, again, is that the possibility 
of counter-assertions to one’s assertions is the basic feature of 
intersubjectively determined normative structure. In Redding’s 
words, “[W]ith the opposition of one assertion to another we are in 
the realm of recognitive interaction.”2 The dialectical progression to 
the final judgment form, the apodictic, is now driven by the 
“contestation between apparently equally justified ‘problematic’ 
judgments”. In the apodictic judgment, the “claimant attempts to 
give a justification for the initial claim.”3 Of course, justifications can 
be either accepted or rejected, yet one’s status as a reasoner 
typically requires one to attempt to persuade those to whom one is 
providing the justification. Note how this parallels Kant’s account of 
aesthetic judgments of beauty in §40 of the 3rd Critique, where an 
appeal is made to the idea of a sensus communis.4 
What is most interesting here is the parallel between the grounds 
of the appeal to agreement in aesthetic judgment, in Kant, and the 
grounds of the establishment of objectivity in the dialectic of 
judgment in Hegel. For Kant, one important condition of the 
possibility of agreements in subjective feeling (insofar as it is the 
                                                 
1 Cf. Evans (1982). This contrast is structurally identical to 
Strawson’s(1966/2006) interpretation of what the Transcendental 
Deduction offers: the idea of a subjective route through an objective world. 
The structure in the latter is the idea of there being subject-relative 
thoughts about things that exist independently of their being thought by 
the subject in question. 
2 Interpretations of Hegel that take Anerkennung to be the central 
concept of his philosophy are found in Williams (1992), Redding (1996). 
3Redding (2007a, 188). 
4 Cf. Kant’s remarks about the analogy between physical and normative 
forces: “Thus, in analogy with the law of the equality of effect and counter-
effect in the mutual attraction and repulsion of bodies, I can also conceive of 
the community of the members of a commonwealth in accordance with rules 
of justice, but I cannot transfer the specific determinations of the former 
(the material attraction and repulsion) to the latter and attribute them to 
the citizens in order to conceive of a system which is called a state.” (Kant 
(2000, 5:464-465, 329)). See also Kant (1996d, 6:232-233, 389) for a similar 
example. 
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basis for aesthetic judgment) is a shared a priori faculty of 
sensibility; for Hegel, “the ultimate ground of the judgment” is “the 
recognitive relation between subjects…their acknowledging each 
other as free in their conceptual capacities”.1 Notice in both cases 
that whilst such judgments have a central “subjective” element, 
what occasions the judgments is something that can be properly 
regarded as “objective”: empirical properties of an object occasion 
certain feelings, and certain features of objects evaluated are the 
basis for claiming them to be better or worse, beautiful or ugly, good 
or bad, by some normative criterion (or some set of criteria).  
The key is to recognise that, in Hegel’s view of the evaluative 
judgment, what occasions the judgments is within the purview of 
reason precisely because such things are referred to and judged 
about: the process of reasoning and the things reasoned about are 
properly conceived of as in harmony with one another. In his 
discussion of the judgment of the concept Hegel makes this point by 
saying that the subject and the predicate of the judgment are 
“adequate to one another”.2 
Having made this claim, one is then led to the question of how it 
can be that certain properties or qualities come to be the ones upon 
which one’s judgment is based (one is not concerned merely with how 
one comes to have a certain “subjective” appreciation of those 
properties). It seems proper to say that the process of justification 
involved in evaluative judgment requires one to convince one’s 
interlocutors that such and such properties of the object in question 
are the ones they ought to be judging it on the basis of. In the 
example of a house, one might argue that a house having certain 
materials that allow it to be occupied with comfort, or being painted a 
certain colour that harmonises with its surroundings, are the 
                                                 
1Redding (2007a, 189). 
2Longuenesse (1992/2007) raises serious objections to Hegel’s claim 
regarding the “unity of thought and being”. It would be interesting to see 
McDowell’s reading of Hegel’s conception of reason extended to Hegel’s 
theory of judgment, since this would be an interesting angle on the 
apparent problem. One McDowellian thesis that could be developed by 
doing this is what I would refer to as the “Equipoise Thesis”: the idea that 
thought and being are “in equipoise” (see the papers in McDowell (2009). 
This should be understood as a way of thinking about reasoning as a 
process occurring in concrete communities of reasoners, rather than the 
absurd idea that “everything is always exactly the way we believe or judge 
it to be”.  
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properties of it upon which one ought be basing one’s evaluative 
judgment of it.1 
Recognition of the essential role of symbolism and analogy in 
reasoning is crucial, because it signals to us how more than just the 
inferential practices of communities of reasoners determines the 
normative structure of such practices; it is clear that empirical 
properties of symbolic representations are also relevant to the 
functioning of such representations. This is evident in the fact that 
dis-analogy and mixed metaphor are both possible; it is also revealed 
in abductive reasoning, where an object possessing certain relevant 
empirical properties is oftentimes, and sometimes erroneously, taken 
to be a sign of it possessing certain other empirical properties.  
The empirical likeness of both aesthetically appraised phenomena, 
as well as morally appraised phenomena, can often be grounds for 
grouping them together as satisfying some norm. The key point is 
that the belonging to the normatively determined category is 
something not decided entirely by the object’s or event’s empirical 
properties; belongingness to a normatively determined category is 
something to be decided upon by those collectively determining its 
worth. And it is a condition of the possibility of such a structure in 
rationality that symbols and analogies involves an element of 
indeterminacy, or, as contemporary philosophers would say 
“vagueness”.  
The key is to understand how this vagueness is not debilitating of 
the ability to employ normative categories, but essential to them. 
After all, if one were to go on to search for additional instances of 
kinds that resembled in every respect the instances one knew, one 
would presumably be at a disadvantage; that is, at a loss when 
attempting to think coherently about the world (the inchoate plight 
of the nominalist). This feature of symbols is a further virtue by 
which they afford inexhaustible worth: one can derive significance 
from them in a way that is normatively constrained, yet to an 
indeterminate extent; the content of a symbol can never be fully and 
adequately captured with concepts (in their schematic uses). Of 
course, it is quite easy to formulate accidental dis-analogies by 
attempting to connect irrelevant features of symbols with what they 
symbolise, but again, the rational context within which the symbol is 
employed serves to constrain such possibilities and brings them into 
a reasonable level of agreement. 
                                                 
1 See the discussion on  Redding (2007a, 189-190) and the reference to 
McDowell (1979/1998). 
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Moreover, the centrality of symbolism and analogy in reasoning 
signals certain empirical constraints on rationality. Kant recognised 
that the application of pure practical reason to empirically bound 
action required a mediation by way of symbolic representation, yet 
we have seen that the point is far deeper: judgment in general 
requires appeal to things judged about, and our only route to 
discovering appropriate ways to judge kinds of things, as well as 
individuals as kinds of things, is by way of example. It seems fair to 
say that symbolic representation is essential to conceptual activity in 
both theoretical and practical cognition, that is, in empirical models 
and moral exemplars, respectively. Yet the nature of symbols—their 
empirical character as containing irrelevant features—also makes 
possible conceptual change. Thus, the condition of the possibility of 
conceptual activity—application of conceptual functions and rules to 
spatio-temporal empirical intuitions—is also the condition of the 
possibility of conceptual change. By this latter point it is meant that 
the structure of the free activity of judging itself leads, inevitably, to 
changes in rules by which judgments are made. 
It is important to see that we speak of necessary rather than 
sufficient conditions of changes in judging. Quite clearly an empirical 
perspective of the rational judge is required to appreciate an actual 
change in judgmental activity, but once such a perspective is taken 
one can only have sufficient, rather than necessary conditions in 
view: one can only comprehend the presence of conditions that lead 
to actual changes in judging although one cannot say whether such 
changes were necessary or not. 
What emerges at this level is an impetus for a view of judgmental 
activity that accounts for the free, rational self-determination of 
communities of individuals that are able to transform their usage of 
concepts in the way that symbolic and analogical cognition suggests 
is possible. Such a view, I suggest, whilst only implicit in Kant, is 
fully explicit in Hegel. 
Our central task has so far been to determine is how symbolic 
representation is distinct from schematic representation. Kant thinks 
that symbols provide a guide for practical and aesthetic judgment, 
since he understands them to be embodied examples of ideas. Whilst 
ideas in theoretical reason play a regulative role in our thought—
they are principles by which our reasoning practices are guided. 
Ideas in practical reason, however, have a quasi-constitutive role 
insofar as they are embodied in examples that serve as guides for our 
thought. One might say further that this constitutive function is 
enabled by the effect of the symbol on one’s moral character (one’s 
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will). By saying that symbols “guide” our thinking in moral matters 
Kant must mean that symbols conclusively establish neither the 
exact nature of ideas, nor that they have been satisfied. 
We must now ask: If ideas can be embodied in examples, for Kant, 
then how is this distinct from ideas simply having their life in 
examples? That is, existing only at the level of examples (yet 
admittedly all of the relevant ones)? After all, Kant’s claim is that 
ideas are actually abstract conceptions of the common principle 
discovered in examples. The question is what allows for the 
discovery of the common principle. Kant is always insisting upon the 
distinction between aggregates and unities and claiming that only in 
the latter case is the whole prior to the parts.1 And this is the mark of 
a principle: in moral behaviour one subjugates one’s particular 
actions to the universal demands of the moral law (one “subsumes 
the particular under the universal”). In this sense the universal 
moral law, qua whole, is conceptually prior to the particular piece of 
moral behaviour, qua part.  
Now although Kant warns against attempting to derive morality 
from examples, he does not argue convincingly enough against the 
possibility that idealised rational standards (crystallised in the form 
of ideal unities—“ideas”) might have their origins in actual patterns 
of normatively constrained behaviour, and that in virtue of this the 
connections between particular concrete actions and concrete 
phenomena might be clarified and thereby reflected at the level of 
the abstract. Note that this kind of derivation of ideals from the 
actual could occur in many different senses: historically across 
communities, genetically in individuals (but not necessarily so as to 
be understood in a reductive sense pertaining to mere natural signs; 
there might after all be “natural signs” that are only intelligible 
within an intersubjective context and which are therefore in 
principle irreducible), and so on. Even if the connection cannot be 
conclusively established, it certainly cannot be ruled out without 
thorough investigation.   
Recall that the form of existence Kant is implicitly appealing to is 
the Neo-Platonic idea of “unity”; Kant’s problem is, however, that he 
refuses to grant sovereignty to the negativity of such a unity in the 
manner of Proclus and Hegel. Kant is of the opinion that only “being” 
rather than “unity” can truly be said to have “reality”, if “being” is 
                                                 
1 Note in connection with this that an intuitive understanding is that 
which would reason from the whole to the parts because it knows the whole 
a discursive understanding reasons from the parts to the whole because it 
cannot know “the whole”. On this see Kant (2000, §77). 
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simply identified with that which is judged about positively in 
experience. His Platonism is therefore ambiguous and seems to serve 
little more than a pragmatic function, as was seen §II.ii. 
Having recognised this, one sees a commonality between symbolic 
representation of ideas of reason in its practical use and the schema 
of the ideas of reason in its theoretical use. Yet in the former case the 
symbols have a “constitutive” role in our cognition because they have 
a causal effect on the will in functioning as guides; in the latter case, 
the schemata of the ideas of theoretical reason—let alone the ideas 
themselves: the soul, world-whole, and God—only play a “regulative 
“role in cognition because the idea itself does not strictly appear in 
theoretical cognition; rather, the idea provides a schema for grouping 
the understanding’s judgments and directing its future empirical 
inquiries.  
It is notoriously unclear how exactly to spell out this idea of 
regulation beyond the forms of words already detailed: Kant’s 
employment of the concept of “regulative” constitutes an appeal to 
“guiding principles” that express “necessary maxims of reason”: a 
status granted to them in virtue of their claim to be necessary 
conditions of the possibility of maximally systematised, unified 
cognition. Perhaps one cannot clarify this further.  
In any case, there is an additional problem one can raise here: 
How do we comprehend the embodied idea as an instantiation of the 
highest ideal of the rational framework which we take ourselves to 
employ in thinking? It seems that we must be already able to “think” 
the idea (to use a Kantian turn of phrase); we must already have a 
rule-governed process in mind in terms of which we can cognize 
moral or aesthetic phenomena in order to be able to recognise the 
embodied example of the idea as of the relevant kind. Genetic 
questions aside of how we come to employ the particular form of 
reasoning we do, we seem to be saddled with the problem of 
determining which comes first, (1), the embodied example of the idea, 
or (2), the highest rational ideal that prescribes a rule to which 
embodied examples must conform. 
(1) is committed to an abstractionism, and the old dialectic of 
“sense” and “concept” is thereby set to play out—one that, if 
construed in the terms of the game played by classical empiricism, 
ends with an implausible semantic atomism that assumes an ability 
to derive meaningful content from single instances in absence of 
theoretical assumptions that themselves already colour the data in 
question; (2) needs to be elucidated carefully, in a manner that does 
not simply construe all possible data as—in the coherentist sense— 
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reflecting the rational demands of the conceptual framework in 
question. I take it that this dualistic picture is part of what Hegel 
seeks to avoid with his novel, “presuppositionless” dialectical 
approach. More specifically, by arguing from the very beginning, in 
the context of the emergence of linguistic consciousness, that 
reason—in its guise as the “intelligence” at the level of subjective 
spirit in the psychology of an individual subject—is at work in the 
lower levels of psychological phenomena such as “feeling” and 
“representation” (in addition to “thought”), Hegel is attempting to 
show how such a blunt distinction between “thought” and “being” is 
wrong-headed.  
Kant’s way of including a “human”, or empirical dimension  in the 
structure of our thought (in the guise of symbolic representation) is 
via his recognition that ethics and aesthetics are modes of judgment 
fundamentally dependent upon the peculiar character of humanity; in 
line with a more or less Aristotelian conception of humans as rational 
animals, Kant thinks of us as having both a sensuous side and a 
rational side; we share the sensuous side with mere nature and we 
share rationality with what was formally known as the Divine. On 
this latter point, it is noteworthy that such a way of splitting human 
nature becomes suspicious if we are denied knowledge of 
metaphysical entities of the kind formerly known as “God”. What 
sense, given this restriction, can we make of the claim that our 
rationality is that which is shared by a divine being?1 
Kant’s notorious rejection of knowledge in this area, in favour of 
faith, highlights his wish to replace the direct schematic 
representation of such metaphysical ideas with merely indirect “as-
if” symbolic representation; although one cannot “know” of “God’s 
existence”, such existence is to be posited as “morally 
necessary”.2Moreover, in moral action, whose aim is the highest 
good, one must think and act “as if” there were a perfect being for 
which the ideals of moral thinking were actual rather than merely 
possible. 
 
                                                 
1 Recall Kant’s claim that we must view our reason as “only a weak 
copy” of a “highest reason” (A678/B706). 
2Kant (1996b, “The existence of God as a postulate of pure practical 
reason", 5:125, 241). 
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IV Symbols as a middling species of intuitive representation 
 
It will be helpful to extend some of the insights gained through 
examination of Kant’s theory of symbolic representation, offered in 
the context of moral psychology, by considering how they might be 
applied to intentionality generally. We examine now the claim, 
therefore, to which we have merely hinted: whether and how 
symbolism may in fact be a feature of empirical cognition, made 
possible by practical concerns in theoretical uses of reason, rather 
than merely in practical uses in moral cognition. This consideration 
ought to serve as a way of giving content to Kant’s proclamation that 
reason functions generally under practical principles; that it is, at 
bottom, practical. This in any case ought to be said by Kant to follow 
from its lack of insight into the “inner nature” of things. 
Our brief discussion is guided by attentiveness to a certain 
reading of Kantian empirical intuitions. Sellars referred to the 
“Janus-faced” character of such theoretical entities1 inasmuch as they 
were treated by Kant in two ways depending upon context: either as 
(1), the sensational matter of thought that is thoroughly non-
conceptual, or (2) the basic, demonstrative, conceptual element of 
empirical cognition that is the paradigmatic instance of a word-world 
correspondence relation, and is instanced in judgment as a logical 
subject. 
The basic argument goes like this. Consider an instance of an 
ordinary empirical concept. This instance of the concept can be 
regarded as a determination which applies to a determinable part of 
an intuition, e.g., one’s enjoyment of an intuition of an apple, which, 
as being of an apple, includes the application of the concept “apple”. 
Note that this usage of “determination” and “determinable” signals 
the fact that an act of predication has been made, where the 
predicate is considered to be a conceptual determination and the 
subject is that which is considered to be determined conceptually (we 
might suggest this is connected with a real distinction between acts 
and things acted upon). Thus, we impute to a Kantian position the 
claim that parts of whole intuitions—that to which “marks” are 
applied—are types of determinables for which there are 
determinates (or, determinate tokenings).  
Although Kant does not say so, it seems there is profit to be 
gained from claiming that he was implicitly committed to two 
different types of logical form. First, the logical form of judgments in 
                                                 
1Sellars (1967/1992, Chapter 1, I, §5 & ff.).  
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his transcendental logic is essentially Aristotelian; this can be 
gleaned from his table of categories, which entails that objective 
judgments have a substance-accident form (see his categories of 
relation corresponding to categorical judgments: “inherence” and 
“subsistence”; substantia et accidens).1The second kind of logical 
form, required at the level of the transcendental unity of 
apperception, is not of this order; it is rather one of consistency, 
where in such a context one needs to be mindful that judgmental 
consistency is dependent also on the unity awarded by reason 
because reason is that which joins judgments in patterns of 
syllogistic reasoning. In the context of reasoning there is no question 
of categorial structure because objects of reason are not constrained 
by the categories, but rather sheer non-contradictoriness. This kind 
of logical form freed from ontological assumptions places all logical 
terms on a par: they become functions of the kind instanced in 
propositional logic. 
If we can rest content with this suggestion it follows that from a 
Kantian perspective all empirical concepts are to be explained in 
terms of a family-member relation (determinables and their 
determinations), rather than a class-member or genus-species 
relation. Class-member relations belong to the realm of what is now 
termed mathematical or propositional logic, and genus-species 
relations belong to a theory of categories.2 
Now, it is true that since Kant offers a theory of reason inclusive 
of syllogistic he is at least implicitly committed to a theory of 
categorial structure, that is, the logical structure of empirical 
theories which involve the formulation of universal, law-like 
statements from which one infers particular facts, and that which 
moreover allows for the inference from one particular fact to another 
hypothetical one, on the basis of a law or rule. Such a theory is, 
however, distinct from Kant’s transcendental logic and his theory of 
empirical concept formation.  
It is evident that since Kant holds a sensationalist view about 
empirical concepts, that they are only properly direct 
representations if there are sensational matters that correspond to 
them, he is then committed to the idea that the mereological parts of 
                                                 
1A80/B106. 
2 I here refer to the idea of a taxonomical theory of categorial structure, 
rather than Kant’s epistemological theory of a priori categories. On the 
difference between Aristotle’s and Kant’s approaches to categories see 
Thompson (1983). The relevant literature on determinables and 
determinates is cited below in Chapter 3. 
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intuitions to which concepts refer, or, that on whose actual 
instantiation they depend for their truthful reference, admit of 
contrary predications. By this it is meant that the parts of whole 
intuitions of things to which concepts refer are themselves potential 
referents of logical subjects which admit of a certain range of 
predications. This range of predications is determined by the kind or 
type of the logical subject at play. In short, if one says that an apple 
is green one has ruled out that it is red, yellow, etc. And saying that 
an apple is green can be established as objectively true insofar as 
“apple” is a substance kind a concept for which has been formed by 
comparison, reflection, and abstraction; likewise, that “green” is a 
surface attribute of the substance whose spatio-temporal presence 
rules out the simultaneous spatio-temporal presence of other colours. 
Let us consider the relation between the substantive “this apple” 
and the property “green”. Such concatenation is isomorphic to the 
relation between the Kantian categories of relation: “subsistence” 
(substantia) and “inherence” (accidens). For simplicity I will render 
these as “substance” and “accident”. The correlated judgments are 
categorical. Thus: 
 
“Apple” stands to “green” 
as 
“Substance” stands to “accident”. 
 
Note that this structure can be thought of as directly instantiated in 
the case of ordinary empirical intuitions, whereas symbolic 
representations can only be thought of as indirectly instantiating the 
structure of an idea, where the real use of reason is used by a rational 
judge as a guide for determining the validity of the judgment within 
which the symbol occurs. Of course, categories themselves are not 
encountered in experience, but represent a “unity of reflection on 
appearances”.1 This raises anew our earlier question (from §II.i) of 
how distinct pure concepts of the understanding are from pure 
concepts of reason, yet in a moment we will see that Kant 
characterises the categories as themselves varieties of “symbolic 
language”. Importantly, both pure concepts of the understanding and 
pure concepts of reason bear analogical relations to empirical 
cognition. 
The point is that although symbolic representations can be 
cognised in terms of their empirical properties and therefore 
                                                 
1A310/B367. 
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understood in terms of their satisfying the logical functions of 
judgment and the categories, their being cognised as a symbol 
requires additional considerations: they must evaluable by reason as 
a manifestation of reason. This raises the question of “internality” 
and “externality” to reason. 
The lesson is that Kant thinks symbols cannot be understood to 
instantiate the properties they symbolise in the same way in which 
schematised empirical concepts can. This is because particular 
instances of schematised empirical concepts can be understood to 
“directly” satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions of the 
application of the concept in question, whereas symbols are regarded 
as symbols in virtue of the fact that they analogically (or, 
“indirectly”) represent the structure of the idea which they 
symbolise. 
Thus, from the standpoint within which a moral agent is regarded 
as merely intelligible, rather than in empirical terms, the thought of a 
particular action in which a duty is fulfilled is noumenal insofar as 
one cannot intuitively represent the demand of the moral law, and 
thus its being empirically satisfied. Instead, judgment of the morality 
of an agent’s action requires construction of an analogy between the 
intuitive representation of a moral exemplar (i.e., Jesus) and the 
example of action in question. Thus, analogies are formed as (1) 
between intelligible principles (the moral law, in its guise as the 
Categorical Imperative) and exemplars, as well as(2) between the 
empirical properties of the exemplar (the best one can do in the 
circumstances) and a common example of someone doing well, even if 
not “the best as is empirically possible”. Presumably the task of 
bringing about the Kingdom of Ends involves evaluation of 
satisfaction on both levels, where comparison of moral actions with 
moral exemplars is necessary only due to the limitations on the 
soundness of individual subjects’ faculties of judgment. 
Symbolisation consists in a property of the symbol standing to 
something in an analogous way to that in which the idea it symbolises 
stands to that thing. We can represent the same structure from 
above in a practical case: 
 
Moral perfection stands to the moral law (is demanded by, 
satisfies) 
as 
Exemplary action stands to the circumstances/conditions of the 
action (is demanded by, satisfies).  
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For Kant, objective, direct, cognitive representations (instances of 
empirical knowledge) that involve intuitive and conceptual elements 
are essentially synthetic constructions of sense-data ordered by 
rules. Indirect representations are cases of empirical cognition whose 
conceptual content has not been derived by comparison, reflection, 
and abstraction upon the sensory manifold, but rather instead 
formed by analogy with empirical concepts that have been formed 
this way. Kant makes this point in §59 of the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment: 
 
To demonstrate the reality of our concepts, intuitions are always 
required. If they are empirical concepts, then the latter are called 
examples. If they are pure concepts of the understanding, then the 
latter are called schemata. But if one demands that the objective 
reality of the concepts of reason, i.e., of the ideas, be demonstrated, 
and moreover for the sake of theoretical cognition of them, then one 
desires something impossible, since no intuition adequate to them can 
be given at all. 
 
Further: 
 
All hypotyposis (presentation, subjecto sub adspectum), as making 
something sensible, is of one of two kinds: either schematic, where to 
a concept grasped by the understanding the corresponding intuition 
is given a priori; or symbolic, where to a concept which only reason 
can think, and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, an 
intuition is attributed with which the power of judgment proceeds in 
a way merely analogous to that which it observes in schematization, 
i.e., it is merely the rule of this procedure, not of the intuition itself, 
and thus merely the form of the reflection, not the content, which 
corresponds to the concept. 
 
Thus, the power of judgment is required to regulate the 
representation of symbols in accordance with a rule, where the 
“accordance with a rule” is understood in terms of the reflective 
function of judgment rather than the determinative; that is, in acts of 
finding concepts for objects, where the unity amongst symbolic 
representations consists in reflective unity: the same concepts and 
ideas are found to correspond to the symbolic representations in 
question. By contrast, determinative judgment consists in finding 
objects for concepts, with the implication that unity amongst 
determinations enacted in such a way would follow from the same 
acts of judgment being made with respect to the relevant objects. 
Viewed this way, determinative judgment and reflective judgment 
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mirror the notions of existence-as-being and existence-as-unity, 
respectively. Importantly, for Kant, only the former variety of 
judgment and form of existence is given in experience (to the extent 
that it has corresponding intuitional material). 
Further on in §59 Kant admits that the role of symbolic 
representation and analogy requires “deeper investigation”, although 
he makes no attempt to contribute significantly to this end and 
insists that “this is not the place to dwell on it.” On the basis of his 
words in this context, however, I think one can infer that he was 
committed to admitting a much deeper role for symbolism and 
analogy in transcendental philosophy than could be gleaned from his 
broader program. Note the following: 
 
Our language is full of such indirect presentations, in accordance with 
an analogy, where the expression does not contain the actual schema 
for the concept but only a symbol for reflection. Examples are the 
words ground (support, basis), depend (be held from above), from 
which flow (instead of follow), substance (as Locke expresses it: the 
bearer of accidents), and innumerable other nonschematic but 
symbolic hypotyposes and expressions for concepts not by means of 
direct intuition, but only in accordance with an analogy with it, i.e., 
the transportation of the reflection on one object of intuition to 
another, quite different concept, to which perhaps no one intuition 
can ever directly correspond.  
 
Thus, because Kant admits that language is replete with symbolism 
he is committed to saying that much of what is judged involves 
analogical cognitions: many judgments can only be rendered true by 
demonstrating how a concept formed by analogy with an 
observational empirical concept stands in relation to something in the 
way the observational empirical concept stands to its relevant 
relatum.1 
Note also that since Kant includes one of his categories, 
“substance”, as a case of symbolic representation, and that if such a 
point is made by Kant about one of his categories it should be made 
about all of them, if he is to be consistent; that is, if they are to be on 
a par. This entails that when the categories are applied to experience 
                                                 
1 §59: “the power of judgment performs a double task, first applying the 
concept of the object to a sensible intuition, and then, second, applying the 
mere rule of reflection on that intuition to an entirely different object, of 
which the first is only the symbol.” 
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they are symbolic representations;1 thus the only difference between 
the pure concepts of reason and the pure concepts of the 
understanding is that the former are formed by the understanding 
through reflection on appearances, and the latter have their source in 
the real use of reason, and are demanded to be employed as 
principles in formal uses of reason due to the systematic unity they 
bring to empirical cognition. 
But is it not the case that pure concepts of the understanding also 
bring systematic unity to the manifold, yet at the level of individual 
judgments, rather than at the level of syllogisms of relation? As 
already noted, the distinction appears to be a distinction between 
unity that is found by reflection and unity that is sought by reason. 
Yet it is not clear that this distinction can coherently be maintained if 
unity “found” by the understanding is also “sought” by it in 
reflection, and also that unity “sought” by reason is also “found” in its 
real use—for if the transcendental ideas are not to be taken as “mere 
figments of the brain”, as Kant insist they aren’t, and that they are 
something above particular instances of syllogisms of relation 
functioning to achieve systematic unity for empirical cognition, then 
we must insist they are “found” in reason.  
 
                                                 
1 It is crucial to separate the sheer transcendental-logical notion of a 
category from its application to experience; I take it this is a logical point 
about the necessity of separating acts of reflection from forms manifested 
in reflection (the categories). 
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V Hegel’s account of representation as a shape of consciousness 
 
Hegel’s discussion of what he calls “representation” occurs within his 
treatment of “Psychology”. The wider context constitutes Sub-
section C, Section One of the Encyclopedia Philosophy of Mind and 
begins with reflections on the nature of such inquiry, before moving 
onto a discussion of the dialectical connection between various 
“shapes of consciousness”.1One of the key features of Hegel’s 
treatment of this topic is his focus on the role linguistic consciousness 
plays in an individual subject’s emergence as a free epistemic agent. 
One is inclined to presume a connection with moral agency in this 
context also, although I will not discuss that important topic. 
This account of the emergence of linguistic consciousness details 
what in Hegel’s view are some of the complex conditions that make 
possible rationality, where Hegel here implicitly provides a way of 
overcoming the “Kantian Paradox”2 that results from Kant’s 
statement of the “fact of reason”.)3 Hegel’s resolution, as we will see, 
implicitly involves the argument that since a subject’s emergence as 
a free agent has linguistic conditions, and since linguistic capacities 
have social conditions, freedom is a social phenomenon.4 
In §440 Hegel begins by telling us what he thinks the subject 
matter of the discipline is. According to him, psychology “studies the 
faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental…apart both 
from the content,” which 
 
on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideation, in thinking 
[theoretical] and also in desire and will [practical] 
 
And, also 
 
                                                 
1See Hegel (1971, §§440-468, esp. §§451-464). McCumber (1993, Chapter 
7) provides an enlightening analysis of the latter sections to which we will 
come. See also McCumber (2010), Vernon (2007), O'Neill Surber (2007).  
2 This is Terry Pinkard’s apt phrase. 
3Kant (1996b, 5:30-32, 164-165). 
4 Cf. Hegel’s remark that the “principle of free mind is to make the 
merely given element (das Seiende) in consciousness into something mental 
(Seelenhaftes), and conversely to make what is mental into an objectivity.” 
(§440, Z.) On the connection between free moral agency and epistemic 
capacities note his remark: “theoretical mind as well as the practical mind 
still fall under the general range of Mind Subjective. They are not to be 
distinguished as active and passive” (§444).  
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from the two forms in which these modes exist, viz. in the soul as a 
physical mode, and consciousness itself as a separately existent object 
of that consciousness. 
 
Three points must be noted. Firstly, by referring to “faculties or 
general modes of mental activity” Hegel is acknowledging that in 
speaking of operations of the mind (activity/acts) one must speak also 
of what makes that operation possible (faculties).1 This can be 
interpreted as a logical point about the unity of a certain capacity.  
Secondly, by insisting that psychology is concerned with acts and 
not content, Hegel is making a useful distinction between the act of 
thinking and things thought about; thus “empirical ideation” should 
be interpreted as the manifestation in a subjective consciousness of 
thoughts and desires. 
Thirdly, he indicates in this initial piece of text that the relation 
between psychological acts, the main of which he characterises as 
“sensation”, “intuition”,2 “representation”, and “thought”, is the point 
of interest for the psychologist.3 
                                                 
1deVries (1988) informs significantly the interpretation of Hegel’s 
“theory of mental activity” presented in this section. 
2 Hegel seems to echo Kant when he says that the “content which is 
elevated to intuitions” is the mind’s sensations (1971, §440, 179). See A42-
43/B59 for Kant’s remarks to the effect that sensation is the matter of 
empirical intuition; cf. also Kant’s remark that matter is “that in the 
appearance which corresponds to sensation” (A20/B34), where appearances 
are in intuitional form. The discussion below should illuminate how Hegel 
intended to improve on what he saw as the difficulties with Kant’s 
intuition/concept distinction.  
The old riddle is: How can one acknowledge the ontological 
irreducibility of individual finite perspectives on the world (say, in a 
perceptually garnered visual image: an Anschauung), whilst acknowledging 
that cognition and thought must be ordered and expressible by general 
functions and rules, that is, by concepts? 
3 Note Hegel’s cautioning against the idea that the relation between 
these shapes is “genetic” in the temporal sense: “The development here is 
not that of the individual (which has a certain anthropological character), 
where faculties and forces are regarded as successively emerging and 
presenting themselves in external existence—a series of steps, on the 
ascertainment of which there was for a long time laid great stress (by the 
system of Condillac), as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the 
origin of these faculties and explain them.” (§442) 
Thus one should not think of the conditions of rational self-
consciousness in a way that allows for each moment of representation 
(“recollection”, “imagination”, “memory”) to be what it is in isolation from 
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This last point merits a brief digression. Here, as in so many other 
places, Hegel tells us that “mind” is the “truth of soul and 
consciousness”. In the present context, he says that mind is an 
“elevation above nature and physical modes, and above the 
complication with an external object—in one word, above the 
material”; further, that “[A]ll it has now to do is to realise this notion 
of its freedom, and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it 
once more begins.”1He also tells us at the end of the “Psychology” 
section that “free mind is actual mind” and that this idea came into 
the world through Christianity; a perspective on humanity which 
sees “the individual as such” as having “infinite value as the object 
and aim of divine love, destined to live in absolute relation with God 
himself, and have God’s mind dwelling in him”.2 These points should 
be borne in mind when considering the development involved with 
the shapes of consciousness mentioned above.3 
Now, since mind is for Hegel the “truth” of the soul and 
consciousness, and since it is conceived of by him as having the array 
of progressively more complex shapes mentioned above, the most 
developed form of these, “thought”, must be taken to evince this 
character most adequately. Further, since mind essentially takes the 
world as its content, thought must be that shape that most 
adequately expresses the fact that minds and the world essentially 
stand in a relation to one another; one can say this is essential to 
having a mind at all. 
Hegel does not rest content with this platitude, however; he says 
the “Idea” is the “unity of the Concept and objectivity” and the 
                                                                                                                            
the others. Rather, it must be insisted that symbols are an integral part of 
a holistic system of reason. Transitions in the text are not necessarily 
transitions in a genetic sense in the forms discussed. 
1Hegel (1971, §440). 
2Hegel (1971, §482). See also §481: “Actual free will is the unity of 
theoretical and practical mind; a free will, which realises its own freedom of 
will, now that the formalism, fortuitousness, and contractedness of the 
practical content up to this point have been superseded.” 
3 See §441, Z.: “The finitude of mind must not…be taken for something 
absolutely fixed, but must be recognised as a mode of the manifestation of 
mind which is nonetheless infinite according to its essence. This implies 
that finite mind is immediately a contradiction, an untruth, and at the same 
time is the process of ridding itself of this untruth. This struggling with the 
finite, the overcoming of limitation, constitutes the stamp of the divine in 
the human mind and forms a necessary stage of the eternal mind. Therefore 
to talk of the limitations of Reason is worse than it would be to talk about 
wooden iron.” 
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“congruence of the Concept and reality”.1 One way to interpret this 
view in the present context is that, given this thesis, and given that 
“thought” for Hegel is the most developed form of mind and that its 
most developed phenomenon is the Idea, the Idea should be taken to 
express in the most complete form what is involved with (1), a mind 
having thoughts about the world and, (2), the world being something 
about which thoughts are had.2The basic idea is essentially Kantian: 
the idea of “God” (Kant’s ens realissimum, Hegel’s Absolute Idea) is 
the form and content of a system: both rationally ordered knowledge 
and a law-governed world (at the level of both nature and spirit) has 
such a form.  
Our present concern is with how Hegel sees representational 
shapes of consciousness as playing an integral part in there being 
such a thing as a perspectival take on a world from within that world. 
Put another way, Hegel’s insistence upon an ineliminable 
representational, symbolic element in consciousness is of a piece with 
his resistance to the idea that a Leibnizian divine script of clear and 
distinct ideas3 could on its own constitute a complete account of 
metaphysical reality,4 or, in his terms, the Absolute Idea. And this 
amounts to saying that finitude is irreducible and an essential 
moment of the infinite; thus that the idea of “God” includes that of 
individual human standpoints. Thus there is a sense in which Hegel’s 
view of the relation between the divine and human standpoints is 
closer to Leibniz’s than Kant’s, since Kant conceives of the two as 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 756). Reason, for Hegel, is “the unity of subjectivity and 
objectivity, of the Concept that exists for itself, and of reality.” Hegel 
(1971, §440, Z.) Cf. also the remarks in the opening paragraphs of Hegel 
(1977b, Chapter V, esp. §§233 and 235). 
2 I here ignore the fact that for both Kant and Hegel it is more proper to 
say that world is a whole the parts of which are thought about. This is 
another way of making the point from §II.ii: the summum genus does not 
have existence in the form of “being”, but rather that of “unity”. 
3 See Leibniz (1982, Chapter xxix). 
4 Note that the phrase “metaphysical reality” would be highly 
problematic in Hegel’s view; the reference is to Leibniz. This general point 
about forms of representation is implicit in the discussion of the 
“mathematical syllogism” in Hegel (1969, 679-686). In the section entitled 
“On the Common View of the Syllogism” Hegel refers to Ploucquet’s 
propositional calculus rather than Leibniz’s, although the same point holds: 
abstraction is a necessary procedure which aids efficiency and clarity of 
expression, although abstract languages cannot be thought of as a sheer 
replacement of that from which they abstract, but rather as a Aufhebung of 
them (see esp. 685-686). 
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being fundamentally different in kind and thus externally rather than 
internally related. 
Our analysis of the significance of Hegel’s account of 
representation requires disambiguation of Hegel’s use of the term 
from Kant’s, as well as from contemporary custom. In §451 Hegel 
tells us: 
 
Representation is this recollected or inwardised intuition, and as such 
is the middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself 
immediately subject to modification and that where intelligence is in 
its freedom, or, as thought. 
 
By “intelligence” Hegel means the activity of spirit at the level of an 
individual subjective consciousness; its emergence should equally be 
understood as the development of reason as a theoretical and 
practical phenomenon; that is, as a capacity for possession of 
objective knowledge and freedom.1He goes on to tell us that this 
capacity manifests in representational consciousness as a rendering 
of “immediacy inward”, where this allows for a penetration of 
intuitive content into consciousness, whilst simultaneously ridding 
such content of “subjectivity of the inwardness”. 
For his part, Kant uses the term “representation” to refer to any 
content of consciousness whatever;2 thus both intuitional and 
conceptual aspects are subsumed under it. One must recall, however, 
that although cognition is for Kant always a product of both 
sensibility and the understanding, the human capacity to represent 
extends wider than this: one can indeed have non-cognitive 
sensations as well as entertain pure concepts of reason, although our 
relation to such phenomena fails in all cases to be properly objective. 
Thus, Kant’s usage is reasonably close to contemporary ones, even if 
one rejects Kant’s transcendental idealist restrictions on knowledge. 
The meaning Hegel grants “representation” in the context of his 
                                                 
1 A more developed account of this theme would involve comparing 
Hegel’s account of the emergence of linguistic consciousness with his 
account of the “actualisation of rational self-consciousness through its own 
activity”. On this, see Hegel (1977b, Chapter V, esp. Sub-section B). 
2 See A319-320/B376-377 for Kant’s taxonomy. He includes all objects of 
thought under the genus “representation in general”, and conceives of the 
following as a “progression”: perceptions, sensations, cognitions (intuitions 
and concepts, where the latter are pure or empirical), and ideas. Note that 
Kant equates “pure concepts” with “notions”, and says that ideas are 
composed of notions. Note also that the Transcendental Ideal is not 
mentioned; is it not a representation? (cf. A567-568/B595-596). 
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reflections on psychology is narrower than both Kant’s usage as well 
as contemporary convention. 
Hegel’s dialectical account of the cross-pollination of shapes of 
consciousness involves him insisting on there being a cognitive form 
that is both imagistic and conceptual. This definition of 
“representation” is unlike Kant’s portrayal of conceptualised 
intuitional content however, since Hegel makes no separation 
between the two aspects: representations are not characterised by 
him as being the outcome of two independent cognitive faculties 
working together (sensibility and the understanding), or, for the two-
aspect Kantian,1 as being possible only under two distinct epistemic 
conditions (sensible and intellectual). Rather, representations are an 
imagistic manifestation of conceptuality, and have a form and content 
not unlike Kant’s symbols. 
It is clear that the claims Hegel makes in this context should be 
regarded as one of his many attempts to reformulate Kant’s account 
of representation. Hegel’s solution is characteristically complicated 
and subtle, since he insists there are three distinct moments involved 
with representation and each of these plays a separate role and is 
related to Kant’s sensible and intellectual conditions in different 
ways. 
                                                 
1 The most complete and well-known account of which is found in Allison 
(2004). 
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V.i Symbols as shapes of linguistic consciousness 
 
As Magnus (2001)and Verene (1985)have both documented in detail, 
symbolism is a pervasive yet ill-treated dimension of Hegel’s work. 
Most obviously, understanding the role symbolism plays for Hegel is 
essential for understanding his Phenomenology as well as his theory 
of Absolute Spirit, in the latter’s guise as both art and religion.1But 
this is not all. The Encyclopedia Philosophy of Mind frames the 
conditions of the emergence of free, rational self-consciousness in 
terms of such consciousness’s capacity to discover as well as to create 
significance in the world, and symbolic consciousness is an essential 
moment of such a process. Here one should recall Hegel’s capsule 
description of his theory of spirit in terms of our ability to gain 
“freedom from…and in” the world we have generated “as our own 
creation”, in response to the world we found “presupposed before 
us”.2 
It is essential here that the symbol “allows spirit to know itself in 
its otherness, to experience its self-alienation—to think itself not 
thinking…it allows spirit to know itself as it truly is.”3Recall the 
remarks from §II.iii above, where it was suggested that if one reads 
Kant’s account of symbolism in conjunction with his claims about the 
sensus communis from §40 of the 3rd Critique, it appears that 
symbolic cognition can be taken to reveal certain features of 
ourselves which are in principle unknowable. This is the case partly 
because symbols are themselves conceptually inexhaustible, and 
therefore indeterminate yet endlessly determinable; it is the case 
also partly because we take them to have a share in the same 
transcendentally ideal world of which our noumenal selves are a part. 
The conceptual indeterminacy and endless determinability of 
symbols follows from their having intuitional form, itself which is 
both indivisible and infinitely divisible. There appears to be a similar 
point at issue in Hegel’s account of symbolic consciousness, although 
his view is of course distinct. 
Another way to frame this emergence of free, rational self-
consciousness is in terms of the activity of positing one’s 
                                                 
1 Thus Hegel’s lectures on these topics are essential sources to turn to 
for details; see Hegel (1975/1988, 2006). 
2 See the capsule description in Hegel (1971, §386). 
3Magnus (2001, 247).  
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presuppositions.1 Hegel’s way of dealing with the problem of 
nihilism, as raised in his time by Jacobi, is to acknowledge that in 
epistemic contexts one always begins with certain presuppositions.2 
Moreover, that it is a condition of rationality that one posit these as 
one’s own, where this does not entail that one ought to dogmatically 
fixate on whatever beliefs one finds oneself with, but rather that the 
possibility of revising beliefs depends upon one first being able to 
recognise them as one’s own; further, that upon reflection one will 
inevitably find one’s way of expressing one’s beliefs to embody 
certain dialectical tensions which lead one to grasp deep and often 
contradictory implications of one’s view. 
Hegel’s explanation of how forms of representation arise at the 
level of subjective spirit involves the claim that the “intelligence” 
abstracts from rich perceptual phenomena to derive common 
characteristics.3 This same pattern can be observed in objective 
spirit at the level of social formation,4 and can also be understood as a 
precondition of spirit coming to self-consciousness, in Chapter 4 of 
the Phenomenology, even if the exact relation of the latter to the 
systematic accounts of spirit in the Encyclopedia is somewhat 
ambiguous. Recall, however, that Hegel regarded the 
Phenomenology as the necessary preamble to the Logic;5 therefore 
one should presumably interpret it as an extended argument for how 
to understand the emergence of self-conscious spirit, from an 
Archimedean point that is simultaneously able to grasp the point of 
view of spirit in its journey. 
                                                 
1 Such phrasing is pervasive in Hegel’s writings. See Hegel (1971, §441, 
Z.): “for free mind, the self-developing and altering determinations of the 
object are explicitly the product of free mind itself, the subjectifying of 
objectivity and the objectifying of subjectivity are its own work. The 
determinations of which it is aware are, of course, inherent in the object, 
but at the same time they are posited by mind. In free mind there is 
nothing immediate. Therefore, when the ‘facts of consciousness’ are spoken 
of as if for mind they were something primary and unmediated and must 
remain for it something merely given, it must be remarked that though at 
the stage of consciousness a great deal of such given material presents 
itself, free mind must not leave these facts as given, independent things, 
but must demonstrate and so explain them to be acts of mind, to be a 
content which it has posited.” 
2 The Introduction to Hegel (1977b) demonstrates this view clearly. For 
more on this topic see Forster (1989). 
3 See Clark (1971), Rayman (2005), Nuzzo (2006), Winfield (2007). 
4 See Hegel (1971, Section Two: Mind Objective), 1991a). 
5Hegel (1969, 27-28). 
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There is therefore good reason to think of Absolute Knowing, as 
detailed in the final chapter of the Phenomenology, as giving a 
different perspective of the same theme that emerges in The 
Subjective Logic: the idea that thought and reality can be “adequate 
to one another”. As indicated in Chapter 1, the section on 
“Subjectivity” gives an account of this possibility from the 
perspective of a rational, subjective consciousness by arguing for a 
radical view of the cognitive shapes of “Concept”, “Judgment”, and 
“Syllogism”. 
Preliminarily it can be said that, for Hegel, the role of the 
intelligence in transforming symbolising consciousness into sign-
making consciousness parallels the conceptual clarification by 
philosophy of the pictorial representation of the trinity in religion, 
whereby it is subsequently articulated as the Absolute Idea.1 The 
basic feature is the common structure expressed by these two 
manifestations of the most fundamental claim of Hegel’s philosophy: 
the essential unity of thought and being. 
Symbolisation is, at the level of subjective spirit, a primitive stage 
in the emergence of linguistic consciousness that is still mired in the 
empirical features of the elements of signification; the successor 
stage of “sign-making” consciousness is correlated with the capacity 
for verbal expression governed by intersubjectively mediated norms 
that transcend any individual consciousness’s grasp or institution of 
them. Symbolisation is also an essential feature of religious 
consciousness, qua manifestation in an individual consciousness of the 
religious moment of Absolute Spirit. In the religious moment of 
Absolute Spirit, symbolisation reveals deep structure involved with 
the freedom of self-consciousness, at the level of pictorial 
representation. 
In the final chapter of the Science of Logic Hegel expresses this 
point regarding unity by acknowledging the ineradicable circularity 
in systematic reasoning. He characterises the “process of further 
determination” as circular, since “while getting further away from 
the indeterminate beginning [Being] is also getting back nearer to 
it”. This is because the “retrogressive grounding of the beginning, 
                                                 
1 “The AbsoluteIdea” is the terminological equivalent in Philosophy, qua 
shape of Absolute Spirit. Thus Hegel’s famous declaration to be giving an 
exposition of “God” in the Logic (see Hegel (1969, 50)) should be 
interpreted as saying that not only is the entire Logic is a development that 
finds fulfilment in its final chapter but, moreover, that the final chapter is 
that of which the book is an “exposition”. Defence of Hegel’s teleological 
strategy cannot be undertaken here. 
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and the progressive further determining of it, coincide and are the 
same.”1 He says further that: 
 
the science exhibits itself as a circle returning upon itself, the end 
being wound back into the beginning, the simple ground, by the 
mediation; this circle is moreover a circle of circles, for each individual 
member as ensouled by the method is reflected into itself, so that in 
returning into the beginning it is at the same time the beginning of a 
new member. Links of this chain are the individual sciences [of logic, 
nature and spirit], each of which has an antecedent and a successor—
or, expressed more accurately, has only the antecedent and indicates 
it successor in its conclusion.2 
 
In harmony with the idea of this circular pattern of reasoning, the 
triune structure common to the idea of “God” in religion and 
philosophy can be said to involve the transition from “God the 
Father”—or subjective consciousness—to “Jesus the Son”—or the 
reflection of thought in its object (the finite subject in the world)—
and finally to the “Holy Spirit”—or the community of thinkers which 
are the condition of the Father qua subjective consciousness realising 
and actualising itself.3 
Note how the idea of a subjective consciousness, with which one 
begins, can only be intelligible in terms of it belonging to a 
community of subjective consciousnesses. This is clearly circular, 
since that community to which such a subjective consciousness 
belongs must include subjects that are also somehow already self-
conscious. Of course, Hegel believes the circle to be virtuous rather 
than vicious, for he sees that one finds one’s way into a pattern of 
reasoning only by adopting certain presuppositions; the important 
mark of rationality is to recognise these for what they are. Crucially, 
one must not posit them uncritically, but rather to attempt to 
develop them dialectically and in so doing recognise such positing to 
be ultimately unavoidable.  
In any case, the consequence is that 
 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 841). 
2Hegel (1969, 842). One is reminded of the reference to the hermeneutic 
circle in Heidegger (1962, §§32-33, esp. H 150-153, 192-194). 
3 Cf. Fichte (1982, see esp. Part One, and Part Two, §4 E.) here on the 
“I” and the “not-I”. Hegel’s trinitarian model is a development of the claim 
that this opposition is necessary for free self-consciousness (a self-
differentiating “I”, that is part of a community of “I”s). Cf. the Master-
Slave dialectic in Chapter 4 of Hegel (1977b). 
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logic, too, in the absolute Idea, has withdrawn into that same simple 
unity which its beginning is [the Father]; the pure immediacy of 
being in which at first every determination appears to be 
extinguished or removed by abstraction, is the Idea that has reached 
through mediation, that is, through the sublation of mediation, a 
likeness correspondent to itself. But now it is also fulfilled being, the 
Concept that comprehends itself, being as the concrete and also 
absolutely intensive totality [the Holy Spirit].1 
 
I suggest that this remark can be interpreted in the following 
manner: the final moment of the trinity, the Holy Spirit, can be 
regarded as a clarification of the initial concept of God, the divine, 
“otherworldly” Father, via the concept of God, the incarnate, 
“worldly” Son, as well as a transformation of it, such that it has the 
form of unity rather than being. Hegel’s insistence upon the move 
from an abstract singularity (God the Father) to a distributive unity 
(the Holy Spirit) is therefore a reversal of Kant’s argumentative 
strategy regarding the generation of the concept of “God”: Kant 
rejects the dialectical inference that leads from the idea of a 
“distributive unity of the use of the understanding in experience” to 
that of a “collective unity of a whole of experience”;2 a dialectical 
inference that has the same form as that involved with the reification 
of the omnitudo realitatis from a source of negative grounding for 
complete determination of individual things, into a “most real being” 
(the ens realissimum) in the form of a singular that contains the 
“perfection” of all possible predicates. Hegel instead begins with a 
conception of “God” as “the Father”, which may be correlated with 
Kant’s sense of the ens realissimum, and then explains how it unites 
with the more adequate conception of “the Holy Spirit”, which 
resembles a distributive unity of judgments made by an organically 
developing community of subjective consciousnesses which together 
mediate the validity of one another’s claims.3 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 842). Translation modified; the interpolations are my own 
also. 
2A582/B610. 
3 This is also a helpful way of understanding Hegel’s attitude to 
contradiction (cf. Redding (2007a, Chapter 7)). In the simplest of terms, it 
may be said that here the One is the many. This can sound like a logical 
point regarding the possibility of conceiving of the members of a set as 
belonging to that one set—thus, being unified, and “one”—yet since Hegel 
views metaphysics as being logic (and vice versa), the point is not merely 
logical (in a formal sense) for him. Regarding contradiction, recall that 
because Kant conceives of his critical metaphysics is metaphysics of “an a 
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Hegel’s point is that the idea of a transcendent God, “the Father”, 
is inadequately so conceived in isolation, but nevertheless not to be 
negated “externally”, due to the dialectical role it plays in the 
successor concept of the Holy Spirit, where a kind of “distributive 
unity” of ensouled, embodied noûs replaces it. The move which both 
Kant and Hegel think is to be resisted is the dialectical one from the 
idea of a totality to the idea of that totality as a singularity. That the 
point follows from certain axioms of idealist logic can be gleaned from 
a glance at Kant’s table of both the categories and logical functions of 
judgment: the category of totality corresponds to the logical function 
of singularity (note Kant’s remark that no judgment is properly 
singular, since only intuitions have the form of singularity). 
The basic difference is that Hegel thinks that although the 
abstractly singular conception of “God” is inadequate, he 
nevertheless believes it to be essential to the dialectical structure of 
the triune God (in religion), as well as the structure of free, rational, 
self-consciousness (in philosophy).Kant, for his part, simply resists 
this dialectical move.  
We are now in a position to appreciate the dialectical exposition of 
linguistic consciousness. John McCumber has provided an analysis of 
§§451-464 of the Encyclopedia Philosophy of Mind congenial to the 
line of argument presented here. He discusses two types of “names” 
and their role in Hegel’s idea that “philosophical truth is the self-
development of thought”1 which is, moreover, essentially expressed 
in language.2 These two kinds are, respectively, “representational 
names”3 and “names as such”,4 where the former are symbolic and 
the latter are kinds of signs. “Representational names” are therefore 
not to be taken to be equivalent to representations of a piece with 
                                                                                                                            
priori judging reason”, Hegel should be read as rebuking him for 
disallowing contradictions in metaphysics, given that contradiction is 
endemic to reason itself. 
1McCumber (1993, 215). 
2 See Hegel (1971, §462, Z.): “to want to think without words…appears 
as wholly irrational.” Cf. Hegel (1969, 31-32). On 33 Hegel expresses the 
same point discussed here: language plays a central role in elevating 
thought from pure immediacy into a public, mediated, communicable 
phenomenon. 
Cf. McCumber (1993, 215-220) where he discusses the “aporia” involved 
with the claim that Hegel’s philosophy is a “philosophy of words”; indeed, 
one whose claims for absoluteness are expressed in finite form.  
3  Discussed in McCumber (1993, 220-229). 
4  Discussed in McCumber (1993, 229-238). 
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sub-propositional contents; they are to be taken as symbolic and 
indirect representations; “names as such” are roughly correlated 
with signs and therefore have a similar function to schematically 
distributed representations. They are therefore closer to what would 
now be referred to as sub-propositional contents. 
The key difference between “representational names” and “names 
as such” is therefore the extent to which their empirical character 
plays a functional role. We must take care to not construe “names as 
such” as totally abstract, because for Hegel total freedom from 
empirical matters does not emerge until spirit develops to the stage 
of “thought”.1 
McCumber advances the intriguing claim that a proper reading of 
the role of words, in their guise as vehicles of reason in Hegel’s 
philosophy, ought to dispel confusions endemic to both Left- and 
Right-Hegelianism. This thesis, with whose general presuppositions 
I agree, merits brief comment. A desire for the ideal or “centred” 
reading can be said to be at the forefront of the mind of a serious 
interpreter of a text if one presumes it simply means “sympathetic 
faithfulness”, or “adequacy”. Thus, in harmony with Hegel’s nuanced 
view of the dialectical complexities of a subject’s emergence into the 
realm of reason, it is crucial that one understand how language can 
be regarded as both a topic of what were later called 
“Naturwissenschaften” and “Geisteswissenschaften”. It is important 
to see how such a reading does no violence to the proper account of 
Geist.2As McCumber argues, Hegel regards language as both a 
                                                 
1 There are some additional complexities involved here which for 
simplicity I slide over. For an in-depth analysis of the subtleties of Hegel’s 
view see McCumber’s own discussion, as referenced above. 
2 Cf. McCumber’s reference to Clark (1971, xi) at 217: “Clark argues 
that the passage of thought into language ‘illustrates’ the more general 
passage of logic into nature. Nature is for Hegel ‘impotent,’ incapable of 
manifesting the Concept. And if Clark is right in taking language for Hegel 
to be a strictly natural phenomenon, it would follow that language, too, is 
incapable of expressing philosophical thought.” Below this McCumber says 
that “we seem to have a scholarly consensus that language cannot 
adequately express Hegelian thought because it is representational: rigid 
in form and one-sided in content.” As noted, McCumber’s thesis is that the 
role of non-representational language (signs, rather than symbols) allows 
this difficulty to be surpassed (cf. 218-220 for support for this claim in the 
literature).  
At 219 McCumber seems to identify his interpretation of Hegel’s theory 
of linguistic consciousness as a fusion of those who defend a reading of 
Hegel either in terms of symbolic consciousness or sign-making 
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natural phenomenon as well as an expression of spirit;1 thus it is a 
historical phenomenon that admits of development whereby 
properties of the instances of fulfilment of laws or rules stand to 
modify the law or rule with which they are so far in accord.2 
The points of interest here can be clarified by considering some 
key differences between so-called “natural signs” and “conventional 
signs”. By “natural sign” I mean a form of representation that tracks, 
in a mechanistic fashion, some other natural phenomenon. An 
example of a natural sign would be a lion’s roar.3 By “conventional 
sign” I mean a form of representation whose significance can be 
altered by those who employ the sign: thus the word “red”, when 
uttered by an English speaker under ordinary conditions, refers to 
the colour red, because that is what it is agreed upon by English 
speakers, conceived of as a speech community, to mean.  
A helpful device for focusing the differences between natural 
signs and conventional signs is the distinction between extension and 
intension: conventions are formulated as intensions (definitions) 
which can be articulated and employed to determine the extension of 
a concept (that to which the definition applies). Intensions begin their 
life as abstract generalisations from sets of extensions, since there 
are no “innate concepts”, except in the attenuated sense of natural 
signs. Natural signs themselves are mere sets of extensions 
correlated with other natural phenomena. It is inappropriate to think 
of natural signs as having an “intension” in the same way, except in 
the sense of their law-like regularity being expressible in terms of a 
law-like correlation between natural events formulable in linguistic 
terms. What natural signs do not allow is a mutually-modifying 
relation between extension and intension: something is either a 
natural sign or it is not. That is, the law expressing the correlation 
between certain natural events does not and cannot, by some 
                                                                                                                            
consciousness. Note that this terminology is Magnus’s. McCumber 
associates these two alternative readings with Left-Hegelianism and 
Right-Hegelianism, respectively. 
1 On this see McCumber (2010). 
2 I am here suggesting that there is a degree of harmony between 
Hegel’s historical theory of spirit and those liberal naturalisms that insist 
that interpretive explanations, as offered in the “human sciences”, have a 
certain primacy or sui generis character. See the papers in De Caro (2004, 
2010) on this theme. 
3 See Fichte (1996). 
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feedback looping effect, affect what it describes. This is only possible 
with conventional signs.1 
This claim could be debated on the grounds that the “natural” 
behaviour of certain beings with sufficiently complex linguistic 
ability is able to be modified by concept use, although blurring this 
line is tantamount to blurring the line between “second” and “first 
nature”, about which I will say no more. 
Insofar as for Kant the role that symbolic representation plays in 
cognition depends upon empirical features of such symbols, they bear 
some similarity to natural signs. We see here how work on Kant’s 
account of symbols might actually be used to modify his account of 
schemata, since it is clear that schematisation involves specifying the 
concrete application of concepts, therefore of the specification of 
their relation to empirical, imagistically representable phenomena. 
Consideration of the extent to which all judgments embody an 
aesthetic dimension is highly pertinent here. 
Something else suggested by this comment is that different 
“marks”, in Kant’s terminology, of objects to which concepts are 
applied may be taken to be salient in different (contextual) conditions 
and these previously insignificant features of the object included in 
the extension may lead to modifications in the intension: the 
“definition”, or sense of the concept. We can also see the possibility of 
dis-analogy and inappropriate metaphor here. Nevertheless, in the 
general case the salient feature of a symbol is often immediately 
obvious to most individuals and this signals their familiarity with the 
conventions governing it; Kant’s reference to those who “judge well” 
and those who require training through exposure to many examples 
is pertinent here. 
These points bear consequence for the development of complex 
syntactic structure out of primitive symbolism. Consider the way in 
which Kant’s symbolic representations could be seen as working at 
two different semantic levels: (1) Determined by empirical likenesses 
based on salient semantic features; (2) Determined by similarity of 
inferential role of the propositional structures with which judgments 
                                                 
1 Cf. Kant’s famous remarks: “Everything in nature occurs in 
accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the capacity to act in 
accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in accordance with 
principles, or has a will. Since reason is required for the derivation of 
actions from laws, the will is nothing other than practical reason.” Kant 
(1996c, 4:412, 66; cf. 4:401, 56) And: “The will is thought as a capacity to 
determine itself to acting in conformity with the representation of certain 
laws.” Kant (1996c, 4:427, 78) 
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referring to the symbol (including it as the subject of a moral or 
aesthetic judgment)are connected; that is, determined by the place 
within a syllogism of the judgments referring to symbolic 
representations. Recall that such representations are a species of 
intuitive representation yet are taken to somehow express a 
structure analogical to an idea, which is not representable in 
intuitional form at all. 
It is worth pointing out that both (1) and (2) are distinct from the 
mere associative connections which might obtain between 
empirically similar phenomena, whose significance is limited to S-R 
governed behaviour. Whilst (1) mentioned above may share 
superficial features, it is radically different due to the intersubjective 
availability of the perceived salience. Sheer S-R connections 
obtaining, for a given conscious being, between empirically similar 
phenomena do not and cannot play the role of (1) unless and until 
they are available for mediation by a more complex, “supervening” 
inferential structure of the kind instanced by (2); that is, until the 
content is integrated into a richer network governed by conventions. 
We thus distinguish three levels of reference: S-R connections, 
symbols which are somehow materially isomorphic to that which 
they symbolise, and verbally expressible representations whose 
physical character as sign-designs is related in no relevant way to 
that which they represent. It should be noted that “sensation” or 
“intuition” in Hegel’s sense should be taken to be causally related to 
that which they represent much in the way that a S-R connection, or 
natural sign is; representations should be taken to be akin to (1) 
above insofar as they evince material structural similarity to that 
which they represent, whereas (2) expresses the character of what 
Hegel calls “thought”. The picture is of course more nuanced than 
this, since these shapes of consciousness interpenetrate one another, 
although such distinctions shall aid our more fine grained distinctions 
between the three moments of representation itself. 
The basic thesis of Chapter 7 of McCumber’s book is that, 
regarding “representational names” (symbols) and “names as such” 
(sub-propositional elements), “while neither by itself is an adequate 
medium for Hegelian philosophical thought, both together may be.”1 
This thesis is also entailed by one of the general claims made by the 
present work, insofar as it is argued that both symbolising and sign-
making activities are essential to the operations of rationality, where, 
appropriately conceived, these together reveal how language ought 
                                                 
1McCumber (1993, 215). 
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to be seen as integrated into the world, as within the lives of 
individual reasoners, qua participants in linguistic communities. 
It is to be noted that the section “Representation” occurs as the 
middle between the extremes of “Intuition” and “Thinking”. The two 
key actions which coordinate with the emergence of the intelligence 
are the “interiorisation” and “universalisation” of the content found 
in intuition.1 The key feature of representations, in Hegel’s sense, is 
that they exhibit intelligible semantic features, whilst having 
irreducible spatio-temporal form. One might even say that the 
semantic content of representations, in this sense, is “exhibited” in 
their form: the significances of their form and content are 
inseparable; Hegelian representations, like symbols, show rather 
than say.2Note that Hegel regards as essential to the freedom of 
thought the possibility of separating semantic content from the 
empirical features of the vehicles by which such content is expressed. 
Thus he says that 
 
we must regard it as an infinite step forward that the forms of 
thought have been freed from the material in which they are 
submerged in self-conscious intuition, figurate conception, and in our 
desiring and willing, or rather in ideational desiring and willing—and 
there is no human desiring and willing without ideation—and that 
these universalities have been brought into prominence  for their own 
sake and made objects of contemplation as was done by Plato and 
after him especially by Aristotle; this constitutes the intelligent 
apprehension of them. 
 
Hegel’s discussion of the representational shape of consciousness 
occurs in three stages, which are indicated in any case by sub-
headings. These are entitled “Recollection” (§§452-454), 
“Imagination” (§§455-460), and “Memory” (§§461-464). “Recollection” 
involves the intelligence retaining an image of something 
encountered in intuition such that it may be recalled from memory at 
a later stage, say, for example, when one recognises new instances of 
a kind one has encountered before.3 Crucially, the intelligence allows 
for recognition of various particulars as being instances of a universal 
because it abstracts from the particularities of the original 
                                                 
1McCumber (1993, 220). 
2Hegel (1969, 33) 
3McCumber (1993, 220-221). 
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presentation of an instance, and recognises its universal quality. This 
allows also for “association of ideas”.1 
This point bears similarity to Kant’s theory of the construction of 
empirical concepts through a process of comparison, reflection, and 
abstraction. It is crucial to see that the basic insight of idealism here, 
as expressed by both Kant and Hegel, is that whilst such a process 
undeniably occurs, this cannot be the whole story regarding our 
conceptual capacities. It is a basic claim of idealist logic that there is 
a deep structure contributed by us, and that this structure is not to 
be analysed in terms of innate neurophysiological structure, as many 
contemporary naturalists would argue.2 Hegel’s development of 
Kant’s formal conception of the “I think” goes hand in hand with an 
argument for the structure of our conceptual discourse as being 
thoroughly intersubjective. The implication is that conceptual 
structure cannot be understood at the level of individual concept-
users (what is “in the head”), but rather must be understood in terms 
of “recognitive interaction”.    
The second stage of representational consciousness occurs at the 
level of the imagination. Here the universal qualities abstracted by 
the intelligence at the stage of recollection are made thematic. This is 
distinct from the former stage, where the basic operation was the 
comprehension of the universality of particular representations; now 
the universality itself is an object of consciousness. As McCumber 
mentions, “[T]he Phenomenology shows this universalising to be not 
merely an individual, psychological process, but a social one. It 
becomes so because representations are, as will be seen, connected to 
utterances.”3 Further, that because to make an utterance is to adopt 
a certain status determined by social and historical conditions on 
language use,4 the significance of the universal qualities extracted by 
the imagination is mediated by these conditions. 
It must be noted that this process is also individual and 
psychological, and that therefore certain contingencies of one’s 
individual imagination condition the manner in which qualities are 
extracted. Clearly, this is essential to creativity and novelty of all 
kinds, and is also a condition of a language resisting ossification and 
                                                 
1 Cf. Hegel (1971, §456). 
2Cf. Hegel (1971, §455). 
3McCumber (1993, 221). 
4McCumber (1993, 223). 
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instead exemplifying dynamism.1 The important point is that in 
communication social and historical mediation transforms the 
original, individual significance that is initially only felt or perceived.2 
The process just adumbrated is that which leads to the formation 
of symbols (then “signs, and ultimately…language.”)3 As McCumber 
says, 
 
When this function of an image is seized upon by the Intelligence so 
that it uses the image to call forth the universal, the image becomes a 
“symbol”. Socrates’ nose…can occasion me to think of “snubness”; 
when this comes to be its main function, the nose is a “symbol” of 
snubness. But the identity in content between symbol and symbolised 
can diminish and even disappear: Socrates’s nose can occasion, for 
example, the thought of his good humour, or even that of human 
‘good-humouredness’ itself. When the identity of content between 
symbol and symbolised wholly disappears, the symbol has become a 
sign. 
 
The consequence is that sign-making consciousness is thereby able to 
move in the realm of universality, by signifying abstract qualities in a 
way that does not require a mode of signification that resembles 
them. Namely, the connection between a sign and something 
signified becomes arbitrary. One might say that, in contemporary 
parlance, the complex syntactical relationships in truth-functional 
discourse require this relationship between sign and signified to be 
arbitrary in order to function as they do. If such relationships were 
not arbitrary, language would be caught up with irrelevant features 
of its mode of expression and would therefore be unable to express 
abstract and therefore complex ideas of the kind necessary for 
intersubjective communication to be possible. It seems obvious that a 
level of generality and universality in linguistic communication is 
required in order for individuals in different informational states—
with different perceptual information available to them—to be able 
to understand one another. 
Hegel explains the transition from the symbol to sign this way: 
 
                                                 
1 It is interesting to note, in this connection, the harmony between social 
and linguistic change, where the lack of one is typically mirrored by lack in 
the other.  
2 This process therefore mirrors the transitions from Chapter 1 to 4 in 
Hegel (1977b). 
3McCumber (1993, 223). 
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The arbitrary attaching of an external existent to a representation 
which does not correspond to it, but is distinct from it even according 
to content,1 makes that existent into a sign.2 
 
The reference to correspondence is significant here.3 We cannot treat 
the issue in detail, although it has so far been implied by our 
discussion of Kant that symbols “correspond” in some way to what 
they are symbols of, in virtue of relevant features of them being 
related in an analogous way to that in which features of what they 
symbolise are related. Ignoring the difficulties with Kant’s 
explanation of the indirect symbolic representation of ideas, we note 
that the physical character of symbols is essential to their meaning. 
This relationship between a symbol and what it symbolises is thus a 
relationship of fairly straightforward correspondence: a symbol is a 
symbolic representation of something else just in case it resembles it, 
viz., exhibits features that correspond to features the symbolised 
thing has.4Recall the problems that arose for Kant, insofar as he held 
that that which is symbolised is an abstract, unintuitable idea. 
Hegel’s insight is that the transition from representations to 
conceptually clarified and developed thought involves the 
transformation of the significance of universal features of individual 
psychological representations through the requisite process of 
articulation of those features in verbal form. As noted above, 
verbalisation of what one takes to be significant places such 
significances into a social “space of reasons”,5 in which those 
                                                 
1 Note the perplexing inconsistencies here with Hegel’s use of content, 
as in Hegel (2006), discussed in §VI. The paradox is that the content of 
representation and thought can be the same (“about the same thing”, the 
“intentional object” referred to in the Husserlian tradition) whilst being 
different (in virtue of being presented in a different form, “the intentional 
content” as discussed in that tradition). 
2Hegel (1986, 156). 
3 Contemporary attempts at expressing similar insights abound in 
analytical philosophy of language. One notable case is Sellars (1962/1991b, 
a), 1967/1992, Chapter V), who distinguishes the linguistic functions of 
“picturing” and “truth”, where the former is relational and non-semantic, 
and the latter is non-relational and semantic. 
4deVries (1987) provides great insight into the ways Hegel’s position 
might be located within both traditional and contemporary theories of 
representation. The relevant connection here is how this issue relates to 
the idea of representations “corresponding” to what they are 
representations of. 
5 This famous phrase is from Sellars (1956/1997, §36). 
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significances are adjudicated upon by the fellow members of one’s 
speech community. Of course, symbolic language is a possible 
medium for intersubjective communication, although it has grave 
limitations, which Hegel frequently points out.1 However, it seems to 
be implied here that the syntactically complex form of linguistic 
consciousness which Hegel refers to in speaking of signs (and which 
we ought to take as relevantly similar to what is now thought of as 
truth-functional propositions) can only arise if a social context exists.  
To restate, this is because it is demanded by a situation in which 
communicators in distinct informational states cannot rely on a form 
of communication that conveys meaning by likening representations 
to their significance; regarding possibility, we should say that the 
idea of an isolated individual operating with a complex syntax does 
not make sense, given the insuperable difficulties with a language 
that would be merely private. 
One obvious reason for this is that abstract concepts or ideas 
cannot be represented symbolically; another is that individuals 
making sense of one another requires them to bring their individual 
psychological states into harmony somehow, and this requires the 
employment of general representations that signify a variety of 
family-resemblances, and are expressed in a complex context 
intelligible in absence of pictorial representations of that which is 
signified, where this is in any case possible only in the case of 
concrete rather than abstract concepts. 
 At this point one must recall the aufgehoben character of 
intuitive material upon which the intelligence sets to work. As 
McCumber notes, “[T]he sign is not an intuition, but an intuition 
negated: the concrete unity of sensuous determinacy found in the 
individual intuition is disregarded in favour of the simple movement 
of the mind to a representation. This movement is then the 
‘attaching’ of the intuition to its meaning.”2 Again, since the quality 
of the sign itself is irrelevant, its way of “attaching” to intuition is all 
that matters. To put the point slightly differently, we should say that 
the way in which a sign is employed to express thoughts about 
intuitively represented/-able items is all we need to know in order to 
know its meaning, which sounds awfully like a “meaning-as-use” 
theory. 
The “negation” of the intuitive content is the important Hegelian 
move. It signals a parallel move to those dialectical transitions in the 
                                                 
1 See his remarks about logical expressions in Chinese in theHegel 
(1969, 32). 
2McCumber (1993, 224). 
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opening chapters of the Phenomenology, where consciousness and its 
object metamorphose through a series of categorial structures which 
express the way in which the relata of the intentional relation are 
related. The relevant transition for present purposes is that from 
“Perception” to “the Understanding”, where an object once 
represented as a substance with properties is in the sequel thought 
of as being determined by its relations to other things. An example of 
this would be the transition from the intuitive representation of a red 
apple as an item of which one could reproduce a corresponding image 
in pictorial form in a painting, to a thought of it as a piece of organic 
matter determined by certain chemical and physical laws and whose 
perceived colour is a result of it both having certain reflective surface 
properties and it being perceived in “normal conditions”, where the 
English word “red” is properly employed. 
McCumber says that the  
 
capacity to reduce complex content to simple thought-
determinations…is not unimportant: in the Phenomenology, it is said 
to be one of the reasons why the individual can, in her own lifetime, 
recapitulate the entire history of Spirit’s rise to the Absolute.1 
 
The transition from this stage of representation—the imagination—
to that of memory involves a similar move to that involved here. The 
imagination made thematic the universal qualities recognised at the 
stage of recollection, and thereby, in McCumber’s words, “got control 
of its images”. Memory now “operates on the word in the same way” 
and therefore gains “control of its names”.2 This procedure must be 
conceived of as “internal” to the actions of the intelligence in a 
stronger sense: relevant relations are now between signs, which are 
moreover determined by the syntactically complex structure that 
emerges at this level. McCumber puts this by saying that “[J]ust as 
Imagination first universalised intuitions by reflecting upon what 
connected them with the images they called up, so Verbal Memory 
reflects upon the relation between the sign and the universal 
signified—on the ‘name’ as their mutual attachment.” Crucially, this 
means that 
 
The sound of the name is thus itself universalised: it becomes a 
representation—the representation of the sound of the name, or as I 
                                                 
1 See  Hegel (1977b, §29).  
2McCumber (1993, 225). 
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will call the ‘representation of the name’—and can be retained within 
the Intelligence.1 
 
This important transition is, according to McCumber’s Hegel, what 
makes possible abstract thought about “meanings”. In §461 Hegel 
says this: 
 
Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through 
the same inwardising (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition 
of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first 
immediate intuition (§451). 
 
Hegel then comments on both signs and names. Regarding signs he 
makes one point, in §461: 
 
(1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by 
this inwardising (memorising) elevates the single synthesis to a 
universal, i.e. permanent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are 
for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name 
originally is) a representation—and recall that for Hegel it is 
judgment that is determining representations (not concepts).2 Thus 
the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one 
representation: the representation in its inwardness is rendered 
concrete and gets existence for its import: all this being the work or 
memory which retains names (retentive Memory). 
 
And of names he makes two, the first of which occurs in §462: 
 
The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the 
ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and 
recognises the thing, and with the thing it has the name, apart from 
intuition and image. The name, as giving an existence to the content 
in intelligence, is the externality of intelligence to itself; and the 
inwardising or recollection of the name, i.e., of an intuition of 
intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalisation to which 
intelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the 
particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, 
representative, or cogitant—series of which the intelligence 
traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks. 
 
The second point occurs in §463: 
 
                                                 
1McCumber (1993, 225). 
2 Cf. the section on “Judgments of Existence” in Hegel (1969, 630-643). 
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(3) As the interconnection of names lies in the meaning, the 
conjunction of their meaning with the reality 
 
There is a sense in which this capability to move in the sphere of 
abstract names is “thinking”, although more properly this is still the 
realm of representation, not thought. This is because the intelligence 
is, so to speak, operating within the realm of actual natural 
language—actual spoken names—whereas at the level of thought, 
the activity is conceived of by Hegel as more abstract than this: he 
speaks of the understanding as cognising an inverted world; as 
having taking invisible explanatory principles as somehow prior to 
that which they explained.1 
Our concern has been to see how Hegel’s analyses of the 
emergence of linguistic consciousness, as so far discussed, stands to 
illuminate the nature of symbolic thinking. Some final points can be 
made to this end. McCumber notes: 
 
The “names in which we think” (or, as I call them representational 
names) are as Hegel presents them fully representational: they are 
names which have been worked up by the Understanding so that 
they have completely articulated their representational meaning and 
then coincided with that meaning. As representational, those 
names—on one of their two sides—provide a cultural mirror for an 
objective world. Precisely because they are, if only to a degree, 
representational, they remain related to the sensuous domain from 
which we saw them develop—here, in the relation between the 
universal meanings of those words and the sensory experiences from 
which they are derived.2 
 
This feature of Hegel’s account announces a holistic sentiment; Hegel 
insists upon the ineradicably sensuous element by defending the 
complex aufgehoben dialectical transitions so far discussed. In 
Hegel’s terms, the symbolic actions in representational thinking are 
forever intermingling with abstract thought; not only is language, in 
Wittgenstein’s phrasing, like an old city with new, architecturally 
complex innovations,3 where the former involve forms of 
onomatopoeic picturing of symbolised phenomena by symbols, but 
language moreover does not “lose the world” in the manner 
suggested by Richard Rorty. Although this point cannot be 
established here, it seems further development of these Hegelian 
                                                 
1 Cf. Hegel (1977b, Chapter 3). 
2McCumber (1993, 226-227). 
3Wittgenstein (1958, §18). 
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ideas could profit from a closer examination of the interaction 
between symbolic and schematic forms in what have in other 
contexts been referred to as “conceptual schemes”.1 
An interpreter of Hegel that acknowledges both his post-Kantian 
credentials as well as his hyperbolic claims that philosophy is 
“essentially rational theology”,2that its actions amount to “no more 
than” a transformation of representations into thoughts and thoughts 
“into the Concept”,3 in addition to his claim that the “content” of the 
epitome of his system—the Science of Logic—is “God as he is in his 
eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite spirit”,4is 
compelled to be open-minded about his highly original philosophical 
theology. An explanation of how reason can be both a social and 
historical phenomenon as well as being committed to theological 
entities is the fundamental burden placed on such an interpreter. I do 
not pretend to have wholly satisfied such demands here, although I 
hope to have highlighted directions in which such developments in 
Hegel scholarship might go. One problem is that Hegel’s position is 
the philosophical equivalent of liquid helium: difficult to get a 
purchase of friction on. 
The general aim of this section therefore has been to explain some 
of the significance of the connections between his theorising about 
religion, on the one hand, and language and self-consciousness, on the 
other. The more specific claim of this section has been that a proper 
understanding of Hegel’s views regarding the structural symmetry 
between religious imagery and philosophical language actually 
stands to render more plausible his account of the idea of “God”, as 
well as his metaphysics of absolute idealism.5 
                                                 
1 See Davidson (1973/1984) for a canonical statement of the issues 
involved. 
2Hegel (1975/1988, 101). 
3Hegel (1991b, §20, 50). 
4Hegel (1969, 50). 
5 In investigating this territory, Magnus (2001) argues against Derrida’s 
reading of Hegel by insisting that “the symbolic mediation of spirit” is a 
feature that allows one to say that whilst spirit endures periods of 
alienation from itself where it is determined by its “other”, it is 
nevertheless able to be fully self-determining on the grounds that symbols 
are both partially opaque to spirit as well as expressions of spirit itself. An 
understanding of the role of the symbolic in Hegel’s philosophy (especially 
its dialectical function in the self-determination of spirit) is essential for 
understanding how real freedom is possible; namely, how a sensuous 
consciousness is able to freely actualise rationality in its life. See Magnus 
(2001, 241 & ff.). 
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A main concern has been to show that the Absolute Idea of 
philosophy, in Hegel’s system, is an alternate expression of the same 
structure in Absolute Spirit at another level: the “God” of religion. 
Here it is crucial that, in religion as in art, the “ambiguity and 
alienation of the symbolic penetrates spirit’s absolute dimension.”1 
Indeed, religion “is itself symbolic with respect to the fully clarified 
truth of philosophy”,2 and yet “spirit cannot be reduced to 
philosophical thought: its absoluteness includes the symbolic forms of 
art and religion.” This is because “[S]pirit has the need to be in an 
other form, and this is part of its positive constitution and self-
determination. Due to their symbolic elements, art and religion 
present their content as something other than the spirit that intuits 
and represents them”;3 these other two moments of Absolute Spirit 
allow spirit “to know its own internal difference.” And it is here 
crucial to be reminded that spirit’s capacity to be “Absolute” is not 
equivalent to a capacity to arrive at some standpoint which it from 
then on occupies; rather, spirit’s “absoluteness lies within its self-
creating, self-determining act. Spirit becomes absolute. It is never 
absolute ‘once and for all.’”4 
 This examination of Hegel’s alternate account of forms of 
representation reveals more detail involved with his claims for an 
“unconditioned” reason; Hegel thinks if reason can be said to be 
conditioned by nothing but itself, then it is unconditioned. Put 
another way, if its activity can be understood in terms of entirely 
rational transitions, then it is indeed infinite: limited by nothing 
outside itself.5 
                                                 
1 Cf. Magnus (2001, 37) on this point. Given this point, and given the role 
that the theory of Absolute Spirit plays in Hegel’s philosophy, it ought to 
be regarded as incumbent upon the Hegelian philosopher to consider the 
actual human practices involved with linguistic transformation more 
seriously (the transformations involved with the move from symbolic 
meaning to syntactically more complex forms of signification).   
2Magnus (2001, 243). 
3Magnus (2001, 244). 
4Magnus (2001, 245). 
5Spinoza (1985, I, Def. 2, 408): “That thing is said to be finite in its own 
kind (in suogenerefinita) that can be limited by another of the same 
nature.” Cf. Magnus (2001, 242).  
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VI Kant and Hegel on “God” 
 
Kant’s generally dismissive attitude to the specificities of religious 
doctrine and narrative was well known and is articulated throughout 
his writings; he was dismissive also of many aspects of Christianity 
as found themselves realised in concrete form in his epoch.1Given his 
constant admonitions against taking one’s departure in moral 
reasoning from empirical examples this ought not to be surprising; 
Kant is always telling us that we must come to conclusions about 
morality through practical reason alone and our appeal to examples 
occurs simply as a matter of expediency. This insistence expresses 
the desire on Kant’s part to dispense with inclination and to rather 
judge rationally and in a principled manner.  
Nevertheless, he had said at B395, with reference to his critical 
metaphysics, as based on a conception of reason as at bottom 
practical, that: 
 
Metaphysics has as the proper end of its investigation only three 
ideas: God, freedom, and immortality; so that the second concept, 
combined with the first, should lead to the third as a necessary 
conclusion. Everything else with which this science is concerned 
serves merely as a means of attaining these ideas and their reality. It 
does not need them for the sake of natural science, but instead to get 
beyond nature. The insight into these ideas would make theology, 
morals, and, through their combination, religion, thus the highest 
ends of our existence, dependent solely upon the faculty of 
speculative reason and on nothing else. In a systematic 
representation of those ideas, the suggested order, which is a 
synthetic one, would be the most appropriate; but in working through 
them, which must necessarily be done first, the analytic order, which 
inverts this one, is more suitable to the end of completing our great 
                                                 
1 See the remarks in Wood (1978, 15) regarding Heinrich Heine’s view of 
Kant as a “theological Robespierre, a soulless, ruthless, and incorruptible 
executioner of the Deity”. Note also Wood’s remarks on 16 as to the 
Prussian minister, Johann ChristophWollner, in his forbiddance of Kant to 
write on “matters pertaining to religion”, on the basis of, amongst other 
things, Kant’s condemnation of “superstitious pseudo-service of God” in 
religious institutions of the time. On this see Kant (1996g, “§3 Concerning 
Priestcraft as a Regime in the Counterfeit Service of the Good Principle”, 
esp. 6:176, 194, n.*). One of the bases for Kant’s criticisms is the frequent 
mistake of confusing the “visible church” for the “invisible church”; an error 
equivalent to the fallacy of subreption: mistaking the appearance for the 
thing in itself.  
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project, proceeding from what experience makes immediately 
available to us from the doctrine of the soul, to the doctrine of the 
world and from there all the way to the cognition of God.1 
 
The synthetic order Kant refers to, from God through freedom and 
then immortality, proceeds from (1) the consciousness of the moral 
law as if it were spoken in the voice of God, to (2) the idea of freedom 
which Kant claims we know a priori upon the basis of our knowledge 
of the moral law, to the idea of (3) immortality, which is required in 
order to make the actualisation of moral perfection intelligible: we 
cannot be expected to emulate moral perfection within finite 
experience since it is not able to be rendered under the conditions of 
possible experience, since it is an unconditional demand; it is that 
which is envisaged in the merely intelligible Kingdom of Ends, in an 
infinitely distant future2 not ever to be encountered in possible 
experience; nonetheless, theology and religion are here considered 
by Kant to be the “highest ends of our existence”,3 a depressing 
thought if entailing that one is a moral failure, almost by necessity.  
Our analysis of symbolic representation in Kant’s account of 
practical reason in §II.iii has revealed why Kant insisted upon a 
                                                 
1My emphases. 
2Kant (1996b, 5:124, 240). Kant attempts to resolve the problem of our 
inevitable moral shortcomings in the eyes of God, at any given instant, by 
claiming that it is because God “scrutinizes the heart”, wherein we strive 
toward satisfaction of the moral law (Kant (1996g, 6:67, 109)). Cf. Kant’s 
remarks about a “boundless future” and “eternity” (6:69, 110). Cf. also 
Kant’s remarks about the fact that the human being “nevertheless started 
from evil” (6:72, 112 & ff.); one may question this presumption, of course, 
and indeed, the presumption that inclinations such as love are not worthy 
unless they are pursued incidently as the result of a virtuous character that 
merely happens to have a sensibility coordinate with its rationally 
determined will. This tension was an early focus of Hegel’s, and he 
articulated an opposed view regarding the deeper value of love in his essay 
on “The Life of Jesus” (see Hegel (1984)). 
3 One should here compare the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason, in  
Kant (1996b, 5:107-148, 226-258), especially the discussion of the postulates 
of pure practical reason: “The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate of 
Pure Practical Reason” and “The Existence of God as Postulate of Pure 
Practical Reason” (5:122-134, 238-247). Note how Kant’s attempt to resolve 
the dialectic in practical uses of reason mirrors his resolution of the 
Antinomy of speculative reason, as well as aesthetic (Kant (2000, §57)) and 
teleological judgment (Kant (2000, §§75-77)): he in each case appeals to the 
idea of the supersensible but does not countenance its existence as 
knowable; rather only that the idea of it is necessary.  
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certain conception of the interaction between the finite, conditioned 
human standpoint and the infinite, unconditional demands we 
conceive of as being made upon us in our conscience, as if uttered by 
“God”.1Thus, Kant conceives of religion as being a fusion of morality 
and theology; ideally, religion is itself a set of ritualistic practices 
guided by moral theology. The symbolic value of the religious 
narrative surrounding Jesus is articulated in Religion Within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason, in the section entitled “The Personified 
Idea of the Good Principle”, where we find Kant saying that the only 
thing that can “make a world the object of divine decree and the end 
of creation is Humanity (rational being in general as pertaining to the 
world) in its full moral perfection.” The exemplar of this is the “Son 
of God”; a human being which is “alone pleasing to God”. Curiously 
such a being is however also to be conceived of as “in him from all 
eternity”, since “the idea of him proceeds from God’s being”. This 
seems to be Kant’s way of acknowledging the import of the father-
son aspect of the trinity,2 since he says further that this being is “not, 
therefore, a created thing but God’s only-begotten Son”, that is 
moreover “the Word”, “(the Fiat!)”. 
Kant insists that it is “our universal human duty to elevate 
ourselves to this ideal of moral perfection, i.e., to the prototype3 of 
moral disposition in its entire purity, and for this the very idea, 
which is presented to us by reason for emulation, can give us force”. 
Note here that the demand is coherent only because the divine 
character of the “Son of God” is not an empirical phenomenon, but 
                                                 
1 See Kant (1996g, “§4 Concerning the Guiding Thread of Conscience in 
Matters of Faith”). Kant speaks of an “inner feeling” regarding the “true 
meaning of the Scripture and its divine origin” and claims that “this 
impulse is but the effect of the moral law which fills the human being with 
heartfelt respect, and hence deserves to be considered also as divine 
command.” He adds to this: “But just as we cannot derive or convey the 
recognition of laws, and that they are moral, on the basis of any sort of 
feeling, equally so and even less can we derive or convey on the basis of a 
feeling sure evidence of a direct divine influence.” Kant (1996g, 6:113-114, 
145) Cf. Kant’s remarks about the “need of practical reason” for “the 
universal true religious faith” in a God that is (1) “the almighty creator of 
heaven and earth, i.e. morally as holy lawgiver”, (2) as “the preserver of the 
human race, as its benevolent rule and moral guardian”, and as (3) “the 
administrator of his own holy laws, i.e. as just judge.” (6:139, 165-166)     
2 Kant is elsewhere dismissive of the trinity: (1996a, 7:38-39, 264). 
3 Note he does not say “archetype”, because as we are told in the 
Dialectic’s chapter “On the pure concepts of reason” (A315/B372), we 
cannot represent this in intuition because it is an idea. 
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rather an intelligible aspect of the moral exemplar; we cannot 
experience this, thus it cannot be a limitation on our capacity to 
empirically realise moral demands. (In connection with this one 
should recall Kant’s remarks about Abraham and Isaac, wherein he 
suggests that we ought to be suspicious of apparently supernatural 
events since they do not conform to the world of sense within which 
all our knowledge occurs; moreover that in that particular case we 
ought to be suspicious of such an immoral demand as it does not 
conform with the moral law, which we do have a priori knowledge of 
through reason alone.)1 
The outcome of our employment of the idea of the “Son of God” as 
a moral exemplar is that in our “practical faith” in it, “the human 
being can thus hope to become pleasing to God (and thereby 
blessed)”. Again, we should remind ourselves that being pleasing to 
God is equivalent to satisfactorily fulfilling the commands which the 
moral law issues, since we hear them as if they were uttered in the 
“voice of God”. Thus, “only a human being conscious of such a moral 
disposition in himself as enables him to believe and self-assuredly 
trust that he, under similar temptation and afflictions (so far as these 
are made the touchstone of that idea), would steadfastly cling to the 
prototype of humanity and follow this prototype’s example in loyal 
emulation, only such a human being, and he alone, is entitled to 
consider himself not an unworthy object of divine pleasure.”2 
As Kant goes on to discuss “The Objective Reality of This Idea”,3 
we find that it is the fact that the “Son of God” is represented as 
moral perfection incarnate that we are able to “emulate” him, qua 
“example”.4 Indeed, Kant says that from “the practical point of view 
this idea [of the Son of God; of moral perfection incarnate] has 
complete reality within itself.” This is because it “resides in our 
morally-legislative reason.”5Note also that in the practical postulates 
                                                 
1Kant (1996g, 6:86-87, 124-125 & 6:187, 204). See also Kant (1996a, 7:62-
65, 282-285). 
2Kant (1996g, 6:60-62, 103-105). 
3Kant (1996g, 6:62-66, 105-108). 
4 See Kant (1996g, 6:64-5 & n.*, 107). Kant also refers to the “Son of 
God” as a “model” (6:66, 108). 
5 Kant in any case raises problems with the employment of the idea of 
the “Son of God” as moral exemplar. One of these, for instance, is that 
Jesus’s disposition is meant to be such as is already in harmony with moral 
perfection (not the quote above whereby the “Son of God” is meant to have 
“issued” from the will of God himself). The specific difficulties here are of 
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Kant deduces the moral necessity of belief in the existence of God 
from the fact that the moral law demands moral perfection of us;1 
thus the idea of “God” as well as the “Son of God” have an identical 
origin: the demand of the moral law. The difference is that “God” qua 
father is the theoretical source of the law and that whose voice we 
imagine as if being instanced empirically in our consciousness (the 
practical manifestation is that of the idea as a force which commands 
and determines our will in a rational manner); the “Son of God” is a 
source of the theoretical conception of a divine, moral incarnation: 
the possibility of humanity being saved from its inherent evil. 
Meanwhile, in the practical domain, the narrative serves as a 
symbolic guide for actual actions which we might perform.2 
Now, given that Kant sees the Kingdom of Ends as involving 
rational subjects who all have their will determined wholly by the 
moral law in the form of particular practical laws (rationally 
determinations of the will, rather than empirical ones) as being the 
“complete determination” of the Categorical Imperative:3 
equivalently, such a state of affairs would be that in which the will of 
“God” would be completely determined qua actualised in the 
individual actions of rational subjects in virtue of their being parts of 
such a kingdom. Kant thus insists our moral vocation is to bring 
about a world where the rational is actualised in the world, and that 
some “laws of nature” would actually be in such a situation rational 
laws (derivations of “The Categorical Imperative” that describe the 
total set of actions of human beings). 
This means Kant’s moral philosophy insists we ought to make the 
rational actual. Hegel is equally keen on such an idea, although Hegel 
claims that “what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational”,4 
and thus believes the rational to itself necessarily be actual (we find 
this idea rendered somewhat clearer upon examination of his claim 
that “not only is the syllogism rational, but everything rational is a 
syllogism”).5 When we encounter Hegel’s explanation of the trinity 
                                                                                                                            
less interest to our present discussion; in any case, see Kant (1996g, 6:76-78, 
116-117). 
1Kant (1996b, 5:122-134, 238-247, esp. 5:124-132, 239-246). 
2 I separate theoretical and practical dimensions in a related but distinct 
way in Chapter 3, §II.iiwhen speaking about the manifestation of “God” in 
theoretical and practical uses of reason. 
3Kant (1996c, 4:436-437, 86). 
4Hegel (1991a, 20). 
5Hegel (1969, 664). 
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below it will become apparent how radical his views of “rational” and 
“syllogism” are. 
In any case, Kant’s employment of the idea of the “Son of God” as 
a moral exemplar entails that: 
 
We ought to conform to it, and therefore we must be able to. 
 
Kant is here insisting that ought implies can, yet we may ask: “Does 
our conscientious cognisance of the moral imperative that we ought 
to perfect our moral performances and moral character imply that we 
can do so?” The answer to this depends upon what is meant by moral 
perfection, and as we have seen in our discussion in §§II.iii of (1) the 
obstacles to our representing satisfaction of the unconditional moral 
law in conditioned empirical behaviours, as well as (2), the role of 
description in establishing the moral status of actions,1 it is far from 
clear how we might can be morally perfect.2 
It is crucial that Kant explicitly connects his discussion of the “Son 
of God” here with his talk of symbolic representation by speaking of 
the role of analogical reasoning involved: 
 
It is plainly a limitation of human reason, one which is ever 
inseparable from it, that we cannot think of any significant moral 
worth in the actions of a person without at the same time portraying 
this person or his expression in human guise, even though we do not 
thereby mean to say that this is how things are in themselves for we 
always need a certain analogy with natural being in order to make 
supersensible characteristics comprehensible to us…although 
through reason we cannot form any concept of how a self-sufficient 
being could sacrifice something that belongs to his blessedness, thus 
robbing himself of a perfection. We have here (as means of 
elucidation) a schematism of analogy, with which we cannot dispense. 
To transform it, however, into a schematism of object-determination 
(as means for expanding our cognition) constitutes 
                                                 
1 See the “Casuistical questions” (and responses to them) scattered 
throughout Kant (1996d). 
2 Cf. Kant’s discussion of conscience here; he says it is not necessary 
that we know, beyond our ability to know, what is the right or wrong thing 
to do, but rather that we must believe that the thing we do is necessarily 
the right thing to do, which is of course meant to be something to which we 
are led by reasoning well in moral contexts (Kant (1996g, 6:185-186, 202-
203)). 
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anthropomorphism, and from the moral point of view (in religion) this 
has most injurious consequences.1 
 
The basic problem with the employment of the “Son of God” as moral 
exemplar is that there is great difficulty with differentiating what 
Kant calls the “schematism of analogy” and the “schematism of 
object-determination”, because, as we have seen, the understanding 
is not separate from reason in the way he assumes. Indeed, how can 
we distinguish “direct” from “indirect” satisfaction of a schema (in 
general) if the only way to make sense of “indirect” satisfaction is by 
conceiving of it as akin to “direct” satisfaction that is simply never 
complete? After all, we must think of “direct” satisfaction of a 
schema as also never complete, albeit in a different way: there are 
always more instances of subsumption under concepts, and 
subordination of concepts to one another, that is required to further 
determine the schema of an empirical concept. 
We should read the above as saying: determine its intension or 
sense by determining its extension through application to instances. 
This would mean we figure out what a concept means, what its 
schema is, where it applies and how, in applying it. Recalling our 
discussion in §V.i, consider the fact that the normative dimension of 
concepts allows us to modify intensions on the basis of their 
extensions: we can change our definition when we discover that 
something about instances to which we allow a concept to apply must 
be made explicit in the intension, or definition; or at least we might 
implicitly change our definition or realise our definition allowed 
certain novel instances to fall under it that up until a certain point we 
had no example of, given in intuition. 
Note here the difference: We say that direct representations of 
concepts involves employment of an intellectual function of the 
understanding(the capacity to judge according to the rules that are 
essential to the concepts we employ) that is never completely 
determined because the function can always be employed in 
additional instances in determinative judgment (one must always be 
able to apply empirical concepts in novel instances).Likewise, 
empirical objects can never be completely determined because one 
can always find more marks in intuition to apply concepts to (a lesson 
from Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment).  
For their part, indirect representations of ideas in symbols 
involve the attempt to satisfy a rational demand that can never be 
satisfied because it is unconditional, whereas symbolic 
                                                 
1Kant (1996g, 6:64-65, 107, n.*). 
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representations of it in intuitional form are conditioned. Recall that 
Kant’s transcendental concept of reason is that of “the totality of 
conditions to a conditioned thing”;1 thus ideas of reason cannot be 
satisfied because they are instanced as principles that call for 
complete object-determination (a complete adumbration of conditions 
and determinations) rather than represent it. 
Thus, the impossibility of completely determining2 an empirical 
concept that is directly represented is due to the fact that the 
complete set of instances to which it applies is not given: it expands 
infinitely. The impossibility of completely determining an idea that is 
indirectly represented follows from the fact that no instance can be 
said to satisfy it. Note how the task of the understanding is to reach 
toward the infinite set, whereas reason fails to find any members 
whatsoever for the sets whose proper names are ideas: the sets of 
the soul, the world-whole, God, the highest good, and so on, have zero 
members.  
Note the mathematical complementarity between ∞ and 0: 1/0 = 
∞; for our purposes here: consider this to be a way of representing 
the idea that a singular idea (“1”) that cannot be divided into 
instances (thus, “0”) is infinite (“∞”). Note that Kant’s ideas are not 
therefore undefined (as “0/0” in mathematics is), but rather their 
definitions simply cannot be adequately understood, except as 
formal, rational demands, that is, theoretical ideas performing a 
practical function. 
The consequences for practical uses of reason are meant to be 
that if we represent moral perfection as if it were no more than 
performing certain actions that are or were performed, we would be 
taking moral instruction merely from examples, where this would 
render unconditional demands conditioned; it would render the 
infinite finite. Hegel’s famous response is that by separating the 
divine from the human and insisting that the infinite cannot, so to 
speak, be instanced in the finite, is to limit the infinite by the finite: 
to insist that the infinite is prevented by the empirical character of 
our will, from being instantiated.3(And to use the device adduced 
above, reason’s entities have zero satisfactions.) Hegel’s point is that 
that which is truly infinite is able to permeate what Kant would call 
the empirically real and so actualise itself “without limit” in 
                                                 
1 See A322-323/B379. 
2 Note that “complete determination of things” is the task recommended 
by Kant’s “principle of complete determination” from the Transcendental 
Ideal (see Chapter 3), not the “complete determination of concepts”. 
3 This criticism was articulated as early as 1802; see Hegel (1977a). 
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particular cases, just as our example of empirical concepts with 
“direct” satisfactions suggested. The issue is, of course, fixing just 
what “empirically real” and “actual” mean, and here one only needs 
to consult the dialectic from feeling and pure immediacy to rationally 
determined thought, where syllogisms are the “truth of the 
judgment”. 
Notice that Hegel’s concern is identical to Kant’s: Kant insists 
that if reason is to be infinite it cannot be construed as satisfied by 
finitude, but Hegel would agree. Hegel’s objection is rather that 
Kant’s conception of reason is incoherent because if one cannot 
conceive of reason as connecting with empirical reality except insofar 
as it demands to be then it is empty.1 According to Hegel, on Kant’s 
view moral demands cannot be satisfied and therefore reason cannot 
be meaningfully be said to be actual; it is, rather, as “phenomenal” as 
the empirical world of appearances. 
We have said enough of this objection; we must now instead 
consider Hegel’s view of the Trinitarian representation of “God” and 
the lessons he believes it contains as to how we ought to conceive of 
rational self-consciousness. We attend to Hegel’s defence of 
“Knowledge of God”2 in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion 
and consider some remarks about the trinity from the Encyclopedia 
Philosophy of Mind. It is worth pointing out that Hegel’s reflections 
from his Lectures are, at face value, extremely unconvincing: Hegel’s 
words often come across as no less dogmatic than the pre-Critical 
rational theology which Kant originally attacked. This is because he 
is, after all, attempting to account for what he calls “religious 
consciousness”. The main obstacle here is that of understanding 
Hegel’s views about content, and attention to a narrow range of 
points should reveal some of this difficulty to be unfounded. 
Most pointedly, Hegel seems at many points to equivocate 
between “belief” and “knowledge”.3 Yet given that Hegel thinks the 
                                                 
1 For Hegel, “God” exists precisely at that level where recognitive 
interaction is in its ideal shape, in acts of confession and forgiveness; in 
Hegel’s view, “God” is for Kant outside the moral sphere we inhabit. See 
the discussion of “C. Spirit That is Certain of Itself. Morality” esp. 
“Conscience. The ‘Beautiful Soul’, Evil and its Forgiveness” Hegel (1977b, 
§§632-671, 383-409). 
2 The section editorially entitled this way occurs in Hegel (2006, 277-330, 
128-189). 
3 “Knowledge is the universal, whereas belief is only a part of 
knowledge. If I believe in God, then God is in my consciousness, and I also 
know that God is.” Hegel (2006, 283, 135). 
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“form” of thought can generate “content”, we may say that the form 
of thought being the Absolute Idea (the philosophical concept that 
correlates with the religious image of “God”) entails the form of all 
thought following from it, at the level of thinking; indeed, this sounds 
very alike Kant’s claim that the complete determination of things in 
the world of sense requires the ens realissimum to be posited by 
reason.1Note then how knowledge may follow from belief: if one 
presumes that the content of thought follows from its form, then 
individual cases of knowledge presuppose a certain form from which 
they follow, and the ability to think about this form entails that one 
knows something about this form. For Hegel, in religious 
consciousness, qua immersed in representations, the freedom of 
thought is represented in the image of the trinity of the “God the 
Father, “God the Son”, and “the Holy Spirit”. At the level of 
representational thinking we cannot adequately represent such a 
form of the complete system of rational thought; thus at least in this 
sense Hegel agrees with Kant’s forbiddance from our representing 
the omnitudo realitatis and the ens realissimum in intuitional form.2 
According to Hegel, this, however, does not mean we do not know it. 
Indeed, he thinks the representational (what for Kant is, roughly, 
intuitional) depiction of the trinity does count as “knowledge of God”; 
moreover that this religious consciousness is the appropriate one in 
which to speak of “God”, where in philosophy it is more proper to 
speak of the Absolute Idea. 
Consider one statement of Hegel’s view of an aspect of 
“knowledge of God” (rational insight as taking the form of immediate 
certainty): 
 
In one respect immediate certainty is said to be knowledge. I do not 
need to believe what I see before me, for I know it. I do not believe 
that a sky is above me; I see it. On the other hand, when I have 
rational insight into the necessity of a thing, then, too, I do not say “I 
believe.”3 
 
I take it the presumption is that one can be said to know “God” both 
immediately and through reason. Now, if we recall that for Kant 
                                                 
1Reflexion6289, AAxviii, pp. 558–9; cited in Longuenesse (1995/2005, 
229). 
2 Hegel says “we speak of “faith in God”—according to ordinary 
linguistic usage—because we have no immediate sensible intuition of God.” 
Hegel (2006, 284, 136). 
3Hegel (2006, 283-284, 136). 
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“God” is a transcendental idea alongside the world-whole, we feel 
pressed to raise a related question in order to clarify the absurdity 
that we merely “believe” “God” exists. Thus, we ask whether it 
makes sense to say “I believe there is a world”; we may wonder 
whether the idea of an ultimate ground for all predications we make 
of things in experience—of all topics of thought that emerge in our 
consciousness, of all subjects we entertain—makes sense.  
Hegel’s remarks about belief can be compared usefully in this 
connection: 
 
Belief rests upon testimony and so has a ground. But the absolutely 
proper ground of belief, the absolute testimony to the content of a 
religion, is the witness of the spirit and not miracle or external, 
historical verification.1 
 
Hegel’s employment of the phrase “the witness of the spirit” is 
revealing: individual subjective religious belief is mediated by such a 
subjective consciousness’s inclusion in the wider sphere of Geist; yet 
individual instances of belief are not externally justified by their 
having been caused by beliefs that pervade communities of which the 
subjects holding the beliefs are parts. Rather, the “One” is reflected 
in “the Many” individuals by way of their grasping the unity to which 
they belong, but which cannot be grasped except as a negative unity. 
We ought to connect this point with Hegel’s view of content. He 
reveals an important part of his view of cognition when he says that 
“[A]ny content can be in feeling, just as it can be in thought 
generally.” Prima facie, this suggests that the dialectical 
transformation of an intentional relation does not alter the 
intentional content of the act related to the object; that is, the 
dialectical differences between feeling, representation, and thought 
do not constitute differences in content as such. If this is right, Hegel 
is committed to the thesis that content is simply whatever a 
cognitive state is about, which would mean he equates intentional 
content with intentional object. And although Hegel does not 
explicitly put the point in these terms, such terminology can be 
employed to elucidate his view; this characterisation would clarify his 
repeated insistence on the unity of thought and being by explaining 
how it can be said that one can have the same content in one’s 
                                                 
1Hegel (2006, 284, 137). 
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cognition in many different ways. In the present context, feeling is 
being discussed as one of these ways.1 
In addition, Hegel confirms that he understands feeling to be 
what in contemporary parlance is known as “non-cognitive”: 
 
We cannot say of feeling that it is good or not good, that it is correct 
and genuine on the one hand, or false or spurious on the other. This 
indeterminateness is feeling [per se].2 
 
However, Hegel recognises that, although feeling is indeterminate in 
this way, when cognition takes this form it is precisely the 
determinateness of the feeling itself that is thematic. And according 
to Hegel “[T]his determinateness is what appears as its content.” 
Even more strikingly, he says 
 
To the extent that we have a representation of this determinateness 
and are ourselves conscious of it, we have therefore an object that 
also appears at the same time in a subjective mode, as an object of 
feeling. In the case of outwardly sensible feeling its determinateness 
is the content—for example, when we feel something hard, the 
determinateness of the feeling is therefore a hardness. But we also 
say about this hardness that there is a hard object present. The 
hardness therefore [both] is subjective and exists as an object.3 
 
Hegel here seems to allow that the “content” is that which the form 
of cognition (feeling, representation, or thought) is about (in the 
terminology of the scholastic and phenomenological traditions: the 
“intentional object”) he apparently has no problem with allowing that 
such content can vary, whilst remaining the same. If so, this would go 
some way to explaining Hegel’s attitude to contradiction, for in the 
example just cited Hegel mentions the content in feeling is 
“hardness” (presumably a “sensation”), yet in representation and 
thought the shape of consciousness would take different forms, would 
                                                 
1 The remainder of the page Hegel (2006, 286, 138) expands on this 
point. On 139 Hegel insists upon the important of the corporeal character of 
the feeling of conviction, and thereby clarifies what he had said earlier 
regarding the “anthropological aspect” of feeling: such a primitive step on 
the road to clarified thought is infused with animalistic flavour (286, 138).    
2Hegel (2006, 287, 139). 
3Hegel (2006, 287, 140). 
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have distinct “content’, yet would nevertheless be about the same 
object, and so would have the same “content” in a different sense.1 
One might ask here whether Hegel would have benefitted from 
employing the tripartite distinction of intentional act, content, and 
object; one might also wonder whether Hegel’s line of thinking has a 
virtue that this tradition of usage does not. For his insistence on 
equating what in other contexts is referred to as “intentional 
content” and “intentional object” seems to go hand in hand with his 
thesis regarding the identity of thought and being. What Hegel must 
say, in order to avoid sounding completely absurd, is that one can 
have cognitive access to phenomena in a variety of structurally 
distinct ways (broadly: feeling, representation, and thought), and 
although in each case the “content” of the cognition is what the 
thought is about, this “content” can change whilst being2 the same.3 
Put another way, one might say that these three distinct forms of 
cognition are not only “moments” of an intentional relation, in the 
sense of an intentional act, enjoyed by a subject, but are also 
moments of actuality, in Hegel’s sense of that word: they are basic 
structures involved with the emergence of linguistic consciousness, 
qua realisation and actualisation of spirit at the level of an individual 
subject. And notoriously, although according to Hegel one has the 
same “content” in feeling, representation, and thought, it is only in 
the latter that the structure of this intentional relation is adequate to 
                                                 
1 See Redding (2007a, Chapter 7) for a helpful discussion of how Hegel’s 
attitude toward contradiction relates to the dialectical logical structure of 
his metaphysics. On 204 Redding refers to the essential role Hegel’s 
“cognitive contextualism” plays in his attitude toward contradiction. This is 
precisely the significance of the above discussion for the apparent 
contradictoriness of the content of distinct shapes of consciousness, insofar 
as they are meant to be the same, even if different (the intentional content 
and the object replicate the “subject” and “object” distinction). 
2 I will not say “remaining” since this introduces difficulties related to 
temporal reference of the kind with which sense-certainty struggles. Of 
course, “being” is a word that carries its own baggage, although it is the 
crucially transformational element of the dialectic that conflicts with the 
use of “remaining”, whereas Hegel shows the concept of “being” itself to 
undergo transformation on the way to the Absolute.  
3 Cf. the remark cited below—“Philosophy does nothing but transform 
our representations into concepts. The content remains always the same.” 
(Hegel (2006, 292, 145))—with Hegel’s claim Hegel (1991b, §20, 50): 
“…philosophy does nothing but transform representations into concepts—
although, of course, it does go on to transform the mere thought into the 
Concept.” 
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its own internal demands—most especially when thought moves in 
the realm of “the Concept”. 
How does this point relate to Hegel’s discussion of “knowledge of 
God”? He does repeat the point just made by claiming that “the very 
determinateness of the feeling is the content”; thus, the 
determinateness of one’s feeling of knowing God is the content of 
that “knowing”; thus the structural failure: such content is radically 
subjective whereas, for Hegel, God is universal and anything but 
merely subjective.1 Nevertheless, such feeling is meant to be 
essential in order to have one’s being—here in the guise of one’s 
subjectivity—fully imbued by the feeling of “knowing”, which is an 
important “anthropological” element in such a relation to God 
(amongst other things one might conceive of oneself as knowing). 
So, in short, this failure of feeling to satisfy the conditions of 
“knowledge of God” proper rests on the fact that it is not the 
“authentic mode” of such knowledge. The “fundamental 
determination of feeling” is, instead, “the specificity or particularity 
of my own subjectivity.”2 And so, in order to properly assess that 
such a determination that arises in my own consciousness has the 
“content” it seems to, “we must look about for grounds of decision 
other than those of feeling.”3 This is because, for Hegel, “it is true 
that every content is capable of being in feeling: religion, right, 
ethics, crime, passion. Each content has a place in feeling.” And I 
take it that this claim is a repetition of the point that whilst the 
proper, or most adequate, shape of consciousness is not always, and 
in fact rarely, feeling, this most primitive mode of cognition is 
absolutely essential; a fact which reminds us of the important 
anthropological aspect of knowing, referred to above. 
Strikingly, however, Hegel extends his critique of feeling by 
claiming that it fails to provide the necessary structure for such a 
basic ethical distinction as that between good and evil; for as he says, 
“evil with all its shadings and qualifications is in feeling just as much 
as the good.”4 And after acknowledging the tendency of ethical 
                                                 
1 Hegel says that “in the case of God we have already drawn attention 
to the fact that this is a content that belongs to thought, for thought is the 
soil in which this content is both apprehended and engendered alike.” 
Hegel (2006, 290, 142). 
2Hegel (2006, 290, 142). 
3Hegel (2006, 290, 143). 
4Hegel (2006, 291, 143). He also refers to Matthew 15:19 in this context 
(cf. n.73) when saying that “in the Bible it says that wicked thoughts of 
blasphemy proceed from the heart.”  
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traditions influenced by Christianity to insist that evil has its source 
in the heart, he notes that “natural feelings cannot be the proper 
impulses to action.”1 Which he takes to mean that “what is genuine is 
not the content of the heart as such, but instead what ought to be the 
heart’s goal and interest—this content and these determinations 
should become and be what is genuinely true.” 
When Hegel proceeds to discuss the “representational” shape of 
consciousness of “God” in his Lectures, he begins by insisting that 
 
what the genuinely true is we first learn through representation and 
thought. 
 
And he then refers to the “form of feeling” as the “subjective aspect”, 
whereas the “form of representation” is said to be the “objective 
aspect, the content of the certainty”. This latter clause is puzzling, 
given the above thesis advanced regarding the relationship between 
Hegel’s views of shapes of consciousness and contradiction, for how 
could representation be the “content of the certainty”, if certainty is 
an experiential manifestation of pure immediacy—the sheer 
presentation in consciousness of a content? If the above thesis is 
correct, the content of the “certainty” that God exists ought to be 
pure immediacy of the feeling that God exists, ought it not? For our 
argument was that the content of cognition God could be the same, 
viz., be about God, whilst nevertheless be different. For we had 
effectively said that the content was the mode of the presentation, 
thus, the claim was advanced that the intentional content and the 
intentional object were, in Hegel’s eyes, apparently united (in the 
manner of thought and being standing in an identity relation).2 If this 
were correct, which it seemed in first approximation to be, what 
could Hegel mean here? 
I take it that whilst Hegel allows for contradictoriness, he does 
nevertheless seem to think different phenomena have their own 
proper, most adequate mode of presentation. In this case, it seems 
that in the case of “God”, the shape of consciousness most proper is 
representation, and this is so even though its articulation in 
philosophy at the level of the “concept” is somehow superior. This 
could be taken to mean that the “form of representation concerns the 
objective  aspect, the content of the certainty”. This would only be so, 
of course, if Hegel was limiting himself to talk of representation of 
“God” here, rather than to representation in general. If it were the 
                                                 
1Hegel (2006, 291, 144). 
2Pippin (1989, 79-88). 
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latter, this would introduce the difficulty that representation was 
“the content of the certainty, the objective aspect”, of cognition in all 
cases, and for all phenomena. If “objective” is taken here to mean 
“related to the object, qua object”, rather than “object, thought about 
which is in this context conceptually mediated” then there is a good 
argument to think that this is actually the case. Nevertheless, we can 
let the point hold for now, in order to see what illumination it can 
provide for understanding Hegel’s insistence that 
 
For human beings God is primarily in the form of representation. 
[Representation] is a consciousness of something that one has before 
oneself as something objective. The fact that the religious content is 
present primarily in the form of representation is connected with 
what I said earlier, religion is the consciousness of absolute truth in 
the way that it occurs for all human beings. Thus it is found primarily 
in the form of representation.1 
 
The connection between religion and philosophy is made explicitly in 
Hegel’s remarks following this. He asserts that philosophy has “the 
same content” as religion, which he takes in both cases to be “the 
truth”, and believes, moreover, to be “the spirit of the world 
generally and not the particular spirit.”2 This is followed by an 
expression of Hegel’s general position regarding content, as 
mentioned already in the interpretation advanced above: 
 
Philosophy does nothing but transform representation into concepts. 
The content remains always the same.3 
 
Hegel then goes on to note that representations are “sensible forms 
of configurations”, typically referred to as “images” (Bilder). 
However, although representations take the form of images, “they 
have a significance distinct from that which the image as such 
primitively expresses”.4 And by this Hegel would appear to be 
saying the same thing we noted in §V.i in our discussion of the stages 
of the emergence of linguistic consciousness, in the movement from 
recollection to the imagination, where the universal character of a 
representation becomes thematised, rather than its particularity. 
                                                 
1Hegel (2006, 291-292, 144). 
2Hegel (2006, 292, 144). 
3Hegel (2006, 292, 145). Cf. the remark cited above from Hegel (1991b, 
§20, 50). 
4Hegel (2006, 293, 145). 
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The point would be that what the “image as such primitively 
expresses” is not as much to the point, as is its “symbolic or 
allegorical” character. 
Indeed, Hegel says that, viewed this way, representations have a 
dual character; with them, we “have before us something twofold”— 
 
1. “..the immediate”, 
2. “…what is meant by it, its inner meaning”, 
 
—where (1) is the “external aspect”.1 In commenting on this symbolic 
character of religious imagery, Hegel is quite explicit about the non-
literal character of the discourse in which it is found, for he says that 
“there are many forms in religion about which we know that they are 
only metaphors.”2 And his recurring Trinitarian example is adduced: 
 
if we say that God has begotten a son, we know quite well this is only 
an image; representation provides us with “son” and “begetter” from 
a familiar relationship, which, as we well know, is not meant in its 
immediacy, but is supposed to signify a different relationship, which 
is something like this one. This sensible relationship has right within 
itself something corresponding for the most part to what is properly 
meant with regard to God. 
 
Recalling our discussion from §V.i we can say that, for Hegel, the 
ultimate symbolic import of this metaphor rests on a structural 
similarity between the religious imagery of “God the Father”, “the 
Son”, and “the Holy Spirit”, and a certain structure in the form of 
Absolute Spirit known as philosophy (that of “Being”, “Essence”, and 
“the Concept”, which comprises the Absolute Idea).3 We say 
“ultimate” import because the Absolute Idea of philosophy is more 
rarefied than the God of religion, and this is despite the fact that, as 
Hegel was cited as saying above, religious imagery is the essential 
mode in which “Truth” is manifested for human beings.  Hegel sheds 
some light on this connection in a lucid passage from the 
Encyclopedia Philosophy of Mind that is worth quoting at length: 
 
                                                 
1Hegel (2006, 293, 145-146). 
2Hegel (2006, 293, 146). 
3 See the Introduction to The Subjective Logic in Hegel (1969) where it 
is said that “the Concept” is the truth of “Being” and “Essence” and contain 
them within it; note also that “the Idea” is the unity of “the Concept” and 
“reality”. 
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What we have said…about the nature of mind is something which 
philosophy alone can and does demonstrate; it does not need to be 
confirmed by our ordinary consciousness. But in so far as our non-
philosophical thinking, on its part, needs an understandable account 
of the developed Concept of mind or spirit, it may be reminded that 
the Christian theology, too, conceives of God, that is, of Truth, as 
spirit and contemplates this, not as something quiescent, something 
abiding in empty identicalness but as something which necessarily 
enters into the process of distinguishing itself from itself, of positing 
its Other, and which comes to itself only through this Other, and by 
positively overcoming it—not by abandoning it. Theology, as we 
know, expresses this process in picture-thinking by saying that God 
the Father (this simple universal or being-within-self), putting his 
aside solitariness creates Nature (the being that is external to itself, 
outside of itself), begets a Son (his other “I”), but in the power of his 
love beholds in this Other himself, recognises his likeness therein and 
in it returns to unity with himself; but this unity is no longer abstract 
and immediate, but a concrete unity mediated by the moment of 
difference; it is the Holy Spirit which proceeds from the Father and 
the Son, reaching its perfect actuality and truth in the community of 
Christians; and it is as this that God must be known if he is to be 
grasped in his absolute truth, as the actual Idea in and for itself, and 
not merely in the form of the pure Concept, of abstract being-within-
self, or in the equally untrue form of a detached actuality not 
corresponding to the universality of his Concept, but in the full 
agreement of his Concept and his actuality.1 
 
This clarification ought therefore to be seen as explaining Hegel’s 
claim that the sensible representation of religious imagery “has right 
within itself something corresponding for the most part to what is 
properly meant with regard to God”, where “what is properly meant” 
is that expressed by the Absolute Idea of philosophy.  
Now Hegel makes it fairly clear that the import of religious 
imagery is not to be evaluated in terms of its claim to truth in the 
ordinary sense, where such an assessment would lead to the 
objection of its being merely symbolic and ultimately fictive.2 He 
says in this context that “we certainly do attend to the story with our 
imagination, but we do not ask whether it is meant seriously.”3 And 
in relating his case to Greek mythology, adds that “[W]e enjoy the 
narratives of Jupiter and the other deities, but we do not in the main 
inquire further about what Homer reports of them to us, we do not 
                                                 
1Hegel (1971, §381, 12-13). 
2Hegel (2006, 293-298, 146-151). 
3Hegel (2006, 294, 147). 
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take it in the way we do some other historical report.” However, 
“there is also something historical that is a divine history—a story, 
indeed, that is supposed to be history in the proper sense, namely the 
story of Jesus.” Yet Hegel means something quite particular by this, 
for he claims that the story of Jesus can be taken in a twofold sense 
that notes the actual historical life of a man, as well as the “divine 
history”, where the latter is the “object of reason”. 
Hegel’s meaning is not unequivocal here unless, and until, the idea 
of an “object of reason” can be rendered distinct from, say, a natural 
object, where “object of reason” is taken to be the proper analysis in 
the context of spirit (which does seem eminently plausible). 
Hegel strengthens this impression in adding: 
 
Just as a myth has a meaning or an allegory within it, so there is this 
twofold character generally in every story. Undoubtedly there are 
myths in which the outward appearance is the predominant feature. 
But ordinarily a myth contains an allegory, as in the case of Plato. 
 
And importantly, 
 
Generally speaking, every history contains this external sequence of 
occurrences and action, but they are occurrences with respect to a 
human being, a spirit. What is more, the history of a state is the 
action, deed, and fate of a universal spirit, the spirit of a people. 
Histories of this kind already have a universal feature within them, 
implicitly and explicitly. If we take this superficially, we can say that 
from every history a moral may be extracted. The moral encapsulates 
at least the essential ethical powers that have contributed to the 
action and brought about the event, and they are the inner or 
substantial element.1 
 
Curiously, Hegel thinks that representation necessarily portrays 
such “powers of ethical life” in a narrative form, or “the way it exists 
in appearance”, whereas at the level of thought the universal itself is 
grasped.2 At least here Hegel does not explain exactly what these 
“essential ethical powers” are meant to be, although the general 
point is clear: at the level of thought the common characteristics of 
                                                 
1Hegel (2006, 294-295, 147-148). 
2Hegel (2006, 295, 148). It is worth noting at this juncture Hegel’s words 
from the Introduction to the Subjective Logic: “philosophy is not meant to 
be a narration of happenings but a cognition of what is true  in them, and 
further, on the basis of this cognition, to comprehend that which, in the 
narrative, appears as a mere happening.” Hegel (1969, 588). 
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ethical actions can be expressed in the form of something akin to 
what Kant would call a duty, where the content of the action 
performed from duty can be given verbal expression in a sufficiently 
general way such as to abstract from the “appearance” of the time, 
place, and particularity of instances which fulfil the universal demand 
satisfied by the particular performance.  
Curiously, Hegel adds to these reflections the remark that 
 
the historical as such is what exists for representation, and on the 
other hand there are images. 
 
And he follows this with a repetition of the same point made above, 
about the twofold aspect of stories, now related to the shape of spirit1 
known as “religion”, where religion portrays historical, ethical, 
stories in the shape of representation; an essentially sensible form 
that is instanced as “a series of actions and sensible determinations 
that follow one another in time and then occur side by side in space.” 
Crucially, 
 
The content is empirical, concrete, manifold, its combination residing 
partly in spatial contiguity and partly in temporal succession.     
 
And yet “this content has an inner aspect—there is spirit within it 
that acts upon spirit”, where by this Hegel is acknowledging this 
Spinozist conception of the (True) Infinite, where such is limited by 
nothing outside of itself; the characterisation that enables Hegel to 
defend a conception of spirit that is not supernatural in the 
traditional sense, but is nevertheless not to be analysed in standardly 
“natural” terms either. He does say further that  
 
To the spirit that is in the content the subjective spirit bears 
witness—initially through a dim recognition lacking the development 
for consciousness of this spirit that is in the content. 
 
And in doing so refers to a theme exemplified by his Phenomenology 
as whole—or, at least, in doing so covertly hints at the veracity of an 
interpretation that conceives of that work as involving an ironic 
double-perspective of a spirit whose transformations are being 
viewed from the outside whilst being simultaneously understood 
from an angle only visible from within such a process.    
                                                 
1 For a nice discussion of this locution and the significance it has for 
Hegel, see Pinkard (2008). 
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In his closing reflections on representation proper, Hegel clarifies 
the thesis which we extracted from him above, regarding his position 
on “content”. He says 
 
Representation concerns the objective side of the content, whereas 
feeling concerns the manner in which the content exists within our 
specific being, or within the specificity of consciousness.1 
 
And he then proceeds to question how these sides, or moments, 
relate with respect to religious consciousness; namely, how one form 
might derive from the other (religious feeling from religious 
representation, or vice-versa). He answers this by restating the fact 
that whilst feelings “contain this enveloped subjectivity”, they 
cannot serve as a ground for justification of the content, simply 
because they are too indeterminate. And moreover, that 
representation is the “more objective mode” within which the 
content of religion, qua shape of spirit, is present within 
consciousness.2 And in closing, provides an explanation of the 
functional role of the religious representation: 
 
Representation is necessary for it [the indeterminacy of religious 
feeling] to come to feeling and to consciousness, for it to emerge into 
consciousness and be felt. Instruction and teaching belong to this 
[process of] representation, and religious formation everywhere 
begins from this point.3 
 
Here the distinctly anthropological character of religious imagery, 
mentioned earlier, is affirmed, and light is shed on Hegel’s view of 
the moral vocation of humanity. Recalling Kant’s employment of 
symbolic representation in his practical philosophy as a necessary 
device for rendering unconditional moral demands in a conditioned 
form comprehensible (we might say “apprehensible”, qua sensible), 
we are inclined to say that Hegel takes a similar view, except Hegel 
seems to think the trinity is an ideal model for thinking about the 
very relation itself that a finite consciousness stands in to what Kant 
would call the “moral law”. For Hegel’s insistence upon the 
anthropological character of religious representation, and the divine 
character of dialectical logic, seems to mirror Kant’s distinction 
between the conditioned and unconditioned, where the former is 
                                                 
1Hegel (2006, 297, 150). 
2Hegel (2006, 297, 151). 
3Hegel (2006, 298, 151). 
195 
VI ~ Kant and Hegel on “God” 
represented in a spatio-temporal fashion, and the latter is 
represented in a purely rational manner, not limited by the 
conditions of possible experience for those with sensible (rather than 
intellectual) intuition. 
The most helpful way to understand Hegel’s discussion is to note 
that the dialectical development of consciousness from “sense-
certainty, through “perception”, and then “the understanding” from 
the Phenomenology implies that that of which one is immediately 
conscious cannot be said, unless it is mediated; thus what sense-
certainty cannot articulate itself. For this same reason Hegel says 
““[W]e set certainty in opposition to truth, for in that something is 
certain it is not yet true.”1 This same point holds for cognition of 
“God”, although “God” is meant to be a special case since the way in 
which it is conceived reveals the capacity for rational freedom of the 
individual in question (thus here one should compare Hegel’s 
discussion of varieties of religion). Hegel thus places a much stronger 
emphasis on the exact nature of the idea of “God” than Kant, and this 
follows from his appreciation of the historical nature of 
consciousness: Hegel appreciates that particular cultural practices, 
especially what he groups under “Absolute Spirit”, stand to reveal 
crucial aspects of the forms of life connected with it. Hegel believes 
that the Christian trinity, as an image of three-in-one, represents a 
deep truth about the nature of a free, rational self-consciousness, and 
its capacity to be instantiated in the modern world. 
Hegel’s view of the rational does not entail that we require an 
infinitely distant future life in which we are merely intelligible beings 
in order to conceive of it as actualised. This is because such a view of 
“rational” is wholly without empirical content: it is empty. Thus, for 
infinite rationality to escape becoming finite, qua blocked from 
actualisation in the world by finite wills, it must be able to be 
instanced in the finite; that is, the infinite and the finite must be 
entangled rather than abstract negations of one another. As a 
corollary of this, God and the human standpoint must be seen to be 
entangled in the actual: Absolute Knowing then must be conceived of 
as the infinite process of renewing one’s commitment to norms that 
one realises and actualises in the world, as a part of “The Holy Spirit’ 
(3rd moment of the Trinity). 
 
 
                                                 
1Hegel (2006, 283, 135). 
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I Preamble 
  
This chapter adds more detail to the account offered in Chapter 2, 
§II.ii of the basic representational and structural differences 
between Kant’s and Hegel’s respective ideas of “God”. In that earlier 
context we were concerned with the way in which Kant’s theory of 
reason led him to postulate an idea of “God” that was “beyond” 
experience, yet, in theoretical uses of reason, was regulative for 
systematically unified, rational, self-conscious cognition of the 
phenomenal world. We will now be focusing on the specific logical 
operations Kant takes to be involved in the “rational ascent” to the 
idea of “God”. 
Characterising the logical or rational procedure as an “ascent” is a 
way of acknowledging that the nature of Kant’s conception of the 
rational order is akin to the Porphyrian tree. In the first chapter of 
the Transcendental Dialectic, “The transcendental ideas”, Kant had 
construed rational ascent to conditions as “prosyllogistic” and 
descent to appearances as “episyllogistic”. Recall that this distinction 
can helpfully be clarified by connecting it with a similar contrast 
drawn with regard to judgment in the third Critique between 
reflective judgment through “classification”, and determinative 
judgment through “specification”, respectively. 
Grasping the role these forms of syllogising and judging have in 
Kant’s philosophy is central for understanding what he means by 
“transcendental”, and, given the recognition of similar, related logical 
principles in Hegel’s idealist logic, is central also for understanding 
how Hegel’s own philosophy might be “transcendental” in a non-
foundational sense—the apparent contradictoriness of that idea 
notwithstanding. With respect to Hegel, what one needs to grasp is 
that whilst grounds may be essential, they need not be ultimate and 
presuppositional in any straightforward sense. Moreover, grounds 
must ultimately be rational (stem from reason), and not be mere 
products of the abstract understanding’s capacity to judge, in Kant’s 
sense.     
I’ve just mentioned “operations” rather than “principles”, because 
the latter is to be discussed here in the singular as the “principle of 
complete determination” (hereafter PCD), whilst the former can be 
taken to here refer to the function of assumptions expressed by (1) 
disjunctive judgment and (2) infinite judgment in the employment of 
the principle itself. The assumptions expressed by these principles 
are that one can and must (1) divide possible predications of an object 
into those that are satisfied and those that are not, by utilising the 
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logical notion of the disjunctive “either/or” as a transcendental 
function and (2), in accord with the transcendental function of infinite 
judgment, affirm a negative predicate “not P”, and thereby posit a 
whole of possibility by which is divided into that which satisfies “P” 
and that which does not.  
Note how these functions are complementary: the major premise 
of a disjunctive syllogism divides the whole of possibility into that 
which satisfies a predicate and that which does not, and infinite 
judgment in its place as a minor premise affirms a negative predicate 
of an object (which is one of the disjuncts in the major premise) and 
thereby alludes to a transcendental sphere, the world of sense, that 
stands to be determined.1 Kant thinks this procedure involves 
something merely “analogous” to judgment because the “All of 
reality” is not a genus which may divided into species.2 At any rate, it 
is of great significance that Kant think does not think the “All of 
reality” (omnitudo realitatis) stands to “bits of reality”—judgments 
about phenomena—as genera stand to species. We will return to this 
point. 
Note that although the pure concepts of reason also function as 
principles for the systematic unification of the understanding’s 
actions in experience, the PCD should be interpreted as the basic 
principle of Kant’s transcendental concept of reason. After all, as he 
says, “the transcendental concept of reason is none other than that of 
the totality of conditions to a given conditioned thing”,3 and the 
totality of all conditions—the ground of complete determination of all 
things—conceived of as a singular “in individuo”, as Kant puts it, is 
the ens realissimum  (“the most real being”). This means the idea of 
“God” is for Kant more fundamental and essential than that of the 
soul and the world-whole; it is not simply another transcendental 
idea, it is both that and the Transcendental Ideal.  
                                                 
1 These are the grounds of the PCD Longuenesse (1995/2005, 217-218) 
recognises. The essential connection between these forms of judgment is 
noted also in Longuenesse (2001/2005, 190): “Note…the close connection 
between the forms of disjunctive and infinite judgment: these forms jointly 
contribute to the constitution of a unified logical space within which 
concepts delimit each other’s sphere, and thus contribute to the 
determination of each other’s meaning.” On 191 Longuenesse enumerates 
five themes she finds in Kant’s table of judgments, which, if coupled with 
her account of the PCD, give a summary of her reading of the skeleton of 
Kant’s system of transcendental logic. 
2 A577/B605. 
3 A322/B379. 
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It is these operations, disjunctive and infinite judgment, that will 
here be given a Hegelian dialectical exposition. This dialectical 
exposition will reveal some novel themes in both Kant’s and Hegel’s 
conceptions of determination, and will therefore reveal also the 
dialectical connection between their respective ideas of “God” and 
that of a rational, judging self-consciousness.1  
                                                 
1 There is a portion of the literature on determination—specifically, that 
on determinables and determinates—that it would be valuable to connect 
with the themes in this chapter. Such a task extends, however, beyond our 
immediate concern of clarifying Kant and Hegel. If one were to take this 
path, one ought to begin with Johnson (1921), development of him by Prior 
(1949a, b), the symposium with Körner (1959) and Searle (1959), and 
Rosenberg’s (1966) dissertation under Sellars. For some recent overviews 
see Funkhouser (2006) and Sanford (2011). For a different angle which has 
influenced work on this topic (i.e., Putnam’s), see Wittgenstein (1929). 
Interestingly, Fine (2011) inquires as to what would be involved with 
the world itself having a determinable-determinate structure. (Notice Fine 
does not pose the question: “What would it mean to say that the world itself 
has a determinable-determinate structure?”) Prima facie, this general 
question presupposes a transcendentally real version of the ens 
realissimum in the Leibnizian sense, tied to the sheer “logical possibility” of 
things (and not just concepts) that Kant views as metaphysically 
indeterminate and undeterminable.  
A way of connecting Fine’s analysis with the account of determination 
here can be recommended on the basis of a programmatic remark: “I have 
not wanted to say what it is for a determinate to belong to a given 
determinable but to say what it is for the world to possess the kind of 
structure that it has when the determinate/determinable distinction is in 
play.” (162) Note that a transcendental idealist (Kant), unlike a 
transcendental realist (Aristotle/Fine), will insist that talk of the world 
possessing determinable-determinate structure entails a theory about what 
makes determination by a self-conscious, rational subject possible, and that 
this theory will tell one everything one can know about what it is for the 
world to possess a determinable-determinate structure, for this can be 
nothing more than what it is to know the world as such. Fine does say, 
however, that his account is given in abstraction from such a question (163). 
One could take him then to giving an account that is either neutral with 
respect to transcendental logic, supplementary to it, or in conflict with it. I 
shall not attempt to address this question here. 
In any case, it is likely that Fine’s analysis of that question is conducted 
in ignorance of its connection with the idealist reading of determination 
here explored. It is unsurprising, however, that a Neo-Aristotelian 
metaphysician would find the idea of determinable-determinate structure a 
worthy topic of analysis; for whilst the relation is not itself identical to that 
of subjects and accidents, there is a connection. Cf. Johnson (1921, 173 & ff.) 
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Evidently determination is an important topic in the philosophy of 
logic, so a clear view of how Kant’s and Hegel’s perspectives on it 
differ ought to aid understanding of some of the peculiarities of their 
idealist logics also. And given that idealist logic posits certain 
epistemological grounds for ontological claims, explication of the 
former will recommend a general connection between both of their 
philosophies and what is now referred to as “metametaphysics”.1   
It is also significant that if the complete determination in question 
is essentially judgmental then the possibility of completely 
determining a thing in this sense will for Kant have at least the same 
conditions as those placed upon judging in general.  
The account given here aims to show how in idealist logic there is 
an intimate connection between the way in which an individual thing 
can be determined and the structure of the system within which it is 
determined: it is precisely the function of the PCD to ensure this 
possibility; thus the PCD serves as the highest of the principles 
whose manifestation is of ideas of reason (we might even say it is the 
grounding principle of reason in both theoretical and practical 
domains). 
The account given here thus provides a sketch of what the 
connection between individual object determination and the idea of a 
unified rational system is for both Kant and Hegel. We will see that 
Kant’s view of this connection begins with a rejection of the 
Leibnizian view of the concepts “matter” and “form”, where Kant 
will insist that “matter” is to be conceived as “logical genus” and 
“form” as its mode of specification in “the form of a system”.2   
I take the claims above to imply that idealist logic, for both Kant 
and Hegel, articulates conditions and grounds for (1) a rational self-
consciousness; (2) the things about which such a rational self-
consciousness can have thoughts; and (3) the relation in which a 
                                                                                                                            
on the substantive and the adjective, the difference between which is for 
him a point of departure in offering an account of determinables and 
determinates. 
1 See Chalmers (2009). I think doing so demonstrates how enlightening 
idealist logic is, for such logic, for Kant and Hegel, articulates the structure 
of the foundation of ontological claims. 
2 See Longuenesse (1995/2005, 213) for a similar view. She offers a 
capsule description of her reading of the first Critique at 232 & ff. Kant 
develops the idea of a “form of a system” in greater detail in the 3rd 
Critique. See the First Introduction: “Nature specifies its general laws into 
empirical ones, in accordance with the form of a logical system, in behalf of 
the power of judgment.” Kant (2000, 20:216, 19) 
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rational self-consciousness and the things about it can have thoughts 
stand to each other. This focus reveals the dialectical connection 
between their respective conceptions of the way in which 
understanding is merely “finite” and reason “infinite”; that is, our 
focus reveals their distinct accounts of the dialectical connection 
between “the human standpoint” and “knowledge of God”.1   
 The structure of the chapter is as follows. In §II I explain what 
Kant is up to in The Ideal of Pure Reason, and why the section of 
that chapter known as “The Transcendental Ideal” is so important. I 
narrow my focus further by highlighting the importance of Kant’s 
differentiation between two principles at the beginning of the 
Transcendental Ideal, and explain how Kant there commits himself 
to two distinct views about modality: one relative to “concepts” and 
one relative to “things”. The former kind of modality is “logical” and 
the latter “real”.      
It is important to appreciate the difference between real and 
logical possibility, since the reading of the PCD I shall give here 
depends on acknowledging that, for Kant, whilst the complete 
determination of things involves following a principle that asks one 
to forever reach beyond one’s actual experience, it does not require 
one to transcend what Kant calls possible experience. This reading of 
the PCD follows Longuenesse and contradicts much of the extant 
literature on the Transcendental Ideal.2  
Following Longuenesse,3 we focus on the theoretical components 
that ground Kant’s PCD (infinite judgment, disjunctive judgment, 
and the synthetic unity of apperception) and proceed by offering a 
Hegelian perspective on both their character, in isolation, and on 
                                                 
1 Recall the adumbration of this point in Chapter 1 and the paper it took 
as a point of departure: Longuenesse (1995/2007). 
2 See, for example, Wood (1978), Grier (2001), Ostaric (2009). 
3 Note that on (1995/2005, 212) Longunesse equates the totum realitatis 
with the “unlimited whole of reality”. Kant does not use the phrase totum 
realitatis in the the Transcendental Ideal; he refers to the omnitudo 
realitatis as the “All of reality”, and there is a subtle difference. 
Longuenesse seems to be employing “totum realitatis” in order to establish 
a connection with Kant’s response to Leibniz in The Amphiboly, where 
Kant rejects the idea that “the whole of possibility” (in the purely rational 
sense, of non-contradictoriness = conceivability = possibility, where in the 
case of the “most real being”, possibility = actuality) is equivalent to an 
“unlimited whole of reality”, because “reality”, for Kant, is empirical and 
therefore subject to transcendental-logical conditions of possibility.  
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their supposed roles in the epistemic and semantical complete 
determination of things.  
Following our exposition of judgmental determination in §§III-
III.ii we offer, in short compass, an articulation of some of the 
implications of this exposition. We will thereby also mount an 
explanation of the fundamental place judgmental determination 
occupies in Kant’s and Hegel’s projects of articulating the logic of 
self-consciousness, where self-consciousness necessarily involves 
determination of objects that are not the self.1 Therefore, in §IV, we 
will examine Hegel’s statement of his program in the Introduction to 
The Subjective Logic, as well as remarks he makes about self-
consciousness elsewhere. The themes explored in that crucial section 
will then be connected with those at the core of Kant’s 
transcendental idealism: those explored in Kant’s Transcendental 
Deduction, and expressed in Kant’s claim for a synthetic unity of 
apperception. 
Given that an informed decision about the status of the idea of 
“God” here presupposes at least a clarification of the arguments used 
to motivate a claim for there being a conceptual dependence between 
the idea of “God” and the idea of self-consciousness, we must 
examine those aspects of transcendental logic that are most 
important for understanding this connection. That is exactly what I 
believe Longuenesse’s reading allows for, even if she concludes by 
rejecting Kant’s claim that the ens realissimum is a necessary idea of 
reason in its theoretical use.2 
By focussing on judgment, and by demonstrating the connections 
it has, in Kant and Hegel, with the idea of a “human standpoint” and 
the idea of “God”, or “knowledge of God”, we open the way to further 
fruitful dialogue between analytical reconstructions of German 
Idealism and detailed, exegetical work. The common offering here is 
a theory of what it takes to be a judging, and therefore rational, 
concept-using, normatively-constrained, animal. 
                                                 
1 Here we recall not only Kant’s claim in the Refutation of Idealism that 
“inner experience…is possible only under the presupposition of outer 
experience” (B275), but also Fichte’s (1982) development of transcendental 
idealism as involving a distinction between the “I” and “not-I” (see 
especially his remarks about Kant in “Second Introduction: For readers 
who already have a philosophical system”). It is Fichte’s development of 
Kant that allows for, amongst other things, Hegel’s radicalisation of the 
idea of determination. 
2 See Longuenesse (1995/2005, 214, 233, & ff.). 
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Let us recall the systematising, unifying drive of reason as it is 
detailed in the arguments of the chapter of the Transcendental 
Dialectic entitled “The Ideal of Pure Reason”. And let us be 
reminded that this chapter is the third in a series of three chapters in 
the Second Book of the Dialectic (The Dialectical Inferences of Pure 
Reason), each of which criticises one of the three traditional topics of 
metaphysica specialis: rational psychology, rational cosmology, and 
rational theology, to which correspond “The Paralogisms of Pure 
Reason”, “The Antinomy of Pure Reason”, and “The Ideal of Pure 
Reason”, respectively. 
The Ideal of Pure Reason is concerned with the errors of rational 
theology and its argument essentially has three stages: (1) The term 
“ideal” is introduced and the form of representation exemplified by 
an ideal is compared with ideas1 and the categories;2 (2) the 
connection between the ideal and Kant’s transcendental method is 
drawn and a “critical”, or “regulative” conception of a “highest 
something” is intimated, albeit darkly; (3) the traditional proofs for 
the existence of a highest being (i.e., “God”) are repudiated.3 The 
obscurity of (2) will be our object of clarification. This topic is 
addressed in the Transcendental Ideal.4 
Now, whilst Kant’s criticisms of the arguments for the existence 
of God are of interest, the cosmological and the physicotheological 
proofs presuppose the validity of the ontological proof, so successful 
critique of the latter is sufficient for rejection of the former two.5 
                                                 
1Discussed in the first book of the Dialectic, “On the Concepts of Pure 
Reason” (A310-338/B366-396). 
2A80/B106 & ff. 
3 Cf. Grier’s account of the ideal (2001, 230 & ff.). 
4 As Longuenesse (1995/2005, 212, n.3) notes, when employing the 
phrase “transcendental ideal” Kant is sometimes referring to (1) the 
process of reasoning which leads to the ens realissimum, and sometimes he 
is referring to (2) the ens realissimum itself. Note also that the phrase is 
the title of the section in which the arguments and the entity are discussed.   
5 Note that this strategy does not involve the fallacy of denying the 
antecedent; namely, claiming that “If p, then q; not p; therefore, not q.” The 
point is that the critical account of the PCD, which dispenses with the 
rationalist defence of the ens realissimum, dispenses also with the proofs of 
rational theology. This is because the soundness of the rationalist reading 
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Further restriction of our attention is justified by the fact that 
Kant’s criticisms of the ontological proof follow from his critical 
account of the PCD; a critical account that is the centrepiece of 
Kant’s reformulation of rational theology as transcendental theology. 
Close analysis of that difficult piece of text therefore reveals the 
connection between Kant’s critique of rational theology and his 
philosophical position as a whole. It in fact reveals his transcendental 
idealism to be transcendental theology (we return to this below in 
§II.ii). 
In the Transcendental Ideal, Kant claims that reason’s 
systematising, unifying “drive to the unconditioned” ends with the 
postulation of two necessary, rational entities1 which, when 
conceived in a traditional rationalist sense, involve “illusions of 
reason”:2 the omnitudo realitatis, and the ens realissimum.1(Cf. 
                                                                                                                            
of the PCD is not a sufficient, but rather a necessary condition of those 
proofs. 
Grier also claims an entailment relation between the validity of the 
ontological argument and the other two arguments Kant attacks in order to 
justify her own analysis of The Ideal of Pure Reason (see Grier (2001, 230)). 
Wood rejects this claim regarding the entailment relation (Wood (1978, 
148)) and insists the latter two (cosmological, physicotheological) forms of 
proof may stand independently of the failure of the former (ontological). 
Since we are concerned with the nature of the PCD, and not the proofs for 
the existence of God, this issue will not concern us further. 
1 I say “entities” rather than “ideals” in order to respect Kant’s 
terminological insistence that (1), the ens realissimum is “the one genuine 
ideal of which human reason is capable” (A576/B604; my emphasis) and (2), 
that “the ideal of pure reason is the object of a transcendental theology” 
(A580/B608). 
2 Here note the contrast between two metaphysical pitfalls for the 
rational judging consciousness: (1) errors of judgment (the “fallacy of 
subreption” as so-called in his pre-Critical work) where appearances are 
mistaken for things in themselves, as guarded against in the Appendix to 
the Analytic (The Amphiboly), and (2) illusions of reason, which are 
detailed in the Dialectic, where rational posits such as the pure concepts of 
reason are taken to have objective reality. Grier (2001) is exemplary with 
regard to her thorough treatment of the issues involved here (on this issue 
see esp. Chapters 3 & 4). Her main contribution is to demonstrate how the 
latter pitfall is an ineradicable and indeed essential element of reason in its 
push to the unconditioned (see the contrast between “regulative” and 
“constitutive” in the Appendix to the Dialectic); that the former pitfall is 
entirely avoidable is argued for by Kant in his transcendental 
investigations. 
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Kant’s claim in the Appendix to the Dialectic that the transcendental 
employment of the pure concepts of reason is justified by the 
systematic unity they afford our cognition.) The latter entity (“the 
most real being”) is a dialectical transformation of the former (“All of 
reality”) and is meant to contain the “perfection” of all predicates 
instanced in it. The ens realissimum is conceived of as a singular, or 
“in individuo”, as Kant says.2 The ens realissimum, “the concept of an 
individual being”, is  
 
a transcendental ideal which is the ground of the complete 
determination that is necessarily encountered in everything existing, 
and which constitutes the supreme and complete material condition of 
                                                                                                                            
1 Oddly, Longuenesse (1995/2005) employs the term “totumrealitatis” 
throughout. At 212 she equates this with “unlimited whole of reality”, at 
220 with “sum total of all realities” and “totality of positive predicates”, 
“complete whole of positive determinations of things”. At 222 n.12 she 
attributes to Kant the view that this idea could only be the “whole of 
reality given to the senses”; at 229 “the (indeterminate, collective) whole of 
reality given in space and time”. She mentions the omnitudorealitatis in 
only two places: (1) at 219, where she identifies it with the “sum total of all 
reality”, and at 222, where it is described as a “totality of positive 
predicates”. 
Since Kant only ever mentions the omnitudorealitatis I will not use the 
phrase “totumrealitatis”. Note that the relevant logical moves are in any 
case from a “sum total of all possibility” (A573/B601) to an “All of reality” 
(omnitudorealitatis; A576/B604) to a “most real being” (ens realissimum; 
A576/B604). The equivalent in The Amphiboly of the move from the “sum 
total of all possibility” to the “All of reality” in the Transcendental Ideal is 
that from the “matter of all possibility” to “unbounded reality” (A266/B322 
& ff.). In the case of the intellectualist philosopher in The Amphiboly, 
however, these two are simply taken to be equivalent. There is only taken 
to be a progression in the Transcendental Ideal because Kant is discussing 
what he takes to be a logical error; the consequence is that Kant’s 
transcendental conception of possibility can only be explained in terms of 
the relation between the cognitive faculty of the judging subject and the 
empirical reality given in the world of sense about which they make 
judgments. 
If one were to develop Kant’s view of possibility in contemporary terms, 
a sound beginning can be found in Hintikka (1969) and the recent appraisal 
of him in Perry (2009).       
2A568/B596. 
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its possibility, to which all thinking of objects in general must, as 
regards the content of that thinking, be traced back.1 
 
The ens realissimum is also conceived of by Kant as “the one single 
genuine ideal of which human reason is capable, because only in this 
one single case is an—in itself universal—concept of one thing 
thoroughly determined through itself, and cognized as the 
representation of an individual.” Moreover, the ens realissimum is 
that which is “realised…hypostatised…and personified”, and thereby 
transformed from a “mere representation” into “a highest 
understanding…an intelligence”,2 in order to rationally ground the 
systematic unity of thought about nature;3 a systematicity that is, as 
later argued in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, both 
deterministic and teleological.4 
As we’ve seen, ideas appear to have a more general and abstract 
cognitive function than the categories insofar as they are what we 
might call “metajudgmental” rather than judgmental: they serve to 
unify and systematise the judgmental actions of the understanding, 
whereas the categories serve to unify intuitional content in judgment 
itself. Ideas are rational, and not simply intellectual. “Ideals”, 
however, are to be understood “not merely in concreto but in 
individuo, i.e., as an individual thing which is determinable, or even 
determined, through the idea alone.”5This willingness to speak of 
determination as occurring amongst the elements of thought, rather 
than involving the procedure expressed in the imagery of language 
and thought as “reaching beyond” or “outside” itself to determine the 
world, recalls Kant’s employment of a unique version of the 
Aristotelian form/matter distinction, as stated in The Amphiboly: 
                                                 
1A576/B604; my emphases. I have modified Guyer and Wood’s 
translation to harmonise with Longuenesse’s translation of “durchgängig” 
as “complete” rather than “thoroughgoing”. This is simply because I 
engage closely with Longuenesse’s reading of the principle. Note that 
Norman Kemp-Smith also translates“durchgängig”as “complete”. 
2A583/B611. Apart from the Latin expressions, the emphases in the 
paragraph are mine.   
3 Note the significance of the fact that for Kant nature was the world of 
sense (or, to use a Sellarsian turn of phrase, the world of “actual” and 
“obtainable” empirical representings). 
4 The dialectic of determinative and teleological judgment is the topic of 
the Second Division of the Second Part of the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment (5:385-415, 257-284) and the discussion of this particular issue 
occurs in the famous §§75-77 (5:397-410, 268-279).  
5A568/B596. 
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Matter and form.1 These are two concepts that ground all other 
reflection, so inseparably are they bound up with every use of the 
understanding. The former signifies the determinable in general, the 
latter its determination (both in the transcendental sense, since one 
abstracts from all differences in what is given and from the way in 
which that is determined). The logicians formerly called the universal 
the matter, but the specific difference the form.2 
 
One is here struck by the way Kant’s account of “matter” and “form” 
as “concepts of reflection” clarifies another of his explanations of the 
“matter” and “form” of thought, as offered in the B Edition of the 
Metaphysical Deduction: 
 
the impressions of the senses provide the first occasion for opening 
the entire power of cognition to them and for bringing about 
experience, which contains two very heterogeneous elements, namely 
a matter for cognition from the senses and a certain form for ordering 
it from the inner source of intuiting and thinking, which, on the 
occasion of the former, are first brought into use and bring forth 
concepts.3 
 
Here we have Kant’s classic statement that experiential “content” is 
to be thought of as having two conditioning “forms”: the pure form of 
intuition and the pure form of concepts. Once one appreciates the 
citation from The Amphiboly given prior to this, it becomes clear 
that when Kant speaks of “matter” and “form” it must remembered 
that these are “concepts of reflection” that have a function in 
                                                 
1 Cf. Kant’s official statement about “Matter and form of judgments”: 
“Matter and form belong to every judgment as essential constituents of it. 
The matter of the judgment consists in the given representations that are 
combined in the unity of consciousness in the judgment, the form in the 
determination of the way that the various representations belong, as such, 
to one consciousness.” Kant (1992a, 597). 
2A266-268/B322-324; my emphases. “The logicians” here refers to the 
Schoolmen: Kant is appropriating a piece of Aristotelian scholasticism and 
pressing it into service for what could be called “purely pragmatic” 
purposes. This is to suggest that Kant’s transcendental logic is not merely 
formal logic, but a logic based on the epistemic operations involved in 
thinking: recognition, (re-)identification, individuation, determination, etc. 
A convincing case cannot be made for such an interpretation of 
transcendental logic here, although it is hoped that one can be motivated by 
the specific considerations entered into here.  
3 B118; boldface in translation. 
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“transcendental reflection”: “matter” and “form” mean something 
different depending on whether they are being used to reflect on 
either intuitions or concepts.  
This means that in the citation from The Amphiboly, we cannot 
take Kant to be equating “matter” with sensuous, non-conceptual 
content (“sensation” as “the matter of appearance”), and “form” with 
the conceptual determinations whose logical form is determined by 
functions of judgment, syllogistic inferential relations, and the ideal 
systematic unity expressed by transcendental ideas.1 Regarded such 
a way, “matter” would pertain to the matter of intuition,2 and “form” 
to the form of a concept. But intuition also has the form of spatio-
temporality, and the content of a concept is to be derived from its 
logical significance as a particular element of a judgment. (Recall that 
for Kant concepts are essentially used for judging.)3 
In The Amphiboly Kant writes: 
 
In every judgment one can call the given concepts logical matter (for 
judgment), their relation (by means of the copula) the form of the 
judgment. In every being its components (essentialia) are the matter; 
the way in which they are connected in a thing, the essential form.4 
 
This way of putting the point reveals a key feature of Kant’s 
conception of determination: it occurs between “logical matter” and 
the “form of the judgment”, where the latter has its proper place in 
the syllogistic inferences where it plays a role as a premise or 
conclusion. To say that form is prior to matter in this sense is to say 
that the form of the judgment determines its logical matter. The 
most natural interpretation of such a claim is expressed by the 
                                                 
1 Such a blunt distinction is foreign to Kant anyway; for one, although 
his term “intuition” clearly refers to a blend of conceptual form and 
sensational matter (“sensation is the matter of appearance”(A?/B?)), 
intuitions are not obviously to be understood in a way amenable to this 
“stamping” metaphor—that is, in a way that, if correct would place Kant, in 
virtue of endorsing such an idea, on the “coherentist” arm of McDowell’s 
seesaw. Sellars discusses the “Janus-faced” character of Kantian intuitions 
in Sellars (1967/1992, Chapter I).  
2 For an explanation of the form of intuition (or, “form of appearance”) 
see A20/B34 and A42/B59-60. 
3 See Engstrom (2006) for an attempt to establish the thesis that Kant’s 
distinction between sensibility and the understanding rests on a more 
fundamental distinction between the “matter” and “form” of thought, that 
is not problematically dualistic in the way usually assumed. 
4A266/B322; my emphases, apart from the Latin. 
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semantic holist’s thesis that propositions do not have independent 
significance, but are rather relative to a particular theoretical 
context (here judgmental and syllogistic). When this claim is taken in 
its widest extension, it should be taken to express Kant’s concern 
with explaining the systematic unity of reason.1 
For present purposes, the most crucial remark occurs in Kant’s 
confirmation of the relevance of this matter/form distinction for 
understanding his conception of “the matter of all possibility”, which 
is intimately connected with the idea of the omnitudo realitatis: 
 
Also, in respect to things in general, unbounded reality was regarded 
as the matter of all possibility, but its limitation (negation) as that 
form through which one thing is distinguished from another in 
accordance with transcendental concepts.2 
 
As is evident from the past tense, Kant is here speaking of a 
viewpoint he is rejecting—the transcendental realist’s viewpoint 
within which “unbounded reality” is taken to be given to 
consciousness in a way not constrained by the conditions of 
cognition;3 that is, in a sense that would construe “the matter of all 
                                                 
1 Toward the beginning of The Ideal of Pure Reason Kant speaks of 
“virtue” and “wisdom” as ideas, and “the sage” as an ideal. If we recall our 
discussion of symbolism from Chapter 2, §II.iii we will see what he is 
alluding to when he says: “just as the idea gives the rule, so the ideal in 
such a case serves as the original image for the complete determination of 
the copy; and we have in us no other standard for our actions than the 
conduct of this divine human being, with which we can compare ourselves, 
judging ourselves and thereby improving ourselves, even though we can 
never reach the standard.” (A569/B597) Kant is saying that ideas of reason 
in its theoretical use cannot be represented symbolically; the ens 
realissimum cannot be represented as an ideal “individuo”. 
2A266-267/B322.Longuenesse (1995/2005) modifies the Guyer and Wood 
translation here from “is” to “was”; an adjustment she justifies this way: “It 
is important to translate this past tense to make it clear that Kant is 
describing a view made irrelevant by the critical standpoint he advocates.” 
(213, n.5) 
3 One can easily make of this a tautology, as is often done by those who 
denounce Henry Allison’s two-aspect reading as an accurate portrayal of 
Kant’s intentions. Strawson (2000, 241) characterises the two-aspect 
reading of transcendental idealism as tautologous, insofar as he takes it to 
be saying that we cannot experience things except under the conditions 
under which we experience them. I do not think this is an accurate reading 
of Allison’s two-aspect Kant, nor of Kant himself. See the introduction to 
Allison (2004) for his responses to critics. 
212 
Chapter Three: The Principle of Complete Determination 
possibility” as an object given to consciousness, rather than as a 
regulative ideal whose function is to guide scientific knowledge in its 
attempts to augment its systematic unity. In Kant’s regulative sense, 
distinguishing “one thing from another in accordance with 
transcendental concepts” involves infinite judgment (whose 
corresponding category, mentioned by Kant in the above passage, is 
“limitation”) that determine “parts” of the “whole” of the 
“unbounded reality” through a process with the following form 
 
S is ~P, 
 
where p is some property, from whose sphere of determination S is 
excluded. Such a form of judgment is not mere negation, since 
negative judgment does not involve the positing of (or, as Kant 
would say somewhat misleadingly, “it does not think”) the sphere of 
determination, or predication, from which the subject is excluded. 
The form of judgment just represented is what Kant calls “infinite 
judgment”. 
Kant’s point is that, when applied as a method for finding realms 
of predication from which logical subjects are excluded, this method 
for conceptualising “determination” is easily led into the error of 
positing an object of which all the infinite judgments are limitations, 
although there is, of course, a legitimate transcendental end to which 
infinite judgment is employed. The proper transcendental idealist 
procedure involves conceiving of the ascent to the idea of the “matter 
of all possibility” as a regressive argument to the conditions1 of 
certain kinds of determinative judgment; that is, involving as a 
counterpart, a reflective Porphyrian procedure that subsumes 
objects under concepts, and subordinates those concepts under 
higher concepts in turn until systematic unity is achieved and 
expressed in a singular: the idea of a unified system of theoretical 
and practical freedom, and theoretical and practical knowledge. 
Kant conceives of the conceptual conditions further up the 
categorial tree as merely regulative, not constitutive. This distinction 
is not without problems. I do not mean to suggest Kant is a Neo-
Platonist about concepts employed in the “doctrine of nature”; rather 
                                                 
1 Work in the literature on transcendental arguments that recognises 
the centrality of such a procedure to Kantian transcendentalism is 
important to understand what is meant here. See the literature compiled 
by Isabel Cabrera in Stern (1999/2003, 307-321). See, in particular, Ameriks 
(1978).  
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that his theory of judgment commits him to a certain view of the 
rational order. 
In the context of the PCD in the Transcendental Ideal, however, 
the concept divided disjunctively and then “determined” by infinite 
judgment is that of an “object of possible experience”; this concept is 
the critically-reduced conception of what Longuenesse calls the 
totum realitatis and which Kant actually refers to as the omnitudo 
realitatis (“All of reality”).1 When a negative predicate is affirmed of 
a logical subject, as above, it is the sphere of the entire set of possible 
predicates available for “the concept of an object of possible 
experience” that serves as that to which the logical subject belongs. 
The logical subject of an infinite judgment is thus placed in the 
otherwise undetermined sphere of “the concept of an object of 
possible experience”.2 
Notice that the conceptual sphere of “the concept of an object of 
possible experience” is somewhat determinate: It is structured in 
terms of Kant’s sensible and intellectual epistemic conditions (space 
and time; the forms of judgment, from which flow the categories and 
the concepts of reflection).3 These conditions provide a certain form 
and content (see the discussion of “matter” and “form” above) for 
cognition, with which the PCD harmonises. We will see below that 
Hegel takes issue with these purported transcendental conditions. 
Most famously and succinctly he notes in his sceptical remarks in the 
Introduction to the Science of Logic that the transcendental 
enterprise can be viewed as if “shot from a pistol”.4 Hegel can ask of 
Kant, given that the latter wishes to draw “limits” to knowledge and 
reason, how he knows the nature of these “limits” themselves if he 
cannot think both sides of them (cf. Wittgenstein’s similar remarks in 
the Tractatus).5 
Recall the erroneous inference Kant guards against in The 
Appendix to the Dialectic, of deriving a constitutive usage of a 
transcendental idea from a regulative one; that is, from:  
 
Find for conditioned knowledge given through the understanding the 
unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion.6 
                                                 
1A576/B604. 
2 I here exploit Longuenesse’s(1995/2005, 218) interpretation, yet have 
modified her way of putting the point. 
3 For a defence of this reading against criticism see Longuenesse (2000). 
4 From “With What Must the Science Begin?” in Hegel (1969, 67). 
5Wittgenstein (1921/1961/2001, 5.61). 
6 A308/B364; cited in Grier (2001, 119). 
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To:  
 
If the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions, 
subordinated to one another – a series which is therefore itself 
unconditioned – is likewise given, that is, contained in the object and 
its connection.1 
 
This pair of propositions together expresses the error Kant insists 
grounds the Transcendental Ideal of which we have been speaking: 
the generation of the ens realissimum out of the omnitudo realitatis, 
and the latter itself out of the “distributive use of the understanding 
in experience”. He puts the point this way: 
 
That we…hypostatise this idea of the sum total of all reality2…comes 
about because we dialectically transform the distributive use of the 
understanding in experience, into the collective unity of a whole of 
experience; and from this whole of appearance we think up an 
individual thing containing in itself all empirical reality, which then—
by means of the transcendental subreption we have already 
thought—is confused with the concept of a thing that stands at the 
summit of the possibility of all things, providing the real conditions 
for their complete determination.3 
 
Forced into a contemporary idiom, we might be moved to say that 
they are “reified” forms. Yet to say that they are nothing other than 
“the ground of the process”, or the “form and content” of complete 
determination, is not to deny them a connection with the content 
with which the reasoning process is concerned, what it is about; 
                                                 
1 A308/B364; cited in Grier (2001, 122). Cf.: “to find the unconditioned for 
conditioned cognitions of the understanding, with which its unity will be 
completed.” (A307/B364).Ostaric (2009, 159) refers to this as reason’s 
“principle of systematicity”. The assumption quoted from Grier is a 
presupposition of this principle. 
2 Note that the omnitudorealitatis is actually characterised by Kant as 
the “All of reality”, rather than the “sum total of all reality”. There are 
many ambiguities in this section of Kant’s work and the most plausible 
interpretation of this divergence seems to be that he is here careless with 
his phrasing; therefore, that “All of reality” and “sum total of all reality” 
should be taken to be the same. On this point, note the remarks above 
regarding Longuenesse’s employment of the totumrealitatis. 
3A582-583/B660-661; my emphases. 
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rather, it is to have one’s eyes open to their functional character: 
their nature understood in terms of what they do. 
Now, for Kant, these purely rational entities are not possible 
objects of experience, yet, given his beliefs about the structure of at 
least our thought, he nevertheless takes them to be ineradicable 
elements of at least our discursive thinking: he takes them to have a 
related function to the transcendental ideas (the soul, the world-
whole, God) and therefore that they function as “regulative ideals” 
for inquiry in a related way. To specify this a little further, we may 
say that the omnitudo realitatis, functioning regulatively, serves as a 
way of thinking about possible experience in general: “All of reality” 
as the distributive unity of the understanding in its judgments of the 
world of sense. The ens realissimum, functioning regulatively, is the 
singular grounding condition of this domain, its source of objective 
predications (transcendental-logical functions as instanced in 
empirical judgments: “the concept of an object of possible 
experience”. 
According to Kant, it is the rationalist’s error to think that such 
ideas play a “constitutive” role in our thought, as if the supposed 
“rational intelligibility” of the ideas guaranteed their “reality”. 
Further, that this manifestation of the transcendental illusion 
equates to thinking that the “matter” of the “whole of possibility” is 
given to thought. Kant’s response to Leibniz in The Amphiboly, 
involves him saying that only the “form” of the “whole of possibility” 
can be so given insofar as this is no more than the transcendental 
conditions on knowledge. Further, according to Kant’s critique of 
metaphysics, such form can only be expressed by the PCD itself, in 
the guise of an epistemological and semantical task.1 
We will return to this point, since we must first discuss the two 
principles whose structure Kant explains in the opening paragraphs 
of the Transcendental Ideal. 
                                                 
1A266-268/B322-324. 
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The PCD is that which guides the rational ascent of reason to the 
idea of the ens realissimum, qua ground of all reality thought of as an 
individual1—which is moreover a most real being—by insisting that 
the “complete determination” of any “thing” requires comparison of 
that thing with all pairs of possible predicates “contained in” the idea 
of the “sum total of all possibility”.2 
Kant equates “the whole of possibility” with “the sum total of all 
predicates of things in general”.3 My emphasis is intended to 
recommend that Kant is speaking of “things in general” to only be 
epistemically available under the conditions of the possibility of an 
“object of possible experience”. So even though the concept of a 
“thing in general” does not strictly involve sensible conditions yet 
rather only intellectual conditions, this is not enough to render it an 
object of knowledge, but rather only the idea of a possible object of 
knowledge to which must be added sensible matter in an appearance. 
From this it follows that “things” are here to be understood as 
transcendental-logical kinds (singulars which provide intuitional 
matter for the idea of an “object in general”, or “transcendental 
object”) and not empirical kinds. 
Crucially, Kant distinguishes between the PCD, which guides the 
process of determining things in the world of sense, and another 
principle (“the principle of determinability”, hereafter PD), which he 
takes to express the claim that concepts are determinable. It is of the 
utmost significance that Kant differentiates these two principles at 
the beginning of the Transcendental Ideal, because they reveal to us 
how the conditions of the possibility of a thing are for him more 
complex and numerous than the condition of the possibility of a 
concept. The latter is singular and not plural because the only 
condition of the possibility of a concept is non-contradictoriness. Kant 
provides this explanation of the PD: 
                                                 
1A568/B596. 
2 On this point, cf. the reconstruction of Hegel’s critique of Kant in 
Kreines (2007, 326 & ff.).  
Kant seems to later employ “the sum total of all possibility” 
(A573/B601) to mean the same thing as “the whole of possibility”, which 
might be the reason for Longuenesse’s employment of the phrase 
“totumrealitatis” rather than “omnitudorealitatis”. Cf. Figure 14.1 and the 
ensuing discussion in Buchdahl (1992b, 319 & ff.).  
3A572/B600. 
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Every concept, in regard to what is not contained in it, is 
indeterminate, and stands under the principle of determinability: that 
of every two contradictorily opposed predicates only one can apply to 
it, which rests on the principle of contradiction and hence is a merely 
logical principle, which abstracts from every content of cognition, and 
has in view nothing but the logical form of cognition.1 
 
Now, whilst Kant says this principle “rests on the principle of 
contradiction”, he is actually asserting “the principle of contradiction 
applies to concepts”, so the PD is a metaprinciple that is meant to 
validate the principle of contradiction: the PD asserts that the 
principle of contradiction applies to concepts.2 It is clear, however, 
that such a validation is redundant, because in asserting there is such 
a thing as the principle of contradiction one has already done all that 
can be done in order to assert its validity. The positing of a 
“metaprinciple” presumes the need for further validation; an act 
                                                 
1A571/B599. 
2 Cf. the discussion of the apparent complementarity between the 
principle of excluded middle and the principle of contradiction in Wood 
(1978, 42-44). On 42 Wood acknowledges that the principle of contradiction 
is “the principle that at most one of any two contradictories can belong to a 
given concept”, whereas the principle of excluded middle is the 
complementary claim that “at least one of any pair contradictories must 
belong to any given subject.” As Wood recognises, there are clearly 
problems with the implication that universal concepts are determinable in 
this way; the point seems to hold rather only for particulars to which the 
universal concept in question applies (Wood highlights the peculiarity of 
the claim that one could predicate of the concept “humanity” either “young” 
or “not young”, “wise” or “not wise”). This is simply a way of saying that if 
one can predicate at least one concept of a thing, then one can predicate 
indefinitely many more (intuitions are fully determinate and endlessly 
determinable: more marks can always be found in them because there is no 
such thing as an infirma species articulable in conceptual terms). Moreover, 
we ought to conclude that certain conventions will govern which 
predications genuinely determine the thing, as opposed to committing a 
category mistake.  
Part of the problem with the modality at issue here (pure logical 
possibility) is that it ignores the significance of categorial distinctions for 
the possibility of determination of a concept (and not merely a thing-kind). I 
take it that there is a problem with thinking only things, and not concepts, 
embed categorial distinctions, for one cannot speak or think of things 
except in conceptual terms, even if one can speak or think of concepts 
without assuming a material existence is implied by them.  
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which, if carried out consistently, would result in an infinite regress; 
we could ask why the PD applies, and on such a basis be motivated to 
formulate additional principles to establish this, etc. I take it that the 
lesson is that, first principles are indeed always worth establishing, 
but that it is difficult to sometimes see just how they should be 
established.1I am here assuming “God” is in any case a grounding 
idea (which is, if any thing is, a first principle). Importantly, then, 
Hegel’s own attitude toward contradiction is to be borne in mind 
(“everything is contradictory”) when assessing Kant’s attitude 
toward determination.2 
According to Kant, concepts being determinable, therefore their 
being non-contradictory is a condition of their possibility: 
 
The concept is always possible if it does not contradict itself. That is 
the logical mark of possibility, and thereby the object of the concept 
is distinguished from the nihil negativum.3 Yet it can nonetheless be 
an empty concept, if the objective reality of the synthesis through 
which the concept is generated has not been established in particular; 
but as was shown above [in The Analytic], this always rests on 
principles of possible experience and not on the principles of analysis 
(on the principle of contradiction). This is a warning not to infer 
immediately from the possibility of the concept (logical possibility) to 
the possibility of the thing (real possibility).4 
 
                                                 
1Henrich (2003, 8) acknowledges Kant’s dismissal of the attempts by 
Fichte to ground his philosophy in supposedly more fundamental principles. 
We might take this to recommend that Kant was concerned to begin by 
taking possible experience and the deliverances of the moral law through 
our rational conscience as basic data for analysis in terms of what he took to 
be necessary conditions of their possibility. He seems to have been 
unconcerned about providing a singular first principle for his system 
because his system began by looking to “the starry heavens above” him and 
the “moral law within” him(Kant (1996b, 5:161, 269)). 
2 See “The First Law of Thought” in the Doctrine of Essence, Section 
One, Chapter Two: “The Essentialities and Determinations of Reflection” 
in Hegel (1969). Longuenesse (2007, xiv) notes the importance of this 
connection also. 
3 In The Amphiboly Kant distinguishes between four ways of thinking 
of the “concept of nothing”; “nihil negativum” signifies an “Empty object 
without a concept. He distinguishes this from (1), “Empty concept without 
an object” (a mere “thought-entity”, (2), “Empty object of a concept”, and 
(3), “Empty intuition without an object” (A292/B348-349). 
4A596/B624. 
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Here Kant unambiguously denounces the idea that the logical 
possibility of concepts is equivalent to the real possibility of things; 
moreover, that the latter cannot be inferred from the former. As he 
says, one cannot speak of the conditions of the real possibility of 
things except under conditions of possible experience. Kant says that 
claims employing the categories without intuitional content have no 
sense or meaning.1 This would mean that for sheer logical possibility 
to have any import for our cognition it must be augmented through 
consideration of the conditions of real possibility.2 
Crucially, at the end of The Amphiboly it is remarked that the 
“highest concept with which one is accustomed to begin a 
transcendental philosophy is usually the division between the 
possible and the impossible”, but that “since every division 
presupposes a concept that is to be divided, a still higher one must be 
given”, which he says is “the concept of an object in general”. Now, 
since “the categories are the only concepts that relate to objects in 
general”, the concept of an object in general is to be regarded as only 
having intellectual conditions.3 The difference between “the concept 
of an object in general” and the “concept of an object of possible 
experience” is that the latter also has sensible conditions.  
It is epistemologically significant that something cannot be said to 
be an object of possible experience if it has not been experienced 
before, that is, if it has not been rendered “objectively real” (we thus 
recognise the effects of conditions of the possibility of experience on 
the possibilities for the reproductive imagination).4This is the same 
as saying that unless it can and until it has been brought under the 
sensible conditions of possible experience it is not an object of 
knowledge. Kant’s empirical realism (equivalently: his positivism) 
commits him to saying that “negation is nothing, namely, a concept of 
the absence of an object”.5 This identification of “negation” with 
“nothing” is equivalent to an expression of what Kant calls the “nihil 
privativum”, which for Kant is one of two ways of there being 
“empty data for concepts” (the other is the ens imaginarium). In 
                                                 
1 See B149, A155/B194, A240/B299, and B307-308, 
2 Cf. Franks’s claim in his (2008) review of Bristow (2007): “it is possible 
to distinguish between the determining of things by a formal and empty 
thought, and the sense and meaning that thoughts have when they 
are of an object.” 
3A290/B346. 
4 Here one should note Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment in the 3rd 
Critique, especially his remarks about genius, and the aesthetic idea. 
5A291/B347. 
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contrast to this there are for Kant two ways of a concept itself being 
empty: the ens rationis (“empty concept without object”) the nihil 
negativum (“empty object without concept”).1Importantly, 
determination requires data and “the concept of an object in general” 
can only be given data if it is brought under sensible conditions in the 
guise of “the concept of an object of possible experience”; any 
determination, let alone “complete determination”, can only be 
undertaken as an epistemological and semantical task given both 
sensible and intellectual conditions. 
There is little else to be said about the PD except that the way it 
is contrasted with the PCD demonstrates an important fact about 
Kant’s attitude to logic: while he insisted that general logic did not 
provide sufficient conditions for formulating a framework for 
cognition (for that transcendental logic is also required), he did think 
that it provided a necessary framework for thinking—therefore, by 
extension, it did provide necessary conditions for knowledge. 
Kant thought a “general” logical framework could be employed in 
discussions of noumena as well as other purely intellectual or rational 
objects, such as those posited by metaphysica specialis. Kant is 
therefore committed to saying nothing more, but nothing less, than 
that noumena are non-contradictory. Notice this amounts to saying 
the noumenal world does not tolerate contradictions; this itself seems 
an illegitimate positive claim. The ideas, however, are in principle 
forbade provision of intuitional content. Importantly, for Kant, the 
main reason such rational ideas could be “thought” is that they are 
not inherently “contradictory”: they are “problematic” (merely 
possible) concepts. Such thought entities, conceived of as noumenal, 
are not, however, subject to the categories. It would therefore be 
incorrect to say the transcendental ideas (which, when conceived of 
as objects, are noumenal) are subject to the same conditions as “the 
concept of an object in general”.2 This means that the only way to 
                                                 
1A290-292/B346-349. 
2Ostaric (2009, 158) is wrong to say the real possibility of things is to be 
considered as being applicable to noumena as well as phenomena. Kant is 
quite explicit about the real possibility of “things in general” as being not 
simply pure rational possibility (this is logical possibility, which is 
equivalent to non-contradictoriness), but rather categorial possibility. 
Ostaric is therefore caught in contradiction: If something cannot, qua 
noumenon, be given in intuition, it is useless to speculate what might be the 
case were it able to be given in intuition. This is equivalent to saying that, 
were numbers perceptual objects, were they able to exhibit perceptual 
properties like colour, they would be determinable with respect to 
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articulate the import of the transcendental ideas is to formulate them 
as principles that apply to “the concept of an object in general” (with 
categorial conditions), and then go on to apply the principles 
corresponding to them to possible experience (which has both 
categorial and spatio-temporal conditions). 
As we have seen, the “whole of possibility” premised by the PCD 
begins with Kant’s criterion of logical possibility (non-
contradictoriness), but once complete determination is envisaged as a 
task to be carried out, it must introduce the notion of “categorial 
possibility”: the intellectual conditions upon “the concept of an object 
in general”. Such modality is that minimal frame within which a 
rational agent operates, at least in theoretical enterprises,1 before 
they have applied the PCD to possible experience; the categories 
articulate transcendental-logical modality which will be found, upon 
reflection on appearances, to necessarily apply for “a possible 
empirical consciousness”.2 It is only once the PCD is applied in 
possible experience that spatio-temporal conditions are imposed, and 
therefore empirical concepts made possible. 
In his otherwise excellent account of Kant’s rational theology, 
Allen Wood conflates the conditions of objects of “reason alone” with 
those of “the concept of an object in general”.3 As we’ve just noted, 
the former is pure logical possibility (non-contradictoriness); the 
latter is logical plus categorial possibility (intellectual conditions of 
experience: the logical functions of judgment which make possible 
the categories along with the concepts of reflection). For Kant, the 
difference between the conditions of “an object in general” and “an 
object of possible experience” is that the latter is represented 
completely determinately, in intuition, under the conditions of 
sensibility. Crucially, the PCD expresses the task which reason 
demands to be fulfilled by the understanding in its making of 
judgments: seek out all possible marks which can found in objects; 
determine things by ascertaining whether a predicate can be applied 
to them or not.   
                                                                                                                            
determinate colour predicates, like “red”, and shape predicates, like 
“rectangular”. Such a supposition involves a category mistake. 
1 Yet cf. Longuenesse (2005c) for an account of how the categories 
feature in moral and practical judgments.  
2A310/B367. Cf. Kant’s reference to the categories here: “Through them 
alone is cognition, and determination of an object, possible…no a priori 
concepts of object precede them, from which they could be inferred.” 
3Wood (1978, 47). 
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The basic difference between “an object in general” and “an 
object of possible experience” is therefore that the former is 
determined as the latter: determination requires provision of 
sensible conditions in order to move from sheer transcendental-
logical possibility to empirically-real possibility (based on actuality, 
or the category of “reality” as corresponding to the presence of 
sensation, which is “the matter of appearances”).1 Within possible 
experience “possibility” then only has the following import: one can 
ask, given an object of possible experience (or event in possible 
experience), what can be said about future possibilities for it, in 
spatio-temporal terms. Observe this crucial remark from the 
Postulates of Empirical Thinking (following the B Edition Refutation 
of Idealism): 
 
It certainly looks as if one could increase the number of that which is 
possible beyond that of the actual since something must be added to 
the former to constitute the latter. But I do not acknowledge this 
addition to the possible. For that which would have to be added to the 
possible would be impossible. All that can be added to my 
understanding is something beyond agreement with the formal 
conditions of experience, namely connection with some perception or 
other; but whatever is connected with this in accordance with 
empirical laws is actual, even if it is not immediately perceived. 
 
Notice what this commits one to: statements about theoretical 
entities, such as natural laws and other unobserved posits which 
explain the observed, are to be regarded as statements about 
actuality, nor sheer possibility. This means that unobserved posits 
are to be regarded as much a part of actuality as observed 
phenomena (perceptibles). This is significant, since such a position is 
by no means metaphysically innocuous. Kant writes further: 
 
However, that another series of appearances in thoroughgoing 
[durchgängig] connection with that which is given to me in 
                                                 
1 Here one should recall Kant’s reference to “the transcendental object 
= X” in the A Deduction (A109), a section of chapter on phenomena and 
noumena common to both editions (A246-247/B303-304). See also A250-251: 
“the concept of an object…this transcendental object cannot even be 
separated from the sensible data, for then nothing would remain through 
which it would be thought. It is therefore no object of cognition in itself, but 
only the representation of appearances under the concept of an object in 
general, which is determinable through the manifold of those appearances.” 
Cf. ff. 
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perception, thus more than a single all-encompassing experience, is 
possible, cannot be inferred from that which is given, and even less 
without anything being given at all; for without matter nothing at all 
can be thought. That which is possible only under conditions that are 
themselves merely possible is not possible in all respects. But this is 
the way the question is taken when one wants to know whether the 
possibility of things extends further than experience can reach.1 
 
And in a footnote shortly following this discussion he adds: 
 
Through the actuality of a thing I certainly posit more than 
possibility, but not in the thing; for that can never contain more in 
actuality than what was contained in its complete possibility. But 
while possibility was merely a positing of a thing in relation to the 
understanding (to its empirical use), actuality is at the same time its 
connection with perception.2 
 
These remarks recommend that, if one were to connect Kant’s view 
with current debates about modality he would figure as a peculiar 
kind of “actualist”. 
In contrast to Kant, Hegel problematised such a “formal” (he does 
not say “general”) approach to accounting for rational objects of the 
kind just mentioned; he dramatically altered the distinction Kant 
drew between general and transcendental logic. For Hegel, 
something like general logic, so-called, was to be understood as the 
structure of the “abstract understanding”—the limited standpoint of 
finite thinking3 that holds fast to a set of categories without 
attempting to deduce the other categories upon which they might 
depend. Reason, on the other hand, was understood by Hegel 
primarily as a negative force that demonstrated the emptiness and 
moreover, contradictoriness, of the understanding’s general logical 
                                                 
1A231-232/B284. 
2A234-235/B287. 
3 More usually, Hegel’s criticisms are directed at “formalism”, rather 
than “general logic”, where the latter is Kant’s terminology. The point 
appears to be the same however, since Hegel’s attacks on “formalism” are 
usually directed at Kant’s views about reason (thus his views of general 
logic). For present purposes “formalism” can be read as a valorisation of a 
certain standpoint from either the Phenomenology of the Logic taken in 
abstraction from its dialectical position. Of course, “Absolute Spirit” and 
the “Absolute Idea” are to be accorded special, teleologically privileged 
positions, yet this position is unintelligible when considered in exclusion of 
the rest of those works. 
224 
Chapter Three: The Principle of Complete Determination 
structure by explicating the other categorial forms upon which it 
depended—which its basic categories presupposed.  
For Hegel, reason thus has a dialectical logical structure which 
itself determines the understanding and demonstrates every set of 
categories (which are at the same time phenomenal appearances of 
actuality) to be self-contradictory. At this level, Hegel’s criticism of 
Kant is simply that it is no problem that reason generates 
contradictions, because reality itself is, after all, contradictory.1 
Hegel would therefore dismiss as superficial Kant’s rationalist appeal 
to a sheer “logical” sense of possibility, grounded in non-
contradictoriness, in order to justify the pragmatic employment of 
the ideas of metaphysica specialis. Hegel’s reworking of Kant’s 
program in the Science of Logic omits any talk of transcendental 
ideas; indeed Hegel says this explicitly: 
 
The objective logic thus takes the place rather of the former 
metaphysics which was supposed to be the scientific edifice of the 
world as constructed by thoughts alone. – If we look at the final shape 
in the elaboration of this science, then it is ontology which objective 
logic most directly replaces in the first instance, that is, that part of 
metaphysics intended to investigate the nature of ens in general (and 
ens comprises within itself both being and essence, a distinction for 
which the German language has fortunately preserved different 
expressions). 
 
And follows with a remark about metaphysica specialis: 
 
But further, objective logic also comprises the rest of metaphysics in 
so far as this attempted to comprehend with the forms of pure 
thought particular substrata taken primarily from figurate 
conception, namely the soul, the world, and God; and the 
determinations of thought constituted what was essential in the mode 
of consideration. Logic, however, considers these forms free from 
those substrata, from the subjects of figurate conception; it considers 
them, their nature and worth, in their own proper character. Former 
metaphysics omitted to do this and consequently incurred the just 
reproach of having employed these forms uncritically without a 
preliminary investigation as to whether and how they were capable of 
being determinations of the thing-in-itself, to use the Kantian 
expression—or rather of the Reasonable. Objective logic is therefore 
the genuine critique of them—a critique which does not consider 
them as contrasted under the abstract forms of the a priori and the a 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, "Remark 3. The Law of Contradiction", esp. 442). 
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posteriori, but considers the determinations themselves according to 
their specific content.1 
 
We can represent Kant’s and Hegel’s views graphically: 
 
 
 
Structured by General Logic 
  Reason  
Kant  Structured by Transcendental Logic, systematised and unified by Reason 
  Sensibility——————————————————Understanding 
  (Sensible conditions      (Intellectual conditions 
on knowledge)      on knowledge) 
 
 
All relations structured by the Negative, Dialectical Logic of Reason 
  The Understanding (truth-functional structure of propositions) 
            ^ 
Hegel ^~>>>Perception (term-logical structure of objects w/ 
properties) 
          ^ 
               ^~>>>Sense-Certainty (pure immediacy) 
 
 
 
To see how these differences over metaphysics pan out we observe 
Kant’s explanation of his second principle, the PCD: 
 
Every thing, however, as to its possibility, further stands under the 
principle of complete determination; according to which, among all 
possible predicates of things, insofar as they are compared with their 
opposites, one must apply to it. This does not rest merely on the 
principle of contradiction, for besides considering every thing in 
relation to two contradictorily conflicting predicates, it considers 
every thing further in relation to the whole of possibility, as the sum 
total of all predicates of things in general; and by presupposing that 
as a condition a priori, it represents every thing as deriving its own 
possibility from the share it has in that whole possibility.2 
 
Notice Kant identifies “the whole of possibility” with “the sum total 
of all predicates of things in general”. We’ve just noted that Kant 
thinks that not only the principle of contradiction applies to the 
“concept of a thing in general”, but the categories also. And he thinks 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 63-64). 
2A571-572/B599-600. The italicisation is mine; the boldface exists in the 
translation. 
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the categories are the only concepts that apply to the “concept of a 
thing in general” (clearly no empirical concepts could apply!). 
This suggests that “the whole of possibility” must be understood 
as being the kind of possibility constrained by the intellectual 
conditions of possible experience given in the Analytic. Only once an 
object is actually experienced can it be said to be known 
determinately—qua presented in intuition—and only then can it be 
said to have sensible conditions (since only then is it known). This 
renders a further consequence. 
It seems that for Kant “the whole of possibility” is equivalent to 
“the possibilities permitted by transcendental logic”: “the sum-total 
of all predicates of things in general”.1The availability of things that 
are part of “the whole of actuality”—the empirically real world 
presented piecemeal—qua presented in intuition, is constrained by 
its pure form (space and time). Recall the remark I cited above from 
the Postulates of Empirical Thinking: Kant thinks of possibility is 
being part of actuality, as encountered in possible experience. The 
articulation of the content of “the whole of actuality” is sought in the 
distributive use of the understanding in experience, where the 
complete determination of individual empirical things and their 
interconnection is guided by the PCD.2 It is by this process that the 
empirical content of parts of the “whole of actuality” are given (the 
discursive understanding reasons from the part to the whole, 
whereas the intuitive understanding knows the parts by way of 
knowing the whole). 
We should note at this point an affinity between the PCD and 
another so-called law of thought: “the principle of sufficient reason” 
(PSR), and the corresponding idea that for every thing, idea, or 
concept there is some explanation for it. With his PCD Kant commits 
himself to the idea that, at least in principle, empirical reality is 
determinable objectively with respect to transcendental-logical 
predicates, and subjectively in terms of possible empirical concepts 
which will turn out to be not only spatio-temporal, but also, if 
translatable into objective terms, conditioned by the logical functions 
                                                 
1 Cf. Longuenesse (1995/2005, 227). Cf. the reflexion cited at 228-229. 
2 Note here the complementarity between the complete determination 
of things in judgment and the postulation of empirical laws which provide 
the idea of a completely determine world of sense: in the former one finds 
objects for objects (determinative specification) and in the latter one finds 
concepts for objects (reflective classification). Part of Kant’s project in the 
3rd Critique is to show that these dimensions cannot be cleanly separated. 
227 
II.i ~ Kant’s Kind of Modality 
of judgment insofar as such concepts occur in possible empirical 
judgments.   
I take it that a properly transcendental reading of Kant’s PCD is 
effectively equivalent to a sound empirical employment of the PSR: 
both claim that experience can be rendered intelligible to thinking 
subjects and discoursed about in a way that respects the conditions 
of a subjective viewpoint. That is to say, a sound application of these 
principles resists The Metaphysical Urge and is happy instead to 
construct a conceptual frame that offers conditional explanations of 
empirical phenomena while avoiding ontological profligacy.1 
We should now say a little more about Kant’s view of the form of 
the whole of possibility. It can be viewed in two ways: The real use of 
reason provides the transcendental idea of the ens realissimum, 
which is conceived as a regulative ideal for the complete 
determination of things, where it is supposed that the “most real 
being” contains in full perfection all predicates applicable to the 
world of sense. Meanwhile, the formal use of reason, in positing the 
idea of the ens realissimum as a guide, allows the “whole of 
possibility” to be represented as the distributive unity2 of judgments 
which together comprise objective experience proper. 
This latter claim requires two qualifications: (1) Such a 
distributive unity is to be envisaged as that achieved by a collective, 
not a merely a singular judging subject, where assent to only the 
latter would commit Kant to a solipsism at odds with his thought; (2) 
Whilst such a distributive unity of judgments is properly thought of 
as “the whole of actuality”, we are to recall that for Kant, possibility 
                                                 
1Longuenesse (2005a, 118) notes Kant (1992b) “distinguishes at least 
four types of reason, and therefore four specifications of the corresponding 
principle”: (1) ratio essendi(reason for being, that is, reason for the essential 
determinations of a thing), (2) ratio fiendi(reason for the coming to be of a 
thing’s determinations), (3) ratio existendi(reason for the existence of a 
thing), (4) ratio cognoscendi(reason for our knowing that a thing is thus and 
so)”. 
In her essay, however, Longuenesse claims the PSR manifests itself in 
Kant’s Critical Philosophy simply as a “proof of the causal principle” (118). I 
therefore recommend that the PCD is a more fundamental and complete 
realisation of the PSR insofar as one can determine objects in a way not 
strictly confined to their causal relations, as instanced in the hypothetical 
function of judgment, since the categories of relation are one of four 
families of three concepts (cf. quantity, quality, and modality). I do not 
think one finds this position articulated explicitly in Kant, although it 
follows from the reading I am offering. 
2A582/B610. 
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in the world of sense can only be derived from actuality. This is 
because possibility itself is not manifest empirically, but can only be 
inferred on the basis of what is given empirically.1 
This formal use of reason is the only way in which reason provides 
knowledge proper: by guiding the understanding’s capacity to judge 
in order to create a systematic, unified picture of the whole of 
possibility in its guise as that of the world of sense.      
Note at this point the symmetry between the Transcendental 
Ideal (the ens realissimum) as ground of the PCD, and the three 
ideas of metaphysica specialis as respective grounds of the principles 
for transcendental psychology, cosmology, and theology, 
respectively. Given that the critically reduced version of the ens 
realissimum is the ground of the complete determination of things in 
the world of sense; that it is the master concept of transcendental 
theology means that for Kant, therefore, “God” is the master concept 
of his idealist logic. Thus, explication of transcendental theology is 
for Kant the highest task of such logic. Note also that the real use of 
reason is the source of all four2 of these grounds, and the formal use 
                                                 
1 Cf. Sellars’s denunciation of modal realism in (1952/1991, 290-297, esp. 
294): “The possible worlds of many neo-Leibnizian  treatments of logic are 
actually what we have called possible states of one and the same world.” Cf. 
also Leech (2010) for a recent evaluation of the scanty literature on Kant’s 
views about modality, as well as a presentation of her own view. In various 
places (A74-76/B99-101, A219/B266, A234-235/B/287) Kant says explicitly 
that, for him, modal judgments express the relation of a cognition to the 
cognitive faculty of the subject making the judgment. This is clearly a way 
of saying that for Kant modality is inherently epistemic, and in any case has 
transcendental conditions. 
2 The imagery of an anthropomorphic “God” is the “personified” version 
of the ens realissimum, which is itself a transformation of the 
omnitudorealitatis. It is not entirely clear what name Kant uses to describe 
the transformation of the ensrealissimuminto the omnitudorealitatis. 
For its part, the omnitudorealitatisis also a “hypostatised” instance of 
the activity of the understanding in experience: a transformation of the 
“distributive unity” of such use, into a “collective whole” of experience. Cf. 
Kant’s remarks about these transitions at A582-3/B610-1. There seems to 
be inconsistency between the tripartite transition in the * note and the text 
above it. This apparent ambiguity stems from the fact that Kant suggests 
there is a transformation of the omnitudorealitatis (“sum total of all 
reality”) to a concept of it as “an individual thing containing in itself all 
empirical reality”. The ens realissimum is posited when the concept of the 
omnitudorealitatis as an “individual thing” is “confused with the concept of 
a thing that stands at the summit of the possibility of all things, providing 
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of reason is the activity which employs the ground as a principle for 
systematic unification of the world of sense. 
Before proceeding any further, some additional remarks about 
the original rationalist version of the PCD and its connection with 
Kant’s critical version are in order. Firstly, in The Amphiboly, Kant 
provides a basis for what he later calls the PCD by denouncing a 
purely rationalist conception of determination:  
 
The intellectualist philosopher could not bear it that form should 
precede the things and determine their possibility; a quite 
appropriate criticism, if he assumed that we intuit things as they are 
(though with confused representation). But since sensible intuition is 
an entirely peculiar subjective condition, which grounds all 
perception a priori, and the form of which is original, thus the form is 
given for itself alone, and so far is it from being the case that the 
matter (or the things themselves, which appear) ought to be the 
ground (as one would have to judge according to mere concepts), that 
rather their possibility presupposes a formal intuition (of space and 
time) as given.1 
 
Kant is here criticising Leibniz’s monadic conception of substances as 
thinkable “in themselves” by a divine intelligence on the grounds of 
their containing within themselves their complete conceptual 
determinations.2 Kant instead insists that conceptual determination 
is performed by a subject who is bound also by subjective conditions 
of sensibility, which place spatio-temporal conditions on the 
conceptual determination of substances. (The account of the concept 
of “matter” demonstrates the level of generality he was after: 
entirely non-empirical.) The idea of a complete conceptual 
determination of things outside the conditions of sensibility is 
misguided not only for us, but in general: Kant takes himself to 
debunk the traditional conception of a “divine intelligence” 
supposedly capable of determining reality this way. We can connect 
                                                                                                                            
the real conditions for their complete determination.” (A583/B611; 
translation modified) 
In the * note Kant goes on to talk of “realisation” and “hypostatisation” 
of the ens realissimum, but this now makes his explanation of the above-
mentioned transition sound odd. It seems Kant thinks there are simply 
several similar transitions that occur here; he has not given an 
unambiguous name for each.    
1A267-268/B323-324. Cf. what Kant says about the “formal intuition” of 
space and time in the B Deduction at §26 in the * note. 
2Leibniz (1902/1991). 
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this point with the famous * footnote in the B Deduction at B160-161, 
thanks to an editorial addition: 
 
Inserted in Kant’s copy of the first edition: “The thoroughgoing 
[durchgängig] determination as principle [Princip] is grounded on the 
unity of consciousness: existence determined in space and time. 
Hence in noumena the highest reality contains the matter and the 
form contains the perfection. The formale is the best.” {E CXLIX, p. 
45; 23:37)1 
 
Note here that the “form” which “contains the perfection”, is indeed 
God. Here we first should ask: “What is grounding?”, and indeed, 
such a question would be timely, given the recent interest in the 
topic. Here it seems clear that to say the PCD is grounded on the 
“unity of consciousness”, which is “existence determined in space and 
time”, should be taken to mean the singular framework of 
knowledge, the “set of sensible and transcendental conditions” qua 
“concept of an object of possible experience”, because the “unity of 
consciousness” is that which finds its satisfaction in the thought of an 
object, which is itself a unification of the manifold of sense.  
Thus the idea of a fully-determined object depends on the 
presumption of the conditions of complete judgmental determination, 
and this seems fair and consistent with Kant’s view. The restriction 
on knowledge of “the One” does, however, demand an open future of 
possible empirical predicates, and this seems to be one of the 
consequences of Kant’s nominalism, in its form as a restriction on 
knowledge about empirical content. One does not know the “world of 
sense” as a “collective unity”.  
In this remark above, Kant is effectively telling us that his 
conception of “thoroughgoing” or “complete determination”, later 
discussed in the Transcendental Ideal under the guise of the PCD, is 
limited to “existence determined in space and time”; that is, to the 
conditions of possible experience as defended in the Aesthetic and 
the Analytic. On this basis, the “whole of possibility” of which he 
speaks should be understood as “the whole of possible experience” 
because “existence determined in space and time” necessarily 
involves the categories and therefore the intellectual conditions of 
possible experience as well as the sensible.  
In the B Deduction, Kant speaks of the “comprehension of the 
manifold given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an 
intuitive representation” as the “formal intuition” that “gives unity 
                                                 
1Kant (1998, 370 n.A). The interpolation of “durchgängig” is mine. 
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to the representation”1 that, in the A Deduction, was explained as 
involving the “synthesis of apprehension”.2 The contrast between 
comprehension and apprehension is crucial: In the former case Kant 
is speaking of what is given in experience as available to the 
understanding, whereas in the latter case he is speaking of the same 
thing in its guise as sensible. We should not see any conflict here; 
Kant is simply speaking of our experience in two different ways. We 
should not think that “conceptual stamping” of a “formless given” is 
the appropriate imagery; rather, we should see Kant as insisting on 
two distinct conditions of cognition: the receptivity of sensibility and 
the spontaneity of the understanding.  
Why is this relevant here? The point is that when Kant speaks of 
“formal intuition” at B160 he is conceiving of the form of our 
experience as sensible but also intellectual: he is employing a turn of 
phrase that makes it clear we can only determine “things” under the 
sensible and intellectual conditions of possible experience. Therefore, 
that the rationalist’s talk of “complete determination” errs insofar as 
it ignores the sensible conditions of the possibility of the 
determination of things (rather than the mere determinability of 
concepts). 
It is useful to recall in this context Kant’s discussion of “inner” 
and “outer” as concepts of reflection in The Amphiboly. In that 
crucial section, Kant insists that not simply can things only be 
determined in space, but also only in virtue of the relations which 
they bear to other things in space: 
 
The inner determinations of a substantia phaenomenon in space…are 
nothing but relations, and it is itself entirely a sum of mere relations. 
We know substances in space only through the forces that are 
efficacious in it, whether in drawing others to it (attraction) or in 
preventing penetration of it (repulsion and impenetrability); we are 
not acquainted with other properties constituting the concept of the 
substance that appears in space and which we call matter.3 
 
Kant is here rejecting Leibniz’s recommendation that monads have 
inner determinations whose coherence with the rest of the universe 
is granted simply by the pre-established harmony bestowed upon the 
world by God. (Kant’s discussion of the other three pairs of concepts 
of reflection—“identity” and “difference”, “agreement” and 
                                                 
1B160, n.*. 
2A98-100. 
3A265/B321. 
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“opposition”, and “matter” and “form”—also serve to establish his 
case against Leibniz’s account of both space and conceptual 
determination.)  
Longuenesse agrees with this assessment of The Amphiboly: 
 
the point of the Amphiboly chapter is to show that Leibniz confused 
logical reflection or comparison, as I just characterized it (comparison 
of concepts to form judgments, whatever the origin of those 
concepts), with a comparison of objects. Leibniz thought that at least 
for an infinite understanding, things could be known by concepts 
alone, and therefore, the concepts or rules for comparison of concepts 
could be understood as concepts or rules for comparison of things.1 
 
So Leibniz thought of complete determination as something only 
possible for a divine intelligence; that is, one capable of knowing what 
Kant called “things-in-themselves” in purely conceptual terms to a 
maximally determinate extent. And this is because Leibniz regarded 
human knowledge and Godly knowledge to simply differ in degree, 
rather than kind.  
In fact, if Kant is seen as committed to a critically-reduced 
conception of the ens realissimum, he would appear to agree to these 
terms, but not their metaphysical import. This is because the idea of 
“God”, qua critically reduced ens realissimum, can only have the 
transcendental function of being the ground of the PCD: one can only 
understand what complete determination would involve by applying 
the PCD to possible experience, and therefore by understanding 
completely determinate knowledge as a completely determinate 
knowledge of the world of sense. Aiming for completely determinate 
knowledge of a thing is an epistemological or semantical task and not 
an end of inquiry one arrives at. In application of the PCD the ens 
realissimum is the ground of such complete determination and only 
comprehensible with respect to it.2 This would mean that knowledge 
of a completely determined world of sense is Kant’s critically-
reduced substitute for Leibniz’s conception of Godly knowledge: 
expressed with his idea of the characteristica universalis. 
                                                 
1Longuenesse (1995/2007, 225). Cf. Longuenesse (1998, Chapter 6) 
where she discusses the role of the capacity to judge in generating 
“concepts of reflection” or, equivalently, “concepts of comparison” see 
Longuenesse (1998, 131). 
2 I am here using “comprehension” in Kant’s technical sense 
(A311/B368): reason allows us to “comprehend” reality as a systematic, 
unified nature through the principles followed in formal uses of reason. 
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Moreover, Kant’s notion of a PCD seems to be a critical reduction 
of Leibniz’s PSR: one should expect explanations, reasons or 
“complete determinations” of things to always be possible tasks to 
take on, but ultimately unfulfillable demands to satisfy; such is a 
consequence of our receptive, sensible intuition. Although he never 
says so, Kant is committed to saying that Leibniz’s conception of a 
completely determinate monad is something we posit as an ideal to 
be sought in our attempts to gain systematic, unified rational 
knowledge of nature; a Leibnizian monad seems to be the idea of a 
completely determinate thing as posited by the PCD. 
Kant however insists upon the necessity of sensible conditions on 
knowledge, so his version of a completely determined world of sense 
appears to be an “All of reality” which contains all perspectival 
judgments that could be made about all things from all perspectives 
possible within experience. But this means “knowledge of God” is 
incoherent because it is meant to be aperspectival. That is, the idea 
that God, or an intellectual intuition that could know things as well 
everything taken together as a whole in a completely unconditioned 
manner, must be replaced by the idea that all that is available is a 
total set of conditioned representations, and this hardly amounts to 
either an unconditioned representation of each thing, or an 
unconditioned representation of “the whole”. 
Yet Kant nevertheless insists we need the idea of something 
purely rational that stands outside knowledge; since the PCD is 
unsatisfiable and the rationalist conception of the ens realissimum 
not an object of possible experience. After all, we cannot say what 
determinations would need to apply to the “world in itself”. Thus, 
Kant must rule out in advance not only that we can ever completely 
determine the world of sense (this is, rather, the “regulative ideal” of 
empirical science), but also, that transcendental idealism must retain 
a cognition-transcendent, rational idea of “God”, that serves as an 
“Other” to the “I think” of self-consciousness. 
As we will see in §IV, Hegel questions this Kantian move, at least 
in the sense that such an “Other” to self-consciousness is for Hegel 
contained in self-consciousness itself, and not external to it. This 
recalls our discussion from Chapter 2, §V.i. Indeed, Hegel should be 
seen as rejecting the idea that “God”, or “knowledge of God”, could 
coherently exclude points of view, or perspectives on the world. 
So far we have been concerned with the interpretation of the 
“matter” and “form” of thought that Kant rejects. Kant’s positive 
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account of “matter and form”1, qua concepts of reflection, in The 
Amphiboly provides further support for his contention that cognition 
is only possible given sensibly conditioned intuitions. Recall that for 
Kant only intuitions can provide fully determinate cognitions (even if 
thought under general concepts), since purely conceptual thinking 
could only ever be general.2 This point is crucial. 
This point should be connected with a remark on the idea of a 
determining consciousness, whose structure Kant attempts to detail 
in the B Deduction: 
 
The I think expresses the act of determining my existence. The 
existence is thereby already given, but the way in which I am to 
determine it, i.e., the manifold that I am to posit in myself as 
belonging to it, is not yet thereby given. For that self-intuition is 
required, which is grounded in an a priori given form, i.e., time, which 
is sensible and belongs to the receptivity of the determinable. Now I 
do not yet have another self-intuition, which would give the 
determining in me, of the spontaneity of which alone I am conscious, 
even before the act of determination, in the same way as time gives 
that which is to be determined, thus I cannot determine my existence 
as that of a self-active being, rather I merely represent the 
spontaneity of my thought, i.e., of the determining, and my existence 
always remains only sensibly determinable, i.e., determinable as the 
existence of an appearance. Yet this spontaneity is the reason I call 
myself an intelligence.3 
 
Kant is here clearly endorsing the idea here that the determination 
of the sensibly determinable does not include, as its corollary, a “self-
intuition” that is somehow “given”. This anticipates his rejection of 
the soul of rational psychology in the Paralogisms.4 We should 
understand the claim here to be connected with his rejection of a 
“given” whole of possibility, even qua “world of sense”; we only 
encounter the world of sense piecemeal. It is useful to attend to 
Kant’s expression of the point in the Analytic because it drives home 
the continuity of Kant’s thought across the Critique as a whole: the 
                                                 
1A266-268/B322-324. 
2 It is striking how the capacity for the kind of endless conceptual 
determination possible in aesthetic judgment depends upon this fact about 
the determination of singular intuitions by particular instantiations of 
universal concepts. The analytical tradition is all the poorer for not 
recognising this basic contrast that was so important for German Idealism. 
3B157-158. 
4 See Ameriks (2000, see esp. Chs. II "Immateriality" and IV "Identity"). 
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overall coherence of the understanding’s capacity to judge depends 
upon the regulative employment of the three ideas of metaphysica 
specialis.  
One can feel suspicious about this claim because Kant typically 
insists that transcendental conditions have their origin in sensibility 
and the understanding. As we noted in Chapter 2, §II.ii, this claim is 
ambiguous. It is at least clear that, by Kant’s own lights, insofar as 
reason brings unity to the understanding’s activity the former ought 
to be recognised as conditioning the latter.1 
By connecting these themes with Kant’s explanation of his view of 
“real” and “logical” possibility from The Ideal of Pure Reason, we are 
able to see that the PCD is correlated with the former, and the PD is 
correlated with the latter. The Leibnizian rationalist’s error is to 
mistake the idea of logical possibility entailed by the PD with the 
real possibility of things, the discovery of which is presupposed as a 
task in the insistence upon there begin such a thing as the PCD. 
Therefore, it can be said that Kant’s reformulation of the rationalist 
conception of a “completely determinate object” (for Kant, “the 
concept of an object of possible experience”) involves the coupling of 
conceptual conditions (the logical functions of judgment, from which 
flow the concepts of reflection and the categories) with sensible ones 
(space and time). 
                                                 
1 See Grier (1997) on the tension between Kant’s apparently conflicting 
attitudes to transcendental ideas. She identifies the tension as that 
between a reading that sees the transcendental ideas “transcendental” 
(objective) or “merely ‘methodological or heuristic’” (subjective) (2). I take 
it that Kant simply uses “subjective” and “objective” in two different ways: 
“subjective” can be interpreted as “relative to a subjective knower” but 
also as “non-veridical”; “objective” can be interpreted as “satisfying the 
conditions of knowledge claims” or as “not relative to a subjective knower”. 
And, further, a principle can be relative to (the interests of) a subjective 
knower, yet also satisfy the conditions for an objective knowledge claim. 
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II.ii Transcendental idealism without transcendental theology? 
 
We must consider a caveat at this point. Longuenesse notes correctly 
that 
 
the logical form of complete determination has to be jointly grounded 
in the forms of both infinite and disjunctive judgments.1 
 
Further, such a process of determination must be thought of as 
performed by oneself (and communicable to others; therefore as a 
process conceivably performed by others); the process thus depends 
upon Kant’s theory of self-consciousness. This reading is a sound one, 
although her motivations for insisting on the inessential role of the 
idea of the ens realissimum in the context of Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy can be questioned. In fact, the connections she rightly 
makes between the PCD and both The Amphiboly chapter of the 
first Critique and the First Introduction of the third can be read in a 
way that throws light on the idea of the ens realissimum and its place 
in Kant’s argument, rather than in a way that supports rejection of 
the idea itself. And this is due to the essential role the idea of “God” 
plays for Kant in reason’s achievement of systematic unity in both 
practical and theoretical contexts.  
Observe Kant’s statement of his position on this unity in the 
“Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason” (Book II of the Critique of 
Practical Reason):  
 
if pure reason of itself really can be and really is practical, as the 
consciousness of the moral law proves it to be, it is still only one and 
the same reason which, whether from a theoretical or practical 
perspective, judges2 according to a priori principles…in the union of 
pure speculative and pure practical reason in one cognition, the latter 
has primacy, assuming that this union is not contingent and 
discretionary but based a priori on reason itself and therefore 
necessary. For, without this subordination a conflict of reason with 
itself would arise, since if they were merely juxtaposed (coordinate), 
the first [speculative] would of itself close it boundaries strictly and 
admit nothing from the latter into its domain, whilst the latter 
                                                 
1Longuenesse (1995/2005, 217-218). 
2 Note the peculiarity of this claim: the understanding, not reason, is the 
capacity to judge (the faculty of judgment), whereas reason is the faculty of 
principles or the faculty of inferring. Of course, reason is the ground of 
synthetic a priori judgment (A11/B24).  
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[practical] would extend it boundaries over everything and, when its 
need required, would try to include the former within them.  
 
Kant then says:  
 
But one cannot require pure practical reason to be subordinated to 
speculative reason and so reverse the order, since all interest is 
ultimately practical and even that of speculative reason is only 
conditional and is complete in practical use alone.1 
 
Longuenesse thinks the inclusion of the ens realissimum as a highest 
idea applies in the theoretical case only because it applies in the 
practical; therefore that, in principle, it is not (or, ought not to be) 
required for the theoretical use of reason (our comments about the 
relation just made notwithstanding). Yet since Kant says that 
theoretical (or, speculative) employment of reason “is ultimately 
practical” and “only conditional and complete in practical use alone” 
such a claim, it seems, can be called into question; for the very idea of 
separate theoretical or speculative rational grounds would seem, 
given this admission, to be foreign to Kant’s thought. 
The point is that reason is unified even if it can be employed in 
either theoretical or practical contexts; this dissolves the idea that 
theoretical enterprises are influenced by independent practical 
principles. Rather, as Ostaric has suggested, the idea of the ens 
realissimum might simply only be able to be given an “adequate 
proof in the practical”.2 Indeed, a reflexion from the silent decade 
confirms that this was Kant’s view at one point, and given 
everything else he says there seems to be little reason to think he 
gave this view up. The reflexion runs: 
 
The need of reason to cognise a highest being is that of a necessary 
hypothesis of the employment of reason: 1. Of pure reason; 2. of 
empirical reason (both are speculative); of practical reason. (Later 
addition: Hence, 1. transcendental theology; 2. natural theology: 
cosmotheology, physicotheology; 3. moral theology. All of these are: 1. 
to determine the concept of the highest being; 2. to demonstrate its 
existence. All this cognition is a belief, as is always the case when we 
return to first causes. Transcendental theology alone is deistic; 
natural theology alone is anthropomorphic; moral theology alone is 
                                                 
1 See Kant (1996b, 5:107-148, 226-258). The quote is from 5:121, 237-238. 
The emphasis is mine. 
2Ostaric (2009, 155 & ff.). This phrase occurs at 157. 
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adequately secured against objections. Transcendental theology 
safeguards them.)1 
 
I will not attempt to fully develop a response to this idea; a schema 
for a response will have to suffice. I suggest that the theoretical and 
practical aspects of reason actually both need to be understood in two 
ways:2 
 
Theoretical:  
(i) As theoretical: God is not to be understood as an object of 
rational knowledge, where this would constitute a 
confusion of the role of the real use of reason. Rather, 
belief in a “first cause”, the idea of “God” and the ideal of 
the ens realissimum, is necessary (as Kant says in the 
quote above). 
(ii) As practical: God is a transcendental idea employed as the 
principle or “schema” for transcendental theology in the 
formal use of reason in syllogising. “God” is also the ground 
of the principle of complete determination: the ens 
realissimum. The “philosophical kernel” of the idea of 
“God”,3 the Transcendental Ideal of the ens realissimum, is 
to be understood as “the concept of an object of possible 
experience”, which makes possible all objective empirical 
knowledge. 
 
Practical:  
(i) As theoretical: “God” is conceived of as having a certain 
structure: the “most real being” (ens realissimum), “most 
perfect being” (ens perfectium), “being of beings” (ens 
entium), which depends on the results of the 1st Critique. 
Religion therefore serves to embed a certain theoretical 
dimension in the practical uses of reason. This is the 
essence of Kant’s moral theology. There is an essential 
connection between the idea of “God” as “the most real 
                                                 
1Kant (2005, R 4582, 1772-1775?, later addition: 1776-1778?, 17:601, 146). 
2 Something like this division seems to have been alluded to by Fichte 
(1982, I 472, 46), where he speaks about Kant’s treatment of The 
Categorical Imperative and the idea of intellectual intuition. 
3Allison (2004, 396). 
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being” as well as “morally perfect”. The “perfection” is 
construed by Kant as the “most real” and “the best”.1 
(ii) As practical: “God” is understood as the source of the 
moral law, where the commands of that law are heard “as-
if” uttered by the voice of God). (Recall Kant on conscience 
from Chapter 2, §VI.) 
 
I take this merely implicit structure in Kant’s theoretical and 
practical aspects of the idea of “God” to be made explicit in Hegel’s 
chapter on ‘The Absolute Idea” in the Science of Logic. There Hegel 
tells us: 
 
The absolute Idea has shown itself to be the identity of the 
theoretical and practical Idea. Each of these by itself is still one-sided, 
possessing the Idea only as a sought-for beyond and an unattained 
goal; each, therefore, is a synthesis of endeavour, and has, but equally 
has not, the Idea in it; each passes from one thought to the other 
without bringing the two together, and so remains fixed in their 
contradiction.2 
 
Now, note Longuenesse’s words in the closing paragraph of her 
paper: 
 
There remained the question: why is Kant so intent on asserting, 
again and again, the necessity of the idea [of the ens realissimum], the 
unavoidable illusion it carries, and even the positive, regulative role it 
plays in cognition? My suggestion is that none of this would be 
necessary unless Kant was intent on maintaining its role for practical 
reason. The unity of theoretical and practical reason is what drives 
the admissions of theoretical reason itself. Whether the practical 
grounds for endorsing the idea of ens realissimum are any stronger 
than the theoretical grounds, is a question I had no ambition to 
answer in this chapter.3 
                                                 
1 See the editorial edition in Kant (1998, 370, n.A): “Inserted in Kant’s 
copy of the first edition: “The thoroughgoing determination as principle 
[Princip] is grounded on the unity of consciousness: existence determined in 
space and time. Hence in noumena the highest reality contains the matter 
and the form contains the perfection. The formale is the best.” {E CXLIX, 
p. 45; 23:37) 
2Hegel (1969, 824). 
3Longuenesse (1995/2005, 235). See remarks at 233 also: “I do think that 
the Analytic, together with its Appendix, was sufficient to offer an account 
for systematicity which does away with the ontological illusion carried by 
the ideal of pure reason.” This comment expresses pessimism about Kant’s 
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Although Longuenesse could not be better situated to provide a 
reconstructive account of Kant that involves sorting the plausible 
from less than plausible theses, Kant’s talk about “God” and the 
three ideas we mentioned does not seem to be an accidental accretion 
of his thinking, but rather the touchstone of his philosophical 
approach as a whole.1Kant’s ties to the rationalist tradition should 
not be down-played, but rather understood in a more sympathetic 
fashion. 
As Ostaric has insisted, the push to the unconditioned is not 
simply a requirement of practical reason alone, but is “the need of 
reason as such.”2And “the unconditioned” appears in an 
anthropomorphic guise as “God” in both practical and theoretical 
contexts; therefore, as far as Kant is concerned, reason as such leads 
to a quite peculiar idea of “God”, in its role as a condition of the 
possibility of unified, systematised thinking. So not just moral 
cognition, but also teleological judgments about nature which occur 
in theoretical reason require this idea. Kant makes this point in the 
Jäsche Logic: 
 
One cannot provide objective reality for any theoretical idea, or prove 
it, except for the idea of freedom, because this is the condition of the 
moral law, whose reality is a maxim. The reality of the idea of God 
can only be proved by means of this idea, and hence only with a 
practical purpose, i.e., to act as if there is a God, and hence only for 
this purpose.3 
 
And in a paragraph immediately following this he writes, startlingly: 
 
In all sciences, above all in those of reason, the idea of the science is 
its universal abstract or outline, hence the extension of all the 
cognitions that belong to it. Such an idea of the whole – the first thing 
one has to look to in a science, and which one has to seek – is 
architectonic, as, e.g., the idea of jurisprudence. 
Most men lack the idea of humanity, the idea of a perfect republic, of 
a happy life, etc. Many men have no idea of what they want, hence 
they proceed according to instinct and authority. 
                                                                                                                            
Dialectic; I attempt to show how the ambitions expressed there might be 
better defended in an alternate theoretical and practical tenor.  
1Cf. Guyer (1990b, 33).  
2Ostaric (2009, 157). 
3Kant (1992a, 591). Here recall Kant’s statement regarding God, 
freedom, and immortality at B395.  
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Kant says explicitly that whilst the practical use of reason in moral 
contexts may indeed by the cause of the generation of the theistic 
concept of “God”, the theoretical use of reason nevertheless 
generates a deistic conception.1 So even if one accepts an in principle 
separation between these two uses, the idea of “God”, qua ens 
realissimum, is for Kant ineradicable. Moreover, the idea of “God” 
presupposed by practical uses of reason itself has a certain 
theoretical structure.2 This should in fact be unsurprising; after all, 
recall that the ens realissimum serves as the ground for a principle 
that acts as an epistemological injunction: “completely determine 
things one encounters in possible experience”. 
This task is itself practical; acts of judging are elements of 
theoretical inquiry which is itself a practice; practical uses of reason 
presuppose certain theoretical results just as theoretical uses of 
reason presuppose practical imperatives. 
Our conclusion is that rather than being chided for retaining a 
theoretical conception of “God” in transcendental theology, Kant 
ought to be rather chided for not providing an adequate account of 
the idea of “God” itself such that his “rational necessity” claim from 
the postulates in the Critique of Practical Reason regarding it could 
be interpreted charitably.  
It is easy to feel uneasy about insisting Kant was committed to an 
idea of “God” in theoretical uses of reason because everything else 
Kant says in his theoretical philosophy gives the impression that he 
thinks theological claims are to be cast aside as the relics of a bygone 
age of misguided metaphysical speculation. And yet, if one is to fully 
appreciate the nature of Kant’s systematic project, one must 
appreciate the extent to which his philosophy is, at bottom, a kind of 
transcendental theology. Against Longuenesse, there does not seem 
to be reason to think making Kant palatable requires one reject his 
philosophical theology. 
If one does so, one is left with but a shadow that is the other side 
of the limit he places on knowledge: negative noumena; the realm of 
the unconditioned. It is central to understanding Kant that one 
appreciates how he could have thought that confecting a “scientific 
metaphysics” that adumbrated “transcendental conditions of 
possibility” still required theological claims. Moreover, it is central to 
understanding Hegel’s reaction to Kant that one appreciates the 
                                                 
1Kant (1978, 30). 
2Wood (1978, 25) acknowledges this point. 
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former’s attempted correction of the latter, and therefore the 
relation of this criticism to the currently most prominent views. 
Another difficulty stems from the fact that Longuenesse claims 
the ens realissimum is to be thought of as something akin to the 
rational ideal of “the concept of an object of possible experience”.1It 
is clear that for Kant such a concept is determined negatively by the 
concept of “noumenon”; after all, “the concept of an object of possible 
experience” is equivalent to “phenomenon” (in the universal 
sense).And because both phenomena and noumena are each 
correlated with a certain conception of a knower, the kind of knower 
associated with each is dependent on the other. 
Kant’s ambitions to provide a critical version of the PCD become 
clearer in the remarks immediately following his explanation of it, 
where he reveals an important commitment of his idea of 
transcendental content, as mentioned in the Metaphysical Deduction:  
 
The principle of complete determination…deals with the content and 
not merely the logical form. It is the principle of the synthesis of all 
predicates which are to make up the complete concept of a thing, and 
not merely of the analytical representation, through one or two 
opposed predicates; and it contains a transcendental presupposition, 
namely, that of the material of all possibility, which is supposed to 
contain a priori the data for the particular possibility of every thing.2 
 
This remark can be compared with Kant’s famous account of the 
homologous structure of judgment and intuitional content: 
 
The same function that gives unity to the different representations in 
a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different 
representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called 
the pure concept of understanding. The same understanding, 
therefore, and indeed by means of the very same actions through 
which it brings the logical form of judgment into concepts by means 
of the analytical unity, also brings a transcendental content into its 
representations by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in 
intuition in general, on account of which they are called pure concepts 
of the understanding that pertain to objects a priori; this can never be 
accomplished by general logic.3 
 
                                                 
1Longuenesse (1995/2005, 218). 
2A572-573/B600-601; my emphasis. 
3A79/B104-105; my emphases. 
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The basic point is revealed here: Kant’s critical version of the PCD is 
an attempt to transform a rationalist principle that for Leibniz 
invited a confusion of the mere “logical reflection or comparison of 
concepts to form judgments”1 with “a comparison of objects”, into 
one that operates within the sensible (and intellectual) conditions of 
the possibility of experience. It is precisely this point about the 
cooperation between the sensible and intellectual transcendental 
conditions of experience (and therefore objects of experience) that is 
expressed in the Metaphysical Deduction’s account of the homology 
of intuitions and judgment. The question remaining is whether the 
sensible/intellectual bifurcation will do as it stands, if what Kant 
really wants to say is that they are both required if we are to have 
genuine cognition, as insisted upon in his most famous remark, in the 
Introduction to the Transcendental Logic: 
 
Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without 
understanding none would be thought. Thoughts without content are 
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.2 
 
From Hegel’s point of view, Kant’s retention of a distinction between 
“general logic” and “transcendental logic” evinces a residual 
rationalism inherited from Leibniz, and therefore indicates what 
might be objectionable about even his critically-reduced conception 
of the ens realissimum. 
In offering an exposition of the PCD we seek to establish the 
claim that Hegel has a more plausible theory of the structure of the 
rational determination of things, as well as concepts. If successful, 
this would have the consequence that both Kant’s conception of an 
“object of possible experience” as well as his idea of “God” stand to 
be reformulated in Hegelian terms. I suggest that Kant neglects the 
competing demands that different modes of thought place on their 
objects, and so fails to see that there is not only one “logical” mode or 
manner in which determination can occur.3 This basic Hegelian 
objection is the starting point for a dialectical exposition of the PCD. 
 
                                                 
1Longuenesse (1995/2005, 225). 
2A51/B75. 
3Horstmann (2006a) discusses this issue in connection with what he calls 
the “monistic ontology” of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Following Redding 
(2007a), I refer to this thesis as Hegel’s “cognitive contextualism”. 
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III Kant and Hegel on judgment 
 
An examination of Kant’s and Hegel’s respective views regarding (1), 
the nature of judgment in general, and (2), the significance of 
particular forms which it takes, serves to clarify the related idea of 
the “unity of the understanding”. And given that both Kant’s and 
Hegel’s conceptions of the “unity of the understanding” is intimately 
connected with their views about the “unity of reason”, the provision 
of a skeletal structure which connects these two ideas serves to 
explain what shape a Hegelian transformation of the critically-
reduced PCD in Kant would take, insofar as the PCD expresses a 
key task performed under the assumption of “the unity of a possible 
empirical consciousness” (the idea of a completely determined thing 
serves as a guide for unifying thoughts about individual things; thus 
for achieving unity in one’s thoughts).1 
Moreover, given that attention to Hegelian dialectical insights into 
the forms of judgment reveals what criticisms Hegel could have 
developed more explicitly in connection with Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy, taking this expository path allows for an outline of Kant’s 
and Hegel’s respective views of a “form of a system” to emerge.2 
This is crucial, because if one attends carefully to Hegel’s remarks 
in the introduction to Section Two of The Subjective Logic, 
“Objectivity”, we find him telling us how certain accounts of the 
“sum-total of all realities”, provided in The Doctrine of Being and 
The Doctrine of Essence, find their sequel in certain sections in The 
Doctrine of the Concept.3Key themes to keep one’s eye on here are 
found in Hegel’s discussions of “Teleology” and “Life”: Hegel’s 
reconstruction of the idea of a “sum total of all realities” in The 
                                                 
1 In the section entitled “The regulative principle of pure reason in 
regard to the cosmological ideas” (which discusses, amongst other things, 
the regulative function of the transcendental idea of the “world-whole”), 
Kant says: “in order to determine the sense of this rule of pure reason 
appropriately, it must first be noted that it cannot say what the object is, 
but only how the empirical regress is to be instituted so as to attain to the 
complete concept of the object.” (A509-5110/B537-538) 
2 Cf. the First Introduction to Kant (2000, esp. IV and V). 
3 Hegel refers to the discussion of “Quality” in (b) of Section One, 
Chapter Two of the Doctrine of Being: “Determinate Being” (111-114, esp. 
112). Hegel also refers to “Remark 3: The Law of Contradiction”, in Section 
One, Chapter Two of the Doctrine of Essence, where he discusses 
“Contradiction” (see 431-443, esp. 442). Hegel refers to these passages at 
(1969, 705). 
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Subjective Logic involves a radical transformation of Kant’s views 
about self-consciousness as adumbrated in the Transcendental 
Deduction (with respect to the concept of the “I”),as well as Kant’s 
views regarding an intuitive understanding found in the 3rd Critique 
(with regard, therefore, to the concept of “God”). Kant’s Dialectic of 
Teleological Judgment has a successor in Hegel’s chapters on 
“Mechanism” and “Teleology” in the “Objectivity” section of the 
Doctrine of the Concept, and his account of self-consciousness is 
radicalised by Hegel in Chapter IV of the Phenomenology where its 
emergence is connected with “Life”, which is also the title of Chapter 
One, Section Three of The Subjective Logic.1 
We cannot account for these complexities presently, and our 
purpose is in any case to offer as much as is minimally necessary to 
explain the role of infinite and disjunctive judgment in the formation 
of a system of rational knowledge; nevertheless, a brief remark is 
necessary.  
In the Doctrine of Being Hegel’s reference to the idea of a “sum 
total of all realities” occurs within a discussion of “reality” and 
“negation”; there it is impressed upon us that the idea of a “sum total 
of all realities” cannot be construed as purely positive. This point is 
structurally similar to the point made in the earlier chapter on 
“Being”: the concepts of “reality” and “negation” are, in the chapter 
on “Determinate Being”, the descendants of “being” and “nothing”. 
Hegel’s point in this part of the Doctrine of Being is that such an idea 
of a “sum total of all realities” cannot exclude negation.2 He makes 
the same point in the Doctrine of Essence in his discussion of 
contradiction and one supposes the account offered in the Doctrine of 
                                                 
1 A reading similar to mine is suggested in Pinkard (2002, 261, n.33): “If 
the existence of God were to be proven, it would [for Hegel] have to be a 
matter of showing that the concept of God is itself a further commitment 
necessary to sustain all our other logical commitments and not some kind of 
deduction of necessary predicates of some entity…although Kant had 
thought he had shown that the concept of God could not be a condition of 
the possibility of cognitive experience – although it might well be a 
practical presupposition of morality – Hegel thinks that something like his 
very unorthodox conception of God could in fact be shown to be a 
commitment that one implicitly undertakes when thinking about ‘being’ in 
general.” Further, that “the Logic is conceived to be about the norms of 
judgment and how those norms are themselves to be generated out of what 
is necessary for our own mentality to be possible, that is, out of the Idea 
itself (as the space of reasons).” (262) 
2 At (1969, 665) Hegel speaks of “God, freedom, right and duty, the 
infinite, unconditioned, supersensuous” as being “only negative objects”. 
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the Concept will therefore be the same again, yet taken from the 
standpoint of the unity of these two ideas. This theme is developed 
below in our discussion of infinite judgment. 
Given our task of explaining Hegel’s critique of Kant’s account of 
the “unity” of the understanding and reason, and their relation, we 
begin by turning to a passage where Hegel speaks critically of Kant 
(albeit implicitly): 
 
In conformity with the…interpretation of the syllogism as the form of 
what is rational, reason itself has been defined as the faculty of 
syllogising, while the understanding, in contrast, has been defined as 
the faculty of forming concepts. Quite apart from the underlying 
superficial representation of the spirit as a mere ensemble of forces or 
faculties subsisting side by side, there is this to be said about the 
association of the understanding with the concept and of reason with 
the syllogism: that we ought not to regard the Concept as a mere 
determination of the understanding any more than we ought to 
regard the syllogism as rational without qualification. For, on the one 
hand, what is usually dealt with in formal logic as the doctrine of the 
syllogism is nothing but the simple syllogism of the understanding. It 
does not deserve the honour of counting as the form of the rational, of 
counting indeed as what is rational purely and simply. Nor yet, on the 
other hand, is the Concept as such just a mere form of the 
understanding. On the contrary, it is only the abstractive 
understanding that depreciates the concept in this way.1 
 
An interpretation of what Hegel means by “the Concept” will be 
offered in §IV. For now, note that Hegel’s main complaint, and 
                                                 
1Hegel (1991b, §182, Addition). Cf. Hegel (1971, §467, Zusatz) for his 
remarks on Kant’s distinction between “the understanding” and “reason”: 
“Prior to Kant, no distinction had been made between Understanding and 
Reason. But unless one wants to sink to the level of the vulgar 
consciousness which crudely obliterates the distinct forms of pure thought, 
the following distinction must be firmly established between 
Understanding and Reason: that for the latter, the object is determined in 
and for itself, is the identity of content and form, of universal and 
particular, whereas for the former it falls apart into form and content, into 
universal and particular, and into an empty ‘in-itself’ to which the 
determinateness is added from the outside; that, therefore, in the thinking 
of the Understanding, the content is indifferent to its form, while in the 
comprehensive thinking of Reason the content produces its form from 
itself.” This distinction clearly applies also to judgment and syllogistic 
inference, respectively; it gives a clue as to why Hegel would refer to the 
syllogism as the “truth” of the judgment Hegel (1969, 664). 
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therefore of the relation between reason and the understanding, is 
with the idea of concepts as mere “universal and reflected 
representations”; for Hegel, the paradigm of a concept, one whose 
essence entails its existence, is the “I”; Hegel’s objection to Kant’s 
account of concepts is part of his critique of Kant’s “formal” and 
“subjective” account of the “I think” of self-consciousness. Hegel’s 
basic point is that to conceive of a concept as a mere subjective 
“function” is to undermine the purpose which concepts are to serve: 
they are meant to articulate more than a merely subjective take on 
reality. And yet we should remind ourselves that Hegel nevertheless 
holds a fallibilist position in both semantic and epistemic senses (this 
was discussed in Chapter 2, §III). 
Hegel offers an important programmatic statement at the 
beginning of “The Syllogism” in the Science of Logic: 
 
The understanding is regarded as the faculty of the determinate 
Concept which is held fast in isolation by abstraction and the form of 
universality. But in reason the determinate Concepts are posited in 
their totality and unity.1 
 
The insistence that the understanding and its determinate concepts 
are not independent of reason gives a clue as to how one should 
interpret the significance of infinite judgment: Hegel’s discussion 
there constitutes an attempt to show how positive and negative 
judgments are not independent, but rather, find their sequels in the 
two sides of infinite judgment. And it is the rational connection 
between these moments that is the key: at the level of a finite 
understanding’s judgings, positivity and negativity can seem to 
independent moments, yet as Hegel argues, they turn out to be far 
more complex than this.  
Immediately following the above-cited remark Hegel complains 
that the connection between what Kant called the “real” and 
“formal” uses of reason has never been satisfactorily explained. 
Hegel is adamant that the syllogism itself is “the rational”; thus, for 
Hegel, it is both the “form” and “content” of a system; thus “reason 
as syllogiser” (for Kant, “formal”) and “reason as lawgiver”2 (for 
Kant, “real”) signal two sides of one phenomenon.  
We here take a clue from Longuenesse as to how Hegel’s critique 
of Kant’s account of judgment may reveal something general about 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 664).  
2 Cf. the discussion of this theme in Hegel (1977b, Chapter V, C., (b) 
"Reason as lawgiver" and (c) "Reason as testing laws"). 
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their positions; she proposes to show “that in Hegel’s transformation 
of Kant’s conception of judgment, the move from Kant’s dualism to 
what we might call, with some precaution, Hegel’s ‘monism’ stands 
out with particular clarity.”1And further, that despite the 
 
shift in Hegel’s treatment of judgment from Faith and Knowledge to 
the Science of Logic, the explanations given in Faith and Knowledge 
are still helpful to understand the status Hegel assigns to judgment 
in the Science of Logic: for him, judgment is a mode of being itself 
rather than a mere psychological process, or rather the latter is the 
manifestation of the former for a finite consciousness.2 
 
We offered a detailing of some of the elements involved in this 
characterisation of judgment when discussing Hegel’s account of the 
emergence of linguistic consciousness (in Chapter 2, §§V and V.i); the 
present discussion therefore adds to our portrayal of the role of 
rational activity in the emergence of freedom.  
Note that in the context of discussing the origin of the categories 
Kant speaks of the understanding as “absolute unity” and says that 
the connection among the pure concepts of the understanding must 
therefore be “in accordance with a concept or idea”.3The objective 
validity of this connection, which Kant here says “provides a rule by 
means of which the place of each pure concept of the understanding 
and the completeness of all of them together can be determined a 
priori”, and its relation to sensibility, is the topic of the 
Transcendental Deduction. Kant’s task in the preceding section of 
the Critique, the Metaphysical Deduction, is however to explain the 
nature of the logical functions of judgments and categories, which 
themselves must also be somehow determined by the idea of 
“absolute unity”. It is also the purpose of the Metaphysical Deduction 
to explain the necessary connections between the forms of judgment 
and the categories, and thereby pave the way for a justification of the 
a priori status of both with respect to the deliverances of sensibility.4 
                                                 
1Longuenesse (1992/2007, 193). 
2Longuenesse (1992/2007, 202). 
3A67/B92. 
4 Note that Kant’s famous footnote (in Kant (2004, 474-476, 10-12, n.†)) 
where he admits not only the obscurity of the Transcendental Deduction, 
but also the lesser importance of it, when compared with the account of the 
functions of judgment and the categories. This tells us Kant came to believe 
that it was his transcendental idealist thesis, articulated in the details of 
transcendental logic that was most important. See the defence of Kant in 
Longuenesse (2001/2005), guided by an examination of disjunctive 
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Unfortunately, it has been standard procedure in Kant 
scholarship to dismiss the majority or entirety of this section of the 
Critique. I shall here continue to express solidarity with 
Longuenesse by insisting this aspect of Kant has largely been 
misunderstood and unfairly dismissed.1 
When attempting to understand what Kant means by “absolute 
unity” here we should recall his remark that the categories “contain 
nothing more than the unity of reflection upon appearances, insofar 
as these appearances must necessarily belong to a possible empirical 
consciousness.”2Hegel applauds Kant’s strategy here, although he is 
sceptical about Kant’s exact procedure: 
 
The various types of judgment are to be interpreted not just as an 
empirical multiplicity, but as a totality determined by thinking; and 
one of Kant’s great achievements was to have been the first to draw 
our attention to this. Kant’s classification of judgments according to 
the schema of his table of categories into the judgments of quality, 
quantity, relation, and modality, cannot be regarded as adequate, 
partly because of the merely formal application of the schema, and 
partly because of its content. But all the same, what underlies this 
classification is the genuine intuition that the various types of 
judgment are determined by the universal form of the logical Idea 
itself.3 
 
Turning to the text of the Critique, we find that the connection 
between the unity of the understanding and the unity of a systematic 
mode of inquiry, here the “scientific metaphysics” whose principles 
Kant is bent on discovering and elucidating, is outlined on the first 
                                                                                                                            
judgment and the correlated categories of “community” and “reciprocity”, 
and the related account of synthetic a priori judgment in the Third Analogy 
of experience (A211-218/B256-265). 
Note the curiosity of the fact that the elements of Kant’s position that 
he regarded as most central are those which are typically excluded in 
analytical reconstructions of transcendental arguments. It is simply wrong 
to say that the Transcendental Deduction on its own forms the core of 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy; the arguments set out there lose their 
significance if one ignores Kant’s account of the transcendental-logical 
functions of judgment and the categories. 
1 See her (1998) for an extended defence, as well as the development of 
her position in (2005b, esp. Chs. 1-4). 
2A310/B367. 
3Hegel (1991b, §171, Addition, 248). The emphasis is mine. Notice that 
Hegel here has reversed the order of quality and quantity in Kant’s table. 
This is discussed below. 
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page of the Transcendental Logic under the heading “Transcendental 
Analytic”, where Kant writes, regarding the fourth item of his list of 
tasks for that portion of the Critique (“4. That the table of them [the 
Categories] be complete, and that they entirely exhaust the entire 
field of pure understanding.”): 
 
Now this completeness of a science cannot reliably be assumed from a 
rough calculation of an aggregate put together by mere estimates; 
hence it is possible only by means of an idea of the whole of the a 
priori cognition of the understanding, and through the division of 
concepts that such an idea determines and that constitutes it, thus 
only through their connection in a system.1 
 
We see here that Hegel is at least correct in his estimation of Kant’s 
ambition to provide a system for thinking under an2 “idea of a 
whole”. Kant says further of the pure understanding that 
 
the sum total of its cognition will constitute a system that is to be 
grasped and determined under one idea, the completeness and 
articulation of which system can at the same time yield a touchstone 
of the correctness and genuineness of all the pieces of cognition 
fitting into it.3 
 
Although we are not yet concerned with the key points of difference 
between Hegel’s conception of the “universal form of the logical Idea 
itself” and Kant’s “idea of a whole”, such a comparison is intimately 
related to that of comparing their respective accounts of the “unity of 
the understanding” and “unity of reason”.4 
Hegel thinks of the elements of Kant’s Transcendental Logic as 
requiring a dialectical exposition: if such a thing could ever be 
philosophically convincing, its concepts and the unity in which they 
participate require justification by way of demonstration of their 
interconnectedness.5 Although Kant does attempt to explain the 
relation between the logical functions of judgment in the 
                                                 
1A64-65/B89. 
2 I say “an” and not “the” because Hegel clearly thinks of this 
conception (“idea of a whole”) in unique terms that depart from Kant as 
well as common usage. 
3A65/B90. Cf. the remarks in sections IV and V of the First 
Introduction of the 3rd Critique. 
4 On the distinction between the unity of the understanding and the 
unity of reason see A326/B382-383. 
5 A similar point is made in Pinkard (1979/1985). 
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Metaphysical Deduction and goes on to detail the structure of 
apperception in the Transcendental Deduction, Hegel thinks Kant 
simply presupposes the adequacy of this table—therefore, that the 
table itself is unjustified; it is merely presupposed, but not posited 
and recognised as the outcome of free activity, in Hegel’s stronger 
sense of “free”. Of course, to say that something is unjustified is not 
to say it is unjustifiable, and the fact that Hegel spends much of his 
time in the Science of Logic (especially in The Subjective Logic) 
giving a kind of “speculative deduction” of the logical forms 
themselves demonstrates that he thinks they do play some key role 
in the “metaphysics” of self-conscious, discursive thought. 
Before examining the Metaphysical Deduction, it will be helpful to 
present the table of judgments in juxtaposition to Hegel’s own names 
for the same. Thus, we have:1 
 
 
Kant        Hegel 
 
1. Judgments of Quantity  Judgments of Reflection (or: 
Subsumption) 
Universal       Singular      
Particular      Particular 
Singular       Universal 
 
2. Judgments of Quality  Judgments of Existence2(or: 
Inherence/Thereness) 
Affirmative       Positive 
Negative 
Infinite 
 
3. Judgments of Relation  Judgments of Necessity 
Categorical 
Hypothetical 
Disjunctive 
                                                 
1 I have not repeated the ordering where Hegel makes no modification. 
2The German reads “Das Urteil des Daseins”. Miller translates this as 
“judgments of existence”, yet the last word here is ambiguous, since the 
German “existenz”, which the English suggests it is possible translation of, 
departs from Hegel’s meaning. “Dasein” is rendered as “determinate 
being” in the Doctrine of Being, Section One, Chapter 2; we might 
therefore understand such judgments as pertaining to this moment (this is 
the translation employed in Hegel (1991b).  
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4. Judgments of Modality  Judgments of the Concept 
Problematic       Assertoric 
Assertoric      Problematic 
Apodictic       Apodictic 
 
 
In the chapter on “The Judgment” in the Science of Logic Hegel 
switches the order of (1) and (2) by treating what he calls “judgments 
of existence” before “judgments of reflection”; and given Hegel’s 
names for these forms of judgment as well as the common meaning 
associated with “existence” and “reflection” generally, no mystery is 
to be met with in such a reversal of order. To make the point cheaply, 
we can say that one cannot “reflect” unless one has something to 
“reflect” upon and thereby posit, namely, “existence”, or 
“determinate being”, qua presupposed. Cheapness aside, this does 
actually seem to be (part of) what Hegel has in mind. This, however, 
does not dispense with the question of why Hegel would rename 
Kant’s quantitative and qualitative judgments this way—as 
judgments of existence and judgments of reflection, respectively—
or, why he would rename them at all.  
An answer emerges when we take a high altitude perspective of 
the structure not only of the Logic, but of Hegel’s philosophy as a 
whole. Hegel’s standard philosophical approach of commencing with 
what he takes to be a “most basic” concept and then proceeding to 
examine its logical structure and inherent presuppositions, as well as 
contradictions that arise when attempting to think these through, 
depends on taking the logical functions of qualitative judgments 
(affirmative, negative, infinite) as primitive forms for thinking. In the 
Encyclopaedia Logic, under the heading “(α) The Qualitative 
Judgment” Hegel says: 
 
The immediate judgment is the judgment of thereness; the subject 
[is] posited in a universality (as its predicate) which is an immediate 
(and hence sensible) quality.” 
 
And in §171preceding this he says of the table: 
 
Thus we obtain, first of all, three main types of judgment [existence, 
reflection, necessity], which correspond to the stages of Being, 
Essence, and Concept.1 
 
                                                 
1 The interpolations are mine. 
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So Hegel evidently understands his treatment of judgments of 
“quality” to somehow correspond to his analysis of “Being”, in Book 
One of the Science of Logic—an attitude already suggested by the 
fact that the section begun with that analysis is titled: “Quality 
(Determinateness)”. Before proceeding we must caution against 
finding superficial likeness here: Section Two of Book One of the 
Objective Logic is entitled “Quantity (Magnitude)” and this seems to 
conflict with the suggestion that Book Two, the Doctrine of Essence, 
corresponds to judgments of quantity.  
What we must say at this stage is that Hegel has different 
conceptions of these functions operating at different levels in his 
Logic. Clearly insight is to be gained by distinguishing the placement 
of these functions themselves, for they demonstrate how similar 
logical moves are made at distinct logical levels.1In particular, insofar 
as judgments of reflection “attribute to a subject, i.e. to some 
individual entity in relation to other entities, or to a plurality of 
individual entities, determinations that reflect their relations to one 
another” it is the second section of the Doctrine of Essence, 
“Appearance”, to which we need to look to discover the categories of 
reflection that express related phenomena from a distinct 
standpoint.2 
As is frequently pointed out, Hegel’s analysis of “Being” in the 
Logic mirrors the opening chapters of the Phenomenology where 
Hegel’s dialectical analysis of “Sense-Certainty” demonstrates the 
problematic character of a “mere this”.3The problematic character of 
                                                 
1 We should be cautious about attributing to Hegel a systematic logical 
“method”, such as the erroneous “thesis-antithesis-synthesis” dialectic. On 
this see Kaufmann (1951) and Mueller (1958). Cf. also deVries (1993, 242-
243) where he claims that individual stages of the dialectic ought to be 
treated individually. 
2Longuenesse (1992/2007, 210) discusses this point.  
3 Within analytical scholarship Hegel’s point is now frequently 
associated with Wilfrid Sellars’s attack on the “Myth of the Given”, due in 
part to Sellars’s mentioning of “Meditations Hegeliènnes” in Sellars 
(1956/1997, §20), yet somehow the claim is usually confusedly attributed to 
Sellars, rather than his interlocutor’s mischaracterisation of him. And, 
given the fact that Pittsburgh Hegelianism is self-consciously conceived as 
an extension of Sellarsian themes, one might think that this confused 
attribution played some role in the related readings of Hegel. This would 
require a lot of evidence in order to be established; something we cannot do 
here. The point is that Hegel’s position should not be seen as simply an 
attack on the so-called “Given”; he has something quite specific in mind, 
which nevertheless may include an ancestor of Sellars’s point. 
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a “mere this” supposedly given to thought lies, in part, in the fact 
that such apparent “immediacy” turns out to be “mediated” in that 
the apparent singularity of the this taken to be apprehended by 
thought turns out to actually be a universal: a mere “something” 
having the form “this, here, now”. Moreover, in addition to being 
internally contradictory (what is really “this, here, now” is something 
determinate, whereas such universal terms are, on their own, 
indeterminate), the category itself is epistemically and semantically 
empty; so whilst internal contradictoriness is a dialectical feature of 
categories in general, according to Hegel, this initial stage is also 
empty.1 
The essentially indexical character of such modes of thought 
demonstrates their universality in virtue of the fact that such form is 
that which is most general, not most specific. This dialectical 
transition is thought of by Hegel as the initial step taken by spirit on 
its long and frenzied journey. Meanwhile, in the Science of Logic, 
Hegel begins in a similar way with the category of pure “Being” and 
shows such a category to be, if left unqualified, in no way distinct 
from its opposite: “Nothing”. This dialectical tension results in the 
positing of the category “Becoming” which is taken to contain both 
“Being” and “Nothing” as moments within it. We might think the 
claim is grounded intuitively this way: with the passage of time 
implied by “Becoming”, something proceeds from being what it is to 
being what it was not. This would not entail that such logical 
categories are in fact temporal ones, but rather that such connections 
are only apparent given a certain temporal form in which to 
demonstrate them. 
Even without yet committing ourselves to a defence or 
elaboration of this strategy, we can appreciate the point at hand: 
Hegel thinks that the logical functions of judgments, simply assumed 
by Kant,2 actually bear dialectical relations to one another. That is to 
                                                                                                                            
For one angle on Hegel’s account of the objects of sense-certainty and 
perception by a Sellarsian analytical philosopher with Hegelian sympathies 
see deVries (2008).  
1 We must be cautious here, since the aufgehoben dialectical positions 
results in such rejected categories being served up in alternate forms at 
later stages; the “immediacy” of both “Being” (logical/semantic) and 
“Sense-Certainty” (epistemic/semantic) constitute necessary moments in 
thought, even if empty in isolation. 
2 Standard objections that Kant’s imported his table from the Port 
Royal logic textbooks of his day, notwithstanding, Kant’s table is actually 
unique. See Forster (2008, Chapter 11). See Kant’s words at A70-71/B96: 
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say, the logical forms of judgment themselves must be conceived of 
as forms of judgmental thought that unfold out of one another 
through attempts to judgmentally determine objects, or, to rehearse 
a theme from Kant’s original statement of the PCD: “things” and 
“concepts”. Recall that objects can be both. 
While Kant thought of the logical functions of judgment as twelve 
forms, some of which constitute the pure reflective unity of objective 
judgments, technically the judgments of relation are categorical, 
hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogistic forms. And modality is not so 
much a form of judgment that characterises the thing judged about, 
but rather pertains to the strength of inferences able to be made 
about it.1So, although one may offer a “metalinguistic” account of 
modality as expressed in judgments one makes by “making explicit” 
their modality in judgments of the form, 
 
“S is p has existence/non-existence.” (Assertoric) 
“It is possible/impossible that S is p.” (Problematic) 
“It is necessary/contingent that S is p.” (Apodictic) 
 
we should not think Kantian modality takes this form. Rather, all 
judgments contain a modal flavour, although quite clearly one could 
make that explicit in such forms as iterated above.2 
So, we may say take the permissibility of an inference granted or 
denied to express epistemic modality.3 Modal judgments thus make 
                                                                                                                            
“Since this division seems to depart in several points, although not 
essential ones, from the customary technique of the logicians, the following 
protests against a worrisome understanding are not necessary.” 
1 Both Longuenesse (2001/2005) and Leech (2010) discuss this point. Cf. 
A74-76/B100-101. 
2 See A75/B101, where Kant says problematic judgments are “thought 
only as an optional judgment, which it is possible to assume”. Kant thinks 
with such judgments there is “a free choice” of admitting that which they 
assert (qua proposition); that here one is confronted by “a purely optional 
admission” of them “into the understanding”.  
We should here remind ourselves that for Kant a proposition is just 
some asserted content (propositions are, for him, by their nature 
assertoric), whereas judgments express a certain objective unity in 
thought. This is why they may be part of distinct modal contexts without 
making explicit their modality in the form of modal predicates (possibly, 
necessarily, etc.). 
3Leech (2010) argues that Kant’s kind of modality is not “epistemic” or 
“doxastic” modality, since Kant’s claims it does not contribute to the 
content of a judgment, but rather only its relation to the unity of 
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explicit the implicit inferential structure of one’s discourse, for the 
three modal functions just expressed are to be viewed, when so 
expressed, not as statements within the empirically real framework 
of possible experience, but rather within its transcendental 
structure. That is, for Kant, modality expresses the permissibility of 
further claims one can make, given one’s empirically real experience 
and its transcendental conditions. They thus seem to be very much 
like what Gilbert Ryle referred to as “inference tickets”. 
Note how this follows from Kant’s view that only judgments with 
corresponding intuitional matter for their subject (and therefore 
predicate)1 can be said to be part of empirical reality; according to 
the Postulates of Empirical Thinking, one can infer to further truths 
about actuality given knowledge of that to which such judgments 
refer in addition to the structure of transcendental logic. 
The objectively real judgments one can make about the 
empirically real world together with those judgments about 
unexperienced phenomena one can make on their basis (and the 
requisite transcendental conditions) constitutes the realm of the 
actual. As we’ve noted, Kant tells us in “The Postulates of Empirical 
Thinking” that the possible is, so to speak, part of the actual: it is that 
to which we can infer but have not yet experienced.2This is part 
Kant’s peculiar sense of “real possibility”, as discussed above in §II.i.  
For his part, Hegel thought of the logical functions themselves as 
expressing a dialectic of particular modes of determination. Hegel’s 
synopsis of his chapter on judgment demonstrates this point.3 There 
Hegel makes it clear that he thinks the four forms of judgment are 
patterns of determination that can be “speculatively deduced” from 
one another in a progressive fashion, where in the final form of 
                                                                                                                            
consciousness. I think this is a false dichotomy, and in any case it is 
unargued for; Leech simply assumes epistemic modality could not be that 
which is expressed by the permissibility of an inference from one claim (or 
set of claims) to another claim (or set of claims). In fact, I think it is 
perfectly in concert with Kant’s view that what one might call epistemic 
modality—what additional modal beliefs one is entitled to on the basis of 
what one knows is actual—that which is expressed by adumbrating 
permissible and impermissible inferences. This in any case seems to be the 
view recommended in Kant’s discussion of “real possibility” in “The 
Postulates of Empirical Thinking”.  
1 Any intuitional matter subsumed under the subject of a judgment is, in 
virtue of the function of the copula, subsumed under the predicate. 
2 See the crucial remarks on A230-232/B282-284 and n.* at A234-
235/B587. 
3Hegel (1969, 630). 
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judgments of the concept the two sides of the judgment are 
“identical” with one another.  
The structure of the dialectic here implies something quite 
peculiar: since Hegel regards the three judgmental forms under each 
heading as a whole, where the inter-connection of the first two, taken 
as a pair, is taken to be expressed in the third form, it is this third 
logical function under each heading that both demonstrates the unity 
of the former two as well as motivates the dialectical transition from 
one heading to the next: 
 
Positive, Negative  Infinite Singular 
 
Singular, Particular Universal Categorical 
 
Categorical, Hypothetical  Disjunctive  Assertoric 
 
Assertoric, Problematic  Apodictic  “The Syllogism” 
 
If we compare Kant’s remarks about the dialectical relation between 
the three members of each class of category in the Metaphysical 
Deduction, we find him expressing agreement at least of the level of 
individual headings of the table of judgment: 
 
that each class always has the same number of categories, namely 
three, which calls for reflection, since otherwise all a priori division by 
means of concepts must be a dichotomy. But here the third category 
always arises from the combination of the first two in its class.1 
 
Despite this commonality, the place of “judgment” as a moment in 
Hegel’s Logic raises the question of how one is to connect Kant’s 
transcendental logic with dialectical logic. If we are to understand 
this connection with Kant, we must take the chapter’s structure and 
systematic location seriously. 
Hegel says that the “objective logic, then, takes the place rather 
of former metaphysics which was intended to be the scientific 
construction of the world in terms of thoughts alone.”2And although 
he regards its primary concern to be with that part of metaphysics 
                                                 
1 B110. 
2Hegel (1969, 63). He also refers explicitly to “the soul, the world and 
God” here, which are of course the transcendental ideas Kant had 
attempted to give a transcendental, regulative function to in the second 
section of the Appendix to the Dialectic. 
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concerned with “Being” and “Essence”—ontology—the validity of 
other parts of metaphysics receive explanations through concern 
with this basic mode of metaphysical thinking, and his Subjective 
Logic is in any case meant to articulate the “truth”, at the level of 
“the Concept”, of these former two. Regarding metaphysical forms, 
however, “[O]bjective logic is…the genuine critique of them—a 
critique which does not consider as contrasted under the abstract 
forms of the a priori and a posteriori, but considers the 
determinations themselves according to their specific content.”1 
This explicit statement therefore prohibits a straightforward 
matching of the Metaphysical Deduction in the Transcendental 
Analytic with Hegel’s “Judgment” chapter, since the former is 
constitutive of transcendental logic: combined with the sensible 
conditions of spatio-temporality, it is the central feature of 
transcendental logic. Hegel’s chapter on judgment, however, falls in 
Volume Two of the Logic (“Subjective Logic” or “Doctrine of the 
Concept”); a theoretical move that at once further reveals just how 
different Kant’s and Hegel’s views about logic are, and also reveals 
an odd symmetry. 
We’ve seen that Kant viewed general logic as a source of 
necessary principles for thinking; the highest of which he took to be 
the principle of contradiction. General logic, through its role in 
reason, does, for Kant, shape the pure understanding and therefore 
cognition as a systematically unified whole. Read this way, not only is 
the Transcendental Dialectic, as is frequently pointed out, largely a 
negative piece of philosophy (in “The dialectical inferences of pure 
reason”, especially), it is precisely transcendental logic itself that 
plays the negative role: the positive results of the Dialectic in 
determining the role of reason in our thought rest on the non-
contradictoriness of the “ideas” and “ideal” appealed to, in accord 
with “general” logic. And whilst transcendental-logical conceptions 
are spoken of and included in the analysis of this terrain, their 
employment is restricted to showing what cognition cannot do; what 
empirical knowledge could not be. 
Compare Hegel. The dialectical pathway through the Doctrine of 
Being and the Doctrine of Essence is meant to parallel 
transcendental logic’s setting out of the conditions of the possibility 
of experience (of objects). And there is no mirror of the Metaphysical 
Deduction in Hegel’s Logic simply because Hegel’s conception of 
idealist logic is not committed to static logical functions that set out 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 64). 
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conditions for thought. Those familiar with Hegel’s Dialectic will 
recall that he purports to presuppose nothing;1 therefore, that the 
structure of thought about “Being” and “Essence” cannot rest on 
anything pre-given. But what, then, is the role of the Doctrine of the 
Concept? Here we run into some deeper complications.  
In brief, The Subjective Logic appears to be Hegel’s way of 
setting out some of the basic principles of his own dialectical, 
speculative logic, whose application we would have already observed 
at work in Book One and Book Two. If this is the case, then we can 
say that the principles detailed here can be connected with specific 
parts of The Objective Logic. That is not our task in the current 
work, although it pays to be mindful of the possibility of such a 
reading, since it helps to dispel some of the mystery we have so far 
taken account of, in attempting to connect Hegel’s account of 
judgment with Kant’s.2 
Hegel does offer an explanation of Volume Two of the Logic: 
 
The subjective logic is the logic of the Concept, of essence which has 
sublated its relation to being or its illusory being [Schein], and in its 
determination is no longer external but is subjective—free, self-
subsistent and self-determining, or rather it is the subject itself. 
Since subjectivity brings with it the misconception of contingency 
and caprice and, in general, characteristics belonging to the form of 
consciousness, no particular importance is to be attached here to the 
distinction between subjective and objective; these determinations 
will be more precisely developed later on in the logic itself.3 
 
Whilst we have cautioned against an overly simplistic extension of 
this thesis that would accord Hegel’s account of judgment a central 
but static role structurally isomorphic to Kant’s Metaphysical 
Deduction, we are in a position to insist that Hegel’s account of 
judgment reveals many important features of his conception of the 
relation between thought and reality. Observe the following: 
                                                 
1 The sceptic may say with confidence that Hegel presupposes the 
applicability of his “method”. It is not clear exactly how one is to deal with 
such a criticism. 
2 We mentioned above that Hegel offers a critique of the idea of a “sum-
total of all realities” in all three books of the Logic. There are obviously 
many other connections one can make between parts of the work; the Logic 
is no linear narrative; in order to understand it one must understand how 
certain key sections elucidate Hegel’s various attempts of working out 
dialectical details in different ways in different sections of the work. 
3Hegel (1969, 64). 
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The judgment is the determinateness of the Concept posited in the 
Concept itself…The judgment can…be called the proximate 
realization of the Concept, inasmuch as reality denotes in general 
entry into existence as a determinate being.1 
 
And: 
 
The judgment is the Concept in its particularity, as the distinguishing 
relation of its moments, which are posited as being-for-themselves 
and at the same time identical with themselves, and not with each 
other…It is true that the determinations of singularity and 
universality, or subject and predicate, are also distinct, but the 
absolutely universal fact remains, nonetheless, that every judgment 
expresses them as identical.2 
 
This second remark demonstrates an extremely important point. 
Throughout the argumentative dialectic of judgment Hegel 
continually reminds us that there are two common conceptions of 
judgment that arise. The first is the conception of a judgment as a 
concatenation of independently meaningful items: a subject and a 
predicate. Taken this way the predicate is a universal (qua concept) 
applied to a particular subject (qua object), where the former is 
superficially understood as an “item in the mind” that is to be 
connected with the latter, in its existence as a phenomenon “in the 
world”.3 Hegel says elsewhere that, from this perspective 
 
the subject is in general the determinate, and is therefore more that 
which immediately is, whereas the predicate expresses the universal, 
the essential nature [Wesen] or the Concept; therefore the subject as 
such is, in the first instance, only a kind of name; for what it is is first 
enunciated by the predicate which contains being in the sense of the 
Concept.4 
 
The judgment is usually taken in a subjective sense, as an operation 
and a form, which occurs only in thinking that is conscious of itself. 
But this distinction is not yet present in the logical [realm]; [here] the 
judgment is to be taken as entirely universal: every thing is a 
judgment.—That is, every thing is a singular which is inwardly a 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 623). 
2Hegel (1991b, §166, 243-244). 
3 See the discussion in Hegel (1969, 623-630) in the preamble to “The 
Judgment” chapter. 
4Hegel (1969, 624). 
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universality or inner nature, in other words, a universal that is made 
singular; universality and singularity distinguish themselves [from 
each other] within it, but at the same time they are identical.1 
 
The following discussion of Hegel’s account of the dialectical 
complexities of infinite and disjunctive judgment takes its departure 
from this idea. Namely, that judgment is a stage of “the Concept” 
where finitude manifests as an initially superficial valorisation of the 
subject-predicate form; that is, the form of judgment, where 
something (a predicate) is said of something else (a logical subject). 
It is crucial to see how Hegel’s critique of judgment is therefore 
not only a critique of Kant’s transcendental logic, but also a critique 
of the subject-predicate form. Yet Hegel does not simply reject such 
a form; he wishes to show how it contains many complex logical 
transitions that depend on the intermingling of reason and the 
understanding. 
                                                 
1Hegel (1991b, §167, 246). 
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The degree of elaboration by Kant of the topic we are about to 
discuss is, I wish to suggest, almost inversely proportional to its 
significance. I have so far been claiming that this point holds for 
many of the themes discussed in this work (e.g., symbolic 
representation, the PCD, the Transcendental Ideal, etc.), although 
presently we are faced with a narrower topic. Since Kant says so 
little about it we must make much of what he says; I therefore begin 
by citing at length a lucid reflexion from the Critical Period that 
explains the function of infinite judgment (which Kant at one point 
refers to the “judgment of complete determination”; see footnote 1 on 
the next page): 
 
That something is actual because it is possible in accordance with a 
general concept does not follow. But that something is actual because 
it is completely determined by its concept among all that is possible 
and distinguished as one from all that is possible means one and the 
same as that it is not merely a general concept, but the 
representation of a particular thing through concepts completely 
determined in relation to everything possible. This relation to 
everything possible in accordance with the principle of complete 
determination is the same with respect to [the] concept of reason as 
the somewhere or sometime with respect to sensible intuition.* For 
space and time do not merely determine the intuition of a thing, but 
at the same time they determine its individuality by means of the 
relation of its place and point in time, since [in] the case of space and 
time possibility cannot be distinguished from actuality, since they 
both together contain all possibility in appearance in themselves as 
substrata that must be antecedently given. 
From this it follows only that the ens realissimum must be given 
antecedently to the real concept of all possibility, thus that just like 
space it cannot be antecedently conceived as possible, but as given; 
but not as [space is not given as] an object that is actual in itself, but 
rather a merely sensible form in which alone objects can be intuited, 
so the ens realissimum is also not given as an object but as the mere 
form of reason for thinking the difference in everything possible in its 
complete determination, consequently as an idea that is (subjectively) 
actual before something can be conceived as possible; from which 
however it does not follow at all that the object of this idea is actual in 
itself.1 
                                                 
1 The emphases in the first paragraph are mine. 
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A brief comment: Kant here quite clearly draws a parallel between 
the pure forms of intuition (space and time) and the form of reason 
(ens realissimum), where all three of these are singular. It seems fair 
to suppose that, since sensibility, the understanding, and reason 
must cooperate in order to make possible rational, knowledgeable 
judgments, that the understanding must also be able to be conceived 
as logically singular. I take it that if anything is a candidate for a 
conception of the understanding as singular it is its unity in the form 
of the “I think”, which is the counterpart (at the level of the 
understanding) of the regulative function (at the level of reason) that 
Kant allows for the idea of the soul at the level of transcendental 
psychology. We return to this in §IV. 
Kant says further: 
 
Nevertheless, one sees that in relation to the nature of human 
understanding and its concepts a highest being is just as necessary as 
space and time are in relation to the nature of our sensibility and its 
intuition. 
*(Something whose relation to everything possible is determined in 
absolute space and time is actual. Similarly, that whose relation to 
everything possible is determined in the absolute representation of a 
thing in general is actual. Both belong to the complete outer 
determination with regard to possibility in general and thereby also 
constitute the complete inner determination of an individuo.).1 
 
These remarks serve as a preliminary text; their importance will be 
rendered clearer as we proceed. 
As we’ve noted, Kant’s table of judgments and categories consist 
of four headings each of which encompass three forms. In the case of 
judgments of quality Kant insists upon a form that is irrelevant to 
general logic, yet which to transcendental logic is 
indispensable.2Note that because this form of judgment is not 
recognised by formal logic the philosophical point Kant extracts from 
it does not apply for objects of reason, because objects of reason are 
determined by general logic, not transcendental logic. This fact 
supports the claim that the ens realissimum must be regarded as 
                                                 
1Kant (2005, 1783-1784, 18:558-559, 353). This is cited in Longuenesse 
(1995/2005, 229), although she provides a slightly different translation. 
Longuenesse (217, n.9) refers to “Reflexion 3063, AAxvi, p. 636” in which 
Kant characterises infinite judgment as the “judgment of complete 
determination”. 
2A71-72/B97. 
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having transcendental-logical form, rather than general logical form; 
therefore it supports the claim that the form of modality in question 
when speaking of the “whole of possibility” against which predicates 
are defined negatively in infinite judgment is real possibility, rather 
than logical possibility.1 
Moreover, since Kant conceives of the third element (here infinite 
judgment) under each heading for both the logical functions of 
judgments and the Categories (“limitation” is correlated with infinite 
judgment) as being somehow derivable from but not reducible to the 
other two, we expect that both infinite judgment and the 
corresponding category of “limitation” are in some way a 
combination of positive and negative judgments and the categories of 
“reality” and “negation”, respectively. (Note that in §57 of the 
Prolegomena Kant contrasts “limit” with “boundary”, where the 
former are considered to contain “mere negations” and the latter are 
taken to instance a limit encountered within possible experience, as 
in the case of a physical surface.)2 
We also suggested that there is something distinctly Hegelian 
about this apparently dialectical approach to the logical functions of 
judgments and Categories—even if Kant stops short of saying that 
the triads falling under each judgmental heading are, as a whole, 
internally and holistically related, as Hegel does.  
The transcendental import of infinite judgment is explained by 
Kant this way: 
 
General logic abstracts from all content of the predicate (even if it is 
negative), and considers only whether it is attributed to the subject 
or opposed to it. Transcendental logic, however, also considers the 
value or content of the logical affirmation made in a judgment by 
means of a merely negative predicate, and what sort of gain this 
yields for the whole of cognition.3 
 
The “gain” yielded for the whole of cognition here seems to be that, 
by positively affirming a negative predicate in infinite judgment, a 
whole sphere of possible predicates is alluded to. We can think of this 
in more than one way, and Kant’s actual example of the Metaphysical 
Deduction is ill-chosen; he selects an example of a negative predicate 
whose affirmation entails a single alternative; his example is: “The 
                                                 
1Longuenesse (1995/2005, 217) also makes this point. 
2 On this compare also the reflexion in Kant (2005, R 5270, 1776-1778, 
18:138, 224-225). 
3A72/B97; my emphasis. 
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soul is not mortal”. And although his claim is that the predication of 
“not mortal” divides the whole of reality into dying and undying 
beings, one wonders whether an example of a subject of which could 
be predicated a range of contraries at different conceptual levels, 
might have made the point better. 
Now, it is crucial that Kant is clearly considering judgment as an 
act of attributing a predicate to a subject, an Aristotelian position 
that Hegel sought to undermine by dialectically developing the 
assumptions embedded in it. For instance, since for Kant only 
perceptual individuals—objects of intuition—can be judged 
determinatively, every judgment involves attributing some predicate 
to a subject (recall that the subject predicate structure is mirrored 
by Kant’s categories of substance and accident).1 This is, of course, 
unlike the way in which non-perceptual phenomena are thought 
about: since they are not objects of perception, empirical laws are not 
subjects of predication but rather rules that explain the subsumption 
of subjects under predicates. In other contexts, this difference in 
logic is cashed out as a difference between logic that possesses a 
determinable-determinate structure and that which consists simply 
of determinants that mutually determine one another. I take it that 
the latter kind of logic, which Arthur Prior2 has linked to Leibniz and 
which we might profess to find in modern propositional logic, is a 
structure of thought that lacks ontological commitments of this kind, 
in virtue of not embedding assumptions of our epistemic relation to 
the world.  
The relevance of this point here is that, for Kant and Hegel, the 
structure of judgment does express certain epistemic features of our 
thought. Propositions, however, do not. I suggest the logic of 
propositions is, unsurprisingly, propositional logic. The logic of 
judgment, we might say, is dependent upon the epistemic relation 
the objects judged about. This is as much as saying it embeds 
epistemic features.  
                                                 
1 If we recall remarks from Wittgenstein (1929) regarding the structure 
of atomic propositions, we may wish to conclude that such propositions 
necessarily involve “saying something (predicate) about something 
(subject)”, where things that may be said materially exclude other things 
(this exclusion may be inferred without the construction of an argument). 
Developing this thought would constitute a way of defending Kant’s 
categories as necessary conditions of base level empirical vocabularies. We 
can do no more than suggest that such an analysis may follow from Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy. 
2 See Prior (1949a, b). 
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Recall Hegel’s words from the Encyclopedia Logic:  
 
Judgments are distinct from propositions; propositions contain a 
determination of the subject which does not stand in a relationship of 
universality to them—a state, a singular action, and the like…A 
proposition like: “A carriage is passing by”, would be a judgment, and 
a subjective one at that, only if there could be doubt whether what is 
passing by is a carriage, or whether the object is moving, and not, on 
the contrary, the standing from which we observe it; for then the 
concern would be to find the [right] determination for [my] not yet 
appropriately determined representation.1 
 
Hegel seems to say here that judgment is, paradigmatically, a mode 
of determination involving the attribution of a predicate to a subject, 
itself which is an act of combining a universal with a particular. Of 
course, exactly what the subject-predicate and universal-particular-
singular distinctions amount to are far more complex than this; 
nevertheless there is a certain starting in logic which Hegel seems to 
think Aristotle was right to press on and it is this. What “saying 
something (a predicate) about something (a subject)” turns out to 
involve is extremely complex, and the relation between elements of 
judgments are not static and turn out to depend upon the nuances of 
rational contexts. 
In any case, for Hegel, to “appropriately determine” a 
representation seems to involve finding universal form in the 
particular, where the logical form of particularity mediates between 
singularity and universality.2One can see why this activity counts as 
rational for Hegel, since he, like Kant, sees reason as proceeding by 
subsuming the particular under the universal: reflectively 
determining things by postulating principles that offer more and 
more general explanations. 
Further, Hegel’s account of judgment proceeds as a dialectic 
between the subject and predicate of the judgment in a way that 
mirrors his account of consciousness’s development in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. In the context of the logic of judgment the 
                                                 
1Hegel (1991b, §167, 246). Pippin (1989, Chapter 10)acknowledges this 
point. 
2 The treatment of this issue begins in the chapter on “The Concept” in 
the “Subjectivity” section of The Subjective Logic” and is discussed 
throughout “The Judgment” and “The Syllogism”. 
For the resolution of this dialectic see the example of a judgment about 
the character of a house in the discussion of apodictic judgment in the 
section “Judgments of the Concept” in Hegel (1969, 661-663). 
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dialectic occurs in terms of the reflective categories of “identity” and 
“difference”, where the transitions between the four logical families 
of judgment involve transformations of the relation between these 
categories of reflection. Hegel says that: 
 
It is the aim of the movement of the judgment to reconstitute this 
identity of the concept, or, rather, to posit it. What is already given in 
the judgment is partly the independence but also the 
determinateness of subject and predicate as against each other, and 
partly also their relation, which, however, is abstract. The judgment 
at first affirms that the subject is the predicate; but, since the 
predicate is held not to be what the subject is, there is a contradiction 
which must be resolved, or pass over into some result. But, since in 
and for themselves subject and predicate are the totality of the 
concept and the judgment is the reality of the concept, its progress is 
only development.1 
 
The parallel with the Phenomenology can be seen if we turn to its 
Introduction: 
 
Since consciousness thus finds that its knowledge does not 
correspond to its object, the object itself does not stand the test; in 
other words, the criterion for testing is altered when that for which it 
was to have been the criterion fails to pass the test; and the testing is 
not only a testing of what we know, but also a testing of the criterion 
of what knowing is. Inasmuch as the new true object issues from it, 
this dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on itself and 
which affects both its knowledge and its object, is precisely what is 
called experience [Erfahrung].2 
 
Note that Kant tells us that it is the “logical affirmation” performed 
through predicate negation that can “yield a gain” for the whole of 
cognition tells us that understanding infinite judgment as involving 
the introduction of negative predicates through logical affirmation, 
rather than negation of positive predicates via denial, allows the 
“sphere of determination” corresponding to the negative predicate to 
be regarded in a quasi-positive manner. 
Viewed this way, the transcendental-logical function of infinite 
judgment, in its capacity to “yield a gain for cognition”, depends on 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 630). Cited in Longuenesse (1992/2007, 208). 
2 Cf.Hegel (1977b, 54-55). Citation from Longuenesse (2007, 238, n.10). 
In the essay to which this is cited as a footnote Longuenesse makes a 
similar point. See Longuenesse (1992/2007, 207 & ff.). 
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the subject-predicate structure it exemplifies: Kant capitalises on the 
ambiguity of predicate negation (“The soul is not mortal”) to mean 
either propositional denial or term negation, and sides with the latter 
interpretation. And Kant’s commitment to asymmetry about 
negation, as evident in his equation of positivity with reality, and the 
latter with the presence of sensation, forbids him from thinking of 
the role and status of such negative predicates in any but regulative 
terms. This echoes remarks already made about the regulative 
function of transcendental ideas. Kant says further that: 
 
If I had said of the soul that it is not mortal, then I would at least 
have avoided an error by means of a negative judgment. Now by 
means of the proposition “The soul is not mortal” I have certainly 
made an actual affirmation as far as logical form is concerned, for I 
have placed the soul within the unlimited domain of undying beings. 
Now since that which is mortal contains one part of the whole domain 
of possible beings, but that which is undying the other, nothing is said 
by my proposition but that the soul is one of the infinite multitude of 
things that remain if I take away everything that is mortal.1 
 
This calls for substantial commentary. We see here for the first time 
an anticipation of the point Hegel exploits in his own discussion of 
infinite judgment, regarding the dialectical relation between 
“positively infinite” and “negatively infinite” moments of infinite 
judgment;2 an appearance of a thesis that supports the claim that 
Kant anticipated Hegel’s dialectical approach to logic and which, 
therefore, supports the claim that dialectical logic is a development of 
the revolutionary project of transcendental logic.  
Kant says that statements of the form 
 
“The soul is not mortal”, 
 
are affirmations, when viewed in general logical terms, since they 
involve locating a subject in the “sphere” of some predicate, rather 
than, as in negation, excluding that subject from such a sphere. Yet 
Kant writes that such a statement, viewed otherwise, does no more 
than place its subject within an indeterminate conceptual “sphere” 
defined by its exclusion of the predicate—as in negation.  
Notice the ambiguity in predicate negation Kant trades on: 
infinite judgment involves a shift of focus from conceiving of a 
                                                 
1A72/B97; my emphases. 
2Hegel (1969, 641-643). 
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subject as excluded from the sphere defined by a predicate, to 
conceiving of a predicate as excluded by the definition of the subject. 
We thus have two forms with different emphases, which themselves 
arise out of Kant’s own ambiguous phrase: 
 
(1) The soul is not mortal. (Predicate negation as contradiction: 
ambiguous.) 
 
Scrutiny of this sentence reveals that its clarification involves siding 
with one of two interpretations: 
 
(2) ~ The soul is mortal. (External, propositional negation: 
contradiction.) 
Interpretation: “It is not the case that the soul is mortal.” 
 
(3) The soul is non-mortal. (Predicate negation: contrariety.) 
Interpretation: “The soul has some other character than mortality.” 
 
The first alternative is an externally negated proposition that does 
not introduce any independent conception of the items included in it 
(the soul, mortality), whereas the second alternative involves the 
negation of the predicate and, therefore, appears to entail an 
Aristotelian, term-logical conception of the sentence’s structure of 
the form 
 
S is non-P, 
 
since “non-P”, if it is at all distinguishable from “~P” must be 
understood as tied to a certain construal of “S”: what the array of 
alternative predications is determines whether particular cases are, 
in principle, true or false, as opposed to nonsense. Kant’s example is 
ill-suited to demonstration of this point because we need to show how 
the sphere of certain predicates is not only defined by a sphere of 
inclusion and exclusion, yet is also structured by the essential and 
accidental properties of the subject for which it is a predicate. 
Consider: 
 
(4) The leaf is green. 
 
One can say that 
 
(5) The leaf is not green,  
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And thereby quite easily mean either 
 
(6) ~ The leaf is green. (External negation of the proposition: “It 
is not the case that the leaf is green.”) 
 
Or, 
 
(7) The leaf is non-green. (Term negation.)  
 
Where (7) implies that the leaf is some other colour, i.e., red, orange, 
yellow, brown or some combination of these and where this suggests 
the negation of “green” with respect to the leaf is utterly unlike the 
negation of the sentence 
 
(8) ~ The cubic object is in the kitchen. 
 
Where the negation of this proposition tells us that some state of 
affairs is not the case; i.e., that some cubic item is not in my 
kitchen.1Complications emerge at this point which cannot detain us, 
so we must be satisfied with saying simply that the coherent account 
allowed by propositional logic for n-adic relational statements such as 
this notwithstanding, such an account of logic does not have an 
inbuilt structure suitable to the logic of perceptual objects, like green 
leaves, as does term-logic, wherein it is presupposed that there is 
some object about which one judges and that all one is doing is 
attempting to determine its character in a relevant way. It is of 
course difficult to show how one might ground this claim: that there 
is some other logical form that captures certain intuitions about seen 
things (that they seem to be a substance with an array of accidents). 
The point at issue is that the determination of things via concepts 
involves fitting things into some conceptual sphere, with its own 
conditions of inclusion and exclusion. The function of inclusion and 
exclusion in the allowance of certain determinations of a subject, 
where the latter is understood to be the paradigm of a determinable,2 
                                                 
1 Note the necessity of interpreting “Some”: (8) seems to imply that  
some particular thing is not in some particular location, whereas one can 
equally be interpreted as saying one cannot say that there is any object of 
such-and-such kind (the kind in question) in a certain location (the location 
in question). 
2 We might thereby replace this phrase with “determinates of a 
determinable”. 
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is structured in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions that 
allow certain predications and forbid others.1 By this it is meant that 
possible predicates must be either essential or accidental features of 
a subject; essential features of a subject are features that, in 
accordance with the rules of the language in question, allow for 
certain accidental features, whilst accidental features are ones that 
are permitted by the conceptual structure of the subject to which 
predications attributing such features apply.   
Kant completes his explanation of infinite judgment this way:  
 
the infinite sphere of the possible is thereby limited only to the extent 
that that which is mortal is separated from it, and the soul is placed in 
the remaining space of its domain. But even with this exception this 
space still remains infinite, and more parts could be taken away from 
it without the concept of the soul growing in the least and being 
affirmatively determined. In regard to logical domain, therefore, this 
infinite judgment is merely limiting with regard to the content of 
cognition in general, and to this extent it must not be omitted from 
the transcendental table of all moments of thinking in judgments, 
since the function of understanding that is hereby exercised may 
perhaps be important in the field of its pure a priori cognition.2 
 
We do well to here compare Kant’s official discussion from the 
manual for his lectures on logic, the Jäsche Logic: 
 
As to quality, judgments are either affirmative or negative or infinite. 
In the affirmative judgment the subject is thought under the sphere 
of a predicate, in the negative it is posited outside the sphere of the 
latter, and in the infinite it is posited in the sphere of a concept that 
lies outside the sphere of another.3 
 
                                                 
1 Such an approach to conceptual determination is encountered in 
Robert Brandom’s recent work, where it is construed in terms of material 
incompatibilities (see Brandom (1994, 94-107), 2008, Chapter 5)). This line of 
thinking has its roots in Brandom’sSellarsian account of material inference 
(Sellars (1953)). Brandom derives a different moral from this story 
however, since he systematically denies the need for an Aristotelian logical 
structure (either in general, or in his interpretation of Hegel) and therefore 
denies the need for an account of objects in terms of essential and 
accidental features, which I have just argued is essential to the notion of a 
logical subject in Hegel and Kant, at least in the present context. 
2A72-73/B97-98; my emphases. 
3Kant (1992a, 103-104, 600). 
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This seems to substantiate the interpretation just given of the 
peculiar character of infinite judgment, namely, that it involves 
placing the subject in an “indeterminate” sphere defined by 
opposition to the predicate. Kant provides some illumination of 
infinite judgment in three notes which can be considered in turn. 
 
Note 1. The infinite judgment indicates not merely that a subject is 
not contained under the sphere of a predicate, but that it lies 
somewhere in the infinite sphere outside its sphere; consequently this 
judgment represents the sphere of the predicate as restricted. 
 
This agrees with our remarks made thus far. Kant says further: 
 
Everything possible is either A or non A. If I say, then, that 
something is non-A, e.g., the human soul is non-mortal, some men are 
non-learned, etc., and then this is an infinite judgment. For it is not 
thereby determined, concerning the finite sphere A, under which 
concept the object belongs, but merely that it belongs in the sphere 
outside A, which is really no sphere at all but only a sphere’s sharing 
of a limit with the infinite, or the limiting itself. Now although 
exclusion is a negation, the restriction of a concept is still a positive 
act. Therefore limits are positive concepts of restricted objects. 
 
Not only does this passage indicate the plausibility of our reading, it 
also affirms that Kant is anticipating a distinctly Hegelian thesis: 
that “although exclusion is negation, the restriction of a concept is 
still a positive act,” where this is taken to imply that determinations 
of a thing involve negative moments that are nevertheless in some 
sense positive; in common language, we can determine (specify 
determinatively or classify reflectively) an object or concept by 
excluding certain predications of it. Such a procedure is encountered 
in the theoretical strategy of elimination of alternatives and aids the 
observational moments of falsification inherent in any scientific 
theorising. Consider specificatory determinative judgments whose 
predication is that of an appropriate determinate with respect to a 
determinable: 
 
(9) The leaf is non-green 
(10) The leaf is non-red 
(11) The leaf is non-yellow 
 
Note the determinations here are a family of contrary “marks” or 
“determination-specifications” (recall the distinction between 
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“specification” and “classification” from the 3rd Critique). We 
therefore consider also reflective classificatory judgments, of the 
kind that suggest conceptual hierarchy: “determinations-
classifications”: 
 
(12) This thing is non-animal 
(13) This thing is non-vegetable 
(14) This thing is non-mineral1 
 
 
We then have Note 2, which simply reminds us of the distinction 
between formal logic (which he is discussing) and transcendental 
logic: 
 
According to the principle of the excluded middle (exclusi tertii), the 
sphere of one concept relative to another is either exclusive or 
inclusive. Now since logic has to do merely with the form of 
judgment, not with concepts as to their content, the distinction of 
infinite from negative judgments is not proper to this science.2 
 
Note 3 further confirms our interpretation of infinite judgment: 
 
In negative judgments the negation always affects the copula; in 
infinite ones it is not the copula but rather the predicate that is 
affected, which may best be expressed in Latin. 
 
Here Kant appears to be appealing to our distinction, drawn above, 
between external propositional negation which affects the copula, 
where we say that 
 
“The soul is mortal”, 
 
And negate this by saying 
 
“The soul is not mortal”, where this is equivalent to “~The soul is 
mortal,” or, “It is not the case that the soul is mortal.” 
 
                                                 
1 Note that Hegel portrays what he calls “judgments of necessity” (a 
transformation of Kant’s judgments of relation: categorical, hypothetical, 
and disjunctive) as instancing distinct moments of the genus-species 
relation in the context of predication. 
2Kant (1992a, 104, 600). 
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And term negation, where we negate the predicate “mortal” and 
have 
 
“The soul is ~mortal,” where this is equivalent to “The soul is 
something other than mortal.” 
 
Kant thinks this is best expressed in Latin because in Latin word 
order can be altered to express precisely this difference, without 
involving changes in word choice (where in English a difference 
between “not” and “non” has been introduced to express 
contradiction and contrariety, respectively). In The Blomberg Logic 
Kant notes that we can express “The soul is not mortal” in two 
different ways: 
 
(15) Anima non est mortalis (~The soul is mortal) 
(16) Anima est non mortalis(The soul is non-mortal)1 
 
Kant says explicitly that “[T]he negation no, or the non, does not 
affect the matter at all, but instead only the form of the judgment”. 
According to this line of thinking, “[I]t must be posited, then, not 
with the subject or with the predicate but instead with the copula,” 
as with (14). This quite clearly commits Kant to saying that the form 
of negation operant in formal logic, which he is here discussing, is 
propositional negation.  
As a consequence of this, transcendental logic cannot be regarded 
as having the same form as propositional logic, as if the only 
difference between such logic and Fregean and Quinean extensional 
logics was that Kant tied his version to different metaphysical 
commitments. On the contrary, Kant thinks of the form of 
determination operant in transcendental logic as logically unique. He 
recognises that allowing sentences like (15) to occur in formal logic 
introduces a form of judgment foreign to it. One must resist this, 
since “otherwise the negation of the judgment of reason does not 
affect the form but instead the matter of the judgment, and 
consequently it is then not a negative, but instead a so-called 
judicium infinitum [infinite judgment].”2 
                                                 
1Kant (1992a, 274, 220). 
2 Note that infinite judgments are here said to affect the “matter” of the 
judgment. Cf. our discussion above of matter and form in “The Amphiboly”: 
“the matter” of a judgment is the concepts and the form is the way the 
concepts are related by the copula. 
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Now, if we shift our attention to the discussion of table of 
categories we see that, after defending the triadic structure of the 
four classes of categories, in his “second remark” on the pure 
concepts of the understanding, where he says that  
 
each class, always has same number of categories, namely three, 
which calls for reflection, since otherwise all a priori division by 
means of concepts must be a dichotomy…here the third category 
always arises from the combination of the first two in its class.1 
 
Kant says of the corresponding category for infinite judgment, 
“limitation”, that it “is nothing other than reality combined with 
negation”.2As we move to discuss Hegel’s views about infinite 
judgment we must bear in mind Kant’s distinction between 
transcendental and logical negation, since this reveals to us the role 
negation plays in Kant’s account of the omnitudo realitatis and the 
ens realissimum.  
We know that Kant allows for certain ideas to play a role in 
cognition in virtue of their merely regulative function. Further, this 
regulative function appears to be instantiated in infinite judgments 
that involve a blend of logical affirmation and predicate negation—
which leads to a negated term being regarded as delimiting the 
infinite sphere of possible determinations left once its antithesis is 
removed. Our question then becomes: “How does such a form of 
judgment define the role of the idea of an “All of reality” (omnitudo 
realitatis) and that of a “most real being” (ens realissimum)?”  
For Kant, the idea of the omnitudo realitatis can be conceived as 
regulative with respect to the distributive unity of judgments made 
by the understanding in experience. This is one way in which the 
unity of reason and the unity to the understanding are in concert. 
The omnitudo realitatis can be regarded as a principle (recall that for 
Kant ideas function as principles) which guides the complete 
determination of individuals in the world of sense, where this 
complete determination requires reflection and comparison with all 
predicates which are and could be instanced in such a totality of 
judgments. It is crucial that, because the omnitudo realitatis cannot 
actually be determined, it cannot itself be judged about, as in the 
major premise of a syllogism. This is what it means to say it functions 
as a principle; rather than an object of determination it is a principle 
                                                 
1 B110.  
2 B111. 
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which guides determination. We redress these points with respect to 
disjunctive judgment in §III.ii. 
The ens realissimum, for Kant, also functions as a principle of that 
which contains the “perfection” of all possible predicates within 
itself. It is also the form and content of a rational system, conceived 
of as a singular, which is alluded to in thinking of a “whole of 
possibility”. The thought of an ens realissimum is therefore the 
thought of that which contains the whole of possibility for the 
distributive unity of judgments made in experience. It is also the 
thought of that in which a subject is placed if one affirms a negative 
predicate, as in infinite judgment. Again, the ens realissimum, like 
the omnitudo realitatis, cannot be determined, so it cannot be 
instanced in the major premise of a disjunctive syllogism. Rather, it 
is the idea which guides the operation of determination in the world 
of sense. This claim is developed in our discussion of disjunctive 
judgment below in §III.ii. 
We now consider Hegel. 
Hegel’s account of infinite judgment in the Science of Logic 
appears to capitalise on some of the Ur-speculations of Kant’s in the 
latter’s own treatment, although no such acknowledgment can be 
found in the pages where the exposition occurs. Hegel begins with 
some characteristic remarks: 
 
The negative judgment is as little a true judgment as the positive. 
But the infinite judgment which is supposed to be its truth is, 
according to its negative expression, negatively infinite, a judgment 
in which even the form of judgment is set aside. But this is a 
nonsensical judgment. It is supposed to be a judgment, and 
consequently to contain a relation of subject and predicate; yet at the 
same time such a relation is supposed not to be in it.1 
 
First, by denying that negative and positive judgments are “true 
judgments” Hegel is repeating a tactic applied in other areas: when a 
form of thinking is purportedly incomplete, and therefore deficient in 
some respect, Hegel offers an interpretation of its presuppositions 
whose justification involves clarification of further conceptual 
distinctions which ground it. And, as is clear, such a process could in 
principle persist indefinitely; yet the plausibility of Hegel’s 
philosophy requires that it does not: the trajectory of the Doctrine of 
the Concept is meant to reach a terminus in “The Absolute Idea”.  
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 641-642). 
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Here we need to recognise that for the three forms of judgments 
of existence, as in the other triads of forms of judgment, such a 
clarification involves showing how the triad consists of three 
internally related moments. We therefore find Hegel referring to the 
“negatively infinite judgment” and the “positively infinite 
judgment”, where such a division reflects the conviction that infinite 
judgment is an amalgam of these two forms; further, that these two 
forms are not independently intelligible and only sensical in the 
context of the triad. 
A second insight to be extracted from this paragraph is that the 
negatively infinite judgment violates a relation basic to the logical 
form of judgment: Hegel thinks of judgment as involving the 
“reciprocal determination” of a subject and a predicate,1 yet in the 
case of negatively infinite judgments we have a form akin to two bits 
of logical matter placed side by side without any relevant conceptual 
determination occurring (two individuals, two particulars, or two 
universals; this lesson is that this combination cannot be in principle 
separated; for Hegel a properly connected UPS form is essential).2 
We can see what Hegel has in mind when we examine his examples 
in the following sentences: 
 
Though the name of the infinite judgment usually appears in the 
ordinary logics, it is not altogether clear what its nature really is. 
Examples of negatively infinite judgments are easily obtained: 
determinations are negatively connected as subject and predicate, 
one of which not only does not include the determinateness of the 
other but does not even contain its universal sphere; thus for example 
spirit is not red, yellow, etc., is not acid, not alkaline, etc., the rose is 
not an elephant, the understanding is not a table, and the like. These 
judgments are correct or true, as the expression goes, but in spite of 
such truth they are nonsensical and absurd. Or rather, they are not 
judgments at all.3 
 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 633 & ff.). One of the main points to be gleaned from 
Hegel’s chapter on judgment is that subject and predicate (and therefore 
the copula) may relate to one another in different ways. 
2 Cf. “The Concept” in Section One of The Subjective Logic. 
3 The italics in the second sentence are mine. Hegel is able to say that 
“they are not judgments at all” because they do not attribute a predicate to 
a subject; they do not involve the determination of a subject by a predicate 
(or, as we want to say, a determinable by a determinate). Cf. the remarks 
above regarding how a judgment is distinct from a mere proposition. 
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In speaking of “negatively infinite judgments” Hegel appears to have 
in mind something distinct from, Kant’s example of an infinite 
judgment in the Metaphysical Deduction: “The soul is not mortal”, 
once rendered as predicate negation, was meant to involve 
transcendental-logical commitment to an idea of an infinite whole of 
possibility left after the exclusion of that of which “mortal” is 
predicable. This way of excluding a subject from the sphere of a 
predicate is defined by Hegel as having the positive moment of 
logically affirming the negative predicate and the negative moment 
of excluding the subject from the sphere of the predicate.  
In contrast to this, the nonsensical predications Hegel is attacking 
resemble those whose possibility is suggested by the kind of infinite 
judgment implicated in the PCD, as it is found in the Transcendental 
Ideal. Kant’s two principles there, the PD and the PCD, both fail to 
include the necessary qualification that some predications are 
category mistakes: some predications are nonsense because they 
violate the categorial structure of the language in which they occur; 
others are nonsense because they simply do not determine the 
subject in any relevant way. Hegel’s examples seem to encompass 
both errors.  
It is therefore incorrect for Kant to say that for any concept, “that 
of every two contradictorily opposed predicates only one can apply to 
it”, because not every pair of contradictorily opposed predicates are 
predicable of every concept. And it is no use to say that this is so only 
because qua indeterminate every concept is receptive to such 
determination, for the determinability of concepts depends on their 
determination by appropriate determinates. For each determinable 
there is an array of determinates, or determinations, which specify it, 
and it is simply not required, let alone possible, to determine such 
concepts with every possible concept. Rather, one need only consider 
every relevant concept which stands to its determinable as a 
determinate.1 It seems that this is what Hegel has in mind by 
ridiculing, amongst others, the predication “is a table” of “the 
understanding”; a simple point perhaps, but a crucial one.  
To consider Hegel’s position from another point of view, we can 
say that the indifference with which “rose” stands to “elephant” and 
“understanding” to “table” is equivalent to the indifference with 
                                                 
1 As we will see in a moment, Hegel is committed to something akin to 
this view since he rejects the competing view that there are only 
“determinants” in his discussion of the “mathematical syllogism” where the 
elements involved in determination are on a par (U-U-U). See Hegel (1969, 
679-681). 
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which the determinants of propositional logic stand to one another, a 
case particularly clear where a conjunction of predicates is 
formulated.1 Hegel seems to be here attacking views of judgment 
that construe its parts as symmetrical, rather than as an 
asymmetrical subject-predicate pair, where the implication is that 
the whole structure of determination his logic requires, in some 
contexts, goes missing in the former.  
In this case, Hegel’s discussion of the logical structure of 
judgments is intended to show the limitations of one-sided 
conceptions; here the conception of he wishes to reveal as falsifying is 
that of the elements of the judgment as indifferent to categorial 
structure.2 This might appear to commit Hegel to a form of 
Platonism, yet this response is too quick if by it one means that 
Hegel is simply siding with one interpretation of judgmental 
structure over another and then being done with it.  
If the above-given account is true, Hegel quite clearly cannot be 
interpreted as being committed to an inferentialist semantics tied to 
a purely propositional conception of logic in the modern sense, for 
whilst such a form of thinking might be accurately attributed to 
Hegel in other contexts, he intends for acts of judgment to involve a 
distinct asymmetry, and this asymmetry is fundamental to his 
Dialectic as a whole. It should also, given the potential for a Hegelian 
reading of something akin to Kant’s PCD, be permissible to offer a 
speculative version of it. The grounds for this I explore in §IV. 
In any case, to address the point mentioned above, we can put it 
like this: in Brandom’s terminology,3 one would have to say of 
negatively infinite judgments that “one is not entitled to say” that 
the rose is not an elephant and that the understanding is not a table, 
since inferential commitments and entitlements follow from the 
material inferences permitted by the grammar or structure of the 
natural language in question. 
This feature of determination in judgment may also seem to force 
upon one certain Platonistic considerations, for is not the symmetry 
of logical variables a thesis that enables one to avoid commitment to 
independent notions of substance, itself which is typically 
exemplified by the subject role in judgment, with accidental 
                                                 
1 The ability of the two logical traditions stemming in modern 
philosophy from Leibniz, in opposition to Spinoza and Descartes, to cope 
with conjunctions is a topic in Prior (1949a). 
2 Cf. the project in Strawson (1959/2006). 
3 I have in mind the inferentialist semantics in Brandom (1994). 
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properties predicated of it? Indeed; yet exactly what place such an 
apparently Platonist thesis has in Hegel’s logic is unclear.  
Hegel goes on to elaborate his position in a curious way: 
 
A more realistic example of the infinite judgment is the evil action. In 
civil litigation, something is negated only as the property of the other 
party, it being conceded that it should be theirs if they had the right 
to it; and it is only the title of right that is in dispute; the universal 
sphere of right is therefore recognised and maintained in that 
negative judgment. But crime is the infinite judgment which negates 
not merely the particular right, but the universal sphere as well, 
negates right as right. This infinite judgment does indeed possess 
correctness, since it is an actual deed, but it is nonsensical because it 
is related purely negatively to morality which constitutes its 
universal sphere. 
 
In offering “evil action” as an example of infinite judgment Hegel is 
not speaking loosely, for as he had said earlier, 
 
The judgment is the determinateness of the Concept posited in the 
Concept itself…the opposing of its determinations is its self-
determining activity. The judgment is this positing of the 
determinate Concepts by the Concept itself.1 
 
And in so doing confirms that judgment must doubtlessly be 
regarded as, in a broad sense, a kind of act and not just a 
propositional content. Hence the analogy with “evil action” can be 
interpreted as perfectly coherent; but what of the specifics? Hegel’s 
basic point is clear: negatively infinite judgment, as he interprets it, 
involves the negation of the “universal sphere” of the predicate 
occurring in it. If we allow for the analogy to be extended we are 
pushed to say that just as evil action negates the very idea of right—
it rejects the concept itself, or rejection is implied by the evil action 
itself—so too do the so-called negatively infinite judgments— 
 
(17) Spirit is not red, yellow, etc., is not acid, not alkaline 
(18) The rose is not an elephant 
(19) The understanding is not a table 
 
—negate the “universal sphere” of the predicates “red”, “yellow”, 
“elephant”, “table”, and so forth. Moreover, this negation of the 
universal sphere entails that the sentence, in failing to have a sense, 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 623). 
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in lacking determination of a relevant kind, in falling short of the 
requirements of an actual judgment, fails to have consequences. This 
all means that such sentences cannot play a premise or conclusion in 
inferences, since, at least informally, they neither exclude nor entail 
anything.  
What are the consequences of all this? What Hegel calls the 
“negatively infinite judgment” seems to be that “moment” of infinite 
judgment that Kant draws attention to in saying that such judgment 
involves a “logical affirmation” of a “negative predicate”. Viewed this 
way, infinite judgment posits some property from whose “sphere” 
the subject in question is excluded and, in so doing, introduces a 
division of all possibility into the somewhat determinate sphere of 
“mortal” and the negatively determined, but otherwise completely 
indeterminate, sphere of “not mortal”, where the subject is included 
in the latter.  
The conclusion Kant draws from this is that infinite judgment 
relies on the idea that the indeterminate sphere in which the subject 
is located is potentially determinable; a “gain” is thus “yielded” for 
cognition through the positing of such a “sphere” that stands in need 
of determination because, after all, “cognitive gain” simply is the 
extension of knowledge of which conceptual determination is a 
necessary, and indeed, the paradigm feature. In fact, it would be 
illuminating to suggest that the potential determinability of the 
remaining conceptual sphere left undetermined reflects the fact that 
the “world of sense” is itself inherently determinable.  
What is meant by this is that one can say more about “the world” 
than that what composes it are logical subjects of predication (the 
lesson in the Transcendental Ideal’s account of the omnitudo 
realitatis, as well in the account in the Antinomies of the rational 
cosmologist’s “world itself”, is that the “world-whole” is not itself a 
subject of predication). 
A lesson here, which Hegel would agree with, is that one cannot 
predicate anything of “the One” (qua whole) in the way that one 
enacts predications of its “parts” (singulars), and this is partly 
because of the nature of infinite judgment: if one were to predicate 
something of “the One”, with such judgment (which Kant insists all 
things can be judged in terms of), one would have the following form, 
 
“The One is P. the One is ~non-P”, 
 
where it is thereby presupposed that there is a conceptual 
determination, i.e., “non-p” from whose sphere “the One” is excluded. 
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This of course contradicts the claim that “the One” includes 
everything and all conceptual determinations within it. 
The claim that “the ‘world of sense’ being inherently determinable 
is something known by reason” can be seen as entailed by Kant’s 
remarks that, although it is not “reason’s insight” into the inner 
nature of “ideas” but rather its “interest” in the consequences of 
employing those ideas as principles, this nevertheless means that it is 
rationally perspicuous to one that following principles, such as the 
PCD, leads to gains in objective knowledge. So reason’s interest 
leads to the acquisition of knowledge through the cooperation of 
sensibility and the understanding. But it is difficult to say this is 
mere “interest” if the activity of syllogising itself is constitutive of 
the system of rational knowledge. 
In any case, Hegel draws a different moral. For when he says that 
“infinite judgment does indeed possess correctness…but it is 
nonsensical because it is related purely negatively” to that “which 
constitutes its universal sphere”, he seems to assume that negatively 
infinite judgments by definition involve category mistakes. Here a 
“negative” relation between a subject and the “universal sphere” of 
that which is predicated of it seems to be distinct from Hegel’s usual 
conception of negation in its guise as a mode of determination; 
“negation” here seems to have the sense merely of “conceptual 
exclusion”, without the typical kind of sublation involved with 
Determinate Negation. This is to say that the predications involved 
in negatively infinite judgments entail negating categorially 
irrelevant predicates. Following this thought through, Hegel seems 
to think of negatively infinite judgment as involving a carving up of 
conceptual space by excluding the subject from the “universal 
sphere” of categorially irrelevant predicates.  
This interpretation bears a peculiar structural resemblance to the 
point Kant apparently intended to make about the Aristotelian 
substance-accident structure of logical subjects. Recall that, once 
clarified, Kant’s account of infinite judgments such as “The soul is not 
mortal” could be interpreted as either external propositional 
negation or as term negation, where the latter, as tied to contrariety 
rather than contradiction, invited the positing of a “conceptual 
sphere” of the subject of which the predication was made.1This kind 
of carving up of conceptual space occurs with respect to some 
particular logical subject: a logical subject is placed in an 
                                                 
1 Confirmation of this point was found in The Blomberg Logic, in Kant 
(1992a, §292). See also Kant (1992a, 274, 220). 
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indeterminate sphere defined by opposition to a conceptual sphere 
which it itself defined by one predicate only. 
Putting these two thoughts side by side we have the following: 
Hegel’s account of negatively infinite judgment involves the 
exclusion of a subject from the sphere of incorrect predications—
which in all of Hegel’s examples involve category mistakes. This 
moment of infinite judgment, if performed exhaustively to 
completeness, would therefore involve the delimitation of possible, 
i.e., categorially permitted, predications of some given subject. 
Hegel’s result at the end of such a process would be a negatively 
defined sphere of possible predication for a given subject, including 
both essential and accidental predicates. Of course, nothing at this 
point would allow the distinction between essential and accidental, 
because if a viable conception of the former was antecedently 
available then the whole procedure of negative determination via the 
exclusion encountered in infinite judgment would be moot. 
Kant, however, would view the function of infinite judgment this 
way: Exclusion from the conceptual sphere of a given predicate 
places a logical subject in an indeterminate sphere which therefore 
stands in need of further determination. Under the interpretation 
made available by the construal of term negation as involving 
contrariety rather than contradiction, in saying of souls that they are 
not mortal we are placing “soul” in the indeterminate conceptual 
sphere of “non-mortal”, which of course in such an example which 
admits of no alternate contraries but only a contrary, “immortal”. 
We noted above that Kant’s “soul” example provides no material 
for this point about contrariety, since although it allows him to group 
together all possible subjects into “mortal” and “non-mortal”, yet it 
does not allow him to draw attention to the role of term-negation 
with respect to the individual subject in question, such that the array 
of alternative predications of it could be accounted for.  
Kant’s example is employed for an alternate purpose, however, 
since it employs a predicate whose negation is applicable only to non-
experiential items. “Immortality” cannot be predicated of any objects 
in experience because we cannot, as it were, experience the 
immortality of something, for all the same reasons that we cannot 
“experience” the truth of any of the theses or antitheses in the 
Antinomies, since these overstep the bounds of possible experience. 
We can now evaluate Hegel’s attitude toward the other dialectical 
moment he finds in infinite judgment. Here he tell us that   
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The positive moment of the infinite judgment, of the negation of the 
negation, is the reflection of individuality into itself, whereby it is 
posited for the first time as a determinate determinateness. 
According to that reflection, the expression of the judgment was: the 
individual is individual. 
 
The first sentence suggests to us that Hegel is interpreting 
positively infinite judgments as involving the recoil from the 
categorially irrelevant predications encountered in the negatively 
infinite moment. This recoil, in accordance with our interpretation of 
the significance of such categorially irrelevant predications above, 
would have to amount a “negation of the negation” in the following 
sense: if the negation of the spheres of the categorially irrelevant 
predications of a given subject (e.g. “The rose is not an elephant”, 
“The understanding is not a table”) were performed to completeness 
we would have a negatively defined sphere of predicates categorially 
relevant to the subject in question. As such, this would involve a 
“reflection of individuality into itself” insofar as that is equivalent to 
the individual becoming a “determinate determinateness”, that is, to 
it becoming an individual as such.1 
And yet can such an exercise be performed to completeness? And 
would Hegel actually stake such a claim? 
He writes further: 
 
In the judgment of existence, the subject appears as an immediate 
individual and consequently rather as a mere something in general. It 
is through the mediation of the negative and infinite judgments that 
it is for the first time posited as an individual. 
 
Attention to these sentences rewards us with insight into Hegel’s 
dialectical account of epistemic and semantic development and 
enables a close analogy with points made in the opening chapters of 
the Phenomenology. As we remarked earlier, Hegel’s judgments of 
existence are concerned with the most primitive judgmental forms, 
ones that arise in connection with the idea of “quality”. We noted 
above that Hegel interpreted such judgments as corresponding to 
the idea of “Being” and therefore, somehow, to the Doctrine of Being 
in the first volume of the Science of Logic. Yet we can say more. 
                                                 
1 Notice the commonality of Hegel’s understanding of an individual as a 
“determinate determinateness” and Kant’s conception of the logical 
structure of intuition as singular (and therefore of a particular thing with 
the form of universality in its status as an “allness” collected in one thing). 
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Hegel seems to think that it is the dialectic between positive and 
negative moments encountered within the third form of the triad of 
judgments of existence that shows how one proceeds from the 
epistemically immediate, semantically indeterminate “something” to 
the idea of an individual. This corresponds to the transition from 
“Sense-Certainty” to “Perception”. 
 
The individual is hereby posited as continuing itself into its predicate, 
which it is identical with it; consequently, too, the universality no 
longer appears as immediate but as a comprehension of distinct 
terms. The positively infinite judgment equally runs: the universal is 
universal, and as such is equally posited as the return into itself. 
 
Hegel adds to this: 
 
Now through this reflection of the terms of the judgment into 
themselves the judgment has sublated itself; in the negatively infinite 
judgment the difference is, so to speak, too great for it to remain a 
judgment; the subject and predicate have no positive relation 
whatever to each other; in the positively infinite judgment, on the 
contrary, only identity is present and owing to the complete lack of 
difference it is no longer a judgment. 
 
Hegel here makes two important points about how the negative and 
positive moments of infinite judgment are to be taken, once their 
character is understood correctly.  
First, the negative moment of infinite judgment, as involving 
circumscription of the sphere of categorially relevant predications of 
a subject by a negative process of exclusion of categorically 
irrelevant predications, forbids the supposed subject and predicate 
from having any positive relation to one another, therefore of 
appropriately determining one another. Second, the positive moment 
of infinite judgment, as the dialectical pole to which one is swung 
after recoiling from the negative, does not have sufficient 
“difference” between the (supposed) subject and predicate to be 
called a judgment.  
Hegel gives no examples of this second kind and it is not entirely 
clear what he might have in mind, since the point suggested by our 
reference to the Phenomenology above is that the positive moment 
arises when one is forced to consider the individual as defined 
negatively in the first moment. And this positive moment does not 
seem to be a kind of judgment, even in the sense that the negative 
moment is superficially like a judgment. The positive moment seems 
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to deliver a negatively defined individual, qua subject of a sphere of 
categorially possible predications made available in the negative 
moment.  
Hegel closes his discussion this way: 
 
More precisely, it is the judgment of existence that has sublated 
itself; hereby there is posited what the copula of the judgment 
contains, namely, that the qualitative extremes are sublated in this 
their identity. Since however this unity is the Concept, it is 
immediately sundered again into its extremes and appears as a 
judgment, whose terms however are no longer immediate but 
reflected into themselves. The judgment of existence has passed over 
into the judgment of reflection.1 
 
We are reminded that the negatively infinite judgment seemed to 
involve the “is” of identity, not the “is” of predication, since saying 
“The rose is not an elephant” and “The understanding is not a table” 
seems to involve placing two objects in opposition and denying that 
they are identical, rather than predicating an inappropriate term of a 
subject. This is important for considering the transition to judgments 
of reflection since both senses of “is” are relevant. As Hegel says 
elsewhere, playing on the German word for “judgment”, the 
judgment, as an “original division” or “Ur-teil” is actually a 
separation out of two elements (subject, predicate) of some cognitive 
item which are initially identical.  
Once the dialectic passes into judgments of reflection, subject and 
predicate have been separated out from one another by a process of 
reflection on items encountered in cognition; general terms are 
predicated of logical subjects where the latter are taken to be the 
object of one’s thought and the predicate as the mark that defines it, 
or the mode of its appearance in cognition.  
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 641-643). 
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Disjunctive judgment occupies a special place in Kant’s 
transcendental logic,1 since it serves to explicitly connect Kant’s 
arguments in (1), the Transcendental Deduction with both (2), the 
forms of judgment and, therefore, the role of the latter in the aims of 
the former, as well as (3): the special functions fulfilled by ideas of 
reason in systematising and unifying the actions of the 
understanding (as detailed in Book I and Book II, Chapter III of the 
Transcendental Dialectic).  
The key theme shared by these three families of arguments is the 
idea of a “unity of consciousness”. (1) Is concerned chiefly with the 
transcendental unity of apperception and the self-attribution of 
states of consciousness; defence of (2) consists in explaining the most 
basic forms of thought which, according to Kant, we are possessed of; 
(3) expresses the ultimately ideal status of a system of knowledge 
and therefore reminds us that (1) and (2), as well as being intimately 
connected, are to be regarded as transcendentally ideal conditions of 
the possibility of having coherent thoughts at all.  
Kant introduces the logical family to which disjunctive judgment, 
as the third member of the triad of judgments of relation, belongs, in 
this way: 
 
All relations of thinking in judgments are those a) of the predicate to 
the subject, b) of the ground to the consequence, and c) between the 
cognition that is to be divided and all members of the division. In the 
first kind of judgment only two concepts are considered to be in 
relation to each other, in the second, two judgments, and in the third, 
several judgments.2 
 
                                                 
1 For criticism see Hanna (2008a, 26), where he claims Kant “construes 
disjunction as the ‘exclusive or’, which implies that if ‘P or Q’ is true then ‘P 
and Q’ is false, and therefore apparently overlooks the correct 
interpretation of disjunction as the ‘inclusive or’, which implies that the 
truth of ‘P or Q’ is consistent with the truth of ‘P and Q’. So the joint result 
of these four apparent confusions is that in this respect Kant’s logic is 
significantly stronger than elementary logic and in fact is not an 
extensional logic.” I take it the extensional/intensional distinction is 
problematic when applied to Kant (and Hegel). I comment briefly on this 
below. 
2A73/B98. A similar characterisation is offered in Kant (1992a, §23, 104, 
601). 
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After briefly mentioning categorical and hypothetical judgments 
Kant explains his conception of disjunctive judgment: 
 
the disjunctive judgment contains the relations of two or more 
propositions to one another, though not the relation of sequence, but 
rather that of logical opposition, insofar as the sphere of one 
judgment excludes that of the other, yet at the same time the relation 
of community, insofar as the judgments together exhaust the sphere 
of cognition proper; it is therefore a relation of parts of the sphere of a 
cognition where the sphere of each part is the complement of that of 
the others in the sum total of the divided cognition…1 
 
Kant then offers an example: 
 
“The world exists either through blind chance, or through inner 
necessity, or through an external cause.” Each of these propositions 
occupies one part of the sphere of the possible cognition about the 
existence of a world in general, and together they occupy the entire 
sphere. To remove the cognition from one of these spheres means to 
place it in one of the others, and to place it in one sphere, on the 
contrary, means to remove it from the others.2 
 
Note how Kant’s conception of disjunction here is exclusive rather 
than inclusive; thus, the minor premise of a disjunctive syllogism 
involves a judgment that concatenates a logical subject with one of 
its mutually exclusive predicates. This logical function is expressed 
in the category of “community”:3 
 
In a disjunctive judgment there is therefore a certain community of 
cognitions, consisting in the fact that they mutually exclude each 
other, yet thereby determine the true cognition in its entirety, since 
taken together they constitute the entire content of a particular given 
cognition.4 
 
                                                 
1A73-74/B98-99. 
2 The boldface italicisation is mine. 
3Kant (2005, R 3104-6, 1776-1778, 16:660-661). 
4 As a brief aside, one finds confirmation that Kant shares Hegel’s belief 
that judgments are not simply propositions—not all propositions are 
judgments—in a note added by the editors of the Cambridge Edition: “The 
following note occurs in Kant’s copy of the first edition: “Judgments and 
propositions are different. That the latter are verbisexpressa [explicit 
words], since they are assertoric” (E XXXVIII, p. 23; 23:25). See Kant 
(1998, 209).  
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Kant adds detail to his discussion of the category of “Community” on 
B111-113: 
 
The agreement of a single category, namely that of community, which 
is to be found under the third title, with the form of a disjunctive 
judgment, which is what corresponds to it in the table of logical 
functions, is not as obvious as in the other cases. 
In order to be assured of this agreement one must note that in all 
disjunctive judgments the sphere (the multitude of everything that is 
contained under it) is represented as a whole divided into parts (the 
subordinated concepts), and, since none of these can be contained 
under any other, they are thought of as coordinated with one another, 
not subordinated, so that they do not determine each other 
unilaterally, as in a series, but reciprocally, as in an aggregate If one 
member of the division is posited, all the rest are excluded, and vice 
versa).1 
 
The remark is crucial for understanding the import of the subject-
predicate relation here. The subject and predicate in Hegel’s 
judgments of determinate being (or inherence), of which infinite 
judgments are an instance, have an asymmetrical determinative 
structure. This determinative structure is unlike the symmetrical 
relations between judgments.2First, judgments involved in pieces of 
reasoning are “symmetrical” to one another simply because 
judgments are connected in relations of entailment and exclusion, for 
example. Two judgments may stand in such logical relations in many 
ways, but in no logical sense is any given judgment asymmetrical to 
any other judgment. Grammatical and categorial asymmetry is 
another matter entirely, but that is beside the point. 
Second, to say subject and predicate are logically asymmetrical is 
to say their logical relation to one another is not like this. That is to 
say, in infinite judgment a predicate is one of a range of determinates 
of a determinable subject, when that subject is being thought in 
terms of some determinable character or other, i.e., colour, pitch, 
shape, etc.3Note that this asymmetry is unsurprising, since infinite 
judgment is a member of the forms also called by Hegel “judgments 
of inherence”, where the predicate in such shapes “inheres”, or does 
not “inhere”, in the subject. Hegel’s other name for the form 
following this group is “judgments of subsumption” where, as in 
                                                 
1 The italics are mine; the boldface exists in the translation. 
2 P.F. Strawson was a long-time defender of this asymmetry. See, 
especially, Strawson (1959/2006), but also (1956, 1957a, b, 1961, 1972). 
3 See Rosenberg’s (1966) account of this. 
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Kant’s account, the copula conveys that everything subsumed under 
the subject is also subsumed under the predicate. In such a form of 
judgment there is no logical asymmetry between subject and 
predicate. 
We saw this bear out in our discussion of the way in which the 
conceptual sphere of a logical subject was related to the affirmation 
of a negative predicate. We noted in Hegel’s discussion of the 
positive and negative moments of infinite judgment, however, that 
this apparent asymmetry involved a dialectical tension which, 
according to him, led to the shape of judgments of reflection.  
Hegel’s point regarding judgments of quality (positive, negative, 
infinite) in its place as the initial stage of a dialectically developing 
form of judgmental determination, was that only in the transition to 
judgments of reflection (singular, particular, universal) did the 
elements of the judgment become “separate”. For Kant, in the third 
family of logical functions, judgments of relation, the connection 
between judgments themselves, taken as wholes, is important, 
rather than the elements within the judgment. For Hegel, the 
corresponding judgments of necessity involve various shapes of the 
genus-species relation.1 
But we run into trouble if we think this is all there is to say, since 
Kant claims that the “sphere” exhausted by a family of judgments, 
related to one another disjunctively, is an aggregate. Does Kant not 
continually remind us that a system of objective knowledge is a 
unity, rather than a mere aggregate? Quite clearly Kant is 
committed to thinking of families of disjunctive judgments as 
aggregates which, if they are to be significant parts (therefore, parts 
at all) of a system of knowledge, must be unified under an idea. It is 
important that the highest idea corresponding to such unity one 
grasps toward in empirical cognition is the idea of “God”, and the 
Transcendental Ideal, the ens realissimum. Here one should recall 
that the progression of forming categorical judgments and 
hypothetical judgments to form a system of rational knowledge is the 
activity of transcendental psychology (attributing a predicate to a 
subject is akin to attributing thoughts to a soul) and transcendental 
cosmology (connecting antecedens and consequens in the progress to 
infinity is the basic activity involved in forming a conception of a law-
governed, mechanistic, causally-determined world-whole).  
Such a goal of rational knowledge should also be understood in the 
context of the remarks cited at the beginning of §III from the 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 650-657). 
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opening section of the Transcendental Logic, regarding the unity of 
the understanding: it is reason’s task to guide the understanding in 
its connection of empirical judgments into a rational whole, by 
employing categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms. 
By way of filling this out, Kant adds: 
 
Now a similar connection is thought of in an entirety of things, since 
one is not subordinated, as effect, under another, as the cause of its 
existence, but is rather coordinated with the other simultaneously 
and reciprocally as cause with regard to its determination (e.g., in a 
body, the parts of which reciprocally attract yet also repel each 
other), which is an entirely different kind of connection from that 
which is to be found in the mere relation of cause to effect (of ground 
to consequence), in which the consequence does not reciprocally 
determine the ground and therefore does not constitute a whole with 
the latter (as the world-creator with the world). 
 
He then completes his discussion with a crucial point: 
 
The understanding follows the same procedure when it represents 
the divided sphere of a concept as when it thinks of a thing as 
divisible, and just as in the first case the members of the division 
exclude each other and yet are connected in one sphere, so in the 
latter case the parts are represented as ones to which existence (as 
substances) pertains to each exclusively of the others, and which are 
yet connected in one whole. 
 
This bears directly on comments thus far made regarding the 
asymmetrical structure of determination within a judgment 
(between subject and predicate) and the symmetrical relations of 
determination between judgments.  
First, Kant makes an analogy between the “sphere” of a concept 
and a divisible thing, yet he does not thereby confuse the different 
principles that apply to these (the PD and the PCD, respectively); his 
point does entail, however, that concepts are wholes with logical 
parts just as things are wholes with material parts. Where does this 
thought lead? Directly, I suggest, to the question of the status of 
logical wholes and material wholes. The latter, as encountered in 
their guise in empirical intuition, require subsumption under 
concepts to be objects of knowledge: an individual object is subsumed 
under the empirical concept “body”, or reflected under the pure 
concept “substantia”, for instance. Meanwhile, logical wholes are that 
whose form and content is determined by the judgments in which 
they occur. And not only are concepts definitively judgeables, they 
292 
Chapter Three: The Principle of Complete Determination 
are also something whose status as universal, particular, or singular 
is determined by their use. Kant makes this point in the Jäsche 
Logic:  
 
All cognitions, that is, all representations related with consciousness 
to an object, are either intuitions or concepts. An intuition is a 
singular representation (repraesentatio singularis), a concept a 
universal (repraesentatio per notas communes) or reflected 
representation (repraesentatio discursiva).Cognition through 
concepts is called thought (cognitio discursiva). 
 
In a note to this he adds: 
 
It is a mere tautology to speak of universal or common concepts – a 
mistake that is grounded in an incorrect division of concepts into 
universal, particular, and singular. Concepts themselves cannot be so 
divided, but only their use.1 
 
A result of this view is that the logical whole of a concept is 
something determined by the appropriate circumstances in which it 
is instantiated in judgment. Another way of putting this is to say that 
logical wholes are found in intensional contexts, material wholes in 
extensional contexts.2 Bearing in mind the above point, this yields 
the thesis that extensions of concepts are determined by the 
intuitions subsumed under them, whilst intensions are determined by 
the judgments made about the experiences in which the intuitional 
content figures. Most importantly, the fact that logical wholes 
(concepts) are only given at the level of thought means that 
empirically the entire conceptual sphere that is divided disjunctively 
is never “given”; thus one has only an aggregate at the empirical 
level that, at the transcendental level is a unity.  
For Kant at any rate, his phenomena/noumena distinction entails 
that one cannot reach a metaphysical conclusion about the priority of 
appearances: that we only have aggregates and all unities are 
illusory (nominalism). Hegel seems to affirm a similar view about 
empirical laws, even if his view of metaphysics, and thus of the 
empiricist’s conclusions, is distinct. He gives air to sentiments on this 
topic in his references to empirical “allness” in a discussion of the 
                                                 
1Kant (1992a, §1, 91, 589). 
2 Cf. the discussion of the mutually modifying relation between 
extension and intension when thought by a conscious entity, in Chapter 2, 
§§II.iiiand V.i. 
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universal judgment of reflection in the Science of Logic.1 Hegel 
(1969) Hegel (1969) Hegel (1969) Hegel (1969) Hegel (1969) Hegel 
(1969) Hegel (1969) Hegel (1969) Hegel (1969) Hegel (1969) Hegel 
(1969) 
In §27 of the Jäsche Logic Kant writes: 
 
A judgment is disjunctive if the parts of the sphere of a given concept 
determine one another in the whole or toward a whole as 
complements (complementa). 
 
And in §28connects with our central theme of matter and form: 
 
The several given judgments of which the disjunctive judgment is 
composed constitute its matter and are called the members of the 
disjunction or opposition. The form of these judgments consists in the 
disjunction itself, i.e., in the determination of the relation of the 
various judgments as member of the whole sphere of the divided 
cognition which mutually exclude one another and complement one 
another. 
 
To this he in a note adds: 
 
one member determines every other here only insofar as they stand 
together in community as parts of a whole sphere of cognition, 
outside of which, in a certain relation, nothing may be thought.2 
 
The final clause is important. The import that disjunctive judgment 
has for transcendental logic is distinct from its import for formal or 
general logic: in the former, since cognition involves both concepts 
and intuitions for Kant, the idea of a “sphere of cognition” is 
restricted to possible experience, rather than simply “intelligible”, 
qua non-contradictory, thoughts. 
In §29 Kant adds some further important details. He says of the 
moment of relation in disjunctive judgment that it consist in this: 
 
the members of the disjunction are all problematic judgments, of 
which nothing else is thought except that, taken together as parts of 
the sphere of a cognition, each the complement of the other toward 
the whole (complementum ad totum), they are equal to the sphere of 
the first. 
 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 648). 
2Kant (1992a, 107, 603). 
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Kant thinks this has the consequence   
 
that in one of these problematic judgments the truth must be 
contained or – what is the same – that one of them must hold 
assertorically, because outside of them the sphere of the cognition 
includes nothing more under the given conditions, and one is opposed 
to the other, consequently neither something outside them nor more 
than one among them can be true. 
 
This means that one member of the family of problematic judgments, 
qua possible judgments, that compose the disjunction is not only 
possible but actual, or, in his striking words: “assertible” or “true”. 
This is the case since, if the disjunction holds, then one and only one 
of the disjuncts, qua possible, is actual: it excludes and is excluded by 
its fellow disjuncts. Kant adds: 
 
in disjunctive judgments the sphere of the divided concept is not 
considered as contained in the sphere of the divisions, but rather that 
which is contained under the divided concept is considered as 
contained under one of the members of the division.1 
 
This connects our theme of “matter and form” with that of “part and 
whole”. Kant’s point is that one cannot consider the content of the 
concept to be distributed across its disjuncts; rather, the truly 
assertible disjunct, as an assertoric judgment, contains the “content” 
of the concept in question. What does this mean? Consider Kant’s 
own example of a learned man. According to Kant, the sphere of the 
predicate “learned” when applied to “this man” can be divided to 
render the disjuncts: 
 
(20) “This man is learned in matters of history.” 
(21) “This man is learned in matter of reason.” 
 
Where each excludes the other (foregoing the conjunction presents 
no problems here). According to Kant’s analysis, saying 
 
(22) “This man is learned”, 
 
is saying something that could be said more specifically—note Kant’s 
view that determination is specification and reflection is 
classification—as (20) or (21). Kant is therefore able to say that the 
                                                 
1Kant (1992a, 108, 604). My emphasis. 
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sphere of the concept “learned” instantiated in the more general 
case, (22), is actually contained under the true member of the 
division. This has two consequences.  
First, Kant is able to insist that one could “mean” the same thing 
regardless of the determinateness of one’s judgment, which seems to 
commit him, in one sense, to an extensional account of the judgment 
because the more specific thought content in (20) and (21) is, strictly, 
a different intension, whereas Kant wants to say (22) could be taken 
to mean the same thing. This suggests he thinks the reference to the 
property that makes a judgment true (the learned character of the 
man in question) can be the same even if the specification of it at the 
level of the judgment is distinct.  
Second, this remark marries well with Kant’s prioritisation of the 
positive, where he insists that “reality” is to be equated with that 
which in judgments corresponds to sensation. As we’ve seen, Hegel 
questions both of these theses, and his various critiques of the idea of 
a purely positive “sum-total of all realities” reveals this most clearly. 
Indeed, we should take Hegel’s account of judgments of determinate 
being as an attempted refutation of this idea at the level of 
judgmental determination. 
In section C of the chapter on “The Judgment” Hegel discusses 
judgments of necessity. It will be remembered that, for Hegel, the 
dialectic of forms of judgment has passed through its moment of 
judgments of reflection (universal, particular, singular) and has been 
sublated, through inner conflicts in these forms, to a consideration of 
the relations between judgments. Just as the transition from section 
A to section B involved the emergence of a distinct, separate 
conception of subject and predicate within a judgment, the transition 
from B to C sees the emergence of a structure within which subject 
and predicate are seen to belong to one another as part of a certain 
categorial structure as taken to exist in virtue of a concrete 
universal. 
At this point we must be reminded that Hegel, unlike Kant, does 
not regard forms of judgment as applicable to any judgment 
whatever; he regards the forms of judgment as moments in a 
progression of the Concept from the initial stage in positive 
judgment to the final stage in apodictic judgment, where the form of 
each judgment is intimately connected with its content. The 
judgments of relation are a stage roughly equivalent to the stage of 
the progression of spirit in the Phenomenology entitled “Force and 
the Understanding”, where the categorial status of entities is 
invoked in order to form unified scientific explanations in terms of 
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laws, which are definitively formed in accordance with the categorial 
status of the objects in question.  
Of categorical judgments Hegel writes: 
 
[I]f, for example, the judgments “the rose is red,” “the rose is a 
plant,” or “this ring is yellow,” “it is gold” are confounded into one 
class, and if so external a property as the color of a flower is taken as 
a predicate of equal rank with its vegetable nature, then a distinction 
is overlooked which must be obvious to the most vulgar 
apprehension. – The categorical judgment must therefore be 
definitely distinguished from the positive and the negative judgment; 
in these that which is predicated of the subject is an individual and 
contingent content, in the categorical judgment it is the totality of the 
intro-reflected form. In it therefore the copula signifies necessity, but 
in the positive and negative only abstract and immediate being.1 
 
As Hegel moves to discuss hypothetical judgments we find he 
appears to think of them as articulating the relations between two 
phenomena which were judgeable in isolation in the categorical form, 
where the concept with which the subject is expressed involves the 
subsumption of its object under the concept expressed by the 
predicate (“The rose is a plant”). A hypothetical judgment is 
therefore a “judgment expressing the fact that an existence 
determined with respect to its genus is conditioned by another 
existence equally determined by its genus”.2 Where does this leave 
disjunctive judgment? The view Longuenesse rightly attributes to 
Hegel is the following: 
 
a disjunctive judgment expresses the division of a genus in the 
exhaustive totality of its species, which supposes a rational division 
that is never completely possible in the cognition of nature. Because 
of this, no empirical judgment can legitimately have the form of a 
disjunctive judgment.3 
 
It follows disjunctive judgment plays a special role in determining 
the categorial structure of a genus by specifying all the species that 
are included in it. Yet a disjunctive judgment has a genus or 
universal as its logical subject and a series of species, or more specific 
universals, as its predicables, and as Hegel remarks, no empirical 
judgment can have the form of a disjunctive judgment because the 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 651). 
2Longuenesse (1992/2007, 212). Cf. Longuenesse (2001/2005). 
3Longuenesse (1992/2007, 212). 
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genus can never be completely determined empirically since the 
relevant species can never all be given.1 
The determinable-determinate distinction may be useful here. In 
fact, Hegel employs an example that seems relevant for such a 
connection: 
 
A colour is either violet, dark blue, light blue, green, yellow, orange, 
or red; – such a disjunction shows plainly its empirical admixture and 
impurity; and considered from this side, and by itself, it may even be 
called barbarous.2 
 
Of the emergence of disjunctive judgment from the two prior forms 
of judgments of relation Hegel writes: 
 
In the categorical judgment, the Concept is objective universality and 
an external individuality. In the hypothetical judgment, the Concept 
in its negative identity emerges in this externality. Through this 
identity, its moments receive the same determinateness, now posited 
in the disjunctive judgment, that they possess immediately in the 
hypothetical judgment. Hence the disjunctive judgment is objective 
universality posited at the same time in union with the form. It 
therefore contains first concrete universality or the genus in simple 
                                                 
1 Note that the judgments of necessity are different ways in which the 
genus-species relation can be conceived; this is important since such a 
relation is unlike that of determinables and determinates, because a genus 
is taken to be intelligible independently of its species (one can give a 
definition of a genus by adumbrating conditions anything being subsumed 
under it must satisfy (e.g., the reasons for which a canine is a mammal), 
where determinates of a determinable are simply the ways in which that 
determinable can be instanced, where the determinable itself cannot 
beindependently defined (the concept of colour, at the phenomenal level, 
cannot be defined except by appealing to instances of colour which exclude 
alternatives being actualised at an identical spatio-temporal point in the 
visual field). 
Cf. the discussion of the universal moment of judgments of reflection, 
where Hegel discusses “empirical allness” (Hegel (1969, 648). The remarks 
here, which give us insight into Hegel’s view about induction, seem to 
speak against the attribution to Hegel of the view that philosophy’s 
knowledge of that which is “true” in what happens (588) could be conceived 
of as anything like realism in contemporary metaphysics. I take it the view 
problematised by this point is that defended by Stern (2009a). 
2Hegel (1969, 656). 
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form as the subject, and secondly the same universality but as 
totality of its distinct determinations. A is either B or C.1 
 
We here find Hegel’s analogue of Kant’s point that division of the 
sphere of a concept in logical disjunction involves positing the former 
as a “simple form as the subject”, and the family of judgments in the 
latter as a “totality of distinct determinations”. Kant remarks of the 
category of totality (as correlated with the logical function of 
“singularity”) that “allness (totality) is nothing other than plurality 
considered as a unity”,2 and this seems to be Hegel’s point also, in 
employing the term “totality”.  
That “the disjunctive judgment is objective universality posited 
at the same time in union with the form” seems to follow from the 
possibility of transforming the logical function of “plurality” 
(category: particularity) into “totality” (category: singularity); 
something that would, for Kant, in the context of judgmental unity 
effected in apperception, seem to constitute the erroneous 
transformation of a distributive unity into a collective unity. In this 
case, however, such a transformation seems to be legitimate because 
judgmental content has direct import for experience through its 
combination of intuitions with concepts. Kant’s standard damnation 
of this error of reason pertains to cases where the collective unity 
delivers a constitutively functioning idea, rather than one employed 
in a regulative capacity. 
The basic conclusion one should take from the functioning of 
disjunctive judgment  in Kant’s transcendental logic seems to be that 
the division of a sphere of a logical subject at the level of concepts 
can appear to be complete, simply because one can specify in a 
definition what one would think counted as an exhaustive division of 
conceptual sphere. Yet one cannot claim to have garnered all the 
relevant appearances in intuitional form, because one can always 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 653). The emphasis in the fourth sentence is mine. Quite 
clearly, for a disjunctive judgment to bear determinative results the 
judgment “A is either B or C” must be rendered as the major premise of a 
syllogism. As Kant informs us in the first chapter of the Transcendental 
Dialectic, “the relation between a cognition and its condition, which the 
major premise represents as the rule, constitutes the different kinds of 
syllogisms. They are therefore threefold – just as are all judgments in 
general – insofar as they are distinguished by the way they express the 
relation of cognition to the understanding: namely, categorical or 
hypothetical or disjunctive syllogisms.” (A304/B361; boldface in translation)  
2 B111. 
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gain more empirical information which may lead to the division of 
empirical concepts and therefore lead to the revision of them. At the 
level of transcendental functions, that is, pure concepts, one can 
regard divisions as complete simply because those concepts are 
secured through reflection and not open to revision on the basis of 
experience. I take it the regulative function of the omnitudo realitatis 
and the ens realissimum in Kant depends upon this point: these 
purely rational entities are “given” in some sense; they are given in 
reason’s formal use and guide the action of the understanding in its 
making of judgments. Yet because they are not given intuitional 
content they simply represent the unity of a system of judgments 
about nature (omnitudo realitatis) and the basic idea of a concept of 
an object of possible experience which is to be completely 
determined (ens realissimum). 
Hegel agrees with Kant that the “spheres” of empirical concepts 
are not given, yet he rejects Kant’s pure concepts of reason, so he 
does not agree with the abstract idea of a unity of empirical 
judgments that together constitute an “All of reality” (omnitudo 
realitatis); nor does he seem to think the idea of “the concept of an 
object of possible experience” employed to guide determination of 
things in the “world of sense” (the radicalised reading of the ens 
realissimum I’ve advanced) is coherent either. Rather, to grasp 
Hegel’s sequel one needs to attend to his account of Erfahrung in the 
Phenomenology, to see that the various conceptual frameworks 
instanced in consciousness all break down due to dialectical tensions. 
But for Hegel it is important that these frameworks are not thereby 
dispensed with; one cannot but rely on the immediacy of “Sense-
Certainty”, the mediated-immediacy of “Perception”, and the 
postulation of unobserved laws to explain the observed in the 
“Understanding”. But these shapes of consciousness are part of much 
more complex forms of life that need to be taken into account; there 
is no reason to consider them as universal and necessary 
“transcendental conditions of the possibility of experience” in the 
way Kant does.1 
                                                 
1Kreines (2007, 327) says of our topic that “it is easy to see how Hegel 
aims to argue, from here, that the goal by which reason guides our 
theoretical inquiry cannot be anything akin to knowledge of an absolutely 
unified and unconditioned totality. If the object of such knowledge would be 
too abstract or indeterminate to explain the determinate phenomena of the 
world, then clearly this cannot be what we are seeking when we pursue 
explanatory insight into such phenomena. Perhaps the goal of reason is 
akin to what Kant calls a ‘systematic unity of nature’. But, if so, then the 
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According to Hegel the key step is taken when one sees how 
“shapes of consciousness” find their truth in “shapes of spirit”: 
subjective spirit of the kind spoken about as “experience” cannot be 
rendered intelligible in absence of a social context. Hegel offers the 
beginnings of this account in Chapter IV of the Phenomenology. 
In our final section we examine some of the general features of 
Kant’s and Hegel’s views on the theme of self-consciousness in order 
to draw together our discussion. 
                                                                                                                            
systematic unity of nature would have to differ in important respects from 
an unconditioned totality of everything.” And further: “In Hegel’s terms, 
Kant’s argument for the limitation of our knowledge depends on taking the 
goal of reason to be the unconditioned in the sense of something opposed to 
or other than the determinate.” (328) 
In support of this Kreines cites Hegel (1991b, §45): “Our empirical 
cognitions are not appropriate for this identity that lacks determinations 
altogether…When an unconditioned of this sort is accepted as the absolute 
and the truth of reason (or as the idea), then, of course, our empirical 
awareness is declared to be untrue, to be appearance.” 
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IV Apperception and the ground of complete determination 
 
My reading of Hegel’s Subjective Logic has so far been, at a very 
general level, in harmony with Pippin’s view of it as a “metalevel 
account of the process of thought’s self-determination”.1In turning to 
a brief discussion of self-consciousness we raise the question of how 
self-determination relates to complete determination of “things” by a 
self (an “I”).2 
First, note Longuenesse’s characterisation of the role of 
apperception in Kant’s account of the complete determination of 
things: 
 
only if one and the same act of comparison and reflection and before 
this, one and the same act of synthesis achieved in order to compare 
and reflect, organizes our perceptions, can all predicates be compared 
to all other predicates, and therefore can concepts of objects be ever 
further specified. This is how the unity of apperception gives rise to 
the unity of experience: the unified act of synthesis and analysis 
(comparison and reflection) is what connects objects in one space and 
one time, and reflects them under concepts. The infinite sphere whose 
division would yield all concepts of possible entities, in which infinite 
judgment thinks the object thought under its subject-concept is then 
the infinite sphere of the concept: ‘‘object given in space and time,’’ 
that is to say ‘‘object of experience.’’ The form of disjunctive 
judgment is the logical form according to which this infinite sphere is 
determined.3 
 
We need to understand Kant’s main goal in the Transcendental 
Deduction and how he attempts to achieve it. One of the most 
important issues to keep one’s eye on here is the structural parallel 
                                                 
1Pippin (1989, 234). Cf. Pinkard (2002, 257): “Hegel thus intended his 
“Doctrine of the Concept” (the third “book” of the Logic) as the theory of 
normativity that would cash out his overall claim that our ascriptions of 
knowledge are not comparisons of any kind of subjective state with 
something non-subjective; they are moves within a social space structured 
by responsibilities, entitlements, attributions, and the undertakings of 
commitments; and as the place in his theory where the ‘Kantian paradox’ 
would be formulated and dealt with.” Shortly after this, Pinkard attributes 
to Hegel the view that the “theory of the concept” is a “theory of 
normativity”. 
2 Cf. B157-158, n.*: “The I think expresses the act of determining my 
existence.” (Boldface in translation.) 
3Longuenesse (1995/2005, 218). 
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between the faculties of sensibility, the understanding, and reason. It 
was suggested earlier that the structure of all three of these faculties 
can be thought of as singular, and this is simply because they are 
unities of some kind or other. Space and time are singular qua pure 
forms of intuition; the unity of the understanding at the level of the 
“I think” is a formal singular, and the transcendental-psychological 
function of “the soul” is that of a singular substance thought of in a 
regulative capacity. Lastly, the unity of reason is found in practical 
contexts in the Categorical Imperative whose “complete 
determination” is the Kingdom of Ends, where this can be construed 
as the merely intelligible circumstances where the will of “God” is 
completely determined in the actions of rational beings; in theoretical 
contexts, the unity of reason is found in its “transcendental concept”:1 
the postulation of conditions for conditions, where this is expressed 
by the PCD. In both cases the unity of reason is grounded in a 
singular: in practical contexts, “God” is a morally necessary postulate 
exemplifying the moral perfection that is the ultimate ground of 
moral judgment; in theoretical contexts, the ens realissimum is 
posited as the source of all possible predications which are supposed 
to be contained “in their perfection” within itself, thus it is the 
ultimate ground of determination in epistemic contexts. The idea of 
“God” thereby impels us to actualise moral perfection in the 
empirical world, in practical contexts, as well as giving systematic 
unity to the idea of completely determinable empirical objects, in 
theoretical contexts. 
Why mention this here? A clue is found in the famous §26 of the B 
Deduction, where Kant gives an answer as to how sensibility and the 
understanding, the pure forms of intuition and the forms of the pure 
understanding (logical functions of judgments, the concepts of 
reflection, and the categories), are to be regarded as two sides of one 
synthetic unity that is a product of both receptivity and spontaneity: 
 
Space, represented as object (as is really required in geometry), 
contains more than the mere form of intuition, namely the 
comprehension of the manifold given in accordance with the form of 
sensibility in an intuitive representation, so that form of intuition 
merely gives the manifold, but the formal intuition gives unity of the 
representation. 
 
The “unity” of the representation as given by the understanding is 
the “formal intuition qua pure concept of space”. So whilst space is 
                                                 
1A322-323/B379. 
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indeed neither a category of the understanding, nor a pure concept of 
reason, the pure intuition of it by sensibility requires an intellectual 
function for thinking of it as amenable to conceptual determination. 
Unfortunately Kant does not satisfactorily clarify this idea, so we 
must speculate as how to best interpret it. He says further: 
 
In the Aesthetic I ascribed this unity merely to sensibility, only in 
order to note that it precedes all concepts, though to be sure it 
presupposes a synthesis, which does not belong to the senses but 
through which all concepts of space and time first become possible. 
For since through it (as the understanding determines the sensibility) 
space or time are first given as intuitions, the unity of this a priori 
intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the 
understanding (§24). 
 
We should read this in conjunction with the remark from the 
Metaphysical Deduction at A79/B104-105: 
 
The same function that gives unity to the different representations in 
a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different 
representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called 
the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, 
therefore, and indeed by means of the very same actions through 
which it brings the logical form of a judgment into concepts by means 
of the analytical unity, also brings a transcendental content into its 
representations by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in 
intuition in general, on account of which they are called pure concepts 
of the understanding that pertain to a objects a priori; this can never 
be accomplished by general logic. 
 
The peculiar and ill-explained idea of “transcendental content” is of 
concern here. Given the parallels I have just drawn between the 
ways in which sensibility, the understanding, and reason may be 
regarded as singular, we are tempted by the following suggestion: 
since transcendental content being brought into the understanding’s 
representations is part of the same action whereby the logical form of 
a judgment is brought into concepts, “transcendental content” must 
stand to representations as “logical form of a judgment” stands to 
concepts.   
If we experience a desk lamp’s angularity and form the judgment 
that “the desk lamp is angular”, the representations, in their guise as 
intuitional content, must be unified by the same action and in the 
same way as the judgment is. As Kant says further, the “analytical 
unity” stands to judgments as the “synthetic unity of the manifold” 
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stands to representations, so we can say further that “transcendental 
content” therefore needs to be understood in the additional sense as 
something found and to be analysed, as when one engages in the 
analysis of concepts that Kant believes philosophy to consist in. It 
also need to be understood as something made, because its being a 
priori means one’s epistemic relation to it is a form of “maker’s 
knowledge”.1 
From this one may infer that transcendental content is the 
battery of transcendental logic in addition to the conditions of 
sensibility; transcendental content is that which is both found and 
made by a thinker in the process of thinking and enjoying knowledge. 
So that which is both found and made is the structure of one’s system 
of knowledge; to think rationally is to have a grip on the structure of 
one’s own thought and to therefore be able to navigate a path both 
through it and with it. Notoriously, Kant’s attempt to cash this idea 
out with his twin notions of receptivity and spontaneity has always 
appeared problematic because it may seem psychologistic, or it may 
seem like a merely formal criterion of self-consciousness (one of 
Hegel’s reasons for rejecting it), or it may seem like Kant separates 
what can then not be put back together. 
Merely listing objections this way is not helpful, so in this section 
I will offer some reflections on how the “I think” in Kant functions in 
distinction from the concept of the “I” in Hegel. This will lead us to 
consider what the successor of Kant’s idea of “God”, as the ground of 
the unity of reason, may be in Hegel’s philosophy. 
Important to bear in mind in our discussion of Hegel below is the 
theme of freedom and its connection with the positing of 
presuppositions. Relations of causality, as thought of as occurring 
between things in nature, are instances of a certain kind of freedom 
“acting in accordance with a concept”, only if the things reasoned as 
standing in causal relations are understood in terms of their concept. 
If things are understood only as limited and conditioned by other 
things, then they are not thought of as candidates for that in which 
the “truly infinite” manifests. That is to say, they are merely finite 
and abstract parts of more complex wholes. The paradigm of that 
which may manifest the “True Infinite” are the self-consciousnesses 
that stand in relations of mutual recognition, because there is a 
dynamic harmony in them, between what they take themselves to be 
and what they are. One wishes to say this is so because properly self-
                                                 
1Hintikka (1972) uses this phrase to characterise Kant’s view of 
apriority in the context of a discussion of transcendental arguments. 
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conscious beings are, in Hegel’s sense, “self-determining”, where this 
means what they take themselves to be in a sense determines what 
they are.  
On this count a problem arises for merely natural objects; one 
version of the lesson is offered in the Phenomenology where Hegel 
claims that self-consciousness is “desire” and obliterates and 
consumes its objects (a structurally similar problem occurs for 
shapes of spirit, as in the master-slave dialectic).Objects are not “in-
and-for-themselves” in any of the “shapes of consciousness” in the 
“Consciousness” section of the Phenomenology because in each case 
they fail to be known “in their concept”.1Firstly they occur as objects 
of mere “Sense-Certainty”; secondly, as substance kinds in 
“Perception”, thirdly, in “Force and the Understanding”, in terms of 
the conditions that make their substantiality possible. In Chapter 3, 
whilst things are now known in a “scientific” manner, in terms of 
forces and conditions that makes them possible, these things have 
now been subordinated to their conditions and one has an “inverted 
world” in which one has only laws and explanations, but not things 
which obey laws, or things which are explained.  
The move that surely is essential to get straight at the level of a 
form of a system, for Hegel, is that this inverted world must be 
thought of as properly integrated into the framework which it 
explains. And one surely must then understand that, since perception 
failed in terms of its adequacy as a “shape of consciousness”, that one 
must sublate the understanding further, and grasp the conditions 
which make possible the integration of law-like explanations into the 
framework which they explain, without ending up with a Kantian 
subjectivism that only says such laws explain “appearances” and not 
“things-in-themselves”. Or this is at least part of the story. 
One may be inclined to take Hegel’s dialectical explanation of 
these moments of self-consciousness as illuminating advances upon 
Kant’s formal criterion of the “I think”. With regard to direct 
engagement however, more is revealed in Hegel’s explicit comment 
regarding Kant’s treatment of the categories themselves, and their 
supposed role in apperception: 
 
                                                 
1 Cf. Hegel (1971, §410): “In habit the human being’s mode of existence 
is ‘natural’, and for that reason not free; but still free, so far as the merely 
natural phase of feeling is by habit reduced to a mere being of his, and he is 
no longer involuntarily attracted or repelled by it, and so no longer 
interested, occupied, or dependent in regard to it.”  
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Now because the interest of the Kantian philosophy was directed to 
the so-called transcendental aspect of the categories, the treatment of 
the categories themselves yielded a blank result; what they are in 
themselves without the abstract relation to the ego common to all, 
what is their specific nature relatively to each other, this has not been 
made an object of consideration. Hence this philosophy has not 
contributed in the slightest to a knowledge of their nature; what 
alone is of interest in this connection occurs in the Critique of Ideas.1 
 
Presuming that in referring to the “Critique of Ideas” Hegel is 
referring to Kant’s account of the transcendental ideas in the 
Dialectic, this remark supports the general reading advanced here. 
Hegel adds to these remarks here a claim that echoes Kant’s 
aspiration to articulate the systematic, unified structure of reason: 
 
if philosophy was to make any real progress, it was necessary that 
the interest of thought should be drawn to a consideration of the 
formal side, to a consideration of the ego, of consciousness as such, i.e. 
of the abstract relation of a subjective knowing to an object, so that in 
this way the cognition of the infinite form, that is, of the Concept, 
would be introduced. But in order that this cognition may be reached, 
that form has still to be relieved of the finite determinateness in 
which it is ego, or consciousness. The form, when thus thought out 
into its purity, will have within itself the capacity to determine itself, 
that is, to give itself a content, and that a necessarily explicated 
content—in the form of a system of the determinations of thought.2 
 
We now proceed by connecting Hegel’s discussion of the “I” from 
The Subjective Logic with Kant’s view from the Transcendental 
Deduction. 
In the main section of the Introduction to The Subjective Logic, 
entitled “On the concept in general”, Hegel introduces his theory of 
“the Concept” and then proceeds to summarise the results of the 
Objective Logic.3 He first mentions (1) the characterisation of 
substance as the “in-itself”,4 then contrasts this with (2) the 
characterisation of substance as the “for-itself”.5 He says under the 
second heading that the “in-itself” involves presupposition, whereas 
the “for-itself” involves positing. It is clear these two stages 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 63). 
2Hegel (1969, 63). 
3Hegel (1969, 577-578).  
4Hegel (1969, 578). 
5Hegel (1969, 578-579). 
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correspond to the Doctrine of Being and the Doctrine of Essence, 
respectively. Under (3), Hegel explains how the former two moments 
are united insofar as they are internally related in the dialectical 
sense; he tells us that cause and effect, for example, are 
determinations that can only be thought together and they cannot be 
what they are in abstraction from one another. In explaining further 
the dialectical relation between presuppositions and the positing of 
them, Hegel says:  
 
Through this positing, then, the presupposed or implicit 
originativeness becomes explicit or for itself; yet this being that is in 
and for itself is such only in so far as this positing is equally a 
sublating of what was presupposed; in other words, absolute 
substance has returned and so become absolute, only out of and in its 
positedness.1 
 
This third heading seems to express the task of The Subjective 
Logic: of revealing the “truth” of the dialectic of being and essence as 
actualised in the concept. 
As he continues, Hegel offers an alternate expression of the 
notorious claim from §18 of the Preface to the Phenomenology, where 
he had said the task is to “to grasp and to express the true not 
merely as substance but equally as subject.”2 In the present context, 
Hegel appears to be implicitly linking his earlier statement with the 
project in The Subjective Logic of offering a theory of “the Concept” 
which is at once manifested in the reasoning practices of rational self-
consciousnesses (as concept, the judgment, the syllogism), also 
intrinsically connected with objective knowledge of nature (as 
mechanism, chemism, teleology), and united in an identity of these 
two poles (life, the idea of cognition, the Absolute Idea).  
As we will see below, Hegel offers an explanation of what he 
means by “subject” in his reinterpretation of Kant’s conception of the 
“I”, which reveals his reason for claiming that this, rather than the 
naïve conception of “substance”, is to be regarded as the basic 
concept of metaphysics. At this point we should recall that Hegel is 
rejecting not only modern pre-Kantian metaphysics, but the general 
ancient Aristotelian project of metaphysics that attempts to 
investigate being-qua-being as well. 
Hegel continues on from the citation above this way: 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 579). 
2 This is the translation of the remark in Horstmann (2006b, 71). It is 
significant Horstmann emphasises the phrase “equally as”. 
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this reciprocity is the appearance that again sublates itself, the 
revelation that the illusory being of causality in which the cause 
appears as cause, is illusory being. This infinite reflection-into-self, 
namely, that being is in and for itself is only in so far as it is posited, is 
the consummation of substance. But this consummation is no longer 
substance itself but something higher, the Concept, the subject. The 
transition of the relation of substantiality takes place through its own 
immanent necessity and is nothing more than the manifestation of 
itself, that the Concept is its truth, and that freedom is the truth of 
necessity.1 
 
Notice that Hegel here equates “the subject” with what he calls “the 
concept”. As Longuenesse points out,2 “the concept” is equivalent to 
what Kant calls “pure reason”.3 Therefore, in this context, by “the 
subject” Hegel means what Kant means by “reason”, from which it 
follows that the unity of reason in Kant is equivalent to the unity of 
the subject for Hegel. And whereas the ens realissimum, qua 
Transcendental Ideal, is for Kant the ground of both a unified system 
of reason as well as the complete determination of individual things 
in possible experience, Hegel’s “exposition” of the concept of “God” is 
the “content” of his Logic. 
We might indeed say that for Hegel, “God” is the ground of the 
unity of the subject, where the subject, qua “concept” (or, Kant’s 
“reason”) is a historically evolving, socially mediated process 
grounded in various shapes of recognition. In such a theory, “God” 
would be the ground of the capacities of self-conscious, reasoning 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 580). See the closing sections of the Doctrine of Essence, 
Section Three: Actuality. These sections, according to Longuenesse 
(1992/2007, 213) should be read in connection with “The Judgment of 
Necessity” and “The Judgment of the Concept”, where the former should 
be connected with Chapter 2 “Actuality” as a whole (but see esp. 541-543), 
and the latter should be connected with the third sub-section  of that 
chapter, “Absolute Necessity” (550-553). See also 570-571, for an 
anticipation of Hegel’s attitude to the connections between the material 
concept of “causality” and the modal concept of “necessity”, and the key 
concept of “freedom”, as is crucial for understanding The Subjective Logic 
as a whole, in particular, the basic thesis that the content of the Logic is 
“God”, qua necessary. 
2Longuenesse (1995/2007, 167-171). 
3 Although Longuenesse (1992/2007, 1995/2007) takes Faith and 
Knowledge as her main text for examining the Kant-Hegel relation, she 
notes that there is good reason for thinking Hegel did not abandon the way 
of defining his ideas vis-à-vis Kant’s as exemplified there. 
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individuals, insofar as they are themselves individual manifestations 
of Geist at the level of subjective consciousness, just as the 
predicates exemplified by things which one strives to completely 
determine, in Kant’s sense, are to be considered as part of, and 
grounded in, the idea of a “whole of possibility”.1 
This of course raises the question of what the relationship 
between “the Concept” and Geist is in Hegel. I take it that these are 
closely related ideas, and that Geist is the idea of self-conscious 
subjectivity as a historical, evolving process, whereas “the Concept” 
is that process articulated in terms of the logical structure of a self-
conscious subjectivity that is at once “Subjective”, “Objective”, and 
“Absolute”, in Hegel’s senses.2 
If this were appropriate it would clarify somewhat the relation 
that the Phenomenology and the Logic stand in to one another: the 
Logic offers an account of the logical stages “contained in” Absolute 
Knowing; the path from Being to the Absolute Idea is only 
intelligible as a path of such a kind; the individual moments one 
passes over in the Logic do not have independent intelligibility or 
application in the same sense outside Absolute Knowing.3 
One should remind oneself of the apparently regressive 
argumentation in which Hegel writes: he clearly thinks the 
phenomenological “We” is presumed all through the Phenomenology, 
although such a perspective on oneself and the world is only 
                                                 
1 Note Kant’s recognition of the social basis of the concept of the “I” in 
the Anthropology lectures: “The fact that the human being can form a 
conception of the I [das Ich] raises him infinitely above all other beings 
living on earth. Because of this he is a person…an entirely different being, 
because of his rank [Rang] and dignity, from things, such as irrational 
animals, to whom one can do as one pleases. (7:127; cf. Starke II, 9, 207-8; 
Groundwork 4:434-435)” 
And also, in the Menschenkunde: “The I contains that which 
distinguishes the human being from all other animals. If a horse could grasp 
the thought of I, then I would climb down and it would have to be viewed as 
a member of my society [alsmeineGesellschaft]” (25:859; both cited in 
Louden (2000, 67)). 
2 Cf. Hegel (1971, §§385-386). 
3This qualification is important; it reminds us that although Hegel often 
writes as if he is speaking of a temporal process, he is concerned all along 
with the grounds of determination, and such grounds and such 
determination as is detailed in his writings are always essentially 
connected with other grounds and other determinations he has discussed 
elsewhere (this is the reason for his emphasis on the necessity of “positing 
one’s presuppositions”). 
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supposedly available to one when one has grasped the norms of one’s 
community by which, ultimately, such shapes of consciousness and 
spirit are bound. This standpoint of “Absolute Spirit” is an ongoing 
development, however, and never static, but always dynamic.1 
This indeed sounds very alike the claim that normative standards 
are those which allow for communicative interaction, and if this were 
appropriate, we ought to say that, whatever else the idea of “God” 
expresses or represents, it at least shares some of the semantic 
content possessed by the phrase “grounds of normative constraint”.2 
And insofar as Hegel can be understood as attempting to give a 
modern reading of the significance of religion, he can be thought of as 
offering a defence of a positive idea of “God” that is not mired in the 
errors of traditional metaphysics of substance, but rather entirely 
congenial to the modern conception of self-determining rational 
subjectivity, rather than externally constrained finitude, which, for 
Hegel, is necessarily coupled with an inadequate conception of 
“infinite”.  
In line with this, Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s idea of “God” is that it 
is one-sided and abstractly negative: “God” is something Kant claims 
we cannot know, but must nevertheless think; presumably, Hegel 
believes that if the idea of “God” is to have the import that it must, 
then it must be essentially knowable. For, even in Kant’s terms, 
there was something odd about likening the regulative function of 
the idea of “God” to a principle, if one could be said to “know” the 
content of this principle in applying it successfully, yet unable to 
“know” the idea which the principle expressed. The error that Kant 
really should have emphasised is that of confusing a principle 
                                                 
1 See similar sentiment expressed in Pinkard (1994, 266). 
2 Cf. Pinkard (2007, 9): “The Idea, moreover, is more than just a set of 
norms; it also includes within itself the ground of intelligibility of those 
norms, that is, some fairly comprehensive conception of why these norms 
should and do matter to us, why we should care about realising them.” 
Cf. Hegel’s remarks from his aesthetics: “The Ideal is unity within 
itself, a unity of its content, not merely a formal external unity but an 
immanent one. This substantial self-reliance which is within itself at one 
with itself, we have already described above as the Ideal’s self-enjoyment, 
repose, and bliss. At the stage we have now reached we will bring out this 
characteristic as self-sufficiency, and require [for artistic representation] 
that the general state of the world shall appear in the form of self-
sufficiency so as to be able to assume the shape of the Ideal. (Hegel, A 1:179 
/ VA 1:236)”. Cited in Pinkard (2007, 26, n.25). 
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(existence as unity) with an object (existence as being), rather than 
that of confusing “thinking” with “cognising” or “knowing”.   
Hegel follows up the thoughts just discussed with a summary of 
some of the arguments of the Doctrine of Essence, where he 
mentions the dialectical stance which a philosopher must take to the 
philosophical systems to which he responds. Hegel’s target here is 
Spinoza’s pantheism: 
 
the true system cannot have the relation to it of being merely 
opposed to it; for if this were so, the system, as this opposite, would 
itself be one-sided. On the contrary, the true system as the higher, 
must contain the subordinate system within itself.1 
 
He says further that 
 
the refutation must not come from outside, that is, it must not 
proceed from assumptions lying outside the system in question and 
inconsistent with it. The system need only refuse to recognise those 
assumptions; the defect is a defect only for him who starts from the 
requirements and demands based on those assumptions…the genuine 
refutation must penetrate the opponent’s stronghold and meet him on 
his own ground; no advantage is gained by attacking him somewhere 
else and defeating him where he is not.2 
 
We should of course bear this remark in mind when reflecting on 
Hegel’s relation to Kant. For now, however, notice how Hegel is 
attempting to recast Spinoza’s idea of “God”, and that he refers to his 
Objective Logic as “the one and only true refutation of 
Spinozism.”3Given that Hegel thinks of the Doctrine of Being as a 
transformation of transcendental logic, he has used Kant against 
Spinoza in order to form a unified idea of “God”.  
In the context of this discussion, Hegel offers one of his many 
versions of the same solution to the Parmenidean problem of “the 
One and the Many”:4 
 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 580). 
2Hegel (1969, 580-581). 
3 This would direct us to one way of interpreting Hegel’s equation of the 
content of his Logic with “God”, although I am presently arguing that it is 
clear the Subjective Logic is equally important since it is the culmination of 
Hegel’s reworking of the idea of “God”. 
4 To which there is in any case a section explicitly devoted, in the 
Doctrine of Being (Hegel (1969, 164-170)). 
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Each of them, the universal and the individual, is the totality, each 
contains within itself the determination of the other and therefore 
these totalities are one and one only, just as this unity is the 
differentiation of itself into the free illusion  of this duality—of a 
duality which, in the difference of the individual and the universal, 
appears as a complete opposition which is so entirely illusory  that in 
thinking and enunciating the one, the other also is immediately 
thought and enunciated.1 
 
This peculiar dialectical relationship wherein universality and 
singularity are united is, so says Hegel, “the concept of the concept”. 
He believes this characterisation to distil certain of the general 
results of the Objective Logic, which he believes to offer an 
“immanent deduction” of what he calls “the Concept”. Recalling the 
reference to Spinoza just made, this means that Hegel believes this 
“immanent deduction” to have vindicated his own account of “God”, 
as finding its truth in the Absolute Idea at the end of the Subjective 
Logic: the immanent deduction of “the concept” (the “I”) in the 
Objective Logic has for Hegel led to a clarification of the relationship 
between the “I” and “God”, where the former finds its absolute form 
and content to be maximally clarified through its relationship to the 
latter, where the latter takes the form of the “Absolute Idea”.  
When Hegel says shortly after these remarks that the philosophy 
of his time was improperly wary and sceptical of philosophical 
accounts of “the Concept” one is reminded not only of the British 
empiricism which, he often took the chance to remind his readers, 
misconstrued the nature of thinking and knowledge; yet one is also 
reminded of his critical attitude to Kant. Recall that Kant was 
likened to the empiricists in §40 of the section in the Encyclopedia 
Logic entitled “Positions of Thought with Respect to Objectivity” 
(the three of which are metaphysics, critical philosophy, and 
immediate knowing): 
 
Critical philosophy has in common with Empiricism that it accepts 
experience as the only basis for our cognitions; but it will not let them 
count as truths but only cognitions of appearances. 
 
We are here reminded that, insofar as Hegel means by “the Concept” 
what Kant meant by “reason”, he would be perfectly correct in 
saying of Kant that he was sceptical of an account of “the Concept”, 
insofar as Kant was sceptical of “reason’s insight”, and instead 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 582). 
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content to speak only of the practical and theoretical virtues of its 
“interest”.1 
At this point Hegel begins his response to Kant’s account of the 
“I”: 
 
The Concept, when it has developed into concrete existence that is 
itself free, is none other than the I or pure self-consciousness. True, I 
have concepts, that is to say, determinate concepts; but the I is the 
pure concept itself which, as Concept, has come into determinate 
existence.2 
 
It is very tempting to read this claim in the following way. “I” is 
unique as a concept, because the subjective “taking-oneself-to-be-an-
I” is equivalent to oneself actually being an “I”; that is, if one truly 
possesses the concept “I” one is an I;3 the subjective and objective 
reality of the concept are intertwined; the subjective taking-to-be-an-
“I”, in Hegel’s words, brings the “I” “into determinate existence”, 
and, conversely, cannot occur unless the one taking themselves to be 
an “I” is an “I”; the two moments presuppose each other.  
From here we have a short route to saying what the conditions of 
there being “I”s are, for these will be the same as the conditions of 
there being beings who take themselves to be “I”s. And recalling 
Hegel’s account of self-consciousness in the famous Chapter IV of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, we note that being an “I” requires a kind of 
dialectical relationship with a “not-I”, which if self-consciousness is to 
be actualised, must be another “I”. That is, the “I” and the “We” are 
necessarily thought together; “I”s must recognise one another as 
well as themselves in mutual recognitive interaction; they must, 
importantly, recognise themselves in the other’s recognition of 
themselves. All this means that recognitive interaction “brings into 
                                                 
1 See the second section of the Appendix to the Dialectic (esp. 
A676/B704). 
2Hegel (1969, 583). 
3 This would seem to be the case for applying the concept to others as 
well as applying it to oneself; after all, in (1977b, §§177-178) Hegel gives the 
impression that such capacities are interdependent. In §177 he says, 
famously: “What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what 
Spirit is—this absolute substance which is the unity of the different 
independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect 
freedom and independence: ‘I’that is ‘We’and ‘We’that is ‘I’.” And in §178: 
“Self-consciousness exists in and for itselfwhen, and by the fact that, it so 
exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.” 
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existence” a “We”: a community that can itself be identified with the 
grounds of “the concept”. 
Given the arguments offered above, it becomes clear that if the 
community of the “We” that is the ground of the possibility of the 
concept of the “I”, and if “the concept” is this concept of the “I” of 
pure self-consciousness, then the ground of the possibility of the “I” 
is the ground of what Kant calls “reason”, which, we recall, is the ens 
realissimum: the ground of the complete determination of things 
within the context of possible experience. From this it follows that, 
since Hegel’s idea of “God” can be thought of as the ground of “the 
concept”, his concept of “God” is none other than the “We” which is 
the ground of all determination in self-consciousness. 
To connect this with Kant’s conception of the “unity of reason” 
and the “unity of the understanding”, we can say that, from a 
Hegelian perspective, the former is properly “constitutive” of the 
latter and does not bring mere “regulative” unity to it: the very 
possibility of being an “I thinking” being depends on the existence of 
the community—the “We”—to which such a being belongs. In other 
words, Kant is wrong to say that the transcendental idea of “God” is 
to be employed simply as a heuristic; rather, the very possibility of 
the concept of both the “I” and “God” implies their existence; further, 
that the two concepts are opposite sides of one coin. 
To guard against misunderstanding, we must note that it is 
precisely the concrete existence of the concept—the existence of it in 
thought—that entails its object being actual; Hegel is not saying that 
the “I” or “God” have the same sense when one is speaking of Natur: 
he is speaking here of the “I” and “God” as necessary concepts at the 
level of Geist. 
We therefore now have a positive Hegelian response to Kant’s 
PCD (where our previous sections—§§III-III.ii—offered a negative 
response): given that the principle is only applicable within possible 
experience, and given that all possible experiences find their “truth” 
in the determinations that are made possible by the dialectical 
progress of reason, in its active function in thinking, the principle of 
complete determination is best understood as grounded in the 
normative structures that make a “We”, a social self-consciousness, 
possible. The complete determination of individual things is best 
thought of as an historically evolving process of conceptual 
transformation, whose guiding ideal is not an ego-logical battery of 
logical functions of judgments and categories, but a dialogically 
evolving process of constraint on processes of thinking, that 
nevertheless do have a certain dialectical structure.  
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Crucially, Hegel regards his account of “the Concept” to express 
the essential truth of “that which happens”:  
 
philosophy is not meant to be a narration of happenings but a 
cognition of what is true  in them, and further, on the basis of this 
cognition, to comprehend that which, in the narrative, appears as a 
mere happening.1 
 
This we could quite easily take to be an endorsement of the 
possibility of philosophical knowledge of the Absolute Idea, where 
this is taken to be, in the context of religious thinking, “God”. And if 
we connect the point with Kant’s account of the ens realissimum, we 
find that Hegel is attempting to resuscitate what he takes to be true 
in that idea that Kant rejects. In Hegel, however, what is “true” is a 
certain essential narrative structure, rather than a particular 
narrative. And oftentimes one is tempted to suppose that this 
essential narrative structure is that captured by the peculiar 
Trinitarian model expressed in the Christian religious imagery in the 
form of “the Father”, “the Son”, and “the Holy Spirit”, and in 
philosophical thinking by the triad of “Being”, “Reflection”, and “the 
Concept”. 
Now, when discussing the “I”, Hegel adduces two moments which 
he says must be “grasped at the same time both in their abstraction 
and in their perfect unity” if the nature of the “I” and “the Concept” 
are to be understood.2 These are “purely self-referring unity” and 
“immediately self-referring negativity”, where these seem to be 
taken by Hegel to be two dialectical moments contained in what Kant 
calls the “synthetic unity of apperception”.3 
These two connections can be seen if we understand Hegel to, in 
first place, be referring to none other than the necessary minimal 
condition of the possibility of being self-conscious: our thoughts being 
able to be accompanied by the “I think”. In this context, the “I” is 
                                                 
1Hegel (1969, 588). 
2Hegel (1969, 583). 
3 §16 of the B Deduction first mentions the “pure” or “original 
apperception”, which Kant conceives of as the unity of the manifold of 
intuition prior to conceptual thought. Kant refers to the “transcendental 
unity of self-consciousness” and says that this is the “unity” of the former 
kind of apperception (B132). He then says “[F]rom this original 
combination much may be inferred.” (B133). 
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nothing other than the principle of analytical unity1 among our 
cognitions; a principle which requires, for example, that all one’s 
thoughts can be held simultaneously without contradiction, and in a 
way that satisfies the requirements of the transcendental unity of 
apperception, whose conditions are, first and foremost, the logical 
functions of judgment and the categories.  
In second place, Hegel refers to the negative unity among our 
thoughts: they are our thoughts insofar as they are not only had by 
us, but also are necessarily not us. In this second case, by 
distinguishing thought from the thinker that has them, we implicitly 
refer to the unity of the thoughts in this thinker. If we note Kant’s 
repetition of the claim that the “I” is a simple representation 
“through which nothing manifold is given”, we can see what Hegel is 
responding to. For Kant appears to hold apart this simple 
representation from the manifold in intuition, even though he admits 
that “I am…conscious of the identical self in regard to the manifold of 
the representations that are given to me in an intuition because I call 
them all together my representations, which constitute one.”2 
Yet Hegel seems to insist that since consciousness of the manifold 
of intuition in original apperception and the consciousness of the 
unity of this in the transcendental unity of self-consciousness are 
essentially connected with the synthetic activity of the pure 
understanding (in its guise as the imagination), they must be 
construed as internally related dialectical moments.  
It is not entirely clear that Kant would disagree. Hegel does 
choose to emphasise the specifically dialectical character of Kant’s 
claim, however, and it might in any case be useful to see that these 
two aspects of self-consciousness are not to be thought of as two 
capacities “coming together”, but rather as two distinguishable 
moments of the phenomenon of self-consciousness.3 
                                                 
1 See B133-134, esp. n.*. Cf. Kant’s remark at B135: “Now this principle 
of the necessary unity of apperception is, to be sure, itself identical, thus an 
analytical proposition, yet it declares as necessary a synthesis of the 
manifold given in an intuition, without which that thoroughgoing identity of 
self-consciousness could not be thought.” 
2 B135. 
3 Close attention to the famous footnote at B160-161 reinforces the 
impression that Kant moved closer to something like this view in the B 
Edition, and yet his remark that “objects can indeed appear to us without 
necessarily having to be related to functions of the understanding, and 
therefore without the understanding containing their a priori 
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Now Kant, in the Paralogisms, rejects the possibility of 
knowledge of the traditional object of rational psychology—the 
Soul—and Hegel cannot be understood as committing the error 
against which Kant had warned; Hegel cannot be understood as 
insisting we have knowledge of a “noumenal self” in the sense Kant 
rejects. Indeed, Hegel agrees with Kant’s denunciation of rational 
psychology in saying: 
 
If we cling to the mere representation of the I as it floats before our 
ordinary consciousness, then the I is only the simple thing, also called 
soul, in which the Concept inheres as a possession or property. This 
representation which makes no attempt to comprehend either the I 
or the Concept cannot serve to facilitate or bring nearer the 
comprehension of the Concept.1 
 
Despite Hegel’s agreement with Kant in this context, given our 
explanation of the “I that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is I”, he nevertheless 
thinks of the negative unity of the “I” as the unity of the thoughts in 
a stronger sense than Kant only insofar as having thoughts, in the 
fully determinate sense intended by Hegel, requires one is a 
participant in a world of dialogical practices; that is, that one is an 
element in the spirit of one’s time. And although one cannot here 
refer to a “reason transcendent” entity to capture the concept of the 
“I”, one does not need to; after all, the concept of the “I” is that of 
“the Concept” itself (what Kant thought of as a systematic, unified 
reason), and this is not a possible concept except in the context of a 
“We”. As we have already argued, the “I” only comes into existence 
in the context of the “We”, so there is no need for anxiety about 
referring to reason transcendent, immaterial, metaphysical entities 
known as “Is”. And this possibility is in harmony with the fact that it 
is possible to offer a non-transcendent, but irreducible, idea of “God”.
                                                                                                                            
conditions…for appearances can certainly be given in intuition without the 
functions of the understanding.” (A89-90/B122)  
1Hegel (1969, 585). 
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As indicated in the Preface, this thesis, whilst expressly about the 
structure and function of the idea of “God” in the logics of Kant and 
Hegel, is thematically centred on the idea of conceptual 
determination. One motivation for this approach to the topic is that it 
provides a frame which allows arguments found in the systematic 
approach to philosophy characteristic of German Idealism to be 
integrated into debates within analytical philosophy, as I explicitly 
indicated at several points. Moreover, there is clear evidence in both 
Kant and Hegel for defence of the claim that their most basic 
philosophical points are essentially ones pertaining to what ought to 
be thought of as philosophical logic. In employing a broad 
classification like this I do not mean to needlessly exclude 
alternatives, but simply emphasise what I see to be the basic point: 
rational reflection, a process that is for Kant and Hegel essentially 
syllogistic at its core, leads naturally to a certain vision (I should like 
to say “image” to emphasise the fact that I do not think believing the 
idea consists in believing a proposition) of the conceptual, rational 
order.  
I mean to say that the dual directions of conceptual activity are, 
quite naturally, toward both maximal generality and maximal 
specificity (abstracting harmlessly from questions of the relativity of 
generality and specificity). The ideal termini under investigation 
here were the infima species and the summum genus, these being 
represented in Kant as the empirical intuition and the ens 
realissimum, respectively (we are of course not meant to be able to 
represent the latter, or to try to, and we cannot fully satisfy the 
demand of complete determination in the former context either). 
In Hegel we found a possible solution for a problem that seems to 
arise in Kant's philosophy as a result of his recommended solution for 
mediation between these two poles of thought: the completely 
determined (not merely determinate; we here speak of a “task”) and 
its purported ground. This mediation is in Kant provided in practical 
reason in the forms of examples of symbolic representations. I 
recommended an extension of this at least implicit thesis in Kant to 
the theoretical, epistemic, empirical dimension of natural scientific 
inquiry, as in the case of modelling one's behaviour on “better” 
examples in the moral dimension, where doing better at 
understanding the world involves one being able to assimilate one's 
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knowledge into a coherent structure at least in the sense of being 
able to connect together and integrate one's experience such that one 
may be able to get about, as it were.  
Hegel's position on this general question of the extent of the 
integration of reason into the deep structure of one's thought, 
especially in the form of language employed in communicating with 
others and having disputes with them, finds him giving complex and 
subtle explanations, in the “Psychology” section of the Encyclopedia 
Philosophy of Mind, as to how similar structures known in Kant as 
“symbols” would connect with both rational and sensuous dimensions 
of one's knowledge. I took this to be the germ of Hegel's (latent) 
basic correction of Kant for the absence of such a theory in the 
theoretical context, and then followed up on some of its consequences 
in some detail in the context of “knowledge of God” in the Lectures 
on the Philosophy of Religion in contraposition to Kant's Religion 
Within the Boundaries of Reason Alone.  
The transition to Chapter Three involved the issue of conceptual 
determination, the idea of “completeness”, being claimed as the 
central issue in the talk about the idea of “God”. It was argued that 
this idea was put into action with the help of certain functions of 
judgment and inference, especially infinite and disjunctive judgment. 
The story came to a close with a brief explanation of how 
apperception in both Kant and Hegel is a ground of this activity of 
“judging under the idea of a whole” which is represented by infinite 
and disjunctive judgments.
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